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The East African Community (EAC) is a regional intergovernmental and supra-
national organization currently comprising the Republics of Burundi, Kenya, 
Rwanda, South Sudan, the United Republic of Tanzania, and the Republic of 
Uganda. Established in 2000, the EAC aims at widening and deepening co-
operation among its Partner States in, among others, political, economic and 
social fields.
The organization has established a Customs Union (2005) and a Common 
Market (2010), and is in the process of establishing a Monetary Union. Its 
ultimate objective is to establish a complete political (con)federation. It 
emphasizes strong participation of the private sector and civil society. The 
accomplishment of these objectives requires an elaborate and functionally-
purposed institutional framework.
The EAC aims at far deeper integration than envisioned by its predecessor, 
whilst simultaneously avoiding the mistakes that led to the failure of previous 
attempts at East African integration. Important safeguards include a gradual 
approach to integration and guarantees to ensure an equitable division of the 
benefits of integration.
There is a general consensus that the European Union (EU) was an impor-
tant source of inspiration and provided a normative model for the EAC. Indeed 
the EAC Treaty and the Protocols have adopted and adapted significant parts 
of the EU’s institutional and legal framework. The normative appeal of the EU 
in this regard can also be readily understood. Despite all the past and present 
failures and challenges facing the EU, no objective observer can deny the ben-
efits of European integration in terms of peace, stability and prosperity. What 
started 60 years ago as a Community between six Member States in a Europe 
destroyed by two world wars has now developed into the most peaceful and 
prosperous block in the world.
Consequently, there are lessons to be learned from the European experi-
ence, including the crucial role of the law and of lawyers in the process of inte-
gration, be they judges, lawmakers, civil servants, academics or practitioners. 
The law is one of the most powerful and indispensable instruments to achieve 
true integration, as effective integration requires some form of supranational 
legal system. That is what we mean by “Integration through law”. Awareness of 
the possibilities the law offers, therefore, is extremely important for any form 
of regional integration.
x preface
The main challenges facing the EAC today in this regard are how to safeguard 
the quality of the increasing body of Community law, how to monitor compli-
ance, and how to make EAC law binding and enforceable within national legal 
systems. All of these are challenges that the EU has faced in the past and is 
still facing, and where both the success and the failures of the EU may be of 
comparative use to the EAC, certainly considering the many similarities in the 
institutional and legal framework of both and the similarities of the challenges 
faced.
The main purpose of this book, initiated by the Leiden Centre for the 
Comparative Study of EAC law (LEAC) in close cooperation with Hon. Justice 
Dr Ugirashebuja, the current President of the East African Court of Justice, is 
to be a source of information and education for all those involved in shaping, 
improving and studying integration in the EAC. By comparing each aspect of 
both institutional and substantive EAC law with its nearest counterpart EU law, 
we hope to have created a vital tool to better understand and move forward the 
integration process in East Africa.
Considering these aims, we are proud that, thanks to the generous support of 
the law firm Allen & Overy LLP, the European Union and the Europa Institute 
of the University of Leiden, this book will not just be available in printed form 
but will also be freely available online via a completely Open Access agree-
ment with Brill Publishers.
We have been fortunate to find excellent authors from the different EAC 
Partner States, all leading experts in their respective fields, enabling us to cover 
all legal aspects of the EAC. We are very grateful for their wonderful contri-
butions and constructive participation in this ambitious project. In addition, 
we have greatly benefitted from the excellent research and editorial assis-
tance provided by Ties Boonzajer Flaes, Louise O’Callaghan, Brenden Fourie, 
Timothy Kawira, Carlota de Paula Coelho, and Merel Valk, as research assis-
tants of the LEAC. We are much indebted to them for, among other things, 
ensuring consistency between the chapters. As always, however, responsibility 
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chapter 1
The Road to East African Integration
Wanyama Masinde and Christopher Otieno Omolo
1.1 Introduction: African Regionalism in a Global Perspective
In recent times, the world has witnessed on the one hand, a trend towards glo-
balization, which has resulted in a “more interconnected world economy and 
world society” characterized by fewer and less significant trade borders, 
and is associated with the decline of the nation-state, and on the other, a trend 
towards regionalization and cooperation between states or groups of states.1 
Gamble, citing Kenichi Ohmae, observes that economic activity in the con-
temporary global economy no longer coincides with traditional political and 
cultural fault lines, so much so that the nation-state is fast being rendered irrel-
evant, at least as a unit of analysis.2 The post-Cold War era has particularly 
featured a resurgence of regionalism across the globe, with both old regional 
blocs being revived and new ones formed. Many reasons have been advanced 
to account for the revival of regionalism, including, the end of the Cold War 
and “the erosion of the Cold War alliance systems”, the unreliability of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the many economic and 
democratic developments in the developing world.3 The success story of the 
European regionalization experiment has also been cited as a factor that has 
inspired the recent wave of regionalism.4
1   Eiassen, K.A., & Monsen, B. (2001). Comparison of European and Southeast Asian 
Integration. In M. Telò, European Union and New Regionalism: Regional Actors and Global 
Governance in a Post- Hegemonic Era (pp. 111–135). Burlington: Ashgate, at 113; Gamble, A. 
(2001). Regional Blocs, World Order and the New Medievalism. In M. Telò, European Union 
and New Regionalism: Regional Actors and Global Governance in a Post-Hegemonic Era 
(pp. 21–39). Burlington: Ashgate. at 21.
2   Gamble, supra note 1, at 23.
3   Eiassen & Monsen, supra note 1, at 113.
4   El-Affendi, A. (2009). The Perils of Regionalism: Regional Integration as a Source of Instability 
in the Horn of Africa? JOURNAL OF INTERVENTION AND STATEBUILDING, 3 (1), at 
1. See further on the example of EU integration EU Chapter 1 detailing the road to European 
integration.
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1.2 The Post-Hegemonic Era and the Search for a New Multilateral 
Equilibrium
Most analysts have generally cited the “post-hegemonic condition” of the 
post-Cold War international system as constituting the congenial background 
for the resurgence of regionalism. The post-hegemonic condition, to cite 
Padoan, is a “situation in which no single country can provide unilaterally, the 
public goods required for the operation of the (international) system”.5 
The post-hegemonic world is also said to be a world in “a state of institutional 
disequilibrium”, that is, a state in which there is “an excess demand for inter-
national public goods” as a result of the combination of, a decrease in sup-
ply because of the erosion of the power of the hegemon, and an increase in 
demand, because of globalization”.6 This condition is ascribed to the decline 
of the United States as a hegemon in the last few decades. The United States 
had emerged as a new hegemon after the Second World War, and had led the 
successful reconstruction of the global political economy in the 1950s and 
1960s, guaranteeing “the conditions for a safe liberal world order”.7 However, 
the economic turbulences of the 1970s and 1980s led to “the erosion of the 
economic supremacy of the United States” and resulted in the decline of its 
hegemonic power and ability to supply public goods, thereby rendering the 
world susceptible to “mercantilists and protectionist policies” by nation-states.8
Regionalism, against this view, is perceived, not just as the result of the “con-
vergence of trade and investment activities” by different groups of nation-states, 
but, as “a policy pursued as a response to the failure of the post-hegemonic 
world in providing international goods”.9 Regionalism has therefore been pur-
sued as an attempt to provide a sort of new multilateral equilibrium in the 
absence of a hegemonic power. Proponents argue that regionalism can con-
tribute to global governance by providing solutions to the demand for public 
goods, and conditions for new multilateralism. Telò, for instance, points out 
that regionalism is a good precondition for multilateralism since interaction 
5   Padoan, P.C. (2001). Political Economy of New Regionalism and World Governance. In 
MarioTelò, European Union and New Regionalism: Regional Actors and Global Governance 
in a Post-hegemonic Era (pp. 39–59) Burlington: Ashgate, at 40.
6   Padoan, supra note 5.
7   Gamble, supra note 1, at 26.
8   Gamble, supra note 1, at 26.
9   Padoan, supra note 5.
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between states and international organizations is easier at the regional level.10 
He also notes that regionalism enhances stability in international regimes 
because it implies “issue linkages” for instance, between economic, security, 
monetary and trade issues, which in turn leads to exchange of information, 
and provides security.11
1.3 New Regionalism and Globalization
An important subject within the discourse on regionalism has been its rela-
tionship with the nation-state and with globalization. There have been debates 
about the roles played by the nation-state and international economics and 
world politics in the emergence of new regionalism. Telò has, for instance, 
argued that both factors are responsible for the development of new region-
alism. He contrasts between domestic or internal factors, and the systemic 
or exogenous economic and political factors, which he argues, constitute the 
causes of the recent wave of regionalism.12 By domestic factors he means, 
the combination of the desire of nation-states to rescue their sovereignty 
and maintain or recover international bargaining power; the private inter-
est of industries lobbying and networking on a regional basis; the “internal 
functional spillover” resulting from regional cooperation agreements; and the 
desire of developing countries to cope with global competition.13
The major systemic factor in the development of regionalism, Telò explains, 
has been globalization, understood as the combination of the interna-
tional forces, political actors and multinational organizations shaping the 
“relations and hierarchies between states, economic interests and regions 
of the world”.14 Telò sees regionalism as the nation-state’s response to a 
two-pronged threat which globalization poses to its existence. On the one 
hand, he sees regionalism—regional trade liberalization and cooperation 
arrangements—as a measure that enables nation-states and companies to 
“cope with the risks and opportunities of the global market and to absorb 
new multilateral rules”.15 On the other hand, he perceives regionalism as a 
10   Telò, M. (2001). European Union and New Regionalism: Regional Actors and Global 
Governance in a Post-hegemonic Era. Burlington: Ashgate, at 13.
11   Telò, supra note 10.
12   Telò, supra note 10, at 4.
13   Telò, supra note 10, at 4.
14   Telò, supra note 10, at 4.
15   Telò, supra note 10, at 6.
Masinde and Otieno Omolo4
response by nation-states to the threat of financial, technological and market 
globalization to the traditional “territorial state power”.16 According to this 
perspective, regionalism rescues national authority by enabling states to pool 
their authority at a regional level, in the face of the weakening or decline 
of national sovereignty. Telò observes that traditional state power— 
sovereignty—has been under threat, not only from technological and mar-
ket globalization, but also from domestic “social factors, political pressures, 
and democratic authority”.17 Hence, regionalism does not only rescue the 
nation-state from global political and economic forces, but, by creating a new 
supranational framework within which different actors express themselves, 
limits the “fragmenting and disintegrating impact of subnational regionalism, 
ethnic fundamentalism and the proliferation of movements (agitating) for 
self-determination”.18
Regionalism thus helps countries cope with traditional deficiencies of the 
nation-state, and to respond accordingly to a globalized economy. The nexus 
of regionalism with globalization is a subject much discussed in the litera-
ture of regionalism, and thus demands more than a cursory treatment here. 
As already noted, the resurgence of regionalism has been closely associated 
with the rise of globalization, which has been an important feature of the 
world economy since the 1980s. There is a consensus that there has been an 
evolution in the functioning of the world economy and in the operations of 
multinational corporations, driven by rapid technological advances, increased 
volumes and increased liberalization of trade, and unimpeded financial flows.19 
Whereas this evolution has brought massive benefits in terms of increased 
volumes of trade, and increased investment and growth, it has also brought 
with it challenges for governments. Globalization and liberalization have, for 
instance, been associated with the weakening of the government’s control over 
their national economies, and in fact exposed domestic economies to exter-
nal shocks.20 Telò, rephrasing Gamble, has noted that “globalizers” speak of 
“hyper-globalization” as constituting the threat to which regionalism seeks to 
16   Telò, supra note 10, at 7.
17   Telò, supra note 10, at 7.
18   Telò, supra note 10, at 7.
19   Eiassen & Monsen, supra note 1, at 113.
20   Eiassen & Monsen, supra note 1, at 113; Jenkins, C., & Thomas, L. (2001). African 
Regionalism and the SADC. In M. Telò, European Union and New Regionalism: Regional 
Actors and Global Governance in a Post-hegemonic Era (pp. 153–177). Burlington: Ashgate, 
at 159.
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respond. By hyper-globalization he refers to “a new-liberal” vision of the global 
economy as “cosmopolitan”; characterized by a “fast convergence of national 
economies” and an increasing autonomy of transnational companies, global 
financial markets, and private and public networks.21 “Hyper-globalization” 
exacerbates the crisis of territorial sovereignty, and in the extreme, renders the 
state all together, superfluous. Governments react to globalization by setting up 
regional blocs to enhance their competitiveness in the new global framework. 
In fact, Telò observes, regionalism is not only the state’s alternative to global-
ization, but also constitutes the state’s gateway to the global economy.22 This 
point is best illustrated by Vasconcelos in his discussion of MERCOSUR. He 
states that MERCOSUR is a project generated by globalization, and born from 
the awareness of Member States like Brazil and Argentina of the difficulties the 
nation-states, with their sovereignty deprived of potency, face “on their own to 
benefit from globalization and to meet the economic and security challenges it 
brings”.23 Jenkins and Thomas reiterate this point in regard to African regional-
ism, arguing that regionalism should be perceived not just as an alternative to 
trade liberalization but as a step in “a process of greater integration into inter-
national markets”.24 Referring to the South African Development Community 
(SADC), they state that regional integration, by creating larger markets, could 
enable SADC to compete in the global economy.25
Regionalism and globalization are said to be complementary, even if they 
bear conflicting tendencies. Gamble notes, quite rightly, that both global-
ization and regionalism comprise complex processes of social change with 
unique patterns of social interaction of actors, which occur independently of 
the state.26 This is reiterated by Telò who observes that regionalism and global-
ization are two components of the same “historical process of strengthening 
interdependence and weakening the state’s barriers to free trade . . .”.27
21   Telò, supra note 10, at 9.
22   Telò, supra note 10, at 9.
23   Vasconcelos, Á. d. (2001). European Union and Mercosur. In M. Telò, European Union 
and New Regionalism: Regional Actors and Global Governance in a Post-hegemonic Era 
(pp. 135–153). Burlington: Ashgate, at 137.
24   Jenkins, supra note 20, at 137.
25   Jenkins, supra note 20, at 137.
26   Gamble, supra note 1, at 27.
27   Telò, supra note 10, at 1.
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1.4 The European Integration as the Primer for New Regionalism
Another feature of new regionalism has been its association with the European 
Union (EU). There is a general consensus amongst theorists of regional inte-
gration that the success story of EU integration has provided both the inspira-
tion and the normative model for the new wave of regionalism throughout 
the world. It is no surprise therefore that much of the analysis of the phenom-
enon of new regionalism has featured, almost invariably, a comparative study 
of the EU and other regional organizations. Telò observes that specialists have 
approached regionalism from the perspective of the EU, focusing on the com-
parison of regional arrangements with the EU, and on the evolution of the EU 
as “both a workshop of institutional innovation and an international entity” in 
the post-Cold War era.28 The present work of course contributes to this larger 
comparative exercise, even if hoping to avoid some of its traps.
The EU has quite explicitly, in its external relations, contributed to the 
development of regional cooperation in many parts of the world. The set-
ting up of inter-regional cooperation is in fact seen as an important element 
in the EU’s self-consciousness as a new global actor. As Vasconcelos has noted, 
the global actorship of the EU has consisted in building a new form of multilat-
eralism based on “areas of regional integration and on the experience of supra-
national regulation of the relations between states”, that is, it seeks to turn the 
international system into “a ‘community’ on the basis of the success of its own 
model, which is then extrapolated into the wider world”.29 For this reason, the 
EU has sought to establish partnerships with regional organizations through-
out the world, and now supports the development of regionalism in Asia, Latin 
America, and Africa. Many regional blocs have been created or re-invented to 
emulate, or in reaction to, the success story of the EU.
The extrapolation of the EU model has of course not been without chal-
lenges. The EU model’s incompatibility with some regions of the world has 
been reported. El-Affendi, for instance, cites the incompatibility of this model 
of integration with the Third World economies as a major impediment to the 
growth of regionalism in Africa.30 He argues that the success of the EU model 
depends on the emergence of strong and diversified economies, “and presup-
poses economic complementarity and a strong political commitment” to over-
come asymmetrical benefits and costs of integration.31 However, it suffices 
28   Telò, supra note 10, at 3.
29   Vasconcelos, supra note 23, at 150.
30   El-Affendi, supra note 4, at 5.
31   El-Affendi, supra note 4, at 5.
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to state, as Telò aptly does, that the future of new regionalism is “intrinsi-
cally linked to the evolving EU”.32 Although one must remain acutely aware 
of the risks of too direct or simplistic a comparison, the EU therefore remains 
the primary comparative model.
1.5 Regionalism in Africa: A Historical Perspective
The fire of new regionalism enkindled in the heart of Europe has also been 
raging across the continent of Africa. Indeed, regionalism itself is not a new 
phenomenon in Africa. Some of the world’s oldest custom unions are found 
in Africa, a legacy of colonialism. Whereas we associate the African regional 
trade integration initiatives since the 1960s with what Telò has called the “eco-
nomic regionalism” (which emerged alongside US-centered multilateralism of 
the same period), the actual urge for the unification of the African continent 
predates the African Independence.33
There has always existed in the collective consciousness of Africa, at least 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, a view that the geographical fault lines that created 
different African states divided a previously united people. Thus, since the 
Independence, there have been persistent calls for African Unity. Even if, 
in the subsequent decades following the Independence, the rather idealis-
tic dream of a politically united Africa, tempered by the complex realities of 
nation-building, has given way to more modest forms of integration, Africa has 
remained steadfast in its belief that its welfare is predicated on the unity of the 
continent.
As Olivier has noted, African regionalism in the post-colonial era has 
evolved chronologically, in episodes, beginning with the anti-colonial fervor 
of the immediate post-Independence period which featured a clamor for uni-
fication under such slogans as “African Unity”, “African Fraternity” and “Pan-
Africanism”.34 This episode envisaged a unification process that would lead to 
the creation of a single African political state—the United States of Africa. 
Ironically, the institutional embodiment of this dream—the Organization for 
African Unity (OAU)—would have as one of its main objectives, the defence of 
the sovereignty of the nation-state inherited from colonialism, a principle that 
is credited with undermining the integration projects in Africa.
32   Telò, supra note 10, at 90.
33   Telò, supra note 10, at 13.
34   Olivier, G. (n.d.). Regional Integration in Africa: A Political Perspective. Unpublished 
Manuscript, 1–18, at 8.
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Olivier has cited this paradox, noting that despite all the rhetoric about 
African Unity at the formation of the OAU, the “state-centric (confederal) 
Westphalian model of sovereignty was accepted and institutionalized as the 
ruling paradigm and political lode star”.35 Hence, whereas one would expect 
that because of a sense of identity that “manifests so prominently” in Sub-
Saharan Africa, it would be easier to achieve African Unity, than in a more 
heterogeneous region like Europe, this would never be the case.36 African 
Unity would remain largely elusive in the decades after Independence. The 
first attempts at regional integration were hamstrung by several factors, 
including, “lack of clear leadership and the iron law of impenetrable national 
sovereignty”, and the failure to move beyond minimalist-intergovernmental 
cooperation.37 The efforts at integration were further compounded by the sub-
versive post-colonial leadership “driven by the expediency and power-political 
considerations”, and the twin burdens of nation-building and consolidation of 
national identities.38
The second episode featured a shift from the idealism of the Pan-Africanist 
project to a more modest approach to regional integration, focusing on the 
“sub-regional economic domain of market-driven intra-state, or extra-territo-
rial cooperation”.39 In the 1960s and 1970s, many African states were tempted 
into forming regional economic blocs. These attempts basically involved pool-
ing some competencies of domestic regulation and policy at a supranational 
level. Many regional blocs sprouted across the continent within this frame-
work for example, the SADC, the original East African Community (EAC) and 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). However, this 
form of regionalism was impeded, again, by the lack of will on the part of the 
states to cede any power to any supranational body.
A third phase in the evolution of African integration happened at the insti-
gation of a combination of systemic factors. In the 1980s, the United Nations 
through its Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) supported the Lagos 
Plan of Action (LPA) and the Full Act of Lagos (FAL), initiated by the OAU, 
as part of its efforts to revitalize the African economy in the wake of the fail-
ure of the post-colonial economic strategies of the preceding decades.40 The 
plans proposed a new Pan-African approach to Africa’s economic problems 
35   Olivier, supra note 34, at 6.
36   Olivier, supra note 34, at 6.
37   Olivier, supra note 34, at 1.
38   Olivier, supra note 34, at 6.
39   Olivier, supra note 34, at 8.
40   Olivier, supra note 34, at 9; El-Affendi, supra note 4, at 3.
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that included the establishment/revitalization of three Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs) as a step towards continental integration. They included 
the revitalization of the already existing, ECOWAS in West Africa, the estab-
lishment of the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) in 1981 for Eastern and Southern 
African states, and the Economic Community for Central African States 
(ECCAS) in 1983.41 Olivier remarks that the LPA was indeed an important phase 
in the evolution of regional integration for re-introducing such pan-Africanist 
themes like “African solidarity, collective self-reliance and self-sufficiency, eco-
nomic progress on self-sustaining socio-economic development, reducing its 
dependence vulnerability vis-à-vis ‘external nations’ ”.42 The LPA underscored 
the importance of regionalism for African economic progress, expressly urging 
that “efforts towards African economic integration” be pursued with “renewed 
determination” so as to create a continental framework for cooperation.43
The Abuja Treaty of 1991 marked the beginning of another phase in the evo-
lution of African integration. The Abuja Treaty was an improvement on the 
LPA. While indicting the African leadership with failure to confront Africa’s 
economic problem, the Abuja Treaty reiterated the importance of regional 
integration, and in fact set the timeline for full continental economic integra-
tion at 2025.44 The Abuja Treaty recommended the rationalization of RECs to 
address the problem of multiple membership African states.45 It envisaged 
the ultimate continental integration which would culminate in the African 
Economic Community (AEC) which would be achieved progressively, begin-
ning with the revamping of existing, or the development of new RECs, as build-
ing blocks.46 The immediate post-Abuja Treaty era saw the revitalization of 
main regional economic blocks. Within its framework, the PTA was replaced 
by the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) in 1993.47
Perhaps the most important phase in African integration was set off by 
the Sirte summit of 2001 which replaced the OAU with the African Union 
(AU). Olivier has noted that the launching of the AU marked the beginning 
of the “ultimate episode in African integration”.48 The AU, Olivier observes, 
41   El-Affendi, supra note 4, at 3.
42   Olivier, supra note 34, at 10.
43   Olivier, supra note 34, at 10.
44   El-Affendi, supra note 4, at 3.
45   African Development Bank. (2016). Eastern African Regional Integration Strategy Paper 
(2011–2015). REGIONAL DEPARTMENTS—EAST (OREA/OREB). African Development 
Bank, at 1.
46   African Development Bank, supra note 45.
47   El-Affendi, supra note 4, at 3.
48   Olivier, supra note 34, at 12.
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essentially perpetuates the OAU paradigm of integration, emphasizing the 
OAU’s foundational principles of “unity, solidarity, cohesion and co-operation”.49 
However, whereas it generally upholds the Westphalian nation-state concept 
that has dominated the past integration projects, it adopts a weaker form 
of sovereignty, providing for intervention in the member states, “in respect of 
‘grave circumstances’ or if requested by member states to restore peace and 
security”.50 In the words of Olivier, the AU waters down the old African dictum 
of “non-interference: to “non-indifference”.51
The AU also has the quality of being a remote replica of the EU. By its 
structure and objectives, it exemplifies the type of regionalism that belongs 
to the species of new regionalism. Olivier has observed that even though the 
EU and AU are sui generis organizations in different ways, they nevertheless 
share some structural and even foundational philosophical underpinnings.52 
He identifies convergence in the intellectual underpinnings of integration, 
and the role perceptions of both organizations. He observes, for instance, that 
both the AU and EU emerged against backgrounds of nation-state failures: 
just as the “idea of Europe” evolved as a “remedy against nationalistic wars”, 
the “idea of Africa” has similarly been inspired by anti-colonial sentiments, 
and the past failures of African nation-states.53 Moreover, he adds, just as the 
EU has evolved out of the acknowledgement by post-war Europe that unity 
would be essential for survival in the bi-polar Cold War world dominated by 
the United States and the Soviet-Union, African integration has also been 
inspired by the appreciation of the need for unity in the face of the Cold War 
and Western economic dominance in the post-colonial era.54
The AU also shares the structural framework of the EU, having adopted 
such institutions as the Commission, the Council, and the Parliament, even 
if each of these are endowed with less power compared to those of the EU. Of 
course, for obvious reasons, many differences abound between the two orga-
nizations. Perhaps most noteworthy is the fact, as Vines has observed, that the 
AU came into existence fully formed and therefore did not have to confront 
49   Olivier, supra note 34, at 12.
50   Olivier, supra note 34, at 12.
51   Olivier, supra note 34, at 12.
52   Olivier, supra note 34, at 1.
53   Olivier, supra note 34, at 1.
54   Olivier, supra note 34, at 1.
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some of the challenges that the EU faced in its evolution.55 This also means 
that it did not have any accession criteria and there was no threshold of demo-
cratic or economic behaviour that a state needed to attain before admission. 
Whereas the EU integration has evolved in a linear succession, from simple 
preferential trade area, to free trade area, through customs union, common 
market, economic union, towards, ultimately, political union, the AU has 
adopted a more “top-down” approach to integration, that began with the mega 
unification projects embodied in OAU/AU, and then moving to the RECs.56 
Still, the EU integration, because it has been a success, provides the best model 
for the kind of regionalism to which Africa aspires.
The AU and the RECs initiated within its framework, have exemplified new 
regionalism both in origins and objectives. There is a considerable disconti-
nuity between the pre-Sirte summit regionalism and regionalism after the 
summit. Indeed, after the Abuja Treaty of 1991, regionalism in Africa has been 
mainly driven by the fear of marginalization of the continent in the new world 
order characterized by regionalism on the one hand, and globalization on the 
other. As observed above, the new wave of African regional integration has 
also been instigated by systemic factors such the international community 
(the United Nations), and the European Union.
However, as Olivier notes, regional integration in Africa still constitutes at 
best, a “work in progress” en route to deeper regional integration, and com-
pared to the EU which it holds as a model, it is still in its “rudimentary stages”.57 
The political union, which would feature deeper institutional integration, is 
yet to be achieved, and is conditioned, as rightly reported by Telò, by the “het-
erogeneity and pre-democratic” nature of the nation-states.58 Many factors, 
such as the weight of the colonial past, “the legacy of the Cold War, the cul-
tural, religious, and linguistic diversity, the unique relation between state and 
society,” and together with the perennial problems of under development, the 
lack of harmonization between national economies, and indeed the ever pres-
ent political tensions between and within Member States, have conspired to 
slow down the process.
55   Vines, A. (2013). A Decade of African Peace and Security Architecture. International Affairs, 
89 (1), 89-1-9, at 95.
56   Olivier, supra note 34, at 15.
57   Olivier, supra note 34, at 5.
58   Telò, supra note 10, at 77.
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1.6 African Regionalism: A Factor in the Decline of the Post-Colonial 
State?
The debate on the relationship between regional integration and the nation-
state in Africa is a prominent feature of the discourse on African regionalism, 
just as it has featured prominently in the discourse on new regionalism in 
general. As already observed, the place of the state within the framework of 
regional integration has constituted an essential fault line in the theoretical 
debates about new regionalism. In Africa, the strong hold of the Westphalian 
paradigm of state sovereignty—a legacy of colonialism—on politics and 
economics, has limited the efforts for regional integration to minimalist 
intergovernmentalism.
The assertion of a strong form of state sovereignty has repeatedly been cited 
as one of the contributing factors to the failure of regional integration in Africa. 
There is no doubt that Africa recognizes the importance of regionalism for 
political and economic progress, but it seems African governments wish this 
were achievable without having to cede their authority, or shift their loyalties 
to some continental federal or supra-national institution which they cannot 
control; or rather that regionalism should complement rather than supplant 
their national projects. In fact, as Oyugi explains, the governments have pre-
ferred to view regionalism as an instrument that supplements or enhances or 
protects the role of the nation-state.59 Proponents of this view have also held 
that regionalism rescues rather than weakens the nation-state in Africa, and 
provides a gateway for the continent into the global political economy.
Africa’s experiment with the Westphalian state system has been notably 
characterized by dismal failure. Anadi has observed that the independent 
African states were, in the first place, never “really negotiated states”; they 
were imposed by colonialism against the consent of the nationalities and thus, 
always struggled for legitimacy.60 Lacking legitimacy, the states have relied 
heavily on force to sustain power, and consequently could not “sufficiently 
harness the advantages of ‘political plurality and ethnic diversity’ in nation 
building”.61 With attention and resources diverted towards strengthening 
59   Oyugi, E. (2009). East African Community—the Third Round: A People, Market or State-
driven Regionalisation project? EAC 10th Anniversary Symposium: Role of Non-State Actors 
in Deepening EAC Integration (p. 9). Arusha: East African Community, at 2.
60   Anadi, S.K. (2005). REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA: The case of ECOWAS. Zürich: 
Zürich University, at 19.
61   Anadi, supra note 60.
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legitimacy, the states therefore have never been able to pay due attention to 
the development of sustainable socio-economic and political institutions. The 
weaknesses have also rendered the African state vulnerable to the forces of glo-
balization. In the post-independent era, the African state has witnessed several 
conflicts, some of which have in fact threatened its very existence.62 The case 
of the African state has typified the inability of the nation-state to singularly 
provide “public goods”. Like every part of the world, regionalism has presented 
Africa with an opportunity to address the failures of the nation-state and to 
respond to the threat of globalization. It is within this context that the East 
African Community, to which we now turn, came into existence.
1.7 Regionalization in the East African Community
An African Development Bank (AfDB) Strategy Paper on Eastern African 
Regional Integration reports that the Eastern African region has the largest 
number of RECs and intergovernmental bodies in Africa, with each of the 1263 
countries in the region possessing membership of six of the eight RECs rec-
ognized by the AU.64 Six of the twelve Eastern African countries—Burundi, 
Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Republic of South Sudan and Uganda, constitute a 
regional bloc known as the East African Community (EAC). The EAC defines 
itself as a regional intergovernmental organization that aims at “widening 
and deepening co-operation among member states in, among others, politi-
cal, economic and social fields for their mutual benefit”.65 The organization 
has established a Customs Union (2005) and a Common Market (2010), and 
is in the process of establishing a Monetary Union. Its ultimate objective is 
to establish a complete political Union—a “Political Federation of the East 
African States”.66
62   Anadi, supra note 60.
63   See Fig. 1, East Africa’ (African Development Bank Website) <http://www.afdb.org/en/
countries/east-africa/> accessed 31 July 2016.
64   African Development Bank, supra note 45, at v.
65   http://www.eac.int/faqs, EAC. (2013). Home: About EAC. Retrieved April 9, 2016, from An 
East African Community Website: http://www.eac.int/index.php?option=com_content&
view=article&id=1:welcome-to- eac&catid=34:body-text-area&Itemid=53.
66   EAC, supra note 65.
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Figure 1.1 Map of Eastern Africa.67
Source: African Development Bank Website (2016).
1.8 The Defunct EAC
The EAC is, like the AU, a reincarnation of a defunct predecessor. The history 
of regional integration in East Africa can be traced to the late 19th century, 
in the very early days of colonialism in the region. As noted in the preamble 
67   ‘East Africa’ (African Development Bank Website) <http://www.afdb.org/en/countries/
east-africa/> accessed 31 July 2016.
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to the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, the for-
mal and social integration in the region can be traced to the construction of 
the Kenya-Uganda Railways from 1897–1901, the establishment of the Customs 
Collection Center for Uganda in Mombasa in 1900, and the East African 
Currency Board and the Postal Union, in 1905.68 These were later followed by 
the establishment of the Court of Appeal for East Africa in 1909, the Customs 
Union for Uganda, Tanganyika and Kenya, then under British administration, 
in 1919, among other regional initiatives.69
Perhaps the most significant milestone in the process of regional integra-
tion at this stage was the formation of the East African High Commission 
in 1948, to strengthen economic links between the three countries.70 The 
Commission established a unified income tax for the three countries. 
It was succeeded by the East African Common Services Organization, which 
was established in 1961 to coordinate such regional service organizations as 
the East African Posts and Telecommunications, the East African Railways 
and Harbors, the East African Airways, the East African Air Aviation Services 
and the East African Development Bank.71 In 1967, a treaty—The Treaty for the 
East African Cooperation—was signed by three East African nations—Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda—establishing the East African Community, and suc-
ceeding the East African Common Services Organization.72 Under the Treaty, 
the three nations agreed to cooperate in a wide array of economic and social 
issues. The Community fostered cooperation in many areas within the region, 
and was considered at the time a model of regional integration and develop-
ment. The integration achieved under the Community was so deep that it was, 
as Kiraso has observed, “in all but name, a federal government”.73 However, in 
1977, barely a decade after it came into existence, the EAC collapsed. Several 
reasons have been advanced to explain why the Community collapsed. Shivji 
explains it rather aptly:
68   EAC. (2010). Home: Treaty Establishing the East African Community. Retrieved April 
08, 2016, from East African Community Website: http://www.eac.int/treaty/index 
.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=75&Itemid=156, at 3.
69   EAC, supra note 68, at 4.
70   Kiraso, B.B. (2009). EAC Integration—Enabling Peace and Security Architecture. EAC 
Peace and Security Conference (p. 18). Kampala: East African Community, at 2; Reith, S., 
& Boltz, M. (2011). The East African Community Integration: Between Aspiration and 
Reality. Ambition for and Reality of the East African Community in a Globalized World 
(pp. 91–107). Dar es Salaam: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, at 92.
71   Kiraso, supra note 70.
72   EAC, supra note 68, at 5.
73   Kiraso, supra note 70.
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The East African Community formed in 1967, which attempted to address 
one of the deep-rooted scourges of colonialism, uneven development, 
also fell victim to the forces of compradorialism and imperialism. It is 
not necessary to go into details. Suffice it to say that the limited economic 
unity could not be sustained in absence of a durable political framework. 
And a durable political framework could not be developed in absence of 
political unity.74
The Treaty that would re-establish the Community more than two decades 
later points to “lack of strong political will, lack of strong participation of 
the private sector and civil society in the cooperation activities, the contin-
ued disproportionate sharing of benefits of the Community among Partner 
States due to the differences in their levels of development and lack of 
adequate policies to address the situation” as the contributing factors to the 
collapse of the Community.75
Many analysts have cited the strong intergovernmental (interstate) structure 
of the Community, and the ideological differences between the leaders of the 
Member States as the main reasons for the collapse. For example, in the 1970s, 
Tanzania was drifting towards Socialism, while Kenya adopted a Capitalist sys-
tem and this ideological incongruence played out in the Community. Mugomba 
has pointed out also that beyond ideology, regional conflict, and external sys-
temic penetration, the East African Community integration was also subverted 
by such factors as “the growing ‘radicalization’ of regional politics, including 
the proliferation of Marxist-oriented regimes in Eastern and Southern Africa; 
Kenya’s contribution to the ‘development of underdevelopment’ within the 
Community and the Common Market, as well as the increasingly conservative, 
authoritarian, and defensive position of Kenyatta’s regime both at home and in 
the region”.76 Furthermore, the collapse of the Community is also blamed on 
governance challenges such as the absence of mechanisms to address corrup-
tion, non-respect for rule of law, and impunity.77
74   Shivji, I.G. (2009). Pan-Africanism and the Challenge of East African Integration. EAC 10th 
Anniversary Symposium (13–14 November, 2009): Pan-Africanism and the Challenge of 
East African Integration (p. 11). Arusha: East African Community, at 6.
75   EAC, supra note 68.
76   Mugomba, A.T. (1978). Regional Organizations and African Underdevelopment: the 
Collapse of the East African Community. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 16 (2), 
The Journal of Modern African Studies, at 270.
77   Kiraso, supra note 70, at 1.
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The collapse of the Community led to the dismemberment of its jointly-
operated services, with each Member State assuming direct control over 
regional services within its territorial boundaries. Regional projects—railways, 
ports, harbors, postal services and airlines—were all now managed separately. 
However, even with the collapse of the Community, the East African states still 
acknowledged the advantages of integration for the region and it was always 
hoped that the Community would be revived at some later date. Therefore, 
the Mediation Agreement of 1984, which set the criteria for dividing the EAC’s 
assets and liabilities, also included a provision for the future re-establishment 
of the Community.78
1.9 The Re-establishment of the EAC
Steps were taken to reestablish the Community at two summits of the head 
of states held in 1993 and 1997. In 1993, a Permanent Tripartite Commission 
for Cooperation was set up to oversee the drafting of a treaty for the establish-
ment of the EAC, and in November 1999, the Treaty for the reestablishment 
of the East African Community was signed by the heads of state of Kenya, 
Uganda and Tanzania. The Treaty entered into force on 7th July 2000. Two new 
members, Rwanda and Burundi, acceded to the Community in 2007 and the 
Republic of South Sudan in 2016, bringing its membership to six. The new-
look EAC therefore constitutes a larger bloc than its defunct predecessor and 
with a combined population of more than 143.5 million people, land area of 
1.82 million square kilometers, and a combined Gross Domestic Product of 
$110.3 billion, it constitutes a key driver of regional integration in the entire 
East African region.79
The EAC has already achieved some of its objectives; it has managed to 
establish a Customs Union (2005) and a Common Market (2010), and is in 
the process of establishing a Monetary Union.80 However, in light of its ambi-
tious objectives, these achievements are rather modest. The Community aims 
ultimately to have a “prosperous, competitive, secure and politically united 
Eastern Africa”—a Political Federation of the East African States.81
78   Kiraso, supra note 70, at 4.
79   EAC Secretariat. (2012). East African Community Facts and Figures—2012. Arusha: East 
Africa Community.
80   EAC, supra note 65. See further chapters 9, 10, and 13 on these developments.
81   EAC, supra note 68.
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As stated in its founding Treaty, Article 5(1), the objective of the Community 
is to develop policies and programs aimed at “widening and deepening coop-
eration among Partner States in political, economic, social and cultural fields, 
research and technology, defense, security and legal and judicial affairs for 
mutual benefit”.82
The EAC thus aims to provide the public goods which the Member States 
cannot individually provide. As Reith and Boltz rightly observe, few of the 
many African regional blocs have set their sights so high.83 Even the more 
established organizations like COMESA, SADC and ECOWAS do not have a 
provision for political union in their founding treaties. By its integration pro-
cess, and objectives, the new EAC typifies the regional blocs that have been 
spawned by the new wave of regionalism. It takes for its model the EU, and has 
adopted the EU’s institutional framework—it is highly institutionalized. The 
new EAC also aims at far deeper integration than envisioned by its predecessor. 
The EAC has also provided in the founding Treaty, for safeguards against the 
fatal mistakes that led to the collapse of its predecessor, including, a gradual 
approach to integration; decentralization of powers from the Summit to the 
Council of Ministers; provision for people-centered and private-sector driven 
integration; inclusion of civil society as key stakeholders; and, stringent with-
drawal procedures.84
However, questions still linger over the viability of this renewed attempt at 
integration in the East African region. Analysts have warned that unless the 
leading decision-makers in the EAC temper their rhetoric with some measure 
of action, the current attempt may, like the previous EAC, flounder. Reith and 
Boltz have noted that the EAC “is strong on paper, but weak in the implemen-
tation of its decision”, and risks losing the support of civil society and becom-
ing “the scapegoat of national politics”.85 Immediately after the collapse of the 
first integration project, Mugomba had warned that no attempt at integration 
would be successful until there was an ideological consensus among partner 
states, the acceptance of a common economic strategy, and a willingness to 
tackle the asymmetries of regional distribution of integration benefits and 
losses.86 While these factors no longer constitute a real threat to integration, 
the project nevertheless faces other, even greater challenges.
82   EAC, supra note 68.
83   Reith & Boltz, supra note 70, at 91.
84   Kiraso, supra note 70, at 4.
85   Reith & Boltz, supra note 70, at 91.
86   Mugomba, supra note 76.
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There are many challenges to be overcome to realize the integration to 
which the EAC aspires. The AfDB Strategy Paper on Regional Integration in the 
Eastern African Region lists four key challenges to successful regional integra-
tion, which are also true with regard to the EAC: weak institutional and human 
capacity of the RECs and national implementation units; poor performance of 
regional organizations which impedes their capacity to deliver expected ben-
efits of integration; limited capacity to mobilize the participation of private 
sector actors in the structures and processes of integration, and insecurity and 
cross-border conflicts.87
The key challenge faced by the EAC is its ambitious nature weighed against 
its capacity. The EAC has adopted a tight integration plan that is scheduled 
to progress through the stages of integration “at a gallop”—with the customs 
union, the common market, monetary union, and the political federation 
all being achieved within set time frames. However, as the EU integration 
(which the EAC seeks to emulate) has shown, regional integration is a com-
plex process that requires much time, and serious resources. The EAC’s ambi-
tious goals are inconsistent with the reality of its capacity, and the capacity 
of its Member States to achieve them. According to the AfDB Strategy Paper, 
the regional organizations in the East African region, including the EAC 
lack the adequate capacity and resources to plan, coordinate, and monitor 
the processes required to further the integration.88 For instance, it has no 
capacity to design complicated corridor investment projects, or for monitor-
ing and evaluation mechanisms for the integration processes.89 The process 
of integration is further compounded by the reluctance of Member States of 
the organizations to cede requisite competences to regional bodies, which 
has meant that regional institutions have little power to make decisions that 
would enhance integration. The AfDB Strategy Paper also cites lack of conver-
gence of attitudes towards regional integration as one of the challenges with 
which the Community is confronted.90 Together with the reluctance of the 
governments to cede sufficient authority to the regional institutions, and to 
enact legislation and regulations necessary to guide the integration process, 
the regional concerns and priorities are often also not really reflected in the 
national policies—the governments simply do not accord the regional integra-
tion project due regard.
87   African Development Bank, supra note 45, at vii.
88   African Development Bank, supra note 45, at vii.
89   African Development Bank, supra note 45, at vii.
90   African Development Bank, supra note 45, at 13.
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Furthermore, due to the reluctance of states to cede power to supranational 
bodies, the EAC is characterized by an excessive state monopoly over decision-
making processes and institutions which in turn poses a serious challenge to 
successful integration. The EAC defines itself as an intergovernmental orga-
nization, and even though it has made provisions for the inclusion of other 
actors in its decision-making process, the monopoly of the decision-making 
process still rests with the governments of the states, leaving non-state actors 
and the civil society locked out of the integration process.
Moreover, effective and deeper integration in the EAC is greatly inhibited by 
the insecurity and political instability in the region. The AfDB Strategy Paper 
acknowledges that apart from offering the Member States the opportunity to 
achieve “better connectivity and enhance prosperity by collectively invest-
ing in growth and development to fight poverty, the EAC could also be a tool 
for resolving the many conflicts that have ravaged the East African region”.91 
Each of the five Member States, with the exception of Tanzania, has experi-
enced at least one conflict—ethnic or civil—in the last two decades and each 
of the states is neighbored by at least one country experiencing one conflict 
or another. Security is indeed a “Public Good” that the nation-states have not 
been able to provide individually, and for which they need collectivity to pro-
vide. The AfDB Strategy Paper points out that the rampant political conflicts in 
the region constitute, a “regional public “bad” that frightens investors, inhibits 
development and stifles economic growth”, and consumes resources that are 
badly needed for productive activities.92 Thus, it is underlined that the resolu-
tion of conflicts and the maintenance of peace and security constitute essen-
tial conditions for successful regional integration in the East African region.
1.10 EAC Integration as an Antidote to the Failure of the State in the 
East African Region
Lamenting Africa’s moral crisis at the turn of the twenty first century, the 
Ghanaian Philosopher, Kwame Gyekye remarked:
Confronted with a deep and resilient development crisis, with frequent 
military disruptions of the democratic political process resulting, inevi-
tably, in political instability, uncertainty, and confusion, and with a poor 
demonstration of political morality resulting in pervasive and rampant 
91   African Development Bank, supra note 45, at 16.
92   African Development Bank, supra note 45, at 16.
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political corruption[,] . . . African life on the eve of the twenty-first cen-
tury is not only confused but at a low ebb.93
The catalogue of the failures of the post-colonial African state is inexhaustible. 
Africa’s fifty years of experiment with the Westphalian nation-state has been 
anything but successful. The African state has also, in the last few decades, 
had to contend with the phenomenon of globalization—the combination of 
the international forces, political actors and multinational organizations—
which, analysts argue, threaten its very existence. It is against the acknowl-
edgement of the limitations and failures of the state, on the one hand, and 
the threat of globalization, on the other, that the debate on the new wave of 
regionalism in Africa has been carried out. The question has been whether 
the maddening rush by Africa for the formation of regional blocs in the recent 
years—most African states have overlapping membership in many regional 
organizations—is itself a concession of the limitations of the states in the light 
of the challenges with which the continent is confronted, and whether indeed 
regionalism constitutes the continent’s best response to the failures of the 
state and to the threats posed by globalization.
This section has analysed the EAC in the context of the resurgence of region-
alism across the globe in the last few decades and has probed the claim that 
new regionalism is the world’s, and indeed Africa’s, response to the decline and 
failure of the nation-state, and the threat of globalization.
93   Gyekye, K. (1997). Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the African 
Experience. New York: Oxford University Press.
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chapter 1A
The Road to European Integration
Armin Cuyvers
1.1 A Bumpy but Rewarding Road . . .
The European Union (EU) has achieved a unique level of political and eco-
nomic integration. More than 500 million European citizens share an area 
of Freedom Security and Justice and an internal market that forms the larg-
est economic bloc in the world. 19 national currencies have been ‘integrated’ 
into a single European currency, further enabling trade and increasing wealth. 
To achieve and sustain such integration, strong institutions have been built, 
novel legal and political mechanisms have been developed, and substantial 
powers have been shared at the Union level, all whilst maintaining the ulti-
mate authority and democratic legitimacy of the Member States.
This high level of integration has wielded enormous benefits in terms of 
wealth, stability and influence. For despite the vital importance of good law 
and institutions, part of the real secret behind integration is that it ultimately 
forms a win-win for all players involved. For states, citizens and businesses 
alike, integration can provide vital economic and political benefits. What is 
more, in our globalizing reality, integration is also necessary to retain the eco-
nomic and political significance of individual states. As markets, companies 
and the digital world transcend borders, so must states transcend their own 
borders and cooperate to retain their relevance.
At the same time, European integration has been a long and bumpy road, 
and the process is far from complete. For despite its long-term benefits, it 
remains a challenge to properly structure regional integration and to over-
come short-term obstacles and conflicts of interest. How, for example, to bal-
ance the influence and interests of different Member States, how to divide the 
benefits and costs of integration, or how to structure democracy at the supra-
national level? Over the years, therefore, the EU has faced many challenges 
and set-backs as it pioneered the process of regional integration and tried to 
adapt how we govern to the reality that needs to be governed. Brexit only forms 
the most recent example of such a set-back and of just how challenging it is 
to develop regional integration that is effective and legitimate, and that can 
resist short-term nationalistic reflexes, especially in times of (economic) crises 
and uncertainty. So far, however, the EU has always overcome such set-backs, 
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usually deepening integration as a result, in part because of the ultimate desir-
ability and necessity of regional integration as set out above, although the fall-
out of Brexit of course still has to become clear.
It is the long and bumpy road travelled by the EU that will be discussed 
in the different EU companion chapters in this book. These companion chap-
ters provide concise overviews of different fields of EU law and discuss the key 
legal tools that were developed to turn integration from an aspiration into a 
reality. Considering the comparative objective of this book, the primary focus 
of these companion chapters is on the foundational rules, mechanism and 
doctrines of EU law that still provide the basis for European integration today, 
and that might provide useful inspiration for East African integration now. 
For more comprehensive or specific discussions on particular issues of EU law 
each chapter will refer the reader to more specialized literature. In this way, 
the companion chapters also hope to function as a portal for those wanting to 
engage in more in depth comparative EAC-EU analysis on particular topics.1
Despite their comparative ambitions, the EU companion chapters of course 
fully recognize the significant differences between the EU and the EAC, and 
consequently the need for tailor-made EAC solutions that fit the unique poten-
tial of East Africa in the 21st century. Comparison can never be a cut-and-paste 
exercise.2 Nor do the EU companion chapters assume that the ‘European way’ 
is per definition the ‘best’ and should therefore always be followed. Quite 
the contrary: the EU offers more than enough failures and mistakes to learn 
from, and these failures are often at least as instructive as the EU successes. 
Instead of simplistically transplanting EU norms to the EAC, therefore, the 
aim of the companion chapters is first to distill the different legal solutions 
 
 
1   For those interested in further exploring EU law also see the Massive Open Online Course 
(MOOC) ‘The Law of the European Union: An Introduction ‘developed by the Europa 
Instituut of Leiden University and available online for free via Coursera.
2   See on the challenges of comparison inter alia V.C. Jackson, ‘Comparative Constitutional 
Law: Methodologies’, in: M. Rosenfeld and A. Sajó (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative 
Constitutional Law (OUP 2012), 54, V.C. Jackson, ‘Methodological Challenges in Comparative 
Constitutional Law’ 28 Penn State International Law Review (2010), 319, M. Tushnet, 
‘Comparative Constitutional Law’, in: M. Reimann and R. Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Law (OUP 2006), 1226, G. Frankenberg, ‘Comparing constitutions: 
Ideas, ideals, and ideology—toward a layered narrative’, International Journal of Constitutional 
Law (2006), 439, P. Legrand, ‘The Impossibility of “Legal Transplants” ’ 4 Maastricht Journal 
of European and Comparative Law (1997), 111. and classically O. Kahn-Freund, ‘On Uses and 
Misuses of Comparative Law’, 37 Modern Law Review (1974), 1.
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that were developed to meet the different challenges of regional integration. 
Subsequently, in conjunction with the primary EAC chapters and preferably 
in a combined effort between EAC and EU experts, it can be further explored 
how such legal solutions may be translated and adapted to the EAC context. 
With the benefit of almost 60 years of European hindsight, such a joint effort 
could hopefully help the EAC to avoid some of the detours taken by European 
integration, shortening the path towards EAC integration and removing some 
of the bumps. This is especially so as the EAC has adapted significant parts of 
the EU institutional and legal framework in its Treaties and Protocols.
This first companion chapter discusses the development of the EU from a 
Community of six focused on Coal and Steel to a deeply integrated Union of 28. 
Considering the limited size of this chapter and the rich history of European 
integration, the discussion focusses on the main developments and most for-
mative crises.3 Consequently, this chapter first discusses the failed attempts at 
European integration that preceded the EU, as well as other forms of coopera-
tion in Europe from which the EU should be distinguished. It then charts how 
the process of European integration got underway, and how it gradually wid-
ened and deepened as more and more Member States joined and European 
integration came to cover more and more policy areas. This discussion will 
include the different Treaties signed as well as some of the major crises and 
events faced by the EU, both to present the whole picture of the integration 
process and to demonstrate how crises may actually form vital and integral 
parts of integration. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of Brexit, 
the most recent fundamental challenge to European integration that may con-
tain useful lessons for the EAC, including on the question of how to deal with 
the possible withdrawal of Partner States.
3   For more detailed discussions on the history of European integration and it main drivers see 
inter alia P. Craig & G. De Búrca, EU Law: texts, cases and materials (OUP, 2015, 6th edition), 
D. Chalmers, G. Davies and G. Monti, European Union Law (CUP, 2010), G. Majone, Dilemmas 
of European Integration: The Ambiguities and Pitfalls of Integration by Stealth (OUP, 2005), 
A. Moravcsik, The Choice for Europes: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to 
Maastricht (Cornell University Press, 1998), or G. Delanty, Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, 
Reality (Macmillan, 1995).
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1.2 The Idea of European Integration: From Failed Attempts to a Union 
on Coal and Steel
The idea of uniting ‘Europe’ has been around for a long time, even if the mean-
ing of ‘Europe’ itself has never been static.4 Several kings, emperors and dicta-
tors have obviously tried to ‘unite’ Europe by force. However, there also is a 
long history of proposals to unite Europe in a more peaceful and cooperative 
manner. In 1693, for example, William Penn already developed a confederal 
proposal for Europe in his ‘Essay Towards the Present and Future Peace of 
Europe’. In 1814, the French philosopher Saint-Simon, even came surprisingly 
close to the EU institutional framework we find today, even planning the capi-
tal for his Union close to Brussels.5
These early ideas, however, never gained real traction. They went against 
the grain of European history, which, in the age of Westphalia, moved towards 
ever more centralized and powerful nation-states.6 Instead of cooperation 
and sharing authority, the trend was to concentrate authority in the state and 
to make the state increasingly absolute. Two world wars, however, drastically 
changed the near sacred status of the sovereign state. World War I lasted from 
1914 until 1918, leaving over 16 million dead. After this war, the League of Nations 
was established, a kind of predecessor to the United Nations, to prevent future 
wars. This relatively weak intergovernmental organization, however, failed, 
and could not prevent a second World War from erupting between 1939 and 
1945. Total deaths due do the Second World War are estimated between 60 to 
80 million. This includes the systematic extermination of over 11 million peo-
ple, mostly Jews, in the Holocaust.
Both world wars had truly brought home the devastating nature and effect of 
modern industrial warfare, especially once linked to nationalism and absolute 
nation-states. Once nationalism, centralized nation-states and modern weap-
onry were combined, the effects were simply unconscionable. Consequently, 
4   See for example D. De Rougemont, The Idea of Europe (New York, MacMillian, 1965), 
G. Delanty, Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality (Basingstoke, Macmillian, 1995), J. Le Goff, 
The Birth of Europe (Oxford, Blackwell, 2005), or R. McKitterick, Charlemagne: the Formation 
of a European Identity (Cambridge, CUP, 2008).
5   See his 1814 ‘Plan de la Réorganisation de la société européenne’, or ‘Plan for the Reorganisation 
of the European Society’.
6   See for a further discussion of the Peace of Westphalia, traditionally seen as the ‘birth’ of the 
modern, sovereign nation-state, and the subsequent evolution of the concept of sovereignty 
in Europe A. Cuyvers, The EU as a Confederal Union of Sovereign Member Peoples, Exploring 
the potential of American (con)federalism and popular sovereignty for a constitutional theory 
of the EU, (Leiden, 2013).
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preventing future wars became of paramount importance. Never again, nie 
wieder, jamais, became the rallying cry for European integration, as well as for 
other international attempts to impose some limits and controls on European 
states. For if states cannot be trusted to always control themselves, the logical 
conclusion was that another layer of control, above the state, was necessary to 
provide a safe-guard.7
At the international level, the UN was established in 1945, with the UN 
Security Council receiving unique competences on the legal use of force.8 In 
Europe, the Council of Europe was established in 1949, with a focus on democ-
racy, the rule of law and human rights. The Council of Europe, which today has 
47 Members, is best known for the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
in Strasbourg, which applies the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR). The core idea behind the ECHR is precisely to have a fundamental 
rights court outside and above the state, so that it can offer protection against 
the state where necessary. Primary protection of fundamental rights, therefore, 
remains at the national level, but the ECtHR forms a safeguard where the state 
fails to respect fundamental rights. The Council of Europe, however, should 
not be confused with the EU. The Council of Europe is an independent, sepa-
rate international organization, with a different and more limited mandate. 
It also is a less far reaching form of integration, and does not even come close 
to the level and scope of supranational integration achieved in the EU.
The first step in the creation of what would become the EU, however, was 
only taken with the famous Schuman declaration of 9 May 1950.9 In this dec-
laration, largely drafted by Jean Monnet, Schuman proposed the creation of a 
European Coal and Steel Community:
Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will 
be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto 
solidarity. The coming together of the nations of Europe requires the 
7   This narrative obviously leaves out the often atrocious acts of European states outside the EU 
as, sadly enough, these acts never played as central a role in uniting Europe as the destruction 
European states visited on themselves.
8   See especially Title VII of the UN Charter and the powers of the UN Security Council con-
tained therein.
9   On the failure of two other attempts concerning political and military integration see for 
example E. Fursdon, The European Defence Community: A History (Macmillan, 1980) and 
R. Cardozo, ‘The Project for a Political Community (1952–2), in R. Pryce (ed), The Dynamics of 
European Union (Croom Helm 1987).
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elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany. Any action 
taken must in the first place concern these two countries.
With this aim in view, the French Government proposes that action 
be taken immediately on one limited but decisive point: It proposes that 
Franco-German production of coal and steel as a whole be placed under 
a common High Authority, within the framework of an organisation open 
to the participation of the other countries of Europe.
The pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide 
for the setting up of common foundations for economic development as 
a first step in the federation of Europe, and will change the destinies of 
those regions which have long been devoted to the manufacture of muni-
tions of war, of which they have been the most constant victims.
The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that 
any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, 
but materially impossible. The setting up of this powerful productive 
unit, open to all countries willing to take part and bound ultimately to 
provide all the member countries with the basic elements of industrial 
production on the same terms, will lay a true foundation for their eco-
nomic unification.
This production will be offered to the world as a whole without dis-
tinction or exception, with the aim of contributing to raising living stan-
dards and to promoting peaceful achievements. With increased resources 
Europe will be able to pursue the achievement of one of its essential 
tasks, namely, the development of the African continent.
In this way, there will be realised simply and speedily that fusion of 
interest which is indispensable to the establishment of a common eco-
nomic system; it may be the leaven from which may grow a wider and 
deeper community between countries long opposed to one another by 
sanguinary divisions.
By pooling basic production and by instituting a new High Authority, 
whose decisions will bind France, Germany and other member countries, 
this proposal will lead to the realisation of the first concrete foundation 
of a European federation indispensable to the preservation of peace.
Without condoning in any form the reference to Africa, the central idea behind 
the Schuman declaration was to create a supranational authority over Coal 
and Steel, which were at that time the two central commodities for industri-
alization and war. In addition, the declaration already contained the inter-
connection of peace and prosperity that was to become central to European 
integration. On the one hand, economic integration formed a tool to ensure 
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peace: once key industries were integrated war would become an (economic) 
impossibility. On the other hand, economic development and increased pros-
perity also formed an end in itself for a Europe ravaged by war. Continued 
peace, moreover, would also contribute to prosperity as nothing undermines 
continued prosperity as armed conflict.10
The European Coal and Steel Community was established in 1952 by the six 
‘founding members’ France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxemburg and The 
Netherlands, and contained the vital supranational elements suggested by 
Schuman and Monnet.11 Most importantly, a supranational High Authority 
was established, the later Commission, which could take binding decisions 
within its own mandate.12 The supranational nature of the ECSC distinguished 
it from ‘normal’ intergovernmental organizations, and allowed it to be far more 
effective and successful.
1.3 From Coal and Steel to the European Community
In 1957, following the success of the ECSC, two additional organisations, both 
clearly supranational in character, were created: the European Atomic Agency 
(EAA), and the European Economic Community (EEC).13 In contrast to the 
ECSC and the EAA, however, the EEC was not limited to specific sectors such as 
coal and steel or atomic energy, but covered the entire economy. The EEA and 
the EEC were established by the same six countries that also pioneered the 
establishment of Coal and Steel Community.
Of these three organisations it is the EEC that developed furthest and con-
tributed most to the economic integration in Europe.14 Its growth over the past 
decades, both in scope as in membership, has been quite impressive.
10   See on this combination also EU Chapter 9.
11   Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (Paris, 18 April 1951).
12   See further on this point EU Chapter 2.
13   The Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the 
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (also known as the Treaty of 
Rome), (Rome, 25 March 1957).
14   In fact the ECSC itself no longer exists. As the ECSC Treaty was concluded for a limited 
period of 50 years, it expired in 2002 with all the assets and activities of the ECSC being 
subsumed into the EU.
 29The Road To European Integration
1.3.1 Development of the EEC
The development of the EEC was, of course, gradual, but certain crucial stages 
in its development can be singled out. After the initial successes and enthusi-
asm, the first critical challenge came in the 1960s and 1970s. During this time, 
and largely due to the political resistance by French president De Gaulle, the 
EEC had slowly retreated to a more intergovernmental way of functioning. In 
June 1965 the situation escalated when De Gaulle walked out of negotiations, 
and for more than half a year the French refused to participate at all, a situa-
tion that became known as the ‘empty chair crisis’. This crisis was resolved in 
January of 1966 with the Luxembourg Accords, but at a very high price. Under 
the Luxembourg Accords, every Member State could declare that a certain pro-
posal being discussed in the Council touched on ‘very important national inter-
est’, which would then obligate the others not to vote on the proposal at all. De 
facto, the Luxemburg Accords gave every Member State a veto whenever they 
wanted to claim one, and they did so frequently. The increasingly frequent use 
of vetoes blocked decision-making, undermined the supranational assump-
tions underlying the EEC, and led to a long period of political stagnation.15
During this period of political stagnation, it was the European Court of 
Justice (CJEU) that kept the process of integration going, inter alia with its 
seminal judgments on the direct effect and supremacy of EU law, as well as on 
the free movement rights of companies and individuals.16 For when political 
decision-making on EU legislation was blocked, the CJEU was able to interpret 
and apply EU primary law, as contained in the different Treaties, and develop 
it into an effective system of rights and obligations. The case law of the CJEU 
thereby helped to keep European integration alive and relevant, but also pro-
vided an impetus for the political revival of European integration and the 
internal market.
This revival came with Single European Act of 1986 (SEA), which was the 
first large Treaty amendment since 1957.17 The SEA placed the ‘single market’ at 
the forefront of European integration, and, with that renewed economic focus 
managed to energise the Communities. For example, it created an ambitious 
aim to finalize the internal market by 31 December 1992, created new compe-
tences to that end, and allowed decision-making by qualified majority, remov-
ing the blockage created by the Luxembourg Accords.18
15   See J-M. Palavret et al. (eds.) Visions, Votes and Vetoes: Reassessing the Luxembourg 
Compromise 40 Years On (Peter Lang, 2006).
16   See for a discussion of this seminal case law EU Chapters 4 and 9–13.
17   The Single European Act (Luxembourg, 17 February 1986), OJ [1987] L169.
18   See further EU Chapter 9 on the SEA and its importance.
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The SEA indeed contributed to a new energy for European integration, 
especially concerning the internal market where a flurry of legislative activ-
ity ensued. Already in 1992, however, the EU was faced with a truly existential 
event: the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the subsequent col-
lapse of the Soviet Union.19 The fall of the Berlin Wall not only led to German 
reunification, and hence a major power shift in the EU, but also to fundamen-
tal questions as to the political nature of the EU and the role of the EU on the 
international stage.
1.3.2 From European Community to Full European Union
The new political reality could also be seen in the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, 
an important milestone in European integration.20 Maastricht formally broad-
ened the scope and ambitions of European integration to Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home affairs ( JHA), taking it clearly 
beyond economic integration alone. At the same time, Member States were 
unwilling to grant supranational authority over such sensitive fields as justice 
and foreign policy.21 Consequently, Maastricht created the so-called ‘temple’ 
structure, a rather uncommon model in constitutional design. Three separate 
‘pillars’ were created. The first pillar was formed by the former EEC, which 
was renamed the ‘European Community (EC)’ to reflect its extended ambit. 
This first pillar remained supranational in character. The Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home affairs ( JHA) formed two 
separate, essentially intergovernmental, pillars. Jointly, these three pillars 
supported the ‘roof ’ of the temple, being the European Union. At this stage 
of integration, therefore, the European Community remained the suprana-
tional heart of European integration, whereas the name ‘European Union’ only 
referred to the wider construct based on the three pillars.
The Treaty of Maastricht also introduced EU Citizenship and further 
empowered the European Parliament as part of a broader attempt to improve 
the democratic legitimacy and functioning of the EU.22 Moreover, it contained 
a commitment to the creation of an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), 
19   See on the enormous impact of this event for the EU inter alia L. van Middelaar, The 
Passage to Europe. How a Continent Became a Union (Yale University Press, 2014), 
chapter 6.
20   Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) (7 February 1992, Maastricht), OJ [2992] 
C 191.
21   See further EU Chapter 5.
22   See further EU chapter 2 on the development of the European Parliament and EU 
Chapter 11 on the concept of EU Citizenship.
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including the introduction of a single currency (the euro), and provided a 
detailed roadmap for its development.23
The Treaty of Maastricht, therefore, contained several far reaching ambi-
tions, but ran into severe difficulties. The ratification of the Treaty was first 
rejected in a Danish referendum, only received 51% of votes in a French refer-
endum, and was heavily fought over in the UK. Only after a second referendum 
in Denmark in May 1993 could the Treaty enter into force. The difficult and 
contested ratification of Maastricht proved a sign of a wider disenchantment 
with European integration, as popular support for the project decreased from 
well over 70% in 1990 to around 50% in 1996.
Subsequent Treaties failed to address these concerns and the different prob-
lems associated with the Maastricht Treaty. The Treaty of Amsterdam, which 
came into effect on May 1st 1999 was markedly less ambitious in its goals and 
achievements. Besides renumbering the existing Treaties, the main alterations 
lay in the free movement of persons, the wider use of the co-decision pro-
cedure, and the introduction of a possibility of ‘closer cooperation’ between 
Member States. The main goal of the Amsterdam Treaty, which was to prepare 
the EU for the approaching enlargement with ten new Member States, was 
certainly not achieved, but rather postponed to the Nice Summit of 2000. The 
Treaty of Nice, however, also failed to achieve sufficient results. The compro-
mises reached were complex and not sufficient to deal with the enlargement 
or the other structural challenges facing the EU.
Consequently, already one year after Nice, the 2001 Laeken declaration of 
the European Council called for a ‘deeper and wider debate about the future 
of the European Union’. The Laeken declaration led to the creation of a 
‘European Convention’ to discuss the future of the EU, and to draft a ‘European 
Constitution’ which would enable the EU to develop further and to deal more 
satisfactorily with the issues raised by enlargement. In 2004, the Convention 
indeed led to a new Treaty entitled the ‘Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe’.24
The Constitutional Treaty was certainly no traditional, statal constitution 
and did not intend to create a European federation. At the same time, the new 
Treaty did purport to further constitutionalise European integration and reflect 
the deep integration reached in Europe.25 In line with these constitutional 
23   The EMU is discussed in more detail in EU Chapter 13.
24   OJ [2004] C 310.
25   See on the contested question of whether the EU Treaties constitute a Constitution 
inter alia B. De Witte, ‘The European Union as an international legal experiment’, in: 
G. de Búrca and J.H.H. Weiler, The Worlds of European Constitutionalism’ (CUP, 2012), 
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ambitions, the Constitutional Treaty was put to a vote in national referenda, 
where it suffered a humiliating defeat. On 29 May 2005, 55 per cent of the 
French voters said no, and on 1 June 2005 even 62 per cent of the Dutch voters 
rejected the Constitutional Treaty.
The precise grounds for these rejections can be debated, and over two-thirds 
of all Member States did ratify, but the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty 
was a major set-back for the EU. After a two year ‘period of reflection’, work was 
started in 2006 on what would become the Lisbon Treaty.26 In 2007 a relatively 
short Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) was held that hammered out a new 
Treaty largely based on the text of the Constitutional Treaty.27 The new Treaty 
was signed on 13 December in Lisbon, hence officially becoming ‘the Lisbon 
Treaty’.28 The Lisbon Treaty survived the national ratification process and dif-
ferent constitutional challenges brought against it, though at a further price 
in legitimacy, and entered into force on 1 December 2009.29 Consequently, the 
Treaty of Lisbon established the legal framework for the EU currently in place.
1.3.3 The Legal Framework after Lisbon
Since the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU is based on two Treaties of equal legal value: 
the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
19, D. Grimm, ‘Types of Constitutions’, in: M. Rosenfeld and A. Sajó (eds) The Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (OUP, 2012), 99, A. Von Bogdandy and 
J. Bast (eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law (2nd edn, Hart, 2010), N. Walker, 
‘Big ‘C’ or small ‘c’’ 12 European Law Journal (2006), 12, S. Douglas-Scott, Constitutional Law 
of the European Union (Pearson 2002), or G. De Búrca, ‘The Institutional Development of 
the EU: A Constitutional Analysis’, in: P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU 
law (OUP, 1999), 55.
26   See European Commission, The Period of Reflection and Plan D (Com(2006)212,2 and the 
EU Council Declaration of 25 March 2007, par. 3.
27   See for an impressive overview M. Dougan, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning Minds, 
not Hearts’ 45 CMLRev (2008), 617.
28   Treaty of Lisbon (13 December 2007, Lisbon), OJ [2007] C 306.
29   See especially in this regard the judgment by the German Constitutional Court on the 
compatibility of the Lisbon Treaty with the German Constitution in BVerfGE, 2 BvE 
123,267, 2 BvE 2/08 (2009) Lissabon Urteil as discussed inter alia by D. Grimm, ‘Comments 
on the German Constitutional Court’s Decision on the Lisbon Treaty. Defending 
Sovereign Statehood against Transforming the European Union into a State’, 5 European 
Constitutional Law Review (2009), 353, C. Schönberger, ‘Lisbon in Karlsruhe: Maastricht’s 
Epigone at Sea’, 10 German Law Journal (2009), 1201, and F. Schorkopf, ‘The European 
Union as An Association of Sovereign States: Karlsruhe’s Ruling on the Treaty of Lisbon; 
10 German Law Journal (2009), 1220.
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European Union (TFEU).30 In addition, Article 6 TEU declares that the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union shall have the same legal value 
as the Treaties. Even though it was not politically feasible to include the Charter 
directly into the text of the Treaties, therefore, the Charter does form part of EU 
primary law and has the same hierarchical status as the TEU and the TFEU.31
Importantly, Lisbon also removed the pillar structure introduced by the 
Treaty of Maastricht. Formally, therefore, there are no more pillars and 
the European Community no longer exists but has been replaced by the 
European Union. This unification of EU law was one important aim of Lisbon. 
At the same time, however, Member States were still not willing to subsume 
foreign policy under a supranational approach. Consequently, Title V of the 
TEU creates a special, largely intergovernmental regime for the Union’s exter-
nal action and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The result of 
this special regime can be described as a kind of ‘hidden’ pillar for external 
relations. Within this hidden pillar Member States remain the key actors in 
most areas of external policy, excluding areas such as trade.32
With the Treaty of Lisbon, two decades of almost constant Treaty change 
and turmoil came to a close. In these 20 years of Treaty making the EEC devel-
oped into a three pillared temple capped by a European Union, only to sub-
sequently morph into a complete European Union with its own citizens and 
currency. During these decades, however, multiple important factors remained 
constant as well, including many of the foundational doctrines of EU law and 
free movement set out in later chapters. In addition, the EU retained its key 
focus on peace and prosperity, even if new objectives and competences were 
added.
Considering the significant political and legal difficulties encountered dur-
ing these Treaty changes, and because finding unanimity with 28 Member 
States has proven far from easy, the expectation after Lisbon was that no major 
Treaty revision would be attempted for at least some time, even though the 
project of integration itself is of course far from finished.33 The prospect of 
Brexit may alter this prediction, even though it may also be possible to deal 
30   The Treaty of Lisbon only served to create these two Treaties, meaning one refers to the 
provisions in these Treaties directly, and not to the Treaty of Lisbon as such when citing 
EU law.
31   See also EU Chapter 3 on the hierarchy of norms within EU law and EU Chapter 6 on the 
application and scope of the Charter.
32   See on the special nature and status of external relations and the CFSP further EU 
Chapter 5.
33   See for the rules on Treaty change Article 48 TEU. Further see on the use of international 
law instrument where Treaty change proved unfeasible, for example during the euro 
crisis, EU Chapter 13.
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with a withdrawal of the UK from the EU without opening the ‘Pandora’s box’ 
of general Treaty revision, in which many Member States may seek to change 
the fundamental set-up of the EU in their own (short-term) interests. Before we 
turn to a brief discussion of Brexit, and the likelihood of a first ever reduction 
in EU membership, however, the next section first describes the enlargement 
of the EU from a group of six to a group of 28 Member States, an important 
process that should be considered in parallel with the political and legal devel-
opment set out above.
1.4 Here and Back Again: From Enlargement to Brexit
1.4.1 Enlarging the EU
As indicated above, the EU started out as a Community of six ‘Founding 
Members’, being Germany, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Belgium and 
Luxembourg. From the very start, however, the relevant Treaties always envis-
aged the accession of new members.34 An option that has been intensively 
used, and has had a major impact on the nature and development of the EU.35
After accession of the UK had been blocked by De Gaulle in 1961 and 1967, 
the first enlargement of the EU took place in 1973 when Denmark, Ireland 
and the UK joined. In 1981 Greece joined the EU as well, with Spain and Portugal 
joining in 1986 and Austria, Finland and Sweden becoming Member States in 
1995. The biggest single enlargement took place in 2004 when ten primarily 
Eastern European countries joined the EU, being Cyprus, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. In 
2007, these countries were joined by Bulgaria and Romania, which were not yet 
deemed ready in 2004. The last enlargement took place in 2013 when Croatia 
became the 28th Member State of the EU. At the time of writing, moreover, 
Albania, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia 
are in the waiting room wanting to join the EU, albeit that for most, acces-
sion may take a very long time. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo have been 
promised the prospect of joining when they are ready. Turkey forms a very spe-
cial case as its accession to the EU was already envisioned by the 1963 Ankara 
Association agreement, yet its accession currently seems further away than 
ever due to growing political tensions and conflicts.
34   Art. 237 of the Treaty of Rome, for example, already provided that ‘any European state 
may apply to become a member of the Community’.
35   See for an overview and analysis, including of the ‘enlargement fatigue’ the may have 
arisen by now, C. Hillion, ‘EU Enlargement’, in: P. Craig and G. De Búrca (eds): The 
Evolution of EU Law (2nd edn., OUP 2011), 187 et seq.
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Even if the EU may currently suffer from ‘enlargement fatigue’, one of the 
open questions of EU integration therefore remains: ‘where does Europe stop’? 
To accede, however, candidate countries have to follow an increasingly long 
and arduous path. To begin with, any state that wishes to join must first request 
permission to become a member from the Council.36 The Council then decides 
by unanimity, after consulting the Commission and receiving the assent of the 
European Parliament. If these requirements are met, an accession agreement 
will be negotiated with the applicant, usually with the Commission negotiat-
ing on behalf of the EU. If an accession agreement is reached this agreement 
must then be ratified unanimously by all the Member States.37
1.4.2 Downsizing the EU?
At the time of writing, however, the EU is more concerned with existing 
Member States leaving the EU than new Member States joining. On 23 June 
2016, 51.9%, or 17.410.742 of the British voters chose to leave the EU. With a 
turnout of 72,2%, a large minority of 48,1%, or 16.141.241 of the voters, opted 
to remain. The ‘Leave’ camp therefore won the day with a difference of 3,8% 
or 1.269.501 votes.38 The new British Prime Minister, Theresa May, has since 
indicated that ‘Brexit means Brexit’—whatever that may mean by itself—and 
that she intends to start the formal procedure for withdrawal before the end 
of March 2017.39
The precise outcome of Brexit will largely be decided on the field of poli-
tics, and not in the legal arena. In addition, with the withdrawal of a Member 
State, the EU is entering new territory, with very little precedents to guide it.40 
Nevertheless, law will certainly have a role to play, and there are at least several 
36   See, reaffirming this notion even in the face of impressive enlargement to the East, 
the 1992 European Council Conclusions (EC Bulletin 6–1992, 1.4.) together with the condi-
tions established for such accession in Copenhagen the next year. See also K.E. Smith, 
‘The Evolution and Application of EU Membership Conditionality’, in: M. Cremona (ed), 
The enlargement of the European Union (OUP 2003), 105 et seq.
37   Art. 49 TEU.
38   The outcome of the referendum therefore invalidates the earlier ‘deal’ between Cameron 
and the other 27 Heads of State and Government, see par. 4 of the European Council 
Conclusions of 19 February 2016, EUCO 1/16.
39   See for example the speech of May on 2 October 2016 to the conservative convention in 
Brighton.
40   Contrary to what is sometimes claimed, the cases of Algeria and Iceland do not provide 
relevant guidance, see A. Tatham, ‘ “Don’t Mention Divorce at the Wedding, Darling!” EU 
Accession and Withdrawal after Lisbon’ in Andrea Biondi, Piet Eeckhout and Stefanie 
Ripley (eds), EU Law after Lisbon (OUP 2012), 143 and F. Weiss, ‘Greenland’s Withdrawal 
from the European Communities’ (1985) 10 ELR, 173.
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rules and principles that will guide and influence the process of Brexit. Several 
of the most important ones will be briefly set out below, focusing on the 
nature and background of Article 50 TEU, the process for the withdrawal, and 
the nature and number of agreements that will to be concluded for Brexit to 
become a reality.41
1.4.2.1 The Nature and Background of Article 50 TEU
Long before the Treaty of Lisbon, the general consensus was that Member 
States could leave the EU.42 After all, it was hardly conceivable that the EU 
could keep a Member State in against its will, even though the precise 
modalities of leaving were far from clear.43 The right to leave the EU, however, 
was only explicitly recognized in Article I-60 of the Constitutional Treaty. After 
the rejection of this Treaty, as discussed above, the right to withdraw from the 
EU was codified by the Treaty of Lisbon in Article 50 TEU, which reads:
41   For further analysis please see P. Craig, ‘Brexit: a drama in six acts’ 2016 (4) European 
Law Review, 447, N. Walker, ‘The European Fallout’ German Law Journal Brexit 
Supplement (2016) 126, G. Davies, ‘What Does It All Mean?’, German Law Journal 
Brexit Supplement (2016) 7, B. De Witte, ‘Near-membership, partial membership end the 
EU constitution’, (2016) (4) European Law Review, 471, R.J. Friel, ‘Providing a Constitutional 
framework for withdrawal from the EU: Article 59 of the Draft European Constitution’ 
(2004) 53 ICLQ, p. 407, S. Berglund, ‘Prison or Voluntary Cooperation? The Possibility of 
Withdrawal from the European Union’ (2006) 29 Scandinavian Political Studies, p. 147, 
F. Harbo, ‘Secession Right—An Anti-Federal Principle? Comparative Study of Federal 
States and the EU’ (2008) 1 Journal of Politics and Law, p. 132, J. Herbst, ‘Observations on 
the Right to Withdraw from the European Union: Who are the “Masters of the Treaties”?’ 
(2005) 6 GLJ, 1755, H. Hofmeister, ‘ “Should I Stay or Should I Go?”—A Critical Analysis 
of the Right to Withdraw From the EU’ (2010) 16 ELJ, 589, A. Lazowski, ‘Withdrawal from 
the European Union and Alternatives to Membership’ (2012) 37 ELRev, 523, P. Nicolaides, 
‘Withdrawal from the European Union: A Typology of Effects’ (2013) 20 MJ, 209, Jean Claude 
Piris, ‘Should the UK withdraw from the EU: legal aspects and effects of possible options’, 
Fondation Robert Schuman / European Issues n°355 / 5th May 2015, A. Tatham, ‘ “Don’t 
Mention Divorce at the Wedding, Darling!” EU Accession and Withdrawal after Lisbon’ in 
A. Biondi, P. Eeckhout and S. Ripley (eds), EU Law after Lisbon (2012), 128, and last but far 
from least, C. Hillion, ‘Accession and Withdrawal in the Law of the European Union’, in: 
A. Arnull and D. Chalmers (eds): The Oxford handbook of European Law (OUP 2015), 126.
42   See also A. Cuyvers, The EU as a Confederal Union of Sovereign Member Peoples—
Exploring the potential of American (con)federalism and popular sovereignty for a con-
stitutional theory of the EU (Diss. Leiden, 2013), 88 a.o., as well as K. Widdows, ‘The 
Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties Containing no Denunciation Clause’ (1983) 53 British 
Ybk Intl L, 102 and paragraph 55 of the Maastricth Urteil (BVerfGE 89, 155) of the German 
Constitutional Court.
43   Cf. K. Lenaerts and P. van Nuffel, Constitutional Law of the European Union (Thomson, 
2005), 363.
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1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accor-
dance with its own constitutional requirements.
2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European 
Council of its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by 
the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an 
agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its with-
drawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship 
with the Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance 
with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, 
acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the 
European Parliament.
3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the 
date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, 
two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the 
European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, 
unanimously decides to extend this period.
4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of the European 
Council or of the Council representing the withdrawing Member State 
shall not participate in the discussions of the European Council or 
Council or in decisions concerning it.
5. A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)
(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
6. If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its 
request shall be subject to the procedure referred to in Article 49.
This affirmation and codification of the right to withdraw served several pur-
poses. Firstly, it was an important symbolical recognition of the ultimate sover-
eignty of the Member States. They remained the ultimate Herren der Verträge, 
or Masters of the Treaty.44 This recognition also was intended as a reassurance 
and legitimization of deeper integration: as Member States could always leave, 
the implication was that any deeper integration confirmed their implicit 
consent.45
44   A. Tatham, ‘ “Don’t Mention Divorce at the Wedding, Darling!” EU Accession and 
Withdrawal after Lisbon’ in A. Biondi, P. Eeckhout and S. Ripley (eds), EU Law after Lisbon 
(2012), 148.
45   C. Hillion, ‘Accession and Withdrawal in the Law of the European Union’, in: A. Arnull 
and D. Chalmers (eds): The Oxford handbook of European Law (OUP 2015), 126, F. Harbo, 
‘Secession Right—An Anti-Federal Principle? Comparative Study of Federal States and 
the EU’ (2008) 1 Journal of Politics and Law, 132.
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Secondly, Article 50 TEU was intended to draw the question of withdrawal 
within the scope of EU law itself. Instead of question of Public International 
Law, withdrawal from the Union should become a question of EU law itself.46 
Thirdly, Article 50 TEU was also intended, at least partially, to make the process of 
leaving the EU unattractive. As will be discussed further below, for example, the 
withdrawing Member State is placed in a difficult negotiation position by 
the short two-year period in principle provided to complete the withdrawal.47 
These different aims and objectives of Article 50 TEU should be kept in mind 
when interpreting and applying this brief, rather open, and sometimes vague 
provision.
1.4.2.2 The Process of Withdrawal under Article 50 TEU
Article 50 TEU provides that a Member State must first decide to withdraw 
from the Union ‘in accordance with its own constitutional requirements.’ 
Subsequently, the Member State must ‘notify the European Council of its 
intention’ to leave.48 The formal process of withdrawal only starts after a noti-
fication has been handed in. Until the UK hands in its notification, therefore, 
nothing changes in its legal position under EU law, and the EU is formally not 
even allowed to open negotiations with the UK on its exit.49
Once a notification has been handed in, the question may arise if a Member 
State may also revoke its notification to withdraw. One could argue that the 
two-year period in Article 50 TEU would be undermined if a Member State 
could revoke its notification, and that the option of revoking a notification 
might allow abuse by Member States.50 Indeed the parties and the UK High 
46   See for an alternative view L.F.M. Besselink, ‘Beyond Notification: How to Leave the Union 
without Using Article 50 TEU’, U.K. Const. L. Blog (30th Jun 2016) (available via <http://
ukconstitutionallaw.org>).
47   Cf. J. Herbst, ‘Observations on the Right to Withdraw from the European Union: Who are 
the “Masters of the Treaties”?’ (2005) 6 GLJ, 1757–8. At the same time the two year limit 
also forms a protection for the Member State that wants to withdraw, as it cannot be kept 
in the EU against its will.
48   As we have seen so far, this has raised the question of UK constitutional law if the UK 
government is allowed to submit a notification under the Royal Prerogative, or whether 
it needs an act of Parliament to do so. At the time of writing, the appeal to the Supreme 
Court against the High Court decision in R (on the application of Miller and Dos Santos) 
v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2016] EWHC 2768 is still pending.
49   See also point two of the statement after the informal European Council of 27 to 29 June 
2016.
50   See for example S. Lechner en R Ohr, ‘The Right of Withdrawal in the Treaty of Lisbon: 
A Game Theoretic Reflection on Different Decision Processes in the EU,’ CEGE 
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Court in R (on the application of Miller and Dos Santos) v Secretary of State sim-
ply assume that revoking a notice is not possible, and that a notice, once given, 
therefore means a one way ticket to leaving the EU.51
On closer inspection, however, the more correct interpretation seems to be 
that a notification under Article 50(2) TFEU can be revoked. To begin with, it 
is hard to imagine that the European Council would actually refuse a Member 
State to remain in the EU, certainly if the revocation of the notification to with-
draw was given after a new election or a new referendum. In addition, how-
ever, it can be argued that a refusal to accept the revocation of a notification 
of withdrawal would also violate the EU’s obligation of sincere cooperation, its 
obligation to strive towards an ‘ever closer union’ and its obligation to protect 
and safeguard the EU citizenship of all British subjects that stand to loose their 
citizenship after a Brexit.52
Once a notification has been given by the UK, however, a two year clock 
starts to tick. If no withdrawal agreement has been agreed and entered into 
force within two years, the UK will automatically and unilaterally leave the 
EU without any agreement on its withdrawal or its new relation with the EU.53 
This scenario is one road towards the so called ‘hard Brexit’ and can be com-
pared to the scenario where one partner comes home and discovers that the 
locks have been changed.
Article 50(3) TEU, however, does allow the European Council, by unanimity 
and with the consent of the UK, to extend this period. Moreover, Article 50(3) 
TEU does not limit the length or the number of such extensions that may be 
agreed. The requirement of unanimity, however, means that any Member State 
may veto an extension, thereby potentially driving the UK towards a hard exit.54
During the negotiations on its withdrawal, moreover, the UK remains a full 
Member of the EU, with all the rights and all the obligations of an EU Member. 
Discussion Papers, No. 77, October 2008, Center for European, Governance and Economic 
Development research, Georg-August-Universität, Göttingen (2008), p. 4. Available via 
<http://www.uni-goettingen.de/de/60920.html>.
51   R (on the application of Miller and Dos Santos) v Secretary of State for Exiting the 
European Union [2016] EWHC 2768, par. 4.
52   See by analogy Case C-135/08 Rottmann ECLI:EU:C:2010:104 and Case C-34/09 Zambrano 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:124.
53   Article 50(3) TEU.
54   Cf on this point the testimony by Sir David Edward concerning the risks for the UK in 
assuming an extension will be granted, as cited in par. 44 of the House of Lords European 
Union Committee Report of 4 May 2016 ‘The process of withdrawing from the European 
Union’, available via <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldselect/ldeu 
com/138/138.pdf>.
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This also means that any extension of the two year period automatically lead 
to a prolonged EU membership of the UK, which might be politically unac-
ceptable to the more impatient Brexiteers. The only exception to the rights of 
the UK after it notifies its intention to leave is that the UK Prime Minister and 
UK ministers may no longer ‘participate in the discussions of the European 
Council or Council or in decisions concerning it.’ The extent of this conclusion 
will depend on how broad or narrow an interpretation is given to the vague 
concept of ‘concerning it’.55
1.4.2.3 The Outcome: Two or Three Agreements?
A last point to be addressed, aside from the content of the new relationship 
between the EU and the UK which will not be discussed here, is how many and 
what kind of agreements need to be concluded to realize a Brexit, and what 
the relation between these agreements must be.56 Article 50 TEU itself clearly 
requires at least two agreements: one agreement on the withdrawal itself and 
one, probably far more elaborate, agreement on the new relation between the 
EU and the UK.57
Crucially, both agreements have a different legal basis, and therefore have 
to be adopted under different procedures. The withdrawal agreement is based 
on Article 50 TEU itself, and forms an agreement between the EU and the UK 
alone. As discussed, this withdrawal agreement under Article 50 TEU has to 
be approved by the European Parliament and concluded by the Council by 
qualified majority. With the exception of the UK, therefore, the other Member 
States will not be parties to this withdrawal agreement, which also means 
55   See on this point C. Hillion, ‘Accession and Withdrawal in the Law of the European Union’, 
in: A. Arnull and D. Chalmers (eds): The Oxford handbook of European Law (OUP 2015), 
126, as well as the Editorial Comments of the Common Market Law Review on Brexit, 53 
(2016) Common Market Law Review, 1.
56   For an overview of the different models for the new relationship between the EU and 
the UK, none of which seem to offer much hope, see inter alia S. Dhingra en T. Sampson, 
‘Life after Brexit: What are the UK’s options outside the European Union?’ Centre 
for Economic Performance, London School of Economics Working PaperBrexit 01, 
and HM Government, ‘Alternatives to membership: possible models for the United 
Kingdom outside the European Union’ March 2016, available via <https://www.gov.uk/ 
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/504604/Alternatives_to_ 
membership_-_possible_models_for_the_UK_outside_the_EU.pdf>.
57   Cf. also the House of Lords European Union Committee Report of 4 May 2016 ‘The process 
of withdrawing from the European Union’, point 31. See also A. Tatham, ‘“Don’t Mention 
Divorce at the Wedding, Darling!” EU Accession and Withdrawal after Lisbon’, in: 
A. Biondi, P. Eeckhout en S. Ripley (red.), EU Law after Lisbon, (OUP, 2012), 128.
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that the withdrawal agreement does not require ratification by the individual 
Member States.
The agreement on the new relation, however, will almost certainly be a 
mixed agreement between the EU and the 27 remaining Member States on 
the one side, and the UK on the other.58 This agreement will most likely be 
based on Articles 37 TEU and 217 and 218 TEU concerning respectively the 
CFSP and association agreements. Consequently, the agreement on the new 
relationship will first have to be approved by the European Parliament and 
subsequently adopted by unanimity in the Council.59 Subsequently, however, 
because of its mixity, the agreement on the new relationship will also have 
to ratified by the UK and each of the 27 remaining Member States. In turn, 
these national ratifications may lead to additional referenda or constitutional 
challenges.60
The procedure for the withdrawal agreement, therefore, is already simpler 
and more straightforward than the procedure for the agreement on the new 
relationship. In addition, the substance of the agreement on the new relation 
is also far more complex and extensive than the substance of the withdrawal 
agreement, which could in theory be one paragraph. To illustrate, CETA, the 
trade agreement between the EU and Canada, which is legally and politically 
less complex than Brexit, already took more than seven years, and a successful 
completion is far from certain.
Because the agreement on the new relation is procedurally and substan-
tively far more complex than the withdrawal agreement, however, it is likely 
that the withdrawal agreement can be completed before the agreement on 
the new relationship. In addition, it is also unlikely that a comprehensive new 
agreement on the new relationship between the EU and the UK can even be 
completed within the two year period. This creates a serious problem as in 
terms of substance and effect the withdrawal agreement and the agreement 
on the new relationship are difficult to separate.61 After all, if the withdrawal 
agreement enters into force before the agreement on the new relationship 
is in place, the UK is de facto kicked out of the EU without a new deal, and 
has to negotiate its new relationship with the EU from outside the EU and its 
internal market.
58   See further EU Chapter 5 on the concept of mixed agreements.
59   Article 218(8) VWEU.
60   See also Editorial Comments, (2016) 53 Common Market Law Review, 1.
61   See also B. De Witte, ‘Near-membership, partial membership end the EU constitution’, 
(2016) (4) European Law Review, 471.
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If one wants to avoid such an indirect hard Brexit, only two options seem 
available, and both are problematic. The first option is to link the entry into 
force of the withdrawal agreement to the entry into force of the agreement 
on the new relationship. This would mean that the UK would only withdraw 
from the Union after the entire agreement on the new relationship has been 
finalised and ratified by the EU and all 27 Member States. The price to be paid 
for this approach, which could guarantee a seamless transition to the new sta-
tus of the UK, is a prolonged EU membership of the UK. After all, it is almost 
certain that a comprehensive agreement on the new relationship cannot be 
concluded and ratified within two years. It may be difficult for the British 
government to convince the Leave supporters that they should wait so long 
for their ‘liberation’ from the EU, and the Brexiteers would want to push a 
Brexit through before the general elections that must ultimately be held on 
7 May 2020.
The second option is to link the withdrawal agreement to a third, transi-
tional agreement. This transitional agreement would govern the relationship 
between the EU and the UK after Brexit for as long as it takes to conclude a final 
agreement on the new relation.62 The problem of this second option, however, 
is that concluding a transitional or interim agreement may be almost as com-
plex and time consuming as concluding the final agreement on the new rela-
tionship itself. For, to begin with, the transitional agreement will have to cover 
many of the same points as the final agreement. In addition, the transitional 
agreement will inevitably form a benchmark for the final agreement and may 
be in place for a long time, meaning all parties may negotiate just as hard as for 
the final agreement.
If it proves impossible to find an agreement on a transitional agreement 
within the period of two years, however, we seem left with a choice between 
a hard Brexit, and a seriously prolonged EU Membership of the UK. Neither 
of these choices is very appealing, but this is of course primarily due to the 
fundamentally flawed assumption behind Brexit that it is possible to enjoy 
the benefits of integration without sharing a certain amount of sovereignty 
at the regional level, as the long and bumpy road towards EU integration has 
illustrated. 
62   C. Hillion, ‘Accession and Withdrawal in the Law of the European Union’, in: A. Arnull en 
D. Chalmers (red.), The Oxford handbook of European Law, (OUP, 2015), 126.
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In the law of international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), 
continental organizations such as the European Union (EU) and the African 
Union (AU) and regional organizations including the Association of South East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) the 
term “institutional framework” often refers to the legal framework that guides 
the pursuit of such organizations’ objectives. The term can also refer to the sys-
tems of formal laws, regulations, and procedures, and informal conventions, 
customs, and norms that shape socioeconomic activity and behavior. However 
for the purposes of this book, this Chapter will only highlight the formal orga-
nizational set-up established by the Treaty for the Establishment of the East 
African Community (“the Treaty”). The second part, the legal framework of the 
EAC, will be discussed in Chapter 3.
The importance and relevance of the institutional framework in the East 
African Community (EAC) can be traced to three facts. Firstly, the EAC has 
revived an inter-state co-operation system, whose historical antecedents and 
systematic development between 1967 and 1977 had given rise to an elaborate 
organizational framework of organs and service commissions. The Treaty for 
East African Co-operation 1967 had established institutions such as the East 
African Authority,1 the East African Legislative Assembly,2 Ministers of the 
Community,3 the Common Market Council,4 the Communications Council,5 
the Economic Consultative and Planning Council,6 the Finance Council7 
1   Articles 46–48.
2   Articles 56–60.
3   Articles 49–51.
4   Articles 30–31, 53(a), 54.
5   Articles 53(b), 54, 55.
6   Articles 53(c), 54, 55.
7   Articles 53(d), 54,55.
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and the Research and Social Council;8 corporations such as the East African 
Airways Corporation, the East African Harbours Corporation, the East African 
Railways Corporation, the East African Posts and Telecommunications 
Corporation;9 judicial bodies such as the Court of Appeal for East Africa;10 the 
East African Industrial Court;11 specialized bodies such as the East African 
Development Bank,12 the East African Community Service Commission13 
and the East African Tax Board;14 and specialized departments, and services 
including the East African Medical Research Council and the East African 
Trypanosomiasis Institute.15
Secondly, the renewal and reconceptualization of co-operation among 
the United Republic of Tanzania, the Republic of Kenya and the Republic of 
Uganda in 1993 underscored the importance of an institutional framework. 
This renewal obliged the countries to explore and identify further areas for 
future co-operation and to work out concrete arrangements for co-operation,16 
and therefore the need for an institutional framework became inevitable. This 
was reflected in the institution-creating overtones of the Agreement for the 
Establishment of The Permanent Tripartite Commission for Co-operation 
Between the Republic of Uganda, the Republic of Kenya and the United 
Republic of Tanzania17 and the Protocol on the Establishment of a Secretariat of 
The Permanent Tripartite Commission for Co-operation Between the Republic 
8    Articles 53(e), 54, 55.
9   Articles 71–79.
10   Articles 80–81.
11   Article 85.
12   Articles 21–22.
13   Articles 62–64.
14   Article 88.
15   East African Community, The East African Community; A Handbook 1972, Arusha, East 
African Community Information Division, 1970.The bodies and institutions included 
the Meteorological Department, the Freshwater Fisheries Organisation, the Industrial 
Research Organisation, the Institute of Malaria and Vector-Borne Diseases, the Institute 
for Medical Research, the Leprosy Research Institute, the Marine Fisheries Research 
Organisation, the Pesticides Research Organisation, the Agriculture and Forestry Research 
Organisation, the Trypanosomiasis Research Organisation, the Tuberculosis Investigation 
Centre, the Veterinary Research Organisation and the Virus Research Institute.
16   See Article 14.02 of The East African Community Mediation Agreement 1984.
17   Agreement for the Establishment of a Permanent Tripartite Commission for Co-operation 
Between the Republic of Kenya, The United Republic of Tanzania and the Republic of 
Uganda; see particularly Articles 1–5.
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of Uganda, the Republic of Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania.18 
Jointly, these instruments established a Permanent Tripartite Commission for 
Co-operation and a Secretariat.
Thirdly, the Community is a creature of modern dynamics in regional-
ism. According to Heitne “the new regionalism differs from the old regionalism 
(which was based on security interests in the bi-polar cold war context) in that 
it is a spontaneous process from within a region, is more comprehensive and 
multi-dimensional and encourages non-state actors and incorporates issues 
of accountability and legitimacy.”19 The EAC has grown as a channel for eco-
nomic integration rather than as a consequence of mainly political solidarity 
as did, for example, other erstwhile organizations in Africa.20 New regionalism 
necessitates organized structures for the purpose of effective and sustained 
realization of objectives. Indeed McCormick, with specific reference to the 
EU, argues that, “integration is effectively driven by institutionalized structures. 
For example, the European Union has evolved and is driven by an elaborate 
structure consisting of the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, the 
European Parliament, the European Court of Justice, the European Council and 
specialized agencies”.21
In its objectives as provided under the Treaty, and unlike the situation that 
obtained under the defunct East African Community (1967–1977), its prede-
cessor the East African Common Services Organisation (1961–1967), and the 
colonial arrangement under the East African High Commission (1947–1961), 
the current integration process aims at achieving more than trade liberaliza-
tion and harmonization in infrastructure and services. To use Amerasinghe’s 
approach to the classification of international organizations, the EAC is “an 
inter-governmental, supra-national and closed organization”22 that seeks to 
 
18   Ibid., Article 5; See also The Protocol on the Establishment of a Secretariat of The 
Permanent Tripartite Commission for Co-operation Between The Republic of Uganda, 
The Republic of Kenya and The United Republic of Tanzania.
19   Bjorn Heitne, Development Regionalism in New Directions In Development Economics 
(Growth, Environmental Concerns and Government in the 1990s) Ed by Mats Lundahl and 
Benno J. Ndulu, London Routledge, 1996 pp. 160–164.
20   Such as The Organisation of African Unity and the Southern African Development 
Co-ordination Conference.
21   John McCormick, The European Union, Politics and Policies 4th Edn, (Philadelphia, 
Westview Press 2008), pp. 109–226.
22   C.F. Amerasinghe, Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations, 2nd 
edn, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996 pp. 9–13; See also Henry G. Schermers 
and Niels M. Blokker, International Institutional Law, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff 
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widen and deepen integration with the systematic establishment of a Customs 
Union, a Common Market, a Monetary Union and ultimately a Political 
Federation.23 It also emphasizes strong participation of the private sector and 
civil society in its co-operation programmes and activities.24 The accomplish-
ment of these objectives requires an elaborate and functionally-purposed 
institutional framework.
2.1.2 Legal Basis for the Institutional Framework
Since the Community is an organisation established by states through a treaty, 
the law applicable to its institutional framework is international law. The legal 
basis for the institutional framework is found in Article 9 of the Treaty, which 
stipulates that—
1. There are hereby established as organs of the Community:
(a) the Summit (of Heads of State);
(b) the Council (of Ministers);
(c) the Co-ordination Committee;
(d) Sectoral Committees;
(e) the East African Court of Justice;
( f ) the East African Legislative Assembly;
(g) the Secretariat; and
(h) such other organs as may be established by the Summit.
2. The institutions of the Community shall be such bodies, department 
and services as may be established by the Summit.
3. Upon the entry into force of this Treaty, the East African Development 
Bank established by the Treaty Amending and Re-enacting the Char-
ter of the East African Development Bank, 1980 and the Lake Victoria 
Fisheries Organisation established by the Convention (Final Act) for 
the Establishment of the Lake Victoria Fisheries Organisation, 1994 
and surviving institutions of the former East African Community and 
shall be designated and function as such.
Publishers, 1995 pp. 33–44, and Ray August, et al., International Business Law: Text, Cases 
and Readings, New Jersey, Pearson Education International, Fifth Edition, 2009, pp. 22–23.
23   Articles 2 and 5 of The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community.
24   Articles 5(3)(g), 127–129 of The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African 
Community.
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4. The organs and institutions of the Community shall perform the func-
tions, and act within the limits of the powers conferred upon them by 
or under this Treaty.25
This Treaty outline does not create a distinct institutional framework, it rather 
creates four policy-making and administrative organs and sectoral commit-
tees. These are i.e. the Summit of Heads of State (“the Summit”), the Council 
of Ministers (“the Council”), the Co-ordination Committee, the Secretariat and 
an unspecified number of sectoral committees. This feature could have been 
intended for the reason that the Treaty is underlain by the preponderance of 
the Partner States’ continuous policy rationalization and harmonization. In 
such a scenario a more definite category of organs in the policy domain could 
neither have been provided for with certainty nor foreseen. Apart from the 
policy organs, the Treaty creates advisory and supervisory organs; the East 
African Court of Justice (“the Court”), as the judicial arm of the institutional 
framework; and the East African Legislative Assembly (“the Assembly”) as the 
legislative arm. The Treaty also takes cognizance of institutions.
In a manner corresponding to the Treaty’s providing for co-operation in 
almost all spheres of economic, social, cultural, political and other endeav-
ors for the Partner States’ fast, balanced and sustainable development, the 
basis for the institutional framework leaves room for the creation of such other 
organs and institutions as the Summit may, in the discharge of its functions 
deem necessary.
It is important to observe that the Partner States subscribe to an under-
taking that “Community organs, institutions and laws shall take precedence 
over similar national ones on matters pertaining to the implementation of [the] 
Treaty”.26 Therefore contrary to what may occur in practice, this undertaking in 
institution-building pinpoints the supremacy of the Community’s organs and 
institutions in leading the process of integration.
It must be further observed that in the discharge of their respective func-
tions the organs and institutions are bound by the fundamental and opera-
tional principles of the Community. Critical among these principles under the 
Treaty are those that stress a “people-centered and market-driven co-operation”27 
and the application of subsidiarity,28 both of which are critical tenets in the 
25   Article 9 read together with Articles 10–12, 13–16, 17–19, 20–22, 23–47, 48–65, and 66–73.
26   Article 8(4).
27   Article 7(1)(a).
28   Article 7(1)(d); the principle of subsidiarity emphasizes multi-level participation and the 
involvement of a wide range of stakeholders in the process on integration.
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establishment of a single market and investment area. In the discharge of their 
respective functions, including during deliberations and decision-making, the 
organs and institutions are bound by such procedure as they are empowered 
by the Treaty to determine.29 In-built institutional measures such as key minis-
terial consultations and engagement of the private sector and civil society are 
supportive of the institutional decision-making process.30
2.2 Analytical Overview of the Main Organs
The roles of the different organs and institutions seem to mirror the Partner 
States’ intended metamorphosis, outlined in Article 5(2) of the Treaty, from 
a co-operation arrangement through integration into a political federation 
most presumably with a single government. Therefore in a manner reflec-
tive of the theory of separation of powers the Court is the judicial organ 
of the Community,31the Council is the main policy organ32 and the Assembly 
is the legislative organ of the Community.33
It is important not only to highlight the nature of each organ and institu-
tion, by reference to its composition and functions and responsibilities, but 
also to highlight some fundamental challenges and contradictions facing each 
organ or institution.
2.2.1 The East African Legislative Assembly
The Assembly consists of elected members who are elected by the National 
Assemblies of the Partner States (elected members); ex-officio members 
consisting of the Ministers responsible for East African Affairs from each 
Partner State; the Secretary General; and the Counsel to the Community.34 
Regarding the elected members Article 50(1) of the Treaty provides that “The 
29   Pursuant to Articles 12(5),15(4),19(3),42 and 60 the Summit, the Council, the Co-ordination 
Committee, the Court and the Assembly have determined their respective rules of 
procedure.
30   These measures include regular meetings and consultations among key Ministers respon-
sible for East African Community Affairs, Finance, Justice; Central Bank Governors; 
the business community under the auspices of the East African Business Council; and 
the Secretary General’s annual forums with identified private sector and civil society 
organizations.
31   Article 23.
32   Article 14.
33   Article 49(1).
34   Article 48(1).
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National Assembly of each Partner State shall elect, not from among its members, 
nine members of the Assembly, who shall represent as much as it is feasible, the 
various political parties represented in the National Assembly, shades of opinion, 
gender and other special interest groups in that Partner State, in accordance with 
such procedure as the National Assembly of each Partner State may determine”.35 
The current membership of the Assembly is 52, with nine elected members 
from each of the five Partner States and seven ex-officio members.
The Assembly is the Community’s legislative organ.36 It is also charged with 
among other functions, liaising with the national assemblies of the Partner 
States on matters relating to the Community,37 debating and approving the 
budget of the Community,38 considering annual reports of the Community39 
and discussing all matters pertaining to the Community.40 It is, to this extent, 
expected to be the people’s representative on matters relevant to the efficient 
functioning of the Community.
In order to comply with the Community policy of popular participation in 
the achievement of its objectives and to reflect the people-centered approach 
of the Community, the views expressed in the debates of the National 
Assemblies are taken into account in the Assembly. By the same token, reports 
on debates of the Assembly are also passed to the National Assemblies for their 
consideration.41
The Assembly’s legislative process is undertaken through enactment of Bills 
initiated by the Council;42 or introduced through motions by any Member 
of the Assembly provided that such a motion relates to the functions of the 
Community.43 However, the Treaty envisages a restriction on the initiation 
of legislation, namely, the requirement that the Assembly shall not proceed 
on any Bill, including an amendment to a Bill that makes provision for the 
imposition of any charge upon any fund of the Community; the payment, issue 
or withdrawal from any fund or the Community of any moneys not charged 
thereon or the increase in the amount of any such payment, issue or with-
drawal; and the remission of any debt due to the Community. Nor can the 
35   Article 50(1).
36   Article 49(1).
37   Article 49(2)(a).
38   Article 49(2)(b).
39   Article 49(2)(c).
40   Article 49(2)(d).
41   Article 65.
42   Article 14(3)(b).
43   Article 59(1).
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Assembly proceed on any motion that makes provision for such purposes.44 
Article 58 of the Treaty outlines the voting procedure in the Assembly, and 
stipulates that voting shall be determined “by a majority of the votes of the mem-
bers present and voting”45 and furthermore that ex-officio members are not 
entitled to vote.46
The Assembly’s relatively wide ambit on legislation must be seen against the 
thrust of the Partner States in the current integration process. Given the fact 
that the Community has already established a Customs Union, a Common 
Market and a Monetary Union, the laying of a strong and effective legislative 
mechanism becomes a sine qua non for both current institutional develop-
ment and the future constitutional basis of the Community. It is against this 
background that the Assembly has since inauguration been able to enact 
basic fundamental laws such as the East African Community Emblems Act 
2003, the East African Community Interpretation Act 2003 and the Acts of the 
Community Act 2003; institutional development laws such as the East African 
Legislative Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Act 2003, the Summit (Delegation 
of Powers and Functions) Act 2007, the Inter-University Council for East Africa 
Act 2008, the East African Legislative Assembly Members Election Act 2011 and 
the East African Community Parliamentary Institute Act, 2012; and annually 
enacted Appropriation Acts whose purpose is to make appropriation out of 
Community’s budgets as approved by the Assembly.
Most critically to integration the Assembly has also enacted laws that are 
supportive of the Partner States’ policy rationalisation and harmonization 
such as the East African Community Customs Management Act 2004, the 
East African Community Competition Act 2006, the Lake Victoria Transport 
Act 2007, the East African Community Joint Trade Negotiations Act 2008, 
the East African Community Standardisation, Quality Assurance, Metrology 
And Testing Act 2008 and the East African Community Budget Act 2009.47 In 
this category are also the East African Community Civil Aviation Safety and 
Security Oversight Agency Act 2009, the East African Community Service 
44   Article 59(2).
45   Article 58(1).
46   Article 58(2).
47   The effectiveness of regional legislation is settled by the provisions of the Treaty 
(Article 8—and especially paragraphs 4 and 5 thereof ) to the effect that Community laws 
shall take precedence over similar national ones on matters pertaining to the implemen-
tation of the Treaty. Therefore once enacted, published and gazetted Community legisla-
tion becomes binding on the Partner States.
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Commission Act 2010, the East African Community Conflict Management 
Act 2012, the East African Community Risk Reduction and Management Act 
2012, the East African Community Vehicle Axle Load, Act 2013, the East African 
Community One Stop Border Posts Act 2013, the East African Elimination 
of Non-Tariff Barriers Act 2014, the East African Community Co-operative 
Societies Act 2014, the East African Community Integration (Education) Act 
2014, the East African Community Electronic Transactions Act 2015, the East 
African Community Creative and Cultural Industries Act 2015, the East African 
Community Electronic Transactions Act 2015, the East African Community 
Persons with Disability Act 2015 and the East African Community Forests 
Management and Protection Act 2015 which are yet to be assented to by the 
Heads of State.48
The trend in the Assembly’s enactment of regional legislation is in quan-
titative contrast with past regional practice. During the period 1961–1977, the 
integration process witnessed the enactment of only 35 Acts of the (now 
defunct) Community. The Assembly’s trend is also more advanced and focused 
when contrasted with that of the Pan-African Parliament and the legislative 
forums of other regional economic communities like SADC, the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and COMESA. The SADC 
Parliamentary Forum is a policy making and deliberative body that approves 
the SADC budget, makes recommendations to the SADC Summit, considers 
and makes recommendations on treaties and promotes SADC objectives and 
programmes. However, the Parliamentary Forum does not legislate and will 
only serve as a legislative body when in future it assumes, as is anticipated, a 
regional parliamentary structure. Likewise, the ECOWAS Parliament is a forum 
for ensuring dialogue, consultation and consensus on matters pertaining to 
the promotion of integration but has no legislative function. Moreover, the 
Protocol Establishing the Pan-African Parliament does not provide for a legis-
lative role among this AU organ’s powers and functions.
However, as much as the legislative momentum is bound to remain on 
course, a few hurdles will have to be addressed, mainly through EAC intra-
organ consultative processes. These hurdles include logistical shortcomings, 
which prevent the Assembly and relevant Committees from discharging work 
strictly in conformity with legislative programmes; the Council’s slow and 
48   By the provisions of Articles 62 and 63, once a Bill has been enacted it is submitted to the 
Heads of State for assent.
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protracted initiation of Bills;49 and Partner States’ delays and intransigence in 
conferring precedence of Community laws over similar national laws.
Moreover, the Assembly has been criticized for exuding a lack of institu-
tional ownership of the Community within the population of East Africa. In 
this regard, Mukandala has long argued that the Assembly’s “set up leaves a lot 
to be desired” on the basis that “members of the Assembly are elected not directly 
by the East African electorate, but by the National Assembly of each Partner State. 
Although those elected are supposed to represent the various political parties and 
shades of opinion, they still will not be direct representatives of the people. As a 
result they will not have a constituency in the wider population to whom they will 
feel obliged to report back.” Furthermore, Mukandala notes that “[s]ince their 
election is a caucus process, it will not involve wide ranging campaigns that can 
educate people on the Community. This is a lost opportunity for the cause of the 
Community to be known, its problems and prospects to be debated, appreciated 
and understood”.50 However, one may plausibly counter argue that besides 
the European Parliament there is no directly elected international assembly 
in the world’s integration processes.
Mukandala’s views are vindicated by the fact that the current process of 
electing the members of the Assembly has often given rise to national par-
liamentary challenge and related litigation. In Prof. Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o & 
10 others v Attorney General of Kenya & 2 Others [Others Intervening],51 the 
Claimants sought an interpretation and application of the Treaty, regard-
ing the validity of the nomination and election of Kenya’s nine represen-
tatives to the Assembly. The Claimants contended that Kenya’s National 
Assembly did not undertake an election within the meaning of Article 50 
of the Treaty and that the Election Rules made by Kenya’s National Assembly 
(The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community (Election of 
Members of the Assembly) Rules 2001) for the purpose of conducting the said 
elections infringed the provisions of Article 50. In support of their claim, evi-
dence was submitted to show that Kenya’s National Assembly only approved 
49   Bills which have pended action by the Council for long include The Lake Victoria Basin 
Commission Bill 2008, The East African Privately-Funded Infrastructure Bill 2009, The 
East African Community Assets Protection Bill 2012 and The East African Community 
Disaster Preparedness Bill 2013.
50   Rwekaza Mukandala, ‘Political Co-operation’ in EAC: Perspectives on Regional Integration 
and Co-operation in East Africa, EAC Secretariat, Arusha/German Agency for Technical 
Co-operation (GTZ), 2000, pp. 101–103.
51   EACJ Ref. No. 1 of 2006.
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names submitted by two political parties. The Court held that the bottom line 
for compliance with Article 50 is that the decision to elect is a decision of and 
by the National Assembly; however the evidence adduced led to only one con-
clusion, namely that the National Assembly of Kenya neither undertook nor 
carried out an election within the meaning of Article 50 of the Treaty.
In Democratic Party and Mukasa Mbidde v Secretary General of the East 
African Community & Attorney General of Uganda52 the Applicants com-
plained of inaction on the part of the Government of the Republic of Uganda 
and its Parliament to amend the 2006 Rules of Procedure of Parliament 
for the election of Uganda’s representatives to the Assembly as earlier directed 
by the Constitutional Court of Uganda.53 They further contended that the inten-
tion to conduct elections of the Assembly Members under the un-amended 
2006 Rules contravened the Treaty in as far as the rules discriminated and lim-
ited the freedom and right of the Democratic Party and its members to associate 
in vying for election as representatives in the Assembly. The Applicant’s sought 
orders to have the Government of the Republic of Uganda and its Parliament 
conform to the provisions of Article 50 of the Treaty. The Court held that 
the 2006 Rules did not conform to the Treaty and restrained the Parliament 
of the Republic of Uganda from conducting the elections unless and until it 
amended the impugned 2006 Rules to conform to Article 50 of the Treaty.
In both cases, and later in Among A. Anita v The Attorney General of Uganda 
and Secretary General of the East African Community54 and Antony Calist Komu 
v Attorney General of The United Republic of Tanzania,55 the Court upheld 
the spirit, tenor, language and intent of Article 50(1) of the Treaty. The Court 
emphasized the requirements of an “election” accommodating all political 
parties and shades of opinion in actualizing the requirements of that provi-
sion, as opposed to a “selection”. The moral of these cases is that the institu-
tional framework could do better with strict compliance with the Treaty or, 
better still, with representation to the Assembly constituted through universal 
adult suffrage.
52   EACJ Ref. No. 6 of 2011.
53   Uganda Constitutional Court Petition No. 28 of 2006: Jacob Oulanyah v Attorney General 
of the Republic of Uganda.
54   EACJ Ref No. 6 of 2012.
55   EACJ Ref No. 7 of 2012.
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2.2.2 The Summit of Heads of State
The Summit, which together with the Council and the Secretariat consti-
tutes the executive arm of the Community, consists of the Heads of State 
or Government of the Partner States.56 A “Head of State” is defined to mean 
“a person designated as such by a Partner State’s Constitution”57 and a “Head 
of Government” means “a person designated as such by a Partner State’s 
Constitution”.58 On the basis of definitions in national Constitutions and inter-
pretation of national laws of the Partner States, both terms refer to Presidents, 
Vice Presidents and Prime Ministers.
The Summit is principally charged with—
(a) giving general directions and impetus as to the development and 
achievement of the objectives of the Community;59
(b) considering annual progress reports and such other reports submitted 
to it by the Council as provided for by the Treaty;60 and
(c) reviewing the state of peace, security and good governance within the 
Community and the progress achieved towards the establishment of a 
Political Federation of the Partner States;61
The Summit is also responsible for—
(a) appointing Judges of the East African Court of Justice (and designate 
the President, the Vice President, the Principal Judge and the Deputy 
Principal Judge);62
(b) handling membership issues such as admitting foreign countries into 
the Community;63 handling sanctions on, and suspension and expul-
sion of errant Partner States;64
56   Article 10.
57   Article 1.
58   Ibid.
59   Article 11(1).
60   Article 11(2).
61   Article 11(3).
62   Articles 24(1), 24(4), 24(5).
63   Article 3(5).
64   Articles 143, 146, 147.
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(c) initiating the process towards the establishment of a Political Federa-
tion by directing the Council to undertake the process;65 and
(d) approving protocols and other annexes to the Treaty.66
The Summit’s functions are arguably limited to overall policy direction, 
whereas implementation, operational policy and similar decisions are made 
by organs subordinate to the Summit. It is also important to note that some 
of the functions of the Summit may, through an Act of the Community, be 
delegated to the Council or the Secretary General.67 This position represents 
a volte-face from the defunct East African Community whose institutional 
arrangement reflected a deep seated involvement of the East African Authority 
which similarly was comprised of Heads of State and whose failure to meet 
and make decisions has often been cited as one of the reasons for the collapse 
of that earlier integration arrangement.68
The functioning of the Summit also observes the principle of the separa-
tion of powers. Firstly, the separation of powers is emphasized by the fact that 
in giving general directions and impetus as to the development and achieve-
ment of the objectives of the Community, the Summit may be said to oper-
ate through the Council from whom it receives reports for consideration.69 
Secondly, there is no operational linkage with the Court or with the Assembly. 
The requirement that each of the members of the Summit assents to Bills 
enacted by the Assembly does not create such a linkage. Reference to “legis-
lative powers” in the provision of the Treaty for an Act on delegation of the 
powers of the Summit70 has sometimes been misconstrued to suggest that 
the Summit may encroach on the Assembly’s domain. However, this reference 
may have been framed only with regard to assent to Bills. It too, therefore, 
cannot create such a linkage.
65   Article 123(6).
66   Article 151(2).
67   Articles 11(5), 11(6), 11(7). It is the actualization of these provisions that gave rise to the 
enactment of The Summit (Delegation of Powers and Functions) Act 2007.
68   Sam G. Nahamya, Regional Economic Disintegration: Tensions, Conflicts and Causes—the 
Case of the East African Community, Fort Collins, Colorado State University, 1980. See also 
Juma Volter Mwapachu, Challenging The Frontiers of African Integration: The Dynamics of 
Policies, Politics and Transformation in the East African Community, Dar es Salaam, E&D 
Vision Publishing Limited, 2012 p. 55.
69   Article 1.
70   Article 11(6).
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The role of the Summit has been subject to judicial scrutiny in The East 
Africa Law Society & 5 Others v the Attorney General of the Republic of Kenya 
& 4 Others.71 The Applicants challenged the legality of an amendment to the 
Treaty which had been adopted by the Summit and which, among other things, 
created new grounds upon which a Judge of the Court could be removed to 
include situations where that Judge is removed from that office for miscon-
duct or due to inability to perform the functions of the office for any reason; 
where the Judge resigns from that office following allegation of misconduct 
or of inability to perform the functions of the office for any reason; or where 
a Judge is subject to investigation by a tribunal or other relevant authority of 
a Partner State with a view to his or her removal from an office referred. The 
amendments also empowered the Summit to suspend a Judge from the exer-
cise of the functions of his or her office on those grounds. It was contended 
by some people that the amendment was motivated by the desire to ‘pun-
ish’ judges of the Court for their decision in Prof. Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o & 10 
Others v The Attorney General of Kenya & 5 Others which had gone against, and 
allegedly “embarrassed” a Partner State. It was further argued that the amend-
ment was in violation of the Treaty provisions in so far as it did not comply 
with the procedures governing amendments to the Treaty—including con-
sultations. A key issue was whether failure to carry out wide consultations on 
the proposals for the amendments to the Treaty constitutes an infringement 
of the Treaty.
The Court, while rightly leaving the amendments intact, held inter alia 
that—
(a) there was a deliberate attempt in the formulation of the Treaty to 
ensure that East Africans, for whose benefit the Community was 
established, participate in protecting the integrity of the Treaty;
(b) the principle of people-centered cooperation is also applicable to 
the Treaty amendment process. Until more elaborate modalities 
are evolved as the Community continues to grow, the resolve to 
allow participation of the private sector and civil society recited in 
the preamble, and the objective to enhance and strengthen part-
nerships with the private sector and civil society enunciated in 
Article 5(3)(g), provide adequate guidelines; and
71   EACJ Ref No. 3 of 2007.
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(c) the introduction of automatic removal and suspension of judges of 
the Court on grounds raised or established in any one Partner State, 
and applicable to only those in judicial or public office, may endan-
ger the integrity of the Court as a regional court.
The decision may generally reflect dictates of good governance. However, the 
Court also decided that “the correct construction of Article 150(5) of the Treaty 
must be that the provision directs the Secretary General to submit proposed 
amendments and comments received from Partner States to the Summit not later 
than the expiry of a period of 90 days. There is no express or implied requirement 
for the Partner States to carry out any consultations, nor is the Secretary General 
required to hold proposed amendments and comments received from Partner 
States until expiration of that period”.72 Indeed some scholars like Kasaija have 
asserted that the application was in effect dismissed and the amendments 
themselves were not bad per se.73
2.2.3 The Council of Ministers
The Council consists of the Ministers responsible for East African Community 
Affairs, the Attorney General and such other Ministers as each Partner State 
may determine.74 A “Minister” in relation to a Partner State means “a person 
appointed as a Minister of the Government of that Partner State and any other 
person, however entitled, who, in accordance with any law of that Partner State, 
acts as or performs the functions of a Minister in that State”.75 The term “Attorney 
General” means “the Attorney General of a Partner State”.76
The Council is the policy organ in as far as implementation of the Treaty 
provisions and integration programmes are concerned.77 The Treaty does 
not define the term “policy”. From an economic and political point of view, 
“policy” should mean a set of principles to broadly guide decisions and achieve 
rational outcomes in a given process. With regard to the Community, policy 
72   Ibid., p. 25.
73   Philip Kasaija, The State of Constitutionalism in East Africa: The Role of the East African 
Community (EAC)-2007 In Constitutionalism in East Africa Ed by Wanza Kioko, Kampala 
Foundation Publishers, 2009 pp. 16–17.
74   Article 13.
75   Article 1.
76   Ibid.
77   Op. cit., footnote 31.
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should relate to the agreed approach towards the realization of the primary or 
strategic objectives of the Community as provided under the Treaty.
This key function of the Council is vindicated by the fact that the Treaty 
bestows on the Council—
(a) advisory roles vis-à-vis all other organs and institutions e.g. to the 
Summit with regard to the salaries and other terms and conditions 
of service of the Judges of the Court and Members of the Assembly; 
the appointment of Deputy Secretaries General of the Community; 
and expansion of country membership of the Community;78
(b) binding supervisory roles in the sense that “Subject to the provi-
sions of the Treaty, the regulations, directives and decisions of the 
Council taken or given in pursuance of the provisions of this Treaty 
shall be binding on the Partner States, on all organs and institutions 
of the Community other than the Summit, the Court and the Assem-
bly within their jurisdictions, and on those to whom they may under 
this Treaty be addressed.”;79 powers to establish institutions such as 
those necessary to administer the Common Market and those like 
specific sectoral councils and sectoral committees;80 and
(c) power to establish institutions such as those necessary to admin-
ister the Common Market and those like specific sectoral councils 
and sectoral committees;81 and
(d) power to consider and approve policy rationalization and harmoni-
zation undertakings in the various areas of co-operation.82
Apart from assisting the Summit in the performance of its functions (including 
the implementation of the decisions and directives of the Summit), and the 
said supervisory powers the Council is required to—
78   Articles 3(6), 25(5), 51(2) and 68(2).
79   Article 16.
80   The Council may establish sectoral councils (Article 14(3)(i)), creates sectoral com-
mittees and may establish institutions for the administration of the Common Market 
(Article 76(3)).
81   The Council may establish sectoral councils (Article 14(3)(i)), creates sectoral com-
mittees and may establish institutions for the administration of the Common Market 
(Article 76(3)).
82   This power applies to progress in all areas of co-operation provided in Chapters Eleven to 
Twenty Seven of the Treaty.
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(a) promote, monitor and keep under constant review the efficient func-
tioning and development of the Community and in this regard, to 
consider measures that should be taken by the Partner States in pro-
moting the attainment of the objectives of the Community;83
(b) initiate and submit Bills to the Legislative Assembly;84
(c) consider the Budget of the Community (once prepared by the Secre-
tary General);85
(d)  make staff and financial rules and regulations;86 and
(e) submit annual progress reports to the Summit.87
For the purpose of ensuring administrative support to the discharge of its func-
tions the Council is required to engage the Counsel to the Community, the 
Registrar of the Court, the Clerk of the Assembly, heads of institutions and 
other members of staff of the Community in employment.88
The current Council can be contrasted to its predecessor, which existed 
under the framework of the defunct EAC. Notably, in comparison to the 
Ministers of the Community, the current Council is significantly less powerful.89 
This contraction of powers is important as the powers bestowed on the Council 
are crucial for ensuring that decisions are taken on time and that implemen-
tation is effectively monitored. For example, directives and regulations are 
the main conduits through which the objectives of the Customs Union, the 
Common Market and the Monetary Union are expected to be achieved.90
The Council’s policy symbiosis with the Assembly is borne out by the lat-
ter’s consideration and enactment into law of the former’s Bills. The Council’s 
83   Articles 14(2), 14(3)(f).
84   Article 14(3)(b).
85   Article 14(3)(e) read together with Article 132(2).
86   Article 14(3)(g).
87   Article 14(3)(h).
88   Articles 45, 49(2)(f), 69 and 70.
89   Juma Volter Mwapachu, Challenging The Frontiers of African Integration: The Dynamics of 
Policies, Politics and Transformation in the East African Community, Dar es Salaam, E&D 
Vision Publishing Limited, 2012 p. 56. See also op. cit., footnote 3.
90   See for example Article 39(1)(c) of The Protocol on the Establishment of the East African 
Community Customs Union, Articles 10(4), 12(3), 19(6), 23(3), 36(2), 41(4), 42(3), 42(5), 
43(5), 44(3), 47(2) and 51 of The Protocol on the Establishment of the East African 
Community Common Market and Article 27 of The Protocol on the Establishment of the 
East African Community Monetary Union.
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dependence on the Court is founded on the provision that “The Council may 
request advisory opinions from the Court.”91
The Council’s discharge of functions has resulted in the development of sev-
eral programmes and projects in different areas of co-operation as outlined by 
the Treaty and using development strategies as bases. The Council’s impact 
on the development of the institutional framework is borne out by the 
fact that it is the Council that proposes the establishment of new organs, 
institutions and offices. It is also the Council that is empowered to grant 
observer status in the Community to inter-governmental and civil society 
organisations.92
Action by the Council was first subject to judicial scrutiny in Calist Mwatela 
and 2 Others v East African Community93 where the Court also underlined 
the separation of powers within the Community’s institutional framework. The 
Applicants challenged the validity of the meeting of the Sectoral Council on 
Legal and Judicial Affairs held between the 13th and 16th of September 2005. 
They contended that a decision reached at that meeting to the effect that 
three Bills originally introduced into the Assembly by way of private member 
motions but which had been taken over by the Council should be withdrawn 
from the Assembly ran contrary to the Treaty and should be rendered null and 
void. The Court decided—
(a) the Treaty has not bestowed any power on the Council to take 
over Bills without observance of the Assembly Rules and the only 
lawful way of withdrawing Bills which have become property of 
the Assembly, as the three Bills had become, is under Rule 34 
of the Assembly Rules which provides for a Motion to be introduced 
in the Assembly for that purpose; and
(b) in light of Articles 14 and 16 of the Treaty, the decisions of the Coun-
cil have no place in areas of jurisdiction of the Summit, Court and 
the Assembly.
2.2.4 The Secretariat
The Secretariat, headed by the Secretary General of the Community, is respon-
sible for, among other functions—
91   Article 36.
92   Under different protocols; Article 3(5)(b).
93   EACJ Ref No. 1 of 2005.
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(a) initiating, receiving and submitting recommendations to the Council, 
and forwarding of Bills to the Assembly;
(b) the initiation of studies and research related to, and the implemen-
tation of, programmes for the most appropriate, expeditious and effi-
cient ways of achieving the objectives of the Community;
(c) the strategic planning, management and monitoring of programmes 
for the development of the Community;
(d) the undertaking either on its own initiative or otherwise, of such inves-
tigations, collection of information, or verification of matters relat-
ing to any matter affecting the Community that appears to it to merit 
examination;
(e) the co-ordination and harmonization of the policies and strategies 
relating to the development of the Community;
( f ) the general promotion and dissemination of information on the Com-
munity to the stakeholders, the general public and the international 
community;
(g) the submission of reports on the activities of the Community to the 
Council;
(h) the general administration and financial management of the Com-
munity;
(i) the mobilization of funds from development partners and other 
sources for the implementation of projects of the Community;
( j) the submission of the budget of the Community to the Council for con-
sideration;
(k) preparing draft agenda for the meetings of the organs of the Commu-
nity other than the Court and the Assembly;
(l) the implementation of the decisions of the Summit and the Council;
(m) the organization and the keeping of records of meetings of the institu-
tions of the Community other than those of the Court and the Assem-
bly;
(n) the custody of the property of the Community; and
(o) the establishment of practical working relations with the Court 
and the Assembly.94
The key role played by the Secretariat in the Community’s institutional 
framework received judicial recognition in Timothy Alvin Kahoho v Secretary 
General.95 An issue as to whether the decision of the 13th Summit of Heads of 
94   Article 90(1).
95   EACJ Ref No. 1 of 2012.
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State Decision to mandate the Secretariat to propose an action plan on, and 
a draft model of the structure of the East African Federation was in contra-
vention of the operational principles under the Treaty and the Partner States’ 
undertaking to implement the Treaty. In deciding the issue in the negative, and 
recognizing that the Secretariat is the only organ created to steer the ship of 
integration by implementing decisions of all the other Organs, the Court stated 
inter alia that: “While addressing this issue, it behooves us to address in a few 
words the critical role that the Secretariat plays in the affairs of the Community, 
generally.” Prof. Sam Turyamuhika writes as follows:96
“The current EAC Secetariat has been typified as powerless, meetings and 
workshop organizer, minute taker etc.” We take a different view of that harsh 
and unfair judgment. The EAC Secretariat is the fulcrum on which the wheels 
of integration rotate. The Summit, the Council of Ministers, the Co-ordination 
Committee and Sectoral Committees are all part-time and meet only as often 
as their functions require. Yet, the Secretariat slogs, day in, day out, to ensure 
that the ship of integration remains afloat. The Community, in our view, is like 
a giant ship owned by shareholders (the people of East Africa);the Summit is 
like a Board of Directors and the Council, is like the Management. The Captain 
is the Secretary-General and the crew are the staff in the Community. To call 
the Captain and crew, useless, and denigrate their role in keeping any ship 
on the high seas on course, is to say that the shareholders or the Board of 
Directors can single-handedly and without any input from those that physically 
man the ship, sail that ship from a distance. The Summit represents the owners 
of the ship, and its duty is to decide where the ship goes and should always act 
in the best interests of the shareholders. The Summit thus meets periodically 
to assess progress and regularly inform the shareholders of the profits (ben-
efits) from the operations of the ship. The Council, Co-ordination and Sectoral 
Committees are the Summit’s agents in overseeing progress aforesaid. Without 
the Captain and crew, the ship can barely survive the storms and other perils 
that are prevalent in high seas including attacks by pirates. We digressed to 
make the point that, our reading and understanding of Articles 11, 14, 18, 21 and 
71 of the Treaty, which create the functions of the Organs of the Community, is 
that the Secretariat is the only Organ created by Article 9 of the Treaty to steer 
the ship of integration by implementing decisions of all the other Organs and 
its crucial role thereby ought to be recognized and supported”.97
96    Sam Turyamuhika, In The Drive Towards Political Integration in East Africa, Ed by Isabelle 
Waffubwa and Joseph Clifford Birungi, p. 173.
97   Ibid., paragraphs 48–49.
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The main challenge facing the Secretariat relates to it responsibility con-
cerning “the implementation of the decisions of the Summit and the Council”. 
This is regarded as challenging because the Secretariat lacks the administra-
tive mechanism and resources to police the Partner States in their general 
undertaking as to the implementation of the Treaty, certainly when com-
pared for example to the European Commission.98 Indeed Mwapachu aptly 
observes that the lack of executive authority is among the many challenges fac-
ing the Secretariat as “[w]ith no tangible executive authority whereby every act 
of the Community is subjected to sovereign interests and concerns of the Partner 
States, the movement towards the realization of a robust EAC integration not to 
speak of achieving the EAC goal is clearly slow tracked.”99 However, the respon-
sibility for the co-ordination and harmonization of the policies and strategies 
relating to the development of the Community100 should be a strength in the 
desired role for the Secretariat to steer a supranational organization.
2.2.5 The East African Court of Justice
The Court is the “judicial body” of the Community.101 The role of the Court, 
which has both a First Instance Division and an Appellate Division, is to 
ensure the adherence to law in the interpretation and application of the 
Treaty.102 The Court is composed of a maximum of fifteen Judges: a maxi-
mum of ten appointed to the First Instance Division and maximum of five 
appointed to the Appellate Division.103 Its Judges are appointed “by the Summit 
from among persons recommended by the Partner States who are of proven integ-
rity, impartiality and independence and who fulfil the conditions required in their 
own countries for the holding of such high judicial office, or who are jurists of 
recognised competence in their respective Partner States.”104 This appointment 
is subject to the restriction that no more than two Judges of the First Instance, 
or one Judge of the Appellate Division shall be appointed on the recommenda-
tion of the same Partner State.105
For purposes of adjudicating between legal and natural persons the Court—
98   See in this regard also the powers of the European Commission as discussed in EU 
chapter 2.
99   Op. cit., footnote 90, pp. 41–42.
100   Article 71(1)(e).
101   Article 23.
102   Articles 23 and 27.
103   Article 24(2).
104   Article 24.
105   Article 24(1) (a)–(b).
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(a) is competent to accept and adjudicate upon all matters pursuant to 
the Treaty for purposes of determining the legality of any act, regu-
lation, direction, decision, action or matter; to this extent the Court’s 
jurisdiction also covers references by the Partner States, references by 
the Secretary General, Community Staff disputes, matters arising out 
of arbitral proceedings;106 and
(b) may also be called upon to give advisory opinions regarding questions 
of law arising from the provisions of the Treaty.107
Initially the Court’s jurisdiction was limited to ensuring adherence to law in 
the interpretation and application of the Treaty.108 However, for the purpose 
of ensuring conflict resolution and confidence building in the region it has 
always been envisaged by the Treaty that the Court shall have such other 
original, appellate, human rights and other jurisdiction as should be deter-
mined by the Council at a suitable date. In 2015, the Court’s jurisdiction was 
extended to cover trade and commercial disputes and disputes arising out of 
the implementation of the Protocol on the Establishment of the East African 
Monetary Union.
Notwithstanding its broad jurisdiction, the Court is not designed to deny 
national courts their respective jurisdictions in accordance with the respective 
municipal laws.109 In this regard, the Court can handle cases stated for prelimi-
nary rulings on matters of the Treaty.110
To date the Court should be credited with having generated not only 
regional jurisprudence but also public confidence in the integration process. 
It is important for the public to know that the Partner States and the organs 
and institutions of the Community cannot avail of impunity for any wrong-
doing under the Treaty. The Court’s decisions in Prof. Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o 
& 10 others v Attorney General of Kenya & 2 Others [Others Intervening]111 and 
Democratic Party and Mukasa Mbidde v Secretary General of the East African 
Community & Attorney General of Uganda112 are of particular significance to 
institutional development as they are examples of the Court upholding the 
rule of law within the Community’s institutional framework.
106   Articles 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32.
107   Op. cit., footnote 89.
108   Op. cit., footnote 99.
109   Article 33.
110   Article 34.
111   Op. cit., footnote 51.
112   Op. cit., footnote 52.
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The Court’s decisions in East Africa Law Society v Secretary General East 
Africa Law Society113 and East African Center for Trade Policy and Law v Secretary 
General114 are also worth highlighting as far as the EAC institutional develop-
ment is concerned. In both cases Article 24 (1) (e) of the Protocol Establishing 
the East African Community Customs Union (which establishes an East 
African Trade Remedies Committee to handle matters pertaining inter alia 
to rules of origin, anti-dumping, subsidies and countervailing measures and 
safeguard measures), and Article 54(2) of the Protocol for the Establishment 
of the East Africa Community Common Market (which empowers competent 
judicial, administrative or legislative authority or any other competent author-
ity to handle disputes arising out of the implementation of the Protocol) were 
in issue. The provisions were impugned for allegedly being inconsistent with 
Articles 27(1) and 38(1) and (2) and by establishing “parallel adjudicatory 
bodies” or allowing national courts and other institutions to handle Customs 
and Common Market disputes, infringing on the jurisdiction of the East 
African Court of Justice. The Court held in both cases that—
(a) the dispute settlement mechanisms created under the Customs 
Union and Common Market Protocols do not exclude, oust or 
infringe upon the interpretative jurisdiction of the Court; but are 
merely alternative dispute resolution mechanisms intended for 
the speedy and effective resolution of trade disputes by experts 
in technical and specialized areas; any submission that this Court 
lacks jurisdiction over disputes arising out of the interpretation 
and application and implementation of the Protocols cannot be 
sustained;
(b) the impugned provisions of both Protocols are not in contravention 
of or in contradiction with the relevant provisions of the Treaty; and
(c) the establishment of the Committee on Trade Remedies or the 
conferring of jurisdiction upon national judicial, administrative or 
legislative mechanisms would not prevent Partner States from com-
plying with Article 8 (1) (a) (which imposes on each individual Part-
ner State an obligation to ensure that objectives of the Community 
are kept in mind during the planning and allocation of resources 
processes) and Article 8 (1) (c) (which contains a prohibition on 
113   EACJ Ref. No. 1 of 2011.
114   EACJ Ref. No. 9 of 2012.
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each individual Partner State to take any measure that is likely to 
jeopardize the achievement of the Treaty).115
The jurisprudence of the Court further demonstrates the Court’s adher-
ence to the separation of powers. For instance, in Mbidde Foundation 
Limited and Rt Hon Margaret Zziwa v Secretary General of the East African 
Community and The Attorney General of Uganda116 the Court, in declining 
to intervene in the Assembly’s process of impeachment of Rt Hon Margaret 
Zziwa as Speaker of the Assembly as sought by the Applicants, upheld the rule 
on separation of powers.
The Court remains faced with challenges such as difficulties associated 
with the enforcement of judgments and rulings as provided for under Articles 
38 and 39 of the Treaty; the need for a balance between adjudicating in the 
primary interests of litigants and the strict application of stringent provi-
sions of the Treaty such as that on limitation of actions as provided under 
Article 30(2) of the Treaty; and the possibility of the Judges, who pursuant 
to Article 140(4) of the Treaty (until the Court is declared fully operational), 
find themselves working under circumstances of “double allegiance” because 
they remain judicial officers in the Partner States’ respective judiciaries and 
can only serve the Court in circuits sanctioned upon permission by the Chief 
Justices taking into account the business at their respective national Courts.
The Court can be strengthened through measures including the determi-
nation that the Court is fully operational as this would enable the Judges to 
serve on a permanent rather than ad hoc basis; and consideration of possible 
amendments to the Treaty in relevant areas of concern such as the need to 
establish a nexus between the trade dispute mechanisms established under 
the Customs Union and the Common Market Protocols and the Court as the 
judicial arm of the Community charged with the interpretation of the Treaty. 
There is also a need for continued discourse on the possibility of future inclu-
sion of crimes against humanity (as an aspect of criminal jurisdiction, and 
an offshoot of universal human rights jurisdiction) within the Court’s juris-
diction. This is informed by the fact that some of the divisions in the Partner 
States’ High Courts handle crimes similar to those established under the Rome 
115   See in this regard also the case law of the European Court of Justice on its exclusive 
jurisdiction as set out in EU chapter 2, for instance in Opinion 2/13 on the accession of 
the EU to the ECHR.
116   EACJ Applications Nos. 5 & 10 of 2014.
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Statute of the International Criminal Court and the fact that only four of the 
Partner States are party to that Statute.117
2.3 Analytical Overview of Other Institutions and Bodies
2.3.1 The Co-ordination Committee
The Co-ordination Committee consists of “Permanent Secretaries responsible 
for East African Community Affairs and such other Permanent Secretaries as each 
Partner State may determine”.118 Principally, the Co-ordination Committee is 
charged with submitting reports and recommendations to the Council either 
on its own initiative or upon request by the Council on the implementation of 
the Treaty. The Co-ordination Committee is responsible for co-ordinating the 
activities of the Sectoral Committees and to that extent it is an organ to which 
Sectoral Committees are answerable.119
Furthermore, the Co-ordination Committee is charged with implementing 
“the decisions of the Council as the Council may direct”.120 It is submitted that 
this seems to be superfluous as the implementation of the integration agenda 
is an obligation and undertaking of the Partner States. Moreover, even if this 
was not the case, the Co-ordination Committee, which only makes recommen-
dations as opposed to decisions, would not be the apt organ to implement the 
decisions of the Council.
2.3.2 Sectoral Committees
The Sectoral Committees are established by the Council on the recommen-
dation of the Co-ordination Committee.121 They are primarily responsible for 
the preparation of comprehensive implementation programmes and setting 
out priorities for different sectors of co-operation. They are also charged with 
monitoring and keeping under constant review the implementation of the 
Community’s sectoral programmes.122
117   The Republic of Rwanda is not party to the Rome Statute.
118   Article 17.
119   Article 18. Compare in this regard also the role of COREPER in the EU, as discussed in EU 
chapter 2.
120   Ibid.
121   Article 20.
122   Article 21.
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2.3.3 Institutions of the Community
The institutions of the Community so far established by the Summit are: the 
East African Civil Aviation Safety and Security Oversight Agency, the East 
African Health Research Council, the East African Kiswahili Commission, 
the East African Science and Technology Commission, the Inter-University 
Council for East Africa and the Lake Victoria Basin Commission. The surviving 
institutions of the former East African Community, which are now deemed to 
be institutions of the new Community, are the East African Development Bank 
and the Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization.123
The development of the institutions has been necessitated by the Partner 
States’ imperative to articulate the scope and necessary institutional mecha-
nism for achieving objectives in different areas of co-operation. Accordingly, 
the establishment of the East African Civil Aviation Safety and Security 
Oversight Agency is a consequence of the Partner States’ co-operation in civil 
aviation and civil air transport; the establishment of the East African Health 
Research Council, the East African Science and Technology Commission may 
be attributed to expanded co-operation in health, science and technology; 
the establishment of the Inter-University Council for East Africa, the Lake 
Victoria Basin Commission and the East African Kiswahili Commission was 
necessitated by the Partner States’ respective undertakings to revive an erst-
while Inter-University Council, to establish an apex body for the management 
of Lake Victoria and the development of Kiswahili as a lingua franca of the 
Community.
2.3.3.1 East African Civil Aviation Safety and Security Oversight Agency 
(CASSOA)
The East African Civil Aviation Safety and Security Oversight Agency (CASSOA), 
like the preceding East African Directorate of Civil Aviation,124 is required 
123   The definition of “surviving institutions” in the Treaty’s Article 1 also includes the East 
African Civil Aviation Academy, Soroti and the East African School of Librarianship. 
However the Community has not repossessed these two as was anticipated. According to 
Article 14.01 of The East African Community Mediation Agreement 1984, Kenya, Tanzania 
and Uganda agreed that “the Soroti Civil Flying School, the East African Development Bank, 
the East African Inter-University Committee, the Eastern and Southern African Management 
Institute, and the East African Community Library Services shall continue to function as joint 
East African institutions or common services, as the case may be, and agree to make appro-
priate arrangements for the financing and operation thereof”.
124   Within the institutional framework of the defunct Community, the Directorate of Civil 
Aviation was charged with among other roles the provision of technical services for avia-
tion safety, initiation of aviation legislation, pilot training.
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“to promote the safe, secure and efficient use and development of civil avia-
tion within and outside the Partner States; assist the Partner States in meeting 
their safety and security oversight obligations and responsibilities under the 
Convention on International Civil Aviation 1944; and provide the Partner States 
with an appropriate forum and structure to discuss, plan and implement com-
mon measures for safe and orderly development of international civil aviation”.125
Prominent among the functions of the CASSOA are to “strengthen the 
Partner States’ institutional framework for aviation safety and security; co-
ordinate the Partner States’ civil aviation safety and security oversight activities; 
foster the Partner States’ timely implementation of International Civil Aviation 
Organisation regional air navigation requirements plans, standards and prac-
tices; evaluate the status of aviation safety and security in the Partner States; and 
facilitate the Partner States’ sharing of technical expertise and facilities in civil 
aviation.”126
2.3.3.2 East African Development Bank (EADB)
The East African Development Bank (EADB), which was established in 1967 
under the Treaty for East African Cooperation is a development finance insti-
tution with the objective of promoting and strengthening socio-economic 
development and regional integration.127 Following the breakup of the 
defunct East African Community in 1977, the EADB was re-established under 
its own Treaty: the Treaty Amending and Re-enacting the Charter of the East 
African Development Bank (1980). The member countries are currently Kenya, 
Tanzania, Rwanda and Uganda. The Republic of Burundi has also applied for 
membership.
To the extent that the EADB plays a threefold role of lender, adviser and 
development partner, it may be regarded as a catalyst in the pursuit of the 
Partner States’ undertaking to “co-operate in financing projects jointly in 
each other’s territory, especially those that facilitate integration within the 
Community.”128
125   Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Community Civil Aviation Safety and 
Security Oversight Agency, Article 4.
126   Ibid., Article 5.
127   Article 1 of The Treaty Amending and Re-enacting the Charter of the East African 
Development Bank, 1980.
128   Ibid.; read together with Articles 8–18.
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2.3.3.3 East African Health Research Commission
The East African Health Research Commission (EAHRC) has a vision for “high 
quality health research for purposes of improvement of the health and well-being 
of the peoples of the Community.”129 The EAHRC aims at “improving the health of 
the citizens in the Partner States through capacity building and poverty reduction 
by promoting, co-ordinating and formulating policies for effective utilization of 
results from health research”.130
Specifically the EAHRC seeks to, among other functions “strengthen health 
research collaboration and co-ordination; promote the application of knowledge 
obtained from health research; promote the development of human resource 
capacities in health research; promote exchange and dissemination of health 
research information; and facilitate the creation of health research databases; 
liaise with national, regional and international health institutions; and develop 
quality assurance processes and address common intellectual property rights 
relevant to health in the Partner States”.131
2.3.3.4 East African Kiswahili Commission
The East African Kiswahili Commission has a vision “to be the leading body 
in the promotion and coordination of the development and usage of Kiswahili for 
regional unity and sustainable socio-economic development in Partner States”.132
The Commission mainly aims at “strengthening national, regional and inter-
national communication through the use of Kiswahili in East Africa and beyond; 
developing Kiswahili as a regional language expressing and conveying African 
values with respect to issues of gender equity, human rights and democracy; 
encouraging collaboration in regional research and assisting the Partner States 
to develop centers of advanced study and research in Kiswahili; assisting the 
Partner States to offer quality education for the production of Kiswahili teach-
ers and communicators in all sectors of society; promoting curriculum reform 
to equip citizens with the Kiswahili literary and linguistic skills and knowledge 
which meet the needs of the East African society and conform to the development 
plans of East Africa; developing quality assurance processes, through harmoniza-
tion of Kiswahili language education programmes, curricula and certification, 
129   Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Health Research Commission, 
Articles 2, 3.
130   Ibid., Article 3.
131   Ibid., Article 7.
132   Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Kiswahili Commission, Articles 2, 3, 5 
and 6.
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in order to ensure that teaching and research in Kiswahili achieve and maintain 
acceptable standards; and assisting governments and other appropriate bodies 
and authorities with the development of strategies for adequate investment in the 
promotion of Kiswahili in East Africa and beyond”.133
For the purposes of achieving these objectives, the Commission plays an 
advisory, collaborative and co-ordination role.134
2.3.3.5 East African Science and Technology Commission (EASTECO)
The East African Science and Technology Commission (EASTECO) is charged 
with promoting and co-ordinating the development, management and appli-
cation of science and technology in the Partner States.135 EASTECO is there-
fore expected to “co-ordinate and facilitate the activities of the Partner 
States and national science and technology institutions in promoting the 
development and application of science, technology and innovation in all aspects 
including policy development, administrative issues, resource mobilization and 
utilization, research and development, product and project development”.136
2.3.3.6 Inter-University Council for East Africa (IUCEA)
The mission of The Inter-University Council for East Africa (IUECA) is “to 
encourage and develop mutually beneficial collaboration between Member 
Universities, and between them and Governments and other organizations”.137
IUECA is therefore charged mainly with “strengthening regional communi-
cation among the universities; initiating, assisting and encouraging the develop-
ment of East African higher institutions of learning; encouraging collaboration 
in regional research; mobilizing universities to offer quality education; promoting 
curriculum reform in order to equip graduates with the skills and knowledge that 
meet the needs of employers and conform to the development plans of East Africa; 
and developing quality assurance processes in order to ensure that teaching and 
research achieve and maintain international standards”.138
133   Ibid., Article 7.
134   Ibid., Article 8.
135   Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Science and Technology Commission, 
Article 5.
136   Ibid., Article 6.
137   The Inter-University Council for East Africa Act 2008, Sections 3 and 4.
138   Ibid., Section 6.
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2.3.3.7 Lake Victoria Basin Commission (LVBC)
The Lake Victoria Basin Commission (LVBC) was established for the manage-
ment of the Lake Victoria Basin. The LVBC is responsible for coordinating the 
sustainable development agenda of the Lake Victoria Basin.139
The broad functions of the institution are “to promote, facilitate and coordi-
nate activities of different actors towards sustainable development and poverty 
eradication of the Lake Victoria Basin” through the harmonization of policies, 
laws, regulations and standards; the promotion of stakeholders’ participation in 
the sustainable development of natural resources; promotion of capacity building 
and institutional development; promotion of security and safety on Lake Victoria; 
promotion of research and development; monitoring, evaluation and compli-
ance with policies and agreed upon actions; preparation and harmonization of 
the Partner States’ negotiating positions against any other state on matters con-
cerning the Lake Victoria Basin; consideration of reports from the Partner States’ 
institutions on their activities relating to the management of the Basin under The 
Lake Victoria Basin Commission Protocol; and initiation and promotion of pro-
grammes that target poverty eradication”.140
2.3.3.8 Lake Victoria Fisheries Organisation (LVFO)
The primary functions of the Lake Victoria Fisheries Organisation (LVFO), 
established by the Convention (Final Act) for the Establishment of the Lake 
Victoria Fisheries Organisation, 1994, are to build cooperation among the 
Member States, to harmonize domestic laws and regulations for the sustain-
able use of the living resources of Lake Victoria, and to develop and adopt con-
servation and management measures.141
LVFO is charged with “promoting the proper management and the optimum 
utilization of the fisheries and other resources of Lake Victoria; enhancing the 
capacity building of existing institutions and developing additional relevant insti-
tutions, in cooperation with existing institutions and other international, regional 
and non-governmental organizations; creating a forum for discussion regarding 
environmental and water quality initiatives affecting the Basin and maintain-
ing a liaison with existing bodies and programs; conducting research regarding 
water quality in Lake Victoria; encouraging, recommending, coordinating and, 
as appropriate, undertaking relevant training and extension activities concern-
ing the fisheries; considering and advising on the effects of the introduction of 
139   Protocol For the Sustainable Development of Lake Victoria Basin, Articles 33–42; read 
together with Articles 3–32.
140   Ibid.
141   The Convention (Final Act) for the Establishment of the Lake Victoria Fisheries 
Organisation, 1994, Article II.
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non-indigenous aquatic animals or plants into Lake Victoria or its tributaries and 
adopting measures related to the introduction, monitoring, control or elimination 
of such animals or plants; serving as a clearing house and databank for informa-
tion on Lake Victoria’s fisheries and promoting the dissemination of information; 
adopting budgets, seeking funding, formulating financial management plans 
and allocating funds for the Organisation’s activities in furthering the purposes 
of the Convention (Final Act) for the Establishment of the Lake Victoria Fisheries 
Organisation, 1994.”142
The institutions that are already in place have several achievements to their 
name, for instance, CASSOA’s harmonization of regional aviation safety and 
security regulations and technical guidance materials; EADB’s growing range 
of financial services in real and property development, infrastructure develop-
ment, trade finance, capital markets development, business advisory services 
etc.; IUCEA’s strengthening of higher education quality assurance processes 
and enhancement of regional research management; and LVBC’s Lake Victoria 
Water and Sanitation Project, Mt Elgon Regional Ecosystem Conservation 
Programme and the Mara Basin Project.
Establishment and projection aside, the nature and structure of the new 
institutions raises a few queries. Whereas the LVBC, the EAHRC, EASTECO and 
the East African Kiswahili Commission are supposed to be legal personalities, 
their establishment has not, contrary to policy, been based on an Act of the 
Community but on protocols i.e. international agreements. In some cases 
the process of establishing an institution on a strong legal and statutory basis 
has been protracted. For instance, the East African Civil Aviation Safety and 
Security Oversight Agency Bill has never been fully assented to, even though 
it was enacted in 2009. Furthermore, although these institutions are required 
to report to the Council, the procedure for this is not harmonized because 
some of the institutions are also required as legal entities to report to their 
own corporate boards, as is the case with the EADB. They may also be required 
to report to Ministerial councils, which are arguably external in composition 
to the Community’s institutional framework, as is the case with the LVFO. 
Furthermore, because there is no common basis for the establishment of the 
institutions the Secretary General’s negotiations with the Partner States for the 
grant of privileges and immunities to them and their staff is not as accordant 
as it should be. There is therefore need to establish a policy framework indi-
cating the exact relationship of the organs and institutions inter se. The moot 
point is whether the institutions are meant to be specialized agencies with 




2.3.4 Other Bodies, Departments and Services
Other bodies, departments and services within the framework should 
include—
(a) The East African Community Trade Remedies Committee estab-
lished to handle disputes and investigate on matters relating to 
rules of origin, subsidies and countervailing measures etc.;143 and 
such bodies, departments and services as may be established pursu-
ant to the Customs law of the Community for purposes of adminis-
tering the Customs Union;144
(b) Such institutions as may be established or authorized by the Coun-
cil for purposes of administering the Common Market;145 and
(c) The East African Central Bank;146 institutions responsible for finan-
cial services (surveillance, compliance, enforcement) and statistics; 
and The East African Monetary Institute147 within the context of 
administering The East African Monetary Union.
2.4 Challenges to the Institutional Framework
Institutional and governance challenges associated with managing interna-
tional organizations, such as Partner States’ overemphasis on national sov-
ereignties, inadequate resources, underdeveloped infrastructure and slow 
implementation of decisions face the Community’s institutional framework. 
Critical among these are the excesses of the requirement of consensus in deci-
sion-making, interface challenges and challenges to the safeguarding of the 
Community’s international status.
2.4.1 Decision-Making by Consensus
Decision making by the Summit and the Council and the making of recom-
mendations by the Co-ordination Committee are guided by the principle of 
consensus. In the case of the Council, this applies to the making of policy 
143   Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Community Customs Union, Article 24.
144   Ibid., Article 34.
145   Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Community Common Market, 
Article 46 read together with Article 76(3) of the Treaty.
146   Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Community Monetary Union, 
Article 20.
147   Ibid., Articles 21 and 23 respectively.
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decisions, directives and regulations pertaining to the development and pro-
gression of the integration process as provided under the Treaty. In this regard, 
the Treaty provides that—
(a) “for purposes of the discharge of functions, the decisions of the Sum-
mit shall be by consensus”;148 and
(b) “subject to a Protocol on decision-making the decisions of the Council 
shall be by consensus”.149
The Protocol on Decision Making by the Council provides that—
1. The decisions of the Council on the following matters shall be by consensus:
(a) Granting of observers status to an inter-governmental organization 
or civil society organization;
(b) Making of the financial rules and regulations of the Community;
(c) Submission of the annual budget of the Community to the Legislative 
Assembly;
(d) Approval of the expenditures of the Community;
(e) Establishment of any sectoral council or committee under the Treaty;
( f ) Submission of Bills to the East African Legislative Assembly;
(g) Policy decisions made pursuant to Article 14(3) (a) of the Treaty;
(h) Decisions on what should be recommended to the Summit on:
(i) Amendment of the Treaty;
(ii) Approval or amendment of any protocol;
(iii) Admission of new members
(iv) Imposition of sanctions;
(v) Suspension of a member;
(vi) Transformation into a political federation; and
(vii) Expansion of areas of co-operation.
2. All other decisions of the Council shall be by simple majority.150
The requirement on consensus has been replicated in the Rules of Procedure 
for the Summit, the Council and the Coordination Committee.151 Accordingly, 
148   Ibid., Article 12(3).
149   Ibid., Article 15(4).
150   Article 2.
151   See Rule 13 of the Rules of Procedure of the Summit, Rule 13 of the Rules of Procedure of 
the Council and Rule 13 of the Rules of Procedure of the Co-ordination Committee (which 
apply mutatis mutandis to all lower committees and bodies).
Kaahwa76
this requirement directs the making of all institutional or organizational policy 
decisions (which create direct obligations on the organs and institutions) and 
all operational decisions (which are necessitated by the Community’s direct 
and substantive operations).
The Treaty does not define the term “consensus” in terms of, for example 
unanimity, or absolute, simple, qualified or other majority. However, the Court 
has given guidance as to the definition of consensus within the Community 
framework: “a general agreement among the members of a given group or com-
munity, each of which exercises some discretion in decision making agreements. 
Achieving consensus requires serious treatment of every group member’s consid-
ered opinion. Once a decision is made it is important to trust in members’ discre-
tion in follow-up action. In the ideal case, those who wish to take up some action 
want to hear those who oppose it, because they count on the fact that the ensuing 
debate will improve the consensus. In theory, action without resolution of con-
sidered opposition will be rare and done with attention to minimize damage to 
relationships”.152
Consensus as applied in the Treaty and protocols is not only a decision-
making mechanism at the policy level for the Summit and the Council and 
in the other executive organs of the Community; it is also a mechanism that 
emphasises “all Partner States’ representation” for a quorum at all meetings.153
The context of the Protocol on Decision Making suggests that all key policy 
matters such as the transformation of the integration process into a political 
federation or achieving key milestones like the Customs Union, the Common 
Market, the Monetary Union and institution building have to be arrived upon 
on the basis of consensus. Any EAC framework in such areas necessitates prior 
agreement/consensus by all the Partner States. Mwapachu has observed that 
“this protocol could have set out, as in the European Union, a matrix of issues 
that would require different forms or modalities of decision-making—unanim-
ity, consensus, qualified majority etc. Unfortunately and given the backdrop of 
the demised EAC and the remaining excess baggage in the Partner States regard-
ing issues of differential stages of economic development, the protocol retained a 
strict requirement for all decisions made by the Council”.154
The only significant exception to the preponderance of consensus in deci-
sion-making is in respect of suspension or expulsion of a Partner State in case 
152   EACJ Application No. 1 of 2008, p. 29.
153   Rules of Procedure.
154   Op. cit., footnote 90, p. 57. See on different forms of decision making in the EU also EU 
chapter 2, and for the crucial importance of decision making by Qualified Majority Voting 
for the internal market, EU chapter 9.
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of failure to observe and fulfill the fundamental principles and objectives of 
the Treaty or gross and persistent violation of such principles and objectives.155
As elaborated by Schermers and Blokker, decision-making by consensus 
ensures “general acclamation” or “common feeling” or “concurrence of feel-
ings”, acknowledges differences in power and interests and obviates “majori-
tarianism”; it has therefore been adopted by many international organizations.156 
However, as has often been the case in the Community, it is a time-consuming 
method in which decisions may often have their intention watered down. It is 
also over-tied to “all Partner States’ representation” for a quorum at meetings.
2.4.2 Interface Challenges
The achievement of the objectives of the Community depends on how cohe-
sive and co-ordinated the organs and institutions are in the discharge of their 
respective functions. Although the Treaty and relevant protocols spell out the 
different functions of the organs and institutions, a primary or literal inter-
pretation of the Treaty suggests that the intention of the Partner States, as 
contracting parties, is that the organs and institutions should play their roles 
with one ultimate objective—development of the Community for the benefit 
of the people of East Africa. Therefore, the introduction and maintenance of 
a mechanism for cordial and collaborative inter-facing and inter-relationships 
between the organs and institutions is unassailable.
Besides providing for the applicability of the principle of asymmetry and 
requiring the Secretariat to establish “practical working relations with the 
Court and the Assembly”157 the Treaty does not establish a mechanism for 
intra-organ/institution collaboration. With the Assembly, the Council and 
the Court each vying for optimum discharge of obligations, misunderstand-
ings and institutional clashes do occur. Therefore, collaboration is more of an 
outcome of necessity in given cases than a substratum for regular operations. 
Regrettably, collaboration is not seen in the practice of the EAC and clashes 
between the different organs and institutions are evident, for example, the 
Assembly allowing a motion on a Bill like the Lake Victoria Basin Commission 
Bill which is not supported by the Council;158 or the Assembly enacting Bills 
such as the East African Community Trans-Boundary Ecosystem Management 
Bill 2011, the East African Community Polythene Materials Control Bill 2011, the 
East African Community Human and Peoples’ Rights Bill 2011, the East African 
155   Article 148.
156   Henry G. Schermers and Niels M. Blokker (1995), International Institutional Law, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, pp. 505–885.
157   Article 71(1)(o).
158  Op. cit., footnote 90, p. 145.
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Community HIV and AIDS Prevention and Management Bill 2012 and the East 
African Service Commission Bill 2010, all of which have not been assented to 
by the Summit.
Moreover, lack of a clear collaborative basis has the potential to generate 
unnecessary duplication of efforts among the organs and institutions. Since 
this challenge arises out of the fact that each organ pursues the accomplish-
ment of its mandate to the best of its ability, the panacea lies in overall institu-
tional review and amendment of the Treaty.
2.4.3 Challenges to the Safeguarding of the Community’s International 
Status
It is part of jus cogens that for purposes of effectively discharging their func-
tions “international organisations should be entitled to the grant of privileges and 
immunities for their assets, properties and representatives”.159 The Treaty recog-
nizes the international legal personality of the Community and invariably the 
Community’s institutional framework.160 In this regard, the Treaty cognizant 
of the Community’s legal capacity as a body corporate with perpetual succes-
sion, provides that—
(a) the Community shall enjoy international legal personality;161 and 
that
(b) persons employed in the service of the Community including staff, 
experts and consultants shall enjoy immunities and privileges while 
performing services to the Community.162
In practice the realization of the international status is afflicted by both 
the Partner States’ insistence on national sovereignty and, a fortiori, their 
reluctance to agree on a common platform premise on the nature and 
extent of immunities and privileges. As a result the conclusion of head-
quarters agreements as bases for the grant of immunities and privileges for 
Community organs, institutions, staff and other persons in the employ of 
the Community remains largely streaked from one Partner State to another 
country to country. This is notwithstanding the Secretariat’s long outstanding 
proposal for the conclusion of a protocol that would be a common yardstick 
for the conclusion of such agreements. 
159   Malcolm N. Shaw (1997), International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
pp. 923–929.
160   Articles 138 read together with Articles 4 and 8.
161   Ibid.
162   Article 73 read together with Article 72.
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chapter 2A
The Institutional Framework of the EU
Armin Cuyvers
2.1 An Evolutionary Supranational Framework
This chapter discusses the original institutional set-up of the European 
Union as well as the key evolutionary steps that led to its current institutional 
reality.1 The initial institutional framework forms an important comparator 
for the EAC today, which is still in its relatively early days. The evolutionary 
developments are both important to indicate which institutional challenges 
may arise in the future and to illustrate what possible solutions and their con-
sequences are. In addition, they serve as an illustration of those areas where 
the institutional system of the EU was also not yet sufficiently developed in the 
beginning, and those areas where the system got it right from the beginning.
To simplify comparison, this chapter first discusses each institution in turn, 
following the sequence of discussion in the EAC chapter. In addition, each sec-
tion will refer to some of the standard works on the different institutions for 
those who would like to engage in a further comparison.
2.2 From Assembly to Parliament
What became the ‘European Parliament’ started life as a relatively powerless 
‘European Assembly’ of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).2 This 
Assembly was not directly elected but consisted of representatives of national 
1   On this issue also see G. De Búrca, ‘The Institutional Development of the EU: A Constitutional 
Analysis’, in: P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU law (OUP 1999), 55.
2   See chapter II of the 1951 Treaty of Paris (ECSC Treaty). For a more elaborate discussion of 
the European Parliament see amongst others P. Dann, ‘The Political Institutions’, in: A. Von 
Bogdandy and J. Bast (eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law (2nd ed., Hart Publishing 
2010), 247, D. Earnshaw and D. Judge, the European Parliament (2nd edn, Palgrave 2008), 
R. Corbett, F. Jacobs and M. Shackleton (eds), The European Parliament (7th edn, John Harper 
Publishing 2007), M. Westlake, ‘“The Style and the Machinery”: The Role of the European 
Parliament in the EU’s Legislative Process’, in: P. Craig and C. Harlow (eds), Lawmaking in 
the European Union (Kluwer, 1998), ch. 5, or P. Pierson, ‘The Path to European Integration: 
A Historical Institutionalist Analysis’ 29 Comparative Political Studies (1996), 123.
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assemblies or parliaments (the so called double-mandate). The Assembly, 
moreover was largely an advisory body without formal powers. Most impor-
tantly, it could not adopt or block legislation. The Assembly only had the right 
to be consulted, and its opinions or comments were not binding on the other 
institutions. It is fair to say, therefore, that in the early days of European inte-
gration the Assembly played only a minor role, and real democratic represen-
tation of national interest was done via the Council.
One of the main evolutionary trends in the institutional history of the EU, 
however, is the gradual empowerment of what is now the European Parliament. 
As the EU sought to increase its democratic legitimacy, each consecutive 
Treaty-amendment gave more and more power to the European Parliament. 
With the Single European Act of 1968, for example, the Assembly was formally 
renamed the ‘European Parliament’, an important symbolical step.3 As of 1979, 
the European Parliament became directly elected through national elec-
tions. With the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and especially 
Lisbon, the European Parliament also got increasing powers over the budget 
and legislation. Today, the European Parliament controls the budget and is 
co-legislator in the large majority of fields covered by EU competences.4 As 
such, the European Parliament has actually accrued more formal rights and 
powers than several Member State parliaments. With this background in mind, 
let us turn to the current composition, powers and operation of the European 
Parliament.
2.2.1 Composition of the European Parliament
The European Parliament consists of 751 members including its President, who 
are elected for a period of five years.5 One of the major issues in the European 
Parliament is the division of seats. On the one hand, there are significant differ-
ences in the population of each Member State. Germany, for example, has over 
80 million inhabitants, where Malta only has around 450.000. If Malta were 
given an equal number of MEP’s to Germany, this would seriously undermine 
the vote of German citizens. Vice versa, if seats in the European Parliament 
would be divided proportionally, the influence of Maltese citizens would be 
negligible.
3   Article 3 SEA.
4   See Article 14(1) TEU. For the ordinary legislative procedure, in which the European 
Parliament acts as a co-legislator with a veto right and the power to table amendments, see 
Article 294 TFEU.
5   Article 14(2) TEU.
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The solution chosen in the EU is to use a degressively proportional system. 
No Member State shall have less than six, or more than 96 MEP’s. The result is 
that the citizens of smaller states are (heavily) overrepresented, whilst those 
of large states are underrepresented, but that nevertheless the populations of 
bigger states retain far greater influence on the whole.6
According to the TEU, the function of MEP’s is to represent ‘the Union’s citi-
zens’. Consequently, they should represent the people and not the Member 
States as such. At the same time, MEP’s are elected in national elections and 
seats are divided per Member State. A Danish citizen, therefore, can only 
cast his vote for a Danish candidate in the Danish elections for the European 
Parliament. No European parties exist either. This also means that national 
parties usually retain control of national lists for the European Parliament, and 
therefore of who is ultimately elected.7 These factors mean that MEP’s retain 
linked to the Member States and represent the different member peoples as 
such rather than all EU citizens as a whole.8
2.2.2 Functions and Powers of the European Parliament
The three primary functions of the European Parliament concern legislation, the 
budget, and political control. In terms of legislation, the starting point is 
that the European Parliament does not have the right of initiative. Only the 
European Commission, and in a few cases the Council, can initiate legislation.9 
The legislative powers of the Parliament, therefore, revolve around amending 
and adopting Commission proposals.
6   For the serious, if not always convincing, concerns of the German Constitutional Court con-
cerning this system of representation and the principle of ‘one man, one vote’, see BVerfGE, 2 
BvE 123,267, 2 BvE 2/08 (2009) Lissabon Urteil.
7   See for an alternative suggestion the plan developed by former MEP Andrew Duff, calling for 
transnational lists for the election of 25 MEP’s, creating a truly European election. The serious 
national political opposition to this proposal reflects the remaining national focus and foun-
dation of the European Parliament. See European Parliament, Committee on Constitutional 
Affairs, Second Report on a proposal for a modification of the Act concerning the election of 
the Members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage of 20 September 1976, 
A7–0027/2012, 1 February 2012.
8   A. Cuyvers, The EU as a Confederal Union of Sovereign Member Peoples, Exploring the poten-
tial of American (con)federalism and popular sovereignty for a constitutional theory of the EU, 
(Diss. Leiden, Wöhrmann 2013), 313.
9   The Parliament may, however, request the European Commission to investigate a cer-
tain topic or to develop a legislative proposal on a certain field (Article 225 TFEU). The 
Commission may ignore or reject such requests, but of course does so at its own peril, and is 
legally obligated to state reasons.
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The precise powers of the Parliament, moreover, depend on the legal basis 
underlying the proposed legislation.10 Under most legal bases, including the 
vital Article 114 TFEU on the internal market, the so called ‘ordinary legisla-
tive procedure’ applies.11 Under this procedure the European Parliament is a 
full co-legislator that can veto legislation and can propose amendments. The 
adoption of legislation, however, always requires the approval of the Council 
of Ministers as well.
In addition to the ordinary legislative procedure, two main special legis-
lative procedures exist as well, each with increasingly reduced powers for 
the European Parliament. Firstly, under the consent procedure, the Council 
formally adopts an act, but the European Parliament must give its consent. 
Here the Parliament can block an act, but not (formally) amend it. Secondly, 
under the consultation procedure, the Parliament only has to be consulted. 
It is the Council that adopts the act and that may also reject or ignore any 
observations made by the Parliament. Clearly under this last procedure the 
power of the European Parliament is limited. At the same time, the European 
Parliament can of course always threaten to use its blocking powers in other 
ongoing legislative procedures to incentivize the Commission and Council to 
take its views into serious consideration.
The European Parliament must also consent to the multi-annual five year 
framework for EU expenditure, and may veto the annual budgets based on this 
framework.12 On the expenditure side, therefore, the Parliament has significant 
powers. On the revenue side, however, the power of the Parliament is limited. 
Most crucially, Parliament, and the EU as a whole, lack the power to directly 
levy taxes, and thereby to increase its own revenues when desired. It is the 
Member States that retain ultimate control over taxing and the revenue avail-
able to the EU. To put the relative financial power of the EU and its Member 
States into perspective, the EU controls just over 1% of European GDP, whereas 
most Member States control around 50% of their national GDP.
The main power of the Parliament in terms of political control con-
cerns the appointment and dismissal of the Commission. To begin with, the 
European Parliament must approve the candidate-president of the European 
Commission, who is nominated by the European Council, taking into 
account the outcome of the elections for the European Parliament. In 2014, 
however, the European Parliament for the first time used this power of approval 
to increase its control over the selection of the Commission President as 
10   On legal bases and EU competences see chapter 3.
11   Article 294 TFEU. Before Lisbon this procedure was known as the co-decision procedure.
12   Articles 312(1) and 314 TFEU.
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such. Most political groupings in the European Parliament selected their own 
candidate for the Commission presidency, the so called Spitzenkandidaten. 
The Parliaments position was that the European Council should then 
select the candidate of the political grouping that won the elections for the 
European Parliament, as this would increase the democratic legitimacy 
of the Commission. As it turned out, the political grouping of Juncker, the 
European People’s Party (EPP), became the largest. Juncker, however, faced 
strong political opposition, especially from the UK. Despite this opposition, 
Juncker was eventually selected by the European Council and approved by the 
Parliament. It now remains an open question of EU law whether this has cre-
ated a legally or politically binding precedent, or whether the next time round 
the European Council will select its own candidate, daring the Parliament to 
actually reject the candidate it puts forward.
Once the Commission President has been approved, the Parliament also has 
to approve the entire College of Commissioners as assembled by the President 
and the Member States. Equally, the European Parliament has the power, at 
any time, to dismiss the entire Commission.13 Both the power to approve and 
to dismiss the Commission, however, only applies to the Commission as a 
body. The Parliament does not have the formal right to reject or dismiss indi-
vidual Commissioners, even though it can place effective political pressure on 
a Commissioner to withdraw or resign ‘voluntarily’, or on the President of the 
Commission to withdraw or dismiss an individual Commissioner.14
In addition to its powers of approval and dismissal, Parliament also has the 
right to challenge the validity of any EU legal act before the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU), to request answers or reports from most other 
institutions, and to receive a report from the President of the European Council 
after each summit.15 In addition, the European Parliament of course organizes 
hearings and debates, and tries to exert its influence via resolutions.
13   Article 17(7) TEU. Under Article 234 TFEU such a motion of censure requires a two-thirds 
majority.
14   See Article 17(6) TEU on the power of the Commission President to dismiss indi-
vidual Commissioners. See on this point also the Order of the CJEU in Case C-394/15 
P Dalli v. Commission ECLI:EU:C:2016:262 as well as the interinstitutional agree-
ment between the Parliament and the Commission on this point: <http://ec.europa 
.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/relations/relations_other/docs/framework_agreement_ 
ep-ec_en.pdf>.
15   Articles 263, 249, 284(3), 228 TFEU and Article 15(6)(d) TEU. On the direct action under 
Article 263 TFEU, see further chapter 7. On the effective use of litigation by the Parliament, 
which is also of interest to the EALA, see for example M. McCowan, ‘The European 
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2.2.3 Operation of the European Parliament
As there are no pan-European parties, but MEP’s also do not represent their 
Member State as such, the European Parliament is organized in Political 
Groupings. These groupings bring together MEP’s from the different national 
parties that are ideologically more or less aligned, such as social-democrats, 
liberals, or Christian-democrats.16 These Political Groupings, and their leader-
ship, wield most political power in the European Parliament.
The European Parliament, moreover, is organized as a ‘working’ Parliament. 
Most of the work of the Parliament is carried out in Committees, where MEP’s 
from the different Political Groupings work on specific subjects.17 Most issues 
are settled in Committee before they reach the plenary for a confirmation vote 
by the plenum. Consequently, when one is interested in a specific field or act, 
it is crucial to focus on the debates in the relevant Committee. In most cases, 
including in the adoption of legislation or tabling amendments, the Parliament 
decides by an ordinary majority.18
2.3 The European Council
Today, the European Council today is one of the most powerful and interesting 
institutions of the EU.19 This makes it all the more interesting that the institu-
tion did not even exist at the conception of the EU. It was only with the Treaty 
of Lisbon in 2009 that the European Council, the EU counterpart of the EAC 
Summit, formally became an institution of the EU.20 Long before that time, 
however, the European Council already was a de-facto institution of the EU.
Parliament before the Bench: ECJ Precedent and EP Litigation Strategies’ (2003) 10 
JEPP 974.
16   For an overview of the eight current Political Groupings see <http://www.europarl 
.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/20150201PVL00010/Organisation-and-rules>.
17   For an overview of the Committees see <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/
parliamentary-committees.html>.
18   Article 231 TFEU.
19   See for example Editorial Comments ‘An ever Mighty European Council’ 46 CMLRev 
(2009), 1383, and for an elegant and insightful discussion of this body, L. Van Middelaar, 
The Passage to Europe, How a Continent became a Union’ (2014, Yale University Press). 
For a more general overview see amongst others U. Puetter, The European Council and the 
Council: New Intergovernmentalism and Institutional Change (OUP, 2014), or J. Werts, 
the European Council (Harper, 2008).
20   Article 15 TEU.
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The European Council started life as an informal meeting of Heads of State. 
It was created during the Paris summit of December 1974, on the initiative 
of then French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing as an informal forum for 
discussion.21 The first actual European Council took place in Dublin on 
11 March 1975. Even though the European Council did not have any for-
mal powers, or even formal existence, under the EU Treaties, a body com-
prising all Heads of State or Government obviously wields significant 
power and influence. Over time, and as European integration deepened, 
European Council meetings gradually became more frequent, and the role of 
the European Council became more prominent. The role and existence 
of the European Council was subsequently formally recognized for the first 
time in the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. It was only with the Treaty of Lisbon, 
however, that the European Council became of the seven official institutions 
of the EU.
2.3.1 Composition of the European Council
First and foremost, the European Council consists of all the EU Heads of State 
or Government.22 Where a Member State has both a Head of State and a 
Head of Government, such as Germany and France, it is up to the Member 
State to indicate which one of the two represents the highest political author-
ity and hence will attend the European Council. For Germany, the prime-
minister (or Bundeskanzler) attends, instead of the President of the German 
Republic, who has more of a ceremonial function. In France, the situation is 
reversed, as the French President wields the highest political authority, not the 
French prime-minister.
Since Lisbon, the European Council has a permanent president. This 
President is elected by the European Council itself for a period of two and a 
half years, renewable once. So far, the president has always been a former head 
of state or government himself.23 The President primarily coordinates and 
builds consensus as he chairs sessions and manages the agenda.
The President of the European Commission is also ex officio a member 
of the European Council, although she does not represent a Member State and 
21   See on the evolution of the European Council and its significance for European integra-
tion also L. van Middelaar, The Passage to Europe. How a Continent Became a Union (Yale 
University Press, 2014).
22   Article 15 TEU.
23   The first President of the European Council was Herman van Rompuy, the former Belgian 
Prime minister. As of 2014, the second President is Donald Tusk, former Prime-Minister of 
Poland.
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therefore has a different position. The High Representative for Foreign Affairs, 
on the other hand, is not a full member but may ‘take part’ in the work of the 
European Council.
2.3.2 Functions and Powers of the European Council
In line with its political weight, the main function of the European Council is 
to lay out the general direction the EU should take and provide the political 
leadership to get there. As the Treaties officially term it, the European Council 
shall ‘provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development’ and 
‘define the general political directions and priorities thereof.’24 Increasingly, 
however, the European Council is also the institution that steps in in times of 
crisis. Both during the euro crisis and the refugee crisis, for example, it was the 
European Council that took center stage and decided on many crucial issues. 
In Brexit as well, the European Council will likely play a leading role. As they 
say in Brussels, these issues are ‘Chefsache’, requiring the political authority 
of the European Council to take actual decisions.
The function of crisis management, however, sits somewhat uneasily with 
the limited formal powers of the European Council, which were primarily for-
mulated with the agenda-setting function in mind.25 The European Council 
can adopt conclusions and take decisions, but has no explicit legislative or 
executive powers. Consequently, it cannot initiate legislation, adopt EU laws, 
spend EU money or take executive action. Formally, moreover, it has no direct 
authority over other institutions such as the Commission or the Council of 
Ministers. In practice, however, the European Council can often act through 
the other institutions, or through the Member States they collectively control. 
After all, the Council of Ministers, that does have legislative powers, is com-
posed of national ministers that usually answer to their own Heads of State 
and Government sitting in the European Council. The European Commission 
usually also has clear incentives to cooperate with the European Council, espe-
cially in crisis situations where action is needed, as well as additional Member 
State funds. Overall, therefore, the functions of the European Council are 
steadily increasing, as are its (informal) powers to fulfill these additional func-
tions. The shifts this increasingly executive role of the European Council lead 
24   Article 15 TEU.
25   L. van Middelaar, ‘Taking decisions or setting norms. EU Presidences between executive 
and legislative power in a crisis-driven Union’, in: Steunenberg et al. (eds), Fit for the Future. 
Reflections from Leiden on the functioning of the EU (Eleven International Publishing, Den 
Haag, 2016), 11 and L. van Middelaar, ‘The return of politics: The European Union after the 
crises in the euro zone and Ukraine’, Journal of Common Market Studies 54 (2016) n° 3, 495.
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to in the nature and functioning of the EU form one of the major institutional 
and constitutional questions of the moment.
2.3.3 Operation of the European Council
The European Council meets at least twice every six months, but can meet 
much more often where developments require. In the context of Brexit, more-
over, the European Council holds ‘informal’ meetings of the 27 remaining 
Member States. Almost always, the European Council decides by consensus. 
One of the key functions of the President of the European Council, therefore, is 
to prepare meetings well, explore the political lay of the land, and find the zone 
of possible agreement before the meeting. This is not to say that the European 
Council cannot be the scene of vehement debate and disagreement, but, as all 
participants know, the result has to be a consensus.
One telling detail about the functioning of the European Council is that it 
normally meets with just its members, no advisors being present. This means 
that the Heads of State and Government normally meet without any civil ser-
vants or ministers, adding to the intimacy and intensity of the meetings and 
the collegial nature of the body.
2.4 The Council of Ministers of the EU
Not to be confused with the European Council, the Council of Ministers is 
the representative body of the Member States in the EU.26 The Council has 
been one of the main institutions since the ECSC and fulfills many different 
functions. Consequently, the Council is hard to pin down into one of the tradi-
tional categories of the Trias Politica. It is a body that consists of the national 
executives, forms part of the EU legislature but also plays an important role 
in the execution of EU law and policies. The Council itself, moreover, only 
forms the top of the iceberg, as the institution rests on a large amount of com-
mittees of national civil servants preparing its work.
26   For a more elaborate analysis of the Council see inter alia U. Puetter, The European 
Council and the Council: New Intergovernmentalism and Institutional Change (OUP, 2014), 
F. Hayes-Renshaw and H. Wallace, The Council of Ministers (2nd edn, Macmillan, 2006), 
M. Westlake and D. Galloway, The Council of the European Union (3rd edn, Harper 
Publishing, 2004).
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2.4.1 Composition of the Council
As its name appropriately suggests, the Council of Ministers is composed 
of ministers of the different Member States.27 The actual ministers attend-
ing a meeting of the Council, however, depends on the topic of discussion. 
On questions of finance, for example, it will be the ministers of finance that 
meet, on questions of transport the ministers of transport, etc.28 All in all, the 
Council meets in ten different configurations. There is no formal hierarchy, but 
the General Affairs Council, composed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, has 
a general coordinating role.29 Despite this coordination, one of the major chal-
lenges facing the Council is safeguarding consistency between the different 
configurations.
The Eurogroup is an informal body comprised of the finance ministers 
of the Eurozone countries. The Commissioner for Economic and Financial 
Affairs, Taxation and Customs as well as the President of the European Central 
Bank may also take part in Eurogroup meetings. As such, the Eurogroup is 
not formally a part of the Council.30 At the same time, during the ‘informal’ 
meetings, which normally take place right before the Economic and Financial 
Affairs (ECFIN) configuration of the Council, Eurogroup members can coor-
dinate their position and hence influence the ultimate decisions taken in the 
Council. Consequently, the Eurogroup in practice has an important impact on 
the functioning of the Council.
2.4.2 Functions and Powers of the Council
The main functions of the Council concern legislation and the budget, policy 
making, coordination of execution and the foreign policy of the EU.31 In addi-
tion, the Council prepares the work for the European Council and follows up 
on European Council conclusions.
With the European Parliament and the European Commission, the 
Council is part of the EU legislature. Unlike the Parliament, there are no leg-
islative procedures that exclude the Council. Consequently, no legislation 
27   Article 16 TEU.
28   Where the issues being discussed touch on multiple portfolio’s, more than one minister 
may attend, voting power not being affected.
29   For an overview, see <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/configurations/>.
30   The Eurogroup started in 1998, but its existence was first recognized in the Lisbon treaty 
via Article 137 TFEU and Protocol 14 on the Eurogroup. This recognition, however, does 
not alter the informal status of the Eurogroup.
31   Article 16 TEU.
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can be adopted without the Council, even though in most cases the Council 
needs the European Parliament to pass a law.32 Equally, the Council determines 
the budget, together with the European Parliament. Through the Council, 
therefore, the Member States retain their influence over EU legislation and the 
budget, even though, as we will see below, the Council can often decide by a 
qualified majority, meaning no single Member State can block legislation.
The Council also plays a particularly important role in foreign relations. 
Considering the political sensitivity of foreign relations, this area has remained 
largely intergovernmental. Member States simply were unwilling to surrender 
this field to full supranationalism. Consequently, the Foreign Affairs Council, 
and the Member States, retain a primary role in foreign policy. In many fields 
of foreign affairs, for example, the Commission does not have the right of 
initiative, and the Council can decide without the European Parliament. 
Nevertheless, over time, the role of both the Commission and the Parliament 
in external relations has clearly increased. To better coordinate EU foreign pol-
icy, the Treaty of Lisbon also introduced the High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.33 This almost impossible job comes 
with three hats. The High Representative simultaneously is a Vice-President 
of the European Commission for foreign affairs, chairs the Foreign Affairs 
Council, and as High Representative heads the European External Action 
Service (EEAS), the diplomatic body of the EU. As we shall see in chapter 5, 
however, the stage has become increasingly crowded when it comes to EU for-
eign relations, with the High Representative, the President of the European 
Commission, the President of the European Council, the rotating President 
of the Council of Ministers and the different Heads of State and Government 
competing for position. Even on this crowded stage, however, and despite the 
role of the European Council in major international crises, the Council remains 
the central institution for EU external relations competences.
2.4.3 Operation of the Council
Most Council configurations meet around once or twice a month, usually 
in Brussels. The Council has a rotating presidency. Every six months, a new 
Member State takes over the presidency, which currently means that a Member 
32   The Council can delegate certain authority to adopt acts to the European Commission, 
or grant the Commission the power to adopt implementing acts, but these acts remain 
under the ultimate control of the Council itself and do not form legislative acts under EU 
law. See Articles 289–291 TFEU.
33   Article 18 TEU.
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State holds the presidency once every 14 years.34 The presidency inter alia 
sets the agenda, chairs meetings, represents the Council internally and exter-
nally, and tries to find consensus, and in doing so can exercise a certain albeit 
limited influence over decision making.35 To ensure consistency with such 
frequent rotations, three Member States together form a so called troika, that 
should coordinate their consecutive presidencies. Since Lisbon, moreover, 
both the Foreign Affairs Council and the Eurogroup have permanent presi-
dencies. The Foreign Affairs Council is chaired by the High Representative, 
whereas the Eurogroup elects its own president for renewable periods of two 
and a half years.36 These permanent presidencies aim to increase consistency, 
coherence and the capacity to act in times of crises for these vital groups.
In terms of decision making the Council uses different mechanisms, rang-
ing from simple majority voting, via qualified majority voting to unanimity. Of 
these mechanisms, qualified majority voting, or QMV in EU lingo, is the most 
important and common one. A qualified majority requires at least 55% of the 
Member States (usually fifteen) that together represent at least 65% of the EU 
population. By requiring at least fifteen states this formula protects smaller 
Members States, ensuring that they remain relevant for decision making. 
The population requirement, on the other hand, respects the larger popula-
tions represented by the more populous states.37 In the resulting balance, 
smaller states are overrepresented but in absolute terms the biggest states 
wield most influence.
QMV has been vital for the success of the EU. Initially, the Council primarily 
operated via unanimity. Especially with more and more Member States join-
ing, however, decision making by unanimity can lead to paralysis because each 
Member State can block an entire proposal. Over time, therefore, the Member 
34   Articles 16(9) TEU and 236(b) TFEU. The order is determined in Decision 2007/5/EC, 
EURATOM [2007] OJ L1/11. In light of Brexit, the UK has indicated it will not assume its 
presidency in 2017.
35   Cf. for the pre-Lisbon situation A. Warntjen, ‘Steering the Union: The Impact of the EU 
Presidency on Legislative Activity’ (2007) 45 JCMS, 1135.
36   Article 18(3) TEU and Protocol 14 Article 2.
37   See Articles 16(4) and 238(2) TFEU. Conversely, a blocking minority requires at least four 
Member States, meaning that even three Member States that represent more than 35% 
of the EU population cannot block legislation. After heated negotiations, moreover, the 
Lisbon treaty also introduced a transitional scheme which can be invoked by Member 
States until 31 March 2017, and which makes it easier for certain states like Poland to block 
legislation. See Article 16(5) and the Protocol on transitional provisions.
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States agreed to switch to QMV in ever more areas.38 This switch of course 
reduces the ultimate control a Member State has over legislation. At the same, 
this loss should also not be exaggerated. To begin with, even in QMV areas, 
the Council always strives for consensus and tries to avoid a vote. In approxi-
mately 80% of cases that fall under QMV the Council decides by consensus.39 
In practice, therefore, states are not often outvoted, although the possibility of 
a vote alone of course already affects the negotiations, and may promote the 
willingness to compromise. Since Lisbon the Council meets in public when it 
deliberates or votes on a draft legislative act, so as to increase transparency.40
2.4.3.1 COREPER and Committees
As stated, the Council only forms the tip of a legislative iceberg. Directly below 
the Council sits COREPER (Comité des représentants permanents), a body of 
permanent representatives of the Member States in Brussels.41 COREPER 
is split into COREPER I, which consists of the deputy representatives, and 
COREPER II, which consists of the permanent representatives or ambassa-
dors of the Member States to the EU. COREPER prepares all the meetings of 
the Council. It designates files as either A or B matters. A matters are already 
agreed in COREPER and only require rubberstamping by the Council. B mat-
ters are the more complex dossiers on which the Council itself must decide.42 
In turn, the work of COREPER is prepared by over 250 different working 
groups of national civil servants. It is in these working groups that the national 
experts of the civil service meet, negotiate and draft, and that vital preparatory 
work is done. Here as well it is vital to understand how the EU institutional 
system builds on and is integrated with the national systems, as opposed to 
some separate federate bureaucracies.
38   The Single European Act of 1986 formed a watershed moment in this regard, as decision 
making by QMV was accepted for the vital field of the internal market (now Article 114 
TFEU).
39   Most of the cases that do come to a vote, moreover, concern agriculture and fisheries, 
and therefore directly opposed and quantifiable interests. See F. Hayes-Renshaw, W. van 
Aken and H. Wallace, ‘When and Why the Council of Ministers of the EU Votes Explicitly’ 
(2006) 44  JCMS, 161, 165 or M. Matilla, ‘Contested Decisions: Empirical Analysis of Voting 
in the Council of Ministers’ (2004) 43 EJPR, 29.
40   Article 16(8) TEU. These public sessions can even be followed via live streams. Of course 
this does not prevent Ministers from negotiating in more private settings.
41   Article 16(7) TEU and 240(1) TFEU.
42   On the significant influence of COREPER also see M. Westlake and D. Galloway, 
The Council of the European Union (3rd edn, Harper Publishing, 2004), 201.
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2.5 The European Commission
The European Commission is the supranational body that represents the 
general European interest.43 It participates in legislation, forms part of 
the EU executive, and has several semi-judicial and enforcement powers. The 
European Commission also represents one of the important institutional 
innovations that sets the EU apart from ‘normal’ international organizations.44 
Right from the start, with the High Authority of the ECSC, the need was felt 
for a supranational body that could safeguard the effectiveness of rules and 
defend the common interest instead of more direct national interests. History 
had shown that purely intergovernmental institutions would not suffice to 
turn the EU’s ambitions into reality. The Commission, therefore, is one of the 
most characteristic EU institutions and a key ingredient to the EU’s success. 
The EU Commission, moreover, is a far more developed institution than the 
EAC Secretariat, both in terms of competences and staff. At the same time, 
the power of the Commission should also not be overstated. The Commission 
functions within an institutional balance with the European Council, 
the Council and the European Parliament. Each of these institutions 
represent their respective interests, and needs the others to realize its aims. 
The Commission, therefore, is not the ‘government’ of the EU.45 It does, how-
ever, provide a vital authority that can help draft and adopt rules that take the 
general European interest into account and subsequently enforce those rules 
to turn them into a living reality.
2.5.1 Composition of the Commission
The College of Commissioners consists of one Commissioner per Member 
State.46 The Commission has a president and a number of vice-presidents, one 
43   See more generally on this important and interesting institution D. Spence (ed), The 
European Commission (3rd edn, Harper, 2006), Temple Lang, ‘How Much do the Smaller 
Member States Need the European Commission: The Role of the Commission in a 
Changing Europe’ 39 CMLRev (2002), 315, or L Hooghe, The European Commission and the 
Integration of Europe (CUP, 2002).
44   Cf. D. Curtin and M. Egeberg, ‘Tradition and Innovation: Europe’s Accumulated Executive 
Order’ (2008) 31 West European Politics, 639.
45   Cf. also D. Curtin, Executive Power in the European Union: Law, Practises and the Living 
Constitution (OUP, 2009).
46   Although Article 17(4) TEU states that as of 1 November 2014 the Commission will be 
reduced to two-thirds of the Member States, this reduction was blocked by a decision 
from the European Council as enabled by the last sentence of this paragraph. This deci-
sion was linked to the first Irish no to Lisbon, after which Ireland received a promise that 
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of which is the High Representative discussed above.47 All commissioners are 
appointed for a five year, renewable term.48 Commissioners should represent 
the general interest of the Union. They must hence be ‘completely indepen-
dent’ from their own Member States and may not accept any instructions.49
The appointment of the Commission starts with the selection of its 
President. Taking into account the results of the election to the European 
Parliament, the European Council proposes a candidate, which must then be 
elected by the European Parliament.50 The President-elect then works with 
the Council to assemble the rest of the commissioners, based on the lists of 
names suggested by the Member States, and to divide the different portfolio’s 
between them. Subsequently, the College of Commissioners has to be approved, 
as a body, by the European Parliament.51 Once in office, the Commission can 
also be fired, again only as a body, by the European Parliament.52 In addition, 
the President has the authority to ask individual Commissioners to resign.53
Each Commissioner has a personal Cabinet of around eight persons to 
support her work. The real manpower of the Commission is located in the 
different Directorates-General, where about 25.000 civil servants work on 
it could keep its Commissioner, and other Member States then wanted the same. See 
Conclusions of the European Council of 11 and 12 December 2008, par. 2 (17271/1/08).
47   In 2014, Jean-Claude Juncker, as President of the Commission, introduced a system with 
one first Vice-President (Frans Timmermans) and multiple ordinary Vice-Presidents. This 
system is based on the discretionary power of the Commission President.
48   Article 17(3) TFEU.
49   Article 17(1) and (3) TFEU.
50   In 2014 the European Parliament for the first time applied the so called ‘Spitzenkandidaten-
procedure’ whereby each political faction in the Parliament nominated its own candidate 
for Commission President. The Parliament claimed that the European Council would 
then be obligated to select the candidate of the faction that won the elections for the 
European Parliament. After a long political battle, the European Council indeed selected 
Jean-Claude Juncker, the wining candidate. It is as yet unclear, however, if this now forms 
a binding convention of EU law, or if the European Council can or will ignore the EP can-
didate next time.
51   Formally, therefore, the European Parliament cannot reject individual Commissioners, 
but only accept or reject the entire Commission, a nuclear option. In practice, the 
Parliament does organize individual hearings for the Commissioners, and can pressure 
the President-elect to withdraw one or more of his candidates.
52   Article 234 TFEU.
53   Article 17(6) TFEU. See also Case C-394/15 P Dalli v Commission ECLI:EU:C:2016:262. 
In addition, the Court of Justice of the EU, on the application of the Council or the 
Commission, may compulsorily retire a Commissioner as well under Article 245 TFEU. 
See on this point Case C-432/04 Commission v. Cresson [2006] ECR I-6387.
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particular areas such as Agriculture, Competition, Migration or Trade. These 
Directorates-General do not report to individual Commissioners, but work 
for the Commission as such. This increases the relative autonomy of these 
Directorates-General, which has both benefits and some draw-backs.
2.5.2 Functions and Powers of the Commission
The Commission has a broad array of functions and powers, ranging 
from the administrative, via the legislative to the quasi-judicial. Like the 
Council, therefore, it is hard to fit the Commission in the traditional model of 
the Trias Politica.
Firstly, the Commission participates in legislation. In most areas except 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy the Commission has the exclusive 
right of initiative. Consequently, a proposal from the Commission is usually 
necessary for any legislation to be adopted.54 During the legislative process, 
moreover, the Commission retains the right to withdraw its proposal, which 
gives it continued influence over the legislation. In addition, legislative acts of 
the Council and Parliament often delegate significant rule-making or imple-
menting powers to the Commission.55 The Commission is then requested, for 
example, to fill-in a framework directive with more specific rules or to adopt 
implementing acts.56 Combined, these powers give the Commission serious 
legislative and quasi-legislative powers. This power also ensures a strong voice 
for the general European interest in EU legislation.
Secondly, the Commission is best known for being the EU ‘executive’, although 
the EU administration may be a more precise term.57 The Commission adminis-
ters the EU’s revenue and budget and is also in charge of many EU programs. In 
54   Article 17(2) TFEU. The Commission also has the initiative for the budget, see Article 314(2) 
TFEU. Note though that in practice most proposals are initiated by the Commission on 
the basis of request by other institutions (Article 225 and 241 TFEU), the need to update 
legislation, or international obligations. Around 5% of proposals are fully based on the 
Commissions own initiative for new legislation. See the House of Lords European Union 
Committee, Initiation of EU Legislation (22nd Report, 2007–08 Session).
55   See Article 290 and 291 TFEU.
56   Often, where power is delegated to the Commission, the use of this power is overseen by 
Committees of Member State representatives. These Committees sometimes can refer a 
matter back to the Council. This entire process of supervision is known as ‘Comitology’. 
See Regulation 182/2011/EU laying down the rules and general principles concerning 
mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implement-
ing powers, OJ [2011] L 55/13, and the Framework Agreement on relations between the 
European Parliament and the European Commission, OJ [2010] L 304/47.
57   Cf. H. Hoffmann and A. Türk (eds), EU Administrative Governance (Edward Elgar, 2006).
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addition, the Commission plays a central role in negotiating agreements with 
third countries, including accession treaties, and in maintaining international 
relations on behalf of the EU, except in the field of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy.58 During the Brexit negotiations, for example, the Commission 
is also likely to play a central role in negotiating the actual legal technicalities 
of withdrawal, even if the main political decision making will take place in the 
European Council and the Council.
Although the Commission therefore fulfills vital administrative func-
tions, again its role should not be overstated. To begin with, its administra-
tive capacity is limited, certainly when one compares the Commission staff 
of around 25.000 with the tens of millions of civil servants employed by the 
Member States. A key role for the Commission, therefore, is to coordinate with 
the much larger national bureaucracies, which are the primary implement-
ers of EU law and policies. The EU administration should therefore be seen 
as a compound structure, where the EU administration must cooperate with 
national administrations to be effective.59 Even at the EU level itself, more-
over, the Commission does not have the capacity to provide all the executive 
and administrative capacity needed, especially in highly technical areas that 
require a lot of expertise. For that reason, over 40 regulatory agencies have 
been developed. These agencies have widely varying powers and tasks, rang-
ing from mere advisory powers to enforcement and rule setting powers. They 
cover specific fields such as Food Safety, Chemicals or Medicines, and form an 
important part of the EU administration. Most of these bodies cooperate with 
the Commission, but they are nevertheless separate and distinct legal entities, 
that wield significant power.60
Thirdly, the Commission has important enforcement and quasi-judicial 
functions and powers. To begin with, the Commission is the so called ‘watch 
dog’ of EU law. It checks whether Member States fully comply with EU law. If 
they do not, the Commission may start an infringement procedure. A Member 
State is then first given notice and given a chance to explain or where necessary 
to improve its compliance with EU law. If the Member State does not comply, 
the Commission may bring the Member State before the Court of Justice.61 The 
58   EEA and High Representative.
59   D. Curtin, Executive Power in the European Union: Law, Practises and the Living Constitution 
(OUP, 2009), A. Cuyvers, The EU as a Confederal Union of Sovereign Member Peoples, 
Exploring the potential of American (con)federalism and popular sovereignty for a constitu-
tional theory of the EU, (Diss. Leiden, Wöhrmann 2013), 141.
60   See also M. Busuioc, European Agencies: Law and Practises of Accountablity (OUP, 2013).
61   Article 258 TFEU.
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CJEU, when it finds a violation, may then order the Member State to comply, or 
in a second round of infringement impose a (serious) fine.62 In a large major-
ity of cases, however, Member States already comply with the suggestions of 
the Commission before the case proceeds to court.63 This general role of the 
Commission as guardian of the Treaties has proven especially important as 
experience has shown that Member States will rarely police each others com-
pliance with EU law, largely due to the political costs of doing so. An effective 
power of enforcement and infringement therefore seems an important build-
ing block for successful regional integration.
The Commission also has special and far reaching powers in the enforce-
ment of EU competition law. The Commission itself can impose fines on com-
panies that partake in prohibited cartels or abuse a dominant position on the 
EU market.64 The Commission may also order Member States to recover illegal 
or unlawful state aid granted to undertakings.65 As the recovery order of over 
13 billion euro in the case of Ireland and Apple demonstrates, these can be far 
reaching powers, even if all Commission decisions can be challenged before 
the Court of Justice.
2.5.3 The Functioning of the Commission
The Commission formally functions under the principle of collegiality. This 
principle means that all decisions should be take collectively by the College 
of Commissioners, and that the College is also collectively responsible for all 
decisions taken. Only minor decisions, or ‘acts of management’ may be dele-
gated to individual Commissioners.66 In practice, most decisions are prepared 
by one or more Commissioners and then approved by the College in its weekly 
Wednesday meeting. Only a limited number is discussed, and an even lower 
number is put to a vote, as consensus is the preferred outcome. When the 
College votes, however, it only requires an ordinary majority.
Over time, moreover, the functioning of the Commission has become 
increasingly ‘presidential’, as the President of the Commission acquired more 
and more power and influence. The President is of course elected first and 
therefore already involved in the initial selection of Commissioners and the 
division of portfolios. In addition, the President may also reallocate or change 
portfolios during the term of office, take over certain policy fields, or even 
62   Article 260(2) TFEU. See for more details chapter 7.
63   Cf Case C-286/12 Commission v Hungary, ECLI:EU:C:2012:687.
64   Articles 101, 102 and 105 TFEU, as well as Regulation 1/2003 [2003] OJ L1/1.
65   Articles 107 and 108 TFEU.
66   Case C-137/92 P Commission v. BASF [1994] ECR I-2555.
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request individual Commissioners to resign.67 More generally, the President 
sets the political agenda and direction of the Commission as a whole, and also 
represents the Commission in the European Council, the European Parliament, 
and the world at large. In 2014, President Juncker moreover used his powers to 
introduce the new post of ‘first Vice-President’ and to give all Vice-Presidents 
of the Commission the power to block proposals from Commissioners in ‘their’ 
project teams. It is to be seen if these innovations will be taken over in later 
Commissions.
2.6 The European Court of Justice
The European Court of Justice is the judicial body of the EU, and has been part 
of the institutional set-up from the start.68 It ensures ‘that in the interpretation 
and application of the Treaties the law is observed.’ The Court of Justice has 
played a crucial role in the success of European integration, especially in the 
creation of an effective internal market and the development of EU law. Indeed 
the Court has been a vital engine for integration during several deep crises, and 
has helped shape the process known as ‘integration through law’, which helped 
the EU to become an effective supranational organization without becoming 
a federal state. For where substantive power largely remains with the Member 
States, law becomes a crucial tool for effective integration.69
67   Article 17(7) TFEU. Of course the President normally will check this with the relevant 
national governments as well.
68   See on this important institution and its role in European integration generally K. Alter, 
The European Court’s Political Power: Selected Essays (OUP, 2009), or G. de Burca and 
J.H.H. Weiler, The European Court of Justice (OUP, 2001). For a nice overview and discus-
sion of several seminal cases of the CJEU and the role they played in European integration 
see M.P. Maduro and L. Azoulai (eds), The Past and Future of EU Law: The Classics of EU 
law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Hart Publishing, 2010).
69   See famously M. Cappelletti, M. Seccombe, and J.H.H. Weiler, Integration Through Law—
European and the American Federal Experience, Vol. I (De Gruyter 1986), and J.H.H. Weiler, 
‘The Transformation of Europe’ 100 Yale Law Journal (1991), 2403. For a further discussion 
on the importance of rule by law for (con)federal organization see A. Cuyvers, The EU 
as a Confederal Union of Sovereign Member Peoples, Exploring the potential of American 
(con)federalism and popular sovereignty for a constitutional theory of the EU, (Diss. Leiden, 
Wöhrmann 2013), 180.
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Like the Commission, the Court is a truly supranational body. It has compul-
sory jurisdiction over all EU law.70 The Court can therefore ensure that EU law 
is interpreted properly and coherently in all different Member States, and that 
all parties respect their obligations.71 The Court thereby forms another of the 
crucial institutional innovations that set the EU apart from ‘ordinary’ interna-
tional organizations and that contributes to the actual effectiveness of the EU. 
Without the Court it can safely be said the EU would never have come close to 
the level of integration reached today. Again, however, the power of the Court 
and EU law should also not be overstated. Ultimately integration succeeds 
because it serves the needs of the Member States and the Member Peoples, not 
just because of the law. Rather, the law is simply one necessary tool in allow-
ing integration to bring concrete benefits to all parties involved. In addition, 
the Court of Justice heavily relies on a close cooperation with national courts, 
as it obviously cannot oversee the application of EU law to over 500 million 
people. Much of the credit for making EU law work, therefore, is also owed to 
the national courts.
2.6.1 Composition of the Court of Justice
The institution entitled the ‘Court of Justice of the European Union’ actually 
consists of two courts. The highest of these is somewhat confusingly also 
called ‘the Court of Justice of the European Union’. The second, lower court is 
now called the ‘General Court’, but was previously entitled ‘the Court of First 
Instance’ (CFI). In addition, the Treaty allows for specialized courts to be set 
up, for example in the field of intellectual property.72 So far, however, only the 
Civil Service Tribunal was set up in this manner to adjudicate staff cases, only 
to be scrapped in 2016 after the enlargement of the General Court.73
The Court of Justice consists of one judge per Member State and 11 
Advocates-General that provide legal opinions to assist the Court in its work. 
The General Court also used to consist of one judge per Member State, but 
in 2016 was enlarged to two judges per Member State to increase its capacity. 
Judges and Advocates-General are appointed by common accord of the gov-
ernments of the Member States, after each Member State nominates its own 
70   The only main exception concerns the Common Foreign and Security Policy, see Article 
24(1) TEU and Article 275 TFEU. For other, smaller, limitations see Article 269 and 276 
TFEU.
71   On the vital importance of the Courts complete jurisdiction over all aspects.
72   Article 19(1) TEU.
73   Council Decision 2004/752/EC, Euratom of 2 November 2004, establishing the European 
Union Civil Service Tribunal [2004] OJ L333/7.
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candidate.74 Before being appointed, however, the suitability of candidates 
must be assessed by a panel of seven members, comprised of former members 
of the Court of Justice and the General Court, members of national supreme 
courts or lawyers of recognized competence.75 Judges and Advocates-General 
are appointed for renewable periods of six years.76 Both courts choose their 
own presidents for renewable periods of three years.
2.6.2 Powers and Functions of the Court of Justice and the General Court
The general function of both EU Courts is to ensure that EU law is observed 
throughout the EU. The main power they have to fulfill this function is the final 
say on the interpretation and application of EU law. Ultimately, it is always up 
to the CJEU to determine both the scope and the correct interpretation of EU 
law, and all national and EU bodies are bound by this interpretation. The CJEU 
jealously safeguards this ultimate say on the interpretation and application of 
EU law. For example, the CJEU has so far blocked the setting up of any alterna-
tive courts or bodies that would have the power to interpret parts of EU law but 
would not be subject to the jurisdiction of the CJEU itself.77 This strict position 
is largely to safeguard the unity and coherence of Union law, which could suf-
fer if its interpretation differed per Member State or if multiple separate bod-
ies could interpret it independently from each other. The jurisdiction of the EU 
Courts, moreover, is obligatory, and cannot be rejected by the Member States 
in individual cases. On this point, therefore, we see a clear difference between 
the exclusive and ultimate jurisdiction of the CJEU, and the more fragmented 
jurisdiction of the East African Court of Justice.
Concerning the relationship between the Court of Justice and the General 
Court, it can generally be said that the General Court acts as a court of first 
instance for individuals and companies, whereas most other issues go straight 
to the CJEU.78 For example, the CJEU deals with cases between the institutions 
74   Articles 253 and 354 TFEU.
75   This is the so called ‘Article 255 panel’. The conclusions of the panel are not made public, 
but it is known that several judges have been rejected based on the opinion of this panel.
76   This system has been criticized as it creates the risk that judges avoid ‘upsetting’ their own 
Member State so as to not endanger their reappointment. In practice, however, this risk is 
largely avoided by the fact that judgments are given by the Court as such, and no dissent-
ing opinions are given, which usually hides the opinion of individual judges.
77   See especially CJEU Opinion 2/13 on the draft agreement providing for the accession of the 
European Union to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454.
78   For a more detailed overview of these legal remedies see the companion chapters 7 and 8.
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and conflicts between the EU and Member States,79 including infringements.80 
In addition, the CJEU answers preliminary references from national courts, has 
appellate jurisdiction over the General Court on points of law, and may pro-
vide opinions on international agreements.81 The General Court, on the other 
hand, hears all actions by individuals and companies challenging an EU act, 
also in the field of competition law, holding the EU liable for non-contractual 
damages.82 Although the General Court is not formally bound by the judg-
ments of the Court of Justice, it considers itself de facto bound to follow the 
jurisprudence of the CJEU.83
In the future, the General Court may also receive the power to answer 
certain preliminary references.84 It is important to note, however, that nei-
ther the CJEU nor the General Court have a general appellate jurisdiction 
over national courts. It is never possible, therefore, to appeal a judgment from 
a national court to the General Court or the CJEU directly.
2.6.3 The Functioning of the Court of Justice and the General Court
The Court of Justice normally sits in chambers of five or three judges. In com-
plex or important cases, or where a Member State or an institution so requests, 
the CJEU will sit as a ‘Grand Chamber’ of 15 judges. Such judgment also tends 
to carry greater weight. In truly exceptional cases the CJEU can sit as a ‘full 
court’ with all 28 judges. Clearly such judgments carry special significance.85 
The CJEU normally receives a written Opinion from an Advocate-General on 
a case, even though under certain expedited procedures it decides to only 
hear the Advocate-General orally or to do without an opinion altogether.
The General Court hears most cases in chambers of three judges, but may 
also sit in chambers of five or in some cases with a single judge.86 Where the case 
requires, however, the General Court may also sit as a Grand Chamber of 15 or a 
full court.87 The General Court does not yet have Advocates-General, but may 
79   Except for conflicts between Member States and the Commission, the ECB or the 
European Council, see Articles 263 and 265 TFEU.
80   See Articles 258, 259, 260, 263, and 265 TFEU.
81   Articles 118(11), 265 and 267 TFEU.
82   Articles 263, 265 and 340 TFEU.
83   Kadi II GC.
84   Article 256(3) TFEU.
85   See Article 251 TFEU together with the Statute of the Court (n. 205), art. 16, as well as Case 
C-370/12 Pringle ECLI:EU:C:2012:756.
86   See Council Decision 1999/291 [1999] OJ L114/52, and the Statute (n 205) Art. 50.
87   Idem.
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acquire them in the future. In addition, the General Court can exceptionally 
ask one of tis judges to act as an Advocate-General in a particular case.88
The General Court and the Court of Justice do not issue dissenting opin-
ions. As one of the core functions of the EU courts is to guard the unity and 
consistency of EU law, it is important that they speak with one voice. One 
consequence of this choice is of course that decisions may form compromises 
between different views within the EU courts, which may undermine their clar-
ity and internal consistency. At the same time, such compromise judgments 
also fit with the collective nature of European integration, which should take 
different views into account. They also prevent the dangerous fragmentation 
that can take place where strong dissenting views may threaten the uniform 
application of EU law, especially in Member States whose national interests 
are best served by the minority view.
One major challenge for the functioning of the CJEU, as for all EU institu-
tions, is posed by the 24 official and working languages of the EU. Although 
the Courts predominantly use French as a working language, judgments need 
to be translated into all official languages, and parties are allowed to submit 
written and oral pleadings in their own language. The CJEU therefore requires 
a very large, and highly specialized, team of lawyer-linguists, and translation 
actually forms a major source of delay.
2.7 Other Institutions and EU Bodies
In addition to the institutions discussed above, Article 13 TEU also establishes 
the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Court of Auditors (CoA) as formal 
EU institutions, bringing the total to seven. The ECB is an independent cen-
tral bank with the exclusive competence over monetary policy of Eurozone 
(including interest rates), and the primary task of ensuring price stability. Its 
governing body is composed of representatives of Member State central banks 
together with the board of the ECB itself.89 Especially after the euro crisis the 
ECB has acquired an increasingly central position, which will be discussed in 
more detail in chapter 13.
The Court of Auditors checks the books of the EU. It examines the 
accounts of all revenue and expenditure of the Union, and checks if these 
88   Statute (n 205) Article 49.
89   Article 282(1) TFEU and Protocol no 4 on the statute of the European System of Central 
Banks and of the European Central Bank.
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are in accordance with the rules. A negative opinion, however, will not block 
expenditure.90 The CoA consists of one member per Member State.
As will also be clear from the above, moreover, the institutions only form 
the top layer of all EU bodies that allow the EU to function and fulfill its 
many tasks. Especially important are the over 40 agencies and the many com-
mittees in which national civil servants meet, as these provide the EU with 
the vital expertise, capacity, and bridge to the national administrations where 
most of the work has to be done. As long as the overwhelming majority of 
administrative and executive capacity remain with the Member States, after 
all, the institutional structure and functioning of the EU must reflect and sup-
port the multilevel nature of the EU. Conversely, as national systems become 
such a vital part of supranational regional integration, each national system 
must also gradually adapt and evolve to include its new functions with the 
EU system, an evolution that has not yet been completed in the EU and that is 
causing part of the problems the EU is experiencing today. 
90   Article 285 TFEU.
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chapter 3
The Legal Framework of the EAC
Elvis Mbembe Binda
3.1 Attribution, Scope and Nature of Competence
The competence of the East African Community (EAC) as an intergovernmen-
tal organization is not stated expressis verbis in the Treaty for the Establishment 
of the East African Community (the Treaty). Unlike the EU where the powers of 
the supranational organization were clearly defined from the onset as to be 
distinguished from the competence of the Member States, in the EAC the situa-
tion is quite blurred.1 In fact, the competence of the EAC can rather be implied 
from the objectives of the Community as broadly set in Article 5 of the Treaty.
According to Article 5(1), the objective of the Community is to “develop pol-
icies and programmes aimed at widening and deepening co-operation among 
the Partner States in political, economic, social and cultural fields, research 
and technology, defense, security and legal and judicial affairs, for their mutual 
benefit”. Obviously, this is a very broad objective that embraces all the imag-
inable aspects of Community life. However, the Community’s competence 
is limited to enhancing cooperation in specific areas that the Partner States 
agreed to undertake in common.2 As far as these fields are concerned, it can 
be considered that a portion of competence has been conferred by the Partner 
States to the EAC, which is henceforth entitled to act within the limits of the 
powers conferred upon to it.3 This includes making policies, enacting legisla-
tions, making regulations, issuing directives, taking decisions, making recom-
mendations, or giving opinions to further the objectives of the community.
Pursuant to Article 8(1)(b) the Partner States have an obligation to work 
in close collaboration with the EAC institutions in the coordination of 
* The author gratefully recognizes that paragraph 3.3, of this chapter was written by Professor 
K. Gastorn.
1   See the clear listing under Art. 3 of the Treaty of Rome (1957) and its modification in subse-
quent EU Treaties, including the current Articles 4–6 TFEU. For a further overview see EU 
Chapter 3.
2   See their list in the next section.
3   Art. 9(4) of the EAC Treaty.
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their economic and other policies in order to achieve the objectives of the 
Community.4 This provision can be construed as enabling a kind of concur-
rent competence between the Partner States and EAC. Therefore, this means 
the conferred competence to the Community on some matters does not imply 
that the Partner States have automatically lost their authority to act on the 
same matters. Actually, the Partner States are entitled to continue making and 
applying their own policies and laws—even on matters under the competence 
of the EAC—as long as the latter has not yet made a common rule applicable to 
all of the Partner States. In other words, the competence of the Partner States 
ends where that of the Community start being exercised.5
Looking at the EU competence typology,6 it can be inferred from various 
provisions that the EAC Treaty has consecrated a general regime of shared 
competence between the Community and the Partner States.
3.2 Main Competences of the EAC
The Treaty does not contain a single article that exhaustively lists the areas or 
powers that the Partner States intend to confer to the Community. The wording 
of the Treaty is rather very subtle and requires attention to find out whether 
a specific area of competence has been transferred to the EAC. In fact, Treaty 
provisions generally impose obligations directly on the Partner States in terms 
such as “the Partner States shall . . .” and “the Partner states agree . . .”, which 
confirms that the EAC is a Partner States-led organization in accordance with 
its intergovernmentalist integration approach. However, some paragraphs 
are inserted under those articles to legitimize the intervention of EAC institu-
tions either by reserving to them a fair amount of latitude to determine the 
course of a certain action or by entrusting them with the power to act with 
immediate effect, with effect on a certain specified time or as soon as certain 
requirements are met.7 It has been suggested that whenever a provision con-
tains such a paragraph, it should be construed as conferring competence to the 
Community.8
4   Art. 4(1)(b) of the EAC Treaty.
5   A.G. Toth, ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty’, (1992) 29 Common Market 
Law Review 1079, p. 1080. Compare in this regard also the discussion in EU Chapter 3 on the 
nature of shared competences in the EU.
6   See Art. 2 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
7   See for instance arts. 75(2), (3) and (4); 76(2) and (3); 80(2); 84(1); 85; 86; etc.
8   A.G. Toth, op. cit., p. 1081.
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In line with this, a careful reading of various Treaty provisions suggests that 
the Partner States intended to confer powers to the Community in the follow-
ing areas:
(i) Trade liberalization and development, including the estab-
lishment of a Customs Union and a common market (Articles. 
75–78);
(ii) Investment and industrial development (Articles. 79–80);
(iii) Standardization, quality assurance, metrology and testing 
(Article. 81);
(iv) Monetary and financial matters, including the free movement of 
capital (Articles. 82–88);
(v) Infrastructure and services (Articles. 89–101);
(vi) Development of human resources, science and technology 
(Articles. 102–103);
(vii) Free movement of persons, labor, services, right of establishment 
and residence (Article. 104)
(viii) Agriculture and food security (Articles. 105–110)
(ix) Environment and natural resources management (Articles. 111–
114);
(x) Tourism and wildlife management (Articles. 115–116);
(xi) Health, social and cultural activities (Articles. 117–120)
(xii) Enhancing the role of women in socio-economic development 
(Article. 121)
(xiii) Political matters (Articles. 123–125);
(xiv) Legal and judicial affairs (Article. 126)
This list is not exhaustive as, pursuant to Article 131, the Partner States may 
decide to extend their scope of co-operation to other fields. Besides, in addi-
tion to the competence in areas mentioned in these general provisions, it 
should be understood that the EAC also has implied competences in any other 
domain not listed above as long as such competence is necessary to perform 
the activities under these areas in order to achieve the Treaty objectives.
3.3 The Principle of Variable Geometry and Enhanced Co-operation
As an operational principle of the Community, the principle of variable geom-
etry is the principle of flexibility that allows for progression in co-operation 
among a sub-group of Partner States in a larger integration scheme in a variety 
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of areas and at different speeds.9 The principle of variable geometry rests on 
the rationale that in any given community some members are able to integrate 
more than others in a variety of areas and at different speeds. It is not a rule of 
exclusion, it simply allows Partner States to jointly agree on issues but imple-
ment them at different speeds.
The concept of variable geometry is also known as the principle of flexibility, 
differentiated integration, enhanced co-operation, Europe à la carte, concen-
tric circles, and multi-speed Europe.10 That means, the concept of enhanced 
cooperation as practiced in the EU where a limited number of EU members 
may cooperate in an area without other members is associated with the con-
cept of variable geometry in the context of the EAC.
In the context of the EAC, the principle of variable geometry is not devel-
oped. However, the East African Court of Justice has opined that the principle 
of variable geometry is in harmony with the requirement for consensus in 
Council decision-making. Adding that, the principle is a strategy of implemen-
tation of Community decisions and not a decision making tool itself and it 
therefore guides the integration process.11
As much as the principle of variable geometry is viewed as a necessary 
means of enabling those ready to proceed, and hoping the remaining States 
follow later, it has the danger of creating a small community within a com-
munity that might ultimately endanger the cohesion of the larger community. 
The EACJ accordingly advised that the principle of variable geometry should 
be resorted to as an exception, not as a rule since institutionalized flexibility 
might lead to a breakup of the Community or its transformation into a mere 
free trade area.12 It is advised that in a young community like the EAC, the prin-
ciple of legal unity should be stressed instead of variable geometry.13
9    Arts. 1(1) and 7(1)(e) of the EAC Treaty.
10   See http://www.euro-know.org/europages/dictionary/v.html (30 Sept 2013); Bomberg, E., 
et al., The European Union: How does it work? (OUP 2012), p. 163.
11   In the Matter of a Request by the Council of Ministers of the East African Community 
for an Advisory Opinion, Application No. 1 of 2008, In the East African Court of Justice at 
Arusha First Instance Division [Coram: Johnston Busingye, PJ; Mary Stella Arach-Amoko, 
DPJ; John Mkwawa, J; Jean-Bosco Butasi, J; Benjamin Patrick Kubo, J].
12   See http://www.euro-know.org/europages/dictionary/v.html) (30 Sept 2013); In the 
Matter of a Request by the Council of Ministers of the East African Community for 
an Advisory Opinion, Application No. 1 of 2008, In the East African Court of Justice at 
Arusha First Instance Division [Coram: Johnston Busingye, PJ; Mary Stella Arach-Amoko, 
DPJ; John Mkwawa, J; Jean-Bosco Butasi, J; Benjamin Patrick Kubo, J]; M.J. Maalim, The 
United Republic of Tanzania in the East African Community: Legal Challenges in Integrating 
Zanzibar, (PhD Thesis, University of Dar es Salaam, 2013), p. 56.
13   R. McAllister, European Union: An Historical and Political Survey (Routledge 2010), p. 91.
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According to Henry Kibet Mutai, the principle of variable geometry was 
incorporated in the EAC Treaty primarily to allay the concerns of Tanzania and 
Uganda, which feared that, given their relatively low levels of development, 
their economies ran the risk of being swamped by Kenyan goods if they were 
obliged to liberalize at the same rate.14
The design of variable geometry as a negotiation strategy and as a strat-
egy of implementation of agreed activities is complex and difficult. The 
concept of variable geometry suits a larger group of countries among which 
a subset is initially willing to enter an agreement.15 It first appeared in EU 
Treaties and has later arisen in other negotiations particularly in the World 
Trade Organization as a possible way of breaking the impasse in failed 
negotiations, such as the GATTs opt-in agreements on Technical Barriers and 
Government Procurement.16
In the EU, variable geometry started with the 1990 Schengen Convention 
relating to the free movement of person among the Schengen States where 
Ireland and the UK were not willing to remove controls on the intra-EU move-
ment of non-EU nationals.17 Then again in 1991 where 11 Member States of the 
EU signed the Social Policy Agreement relating to employment and work-
ing conditions, but the UK opted out. In 1992, the European Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) adopted the common currency, the euro, and com-
mon monetary policy under the European Central Bank. The UK, Ireland and 
Denmark immediately refused to sign and thereby retained their own curren-
cies, with Ireland joining at a later date.18
In the EU, the principle of variable geometry was first formalized in the 
1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, then christened as ‘closer co-operation’, largely in 
response to the UK’s and Denmark’s opt-outs on European Monetary Union, the 
UK’s and Ireland’s exemptions from the Schengen Agreement and Denmark’s 
14   As quoted in J.V. Mwapachu, Challenging the Frontiers of African Integration: The 
Dynamics of Policies, Politics and Transformation in the East African Community, (E&D 
Vision Publishing, Dar es Salaam 2012), p. 365.
15   P. Lloyd, ‘The Variable Geometry Approach to International Economic Integration’, 
University of Melbourne, p. 51. See http://journals.usb.ac.ir/Business/en-us/Articles/
Article_172/ (accessed 15 November 2013).
16   P. Lloyd, op. cit., p. 56.
17   C. Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms, (OUP 2010), pp. 524–527; 
Lloyd, Peter, ‘The Variable Geometry Approach to International Economic Integration’, 
supra, pp. 53–54.
18   P. Lloyd, op. cit., p. 54. See also EU Chapter 13 on the development of EMU in the EU, and 
the problems this has created.
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opt-out on anything to do with a common EU defence policy.19 These opt-outs 
had already created de facto variable geometry.
Today, variable geometry agreements and the ‘acquis communautaire’ are 
the two main tracks of greater integration within the EU. The ‘acquis commu-
nautaire’ refers to EU’s total body of legislation or what has so far been achieved 
by the EU.20 However, the acts adopted in the framework of the variable geom-
etry bind only participating Member States and they do not in formal terms 
constitute part of the acquis that has to be accepted by candidate states for 
accession to the EU. According to Peter Lloyd, variable geometry has the fol-
lowing features.21 First, it is an opt-in agreement devised by a proper subset of 
a larger group of countries. It is therefore an opt-in strategy as opposed to à la 
carte practices of opting out.22 Second, its benefits are restricted to the subset 
of countries. Third, it is a union of temporary steps towards the eventual inclu-
sion of all members into the negotiated arrangements.
In the EAC, this principle found practical application when Kenya, 
Rwanda and Uganda decided in 2013 to fast-track some integration proj-
ects such as the establishment of a single customs territory, a single tourist 
visa and the use of national identity card as travel documents for their citi-
zens to cross their mutual borders.23 Tanzania and Burundi were not ready 
to be involved. Therefore, based on the principle of variable geometry, Kenya, 
Rwanda and Uganda launched the projects and left it open to the discretion of 
Burundi and Tanzania to join whenever they deem appropriate.
19   (http://www.euro-know.org/europages/dictionary/v.html) (30 Sept 2013).
20   S. Hargreaves, EU Law, (OUP 2009), p. 18. Also see Y. Usui, “Constructing an East Asian 
Acquis”, in Nkamura, Tamio (ed), East Asian Regionalism from a Legal Perspective: Current 
features and a vision for the future, (Routledge 2009), pp. 231–243.
21   P. Lloyd, op. cit., pp. 58 and 63.
22   J. Janning, ‘European Democracy and Variable Geometry. How a multi-speed Europe com-
plicates the Union’s democratic legitimacy’, (2013), p. 2. See https://ip-journal.dgap.org/en/
ip-journal/topics/european-democracy-and-variable-geometry (accessed 25 December 
2013).
23   See G. Ajumbo, ‘Is Variable Geometry Leading to the Freagmentation of Regional 
Integration in East Africa?’, available on http://www.afdb.org/en/blogs/integrating-africa/
post/is-variable-geometry-leading-to-the-fragmentation-of-regional-integration-in-east-
africa-12524/ last access on 15 November 2016.
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3.4 Legal Instruments
3.4.1 Treaty and Protocols
The EAC legal landscape consists of the Treaty and protocols concluded 
by the Partner States to enhance their cooperation in agreed areas. In prin-
ciple, each protocol spells out its objectives, scope and any institutional frame-
work needed for cooperation and integration. According to Article 151 of the 
Treaty, each protocol becomes an integral part of the Treaty after signature and 
ratification following the approval by the Summit on the recommendation of 
the Council.
So far, more than a dozen protocols have been ratified and are in force.24 
Among them, three deserve to be mentioned given their paramount signifi-
cance for the regional integration process in the EAC. The first protocol is 
the Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Customs Union which 
entered into force in 2005 with the main aim of eliminating internal tariffs 
and other charges of equivalent effect as well as non-tariff barriers in order to 
smoothen the free movement of goods between the Partner States. The second 
is the Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Common Market in 
force since 2010.25 This Protocol focuses on the free movement of labor, ser-
vices and capital while fostering the freedom of establishment and that of resi-
dence for EAC Partner States’ nationals. The third protocol worth mentioning 
is the Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Community Monetary 
Union. This Protocol entered into force in 2015 after its ratification by all the 
Partner States with the objective to “promote and maintain monetary and 
financial stability aimed at facilitating economic integration to attain sustain-
able growth and development of the Community”.26
24   Inter alia can be mentioned Protocol on the Decision-Making by the Council of the East 
African Community [2001]; Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Kiswahili 
Commission [2007]; the Protocol on Combatting drug trafficking in the East African 
Community [2001]; Protocol on Standardization, Quality Assurance, Metrology and 
Testing [2001]; Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Civil Aviation Safety 
and Security Oversight Agency [1999]; Protocol on the Establishment of the East African 
Science and Technology Commission [2008]; Protocol on Peace and Security [2013]; 
Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Health Research Commission [2008]; 
Protocol for the Sustainable Development of Lake Victoria Bassin [2003]; Protocol on 
Environment and Natural Resources Management [2006]; etc.
25   See also Chapter 9, 10, 11 and 12 for a more detailed discussion of these Protocols.
26   Art. 3 of EAC Monetary Union Protocol as well as Chapter 13.
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Each of these protocols embodies, respectively and successively, the attain-
ment of the first three key stages of the EAC regional integration process, i.e. 
customs union, common market and monetary union as affirmed in paragraph 
fifteen of the preamble to the Treaty. The Protocol on the Establishment of a 
Political Federation, the ultimate stage of EAC regional integration, is still in an 
embryonic draft stage.
Acts and regulations are enacted for the implementation of Treaty protocols. 
In relation to the protocols mentioned above, one could name the East African 
Custom Management Act (2004) and the East African Community Customs 
Union (Rules of Origin) Rules as amended to date, and the six annexes27 
to the Common Market Protocol as some of the acts and regulations in force 
in the EAC.
3.4.2 General Principles
The Treaty makes a distinction between fundamental principles of the 
Community and its operational principles.28 On the one hand, according to 
Article 6, the achievement of the objectives of EAC regional integration is gov-
erned by fundamental principles of (a) mutual trust, political will and sover-
eign equality; (b) peaceful co-existence and good neighborliness; (c) peaceful 
settlement of disputes; good governance including adherence to the principles 
of democracy, the rule of law, accountability, transparency, social justice, equal 
opportunities, gender equality, as well as the recognition, promotion and pro-
tection of human and peoples rights in accordance with the provisions of the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights; (e) equitable distribution of 
benefits; and (f) cooperation for mutual benefit.
On the other hand, Article 7 provides for operational principles that must 
be observed for the practical achievement of the objectives of the Community. 
These are principles of (a) people-centered and market-driven coopera-
tion, (b) the provision by the Partner States of an adequate and appropriate 
enabling environment, such as conducive policies and basic infrastructure; 
27   Annex 1: The East African Community Common Market (Free Movement of Persons) 
Regulations; Annex 2: The East African Community Common Market (Free Movement of 
Workers) Regulations; Annex III: The East African Community Common Market (Right 
of Establishment) Regulations; Annex IV: The East African Community Common Market 
(Right of Residence) Regulations; Annex V: The East African Community Common 
Market Schedule of Commitments on the Progressive Liberalization of Services; and 
Annex VI: The East African Community Common Market Schedule on the Removal of 
Restrictions on the Free Movement of Capital.
28   See for a detailed discussion in this point also Chapter 6.
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(c) the establishment of an export oriented economy for the Partner States 
in which there shall be free movement of goods, persons, labor, services, 
capital, information and technology; (d) the principle of subsidiarity which 
emphasizes on multi-level participation and the involvement of a wide range 
of stake-holders in the process of integration; the principle of variable geom-
etry allowing for progression in cooperation among groups within the com-
munity for wider integration schemes in various fields and at different speeds; 
(f) the equitable distribution of benefits accruing or to be derived from the 
operations of the Community and measures to address economic imbalances 
that may arise from such operations; the principle of complementarity; and 
(h) the principle of asymmetry. In addition to these principles, good gover-
nance also appears as one of the operational principles of the EAC.
The treaty-makers found it judicious to erect two principles that at the same 
time form fundamental and operational principles of the Community. These 
are the principle of equitable distribution of the benefits of the Community 
and the principle of good governance.29 This is not by chance. To understand 
the reason for this choice, one may want to refer to paragraph 4 of the pream-
ble to the Treaty where the “continued disproportionate sharing of benefits of 
the Community among the Partner States” and the “lack of adequate policies 
to address this situation” are deplored as some of the main reasons that caused 
the collapse of the former EAC in 1977.
In fact, right after independence, Uganda and Tanzania already started com-
plaining that the British system had favored Kenya which became more indus-
trialized than her two other Partner States. This allegedly caused serious trade 
imbalances whose manifestation was that Uganda and Tanzania imported 
from Kenya more than they could export. They contended that this situation 
was actually fostered by the customs union which became fully-fledged among 
them in 1940. As a result of the customs union’s common external tariff, it was 
difficult for products from third countries to penetrate the Community mar-
ket. Hence, Uganda and Tanzania had to import quasi-exclusively from Kenya. 
This situation contributed a lot to the economic development of Kenya, but 
to the detriment of the other two EAC countries. According to Uganda and 
Kenya, this was one of the materializations of the inequitable sharing of the 
benefits of the Community.30 The Kampala agreement and the treaty establish-
ing the former EAC attempted to address this issue of inequitable distribution 
of the benefits of the community in 1964 and in 1967, respectively. However, 
29   See Arts. 6(e) and 7(f) for the principle of equitable distribution of the benefits; and 
arts. 6(d) and 7(2) for the principle of good governance.
30   See on this point also further Chapters 9 and 13.
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this was in vain. It is probably to highlight the fatality of this issue in order to 
urge the Partner States to find an effective solution that Treaty-makers resolved 
to make the “equitable distribution of the benefits of the Community” one of 
its dualist general principles under Articles 6 and 7.
On the other hand, good governance as a general principle is one of the 
pillars that supports the entire EAC architecture. In this sense, the EACJ held 
that the principle of good governance has to be observed as it is “foundational, 
core and indispensable to the success of the integration agenda”.31 Good gover-
nance acts as the steering principle to ensure that both the Partner States, and 
EAC organs and institutions are effectively and efficiently converging towards 
the achievement of the integration objectives.
Apart from the principle of variable geometry and that of good governance 
which have been addressed by the EACJ, the scope and the practical mean-
ing of other general principles enshrined in the Treaty are not yet ascertained. 
While the concrete meaning of the principle of variable geometry was asked 
to the Court by the Council in order to break a deadlock in which its decision-
making seemed to be trapped,32 the scope and the practical meaning of the 
principle of good governance was rather an outcome of EAC citizens’ activism.
In fact, for some reasons, the Treaty-makers subjected the human rights 
jurisdiction of the EACJ to the adoption of an ad hoc protocol.33 As this pro-
tocol is still awaited, pursuant to Article 30 of the Treaty that gives quality to 
“any person who is resident in a Partner State” to refer a case on the unlaw-
fulness of any Partner State’s act, regulation, directive, decision or action to 
the EACJ, EAC nationals resorted to Article 6(d) that provides for good gov-
ernance as a fundamental principle of the Community to bypass the human 
rights jurisdictional confinement imposed on the EACJ. According to Article 
6(d) good governance is defined as encompassing “adherence to the princi-
ples of . . . rule of law . . . as well as the recognition, promotion and protection 
of human and peoples rights . . .” Therefore, it was quite straightforward for 
applicants to claim that human rights violations by a Partner State form an 
infringement of Articles 6(d) and 7(2) of the Treaty. The EACJ did not hesitate 
to uphold that while it could not assume jurisdiction to “adjudicate human 
rights disputes, [the Court] will not abdicate from exercising its jurisdiction 
of the interpretation under Article 27(1) merely because the Reference includes 
31   Reference No. 5 of 2011, Samuel Mukira Mohochi v. The Attorney General of the Republic of 
Uganda, Judgment, 17 May 2013, para 36.
32   See Application No. 1 of 2008, Advisory Opinion, 13 September 2008. For more details on 
the principle of variable geometry in the EAC Treaty, see supra (section 3.3.).
33   Art. 27(2) of the Treaty.
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allegations of human rights violations”.34 Hence the Court concluded that the 
principle of good governance in Articles 6(d) and 7(2) of the Treaty contains a 
clear intention of the Treat-makers to safeguard individuals against arbitrary 
governance and ill treatment by totalitarian leader, or mob rule.
This ruling paved the way for several other human rights cases based on the 
violation of the principle of good governance.35 Accordingly, good governance 
has become the most used general principle of the Treaty. This contributed a 
lot to the clarification of the definition of good governance and to the framing 
of its substantial scope.
3.4.3 Regulations, Directives, Decisions, Recommendations and Opinions
Article 8(2)(b) provides for the obligation of the Partner States to confer upon 
Community legislation, regulations and directives the force of law within 
their territories. However, the Treaty does not define what the Community’s 
regulations, directives or decisions are; nor does it provide a clear hierarchy or 
procedural differences between them. Therefore, arguing on the difference of 
their respective binding force could be difficult. Indeed, Article 16 of the Treaty 
that touches this issue of the binding force of the Community’s regulations, 
directives, decisions, recommendations, and opinions rather focuses on those 
taken by the Council, by stipulating that they are binding on the Partner States, 
on all organs and institutions of the Community other than the Summit, the 
Court and the Assembly within their jurisdictions. This is understandable as 
the Council is the policy organ of the Community.36 In addition, pursuant to 
Article 11(5) of the Treaty the Summit can delegate some of the powers (includ-
ing legislative powers) conferred to it to the Council. However, this does not 
34   Reference No. 1 of 2007, James Katabazi v. Secretary General of the East African Community 
and the Attorney General of the Republic of Uganda, Judgment of 1 November 2007, 
para. 41 [emphasis supplied].
35   See for instance: Reference No. 1 of 2010, Honorable Sitenda Sibalu v. the Secretary of the 
EAC, Attorney General of Uganda, Honorable Sam Njuba, and the Electoral Commission 
of Uganda, Judgment of 30 June 2011; Reference No. 7 of 2010, Mary Ariviza and Okotch 
Mondoh v. Attorney of Kenya and Secretary General of the East African Community, 
Judgment of 30 November 2011; Reference No. 30 of 2010, Independent Medico Legal Unit 
v. Attorney General of Kenya, Judgment of 1 March 2013; Reference 4 of 2011, Omar Awadh 
and Six Others v. Attorney General of Kenya and Attorney General of Uganda, Judgment 
of 15 April 2013; and Reference No. 8 of 2010, Plaxeda Rugumba v. Secretary General of the 
EAC and Attorney General of Rwanda, Judgment of 1st December 2011; Reference No. 9 of 
2012, East African Center for Trade Policy and Law v. Secretary General of the EAC, Judgment 
of 9th May 2013.
36   Art. 14(1) of the Treaty.
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answer the question of the difference in both the nature and the binding force 
of EAC acts. Even a look at the EAC Protocol on the Council’s decision-making 
does not provide the expected distinction.
Therefore, it can be noticed that the concern of the Treaty-makers was more 
to establish a hierarchy between the acts of the Community and those of the 
Partner States than to make a clear internal distinction between Community 
acts. This is clearly highlighted in Article 8(4) that provides for the precedence 
of Community laws over the similar ones of the Partner States. It means that in 
case of conflict EAC legislation, regulations, and directives, recommendations 
and opinions should take precedence over any Partner States’ national acts of 
a similar effect.37
3.5 Legislation and Decision-making
This section addresses the legislative process of bills by the East African 
Legislative Assembly, the law-making institution of the EAC, and sheds light 
on the Council’s decision-making.
3.5.1 Legislative Procedures
The Treaty confers power to initiate legislation to both the Council of Ministers 
and the East African Legislative Assembly (the Assembly). This implies a 
dichotomist approach to the EAC legislative process. On the one hand, there 
is the Council Bill initiated by the Council38 and directly introduced to the 
Assembly for the first reading. On the other hand, there is the Private Member’s 
Bill that can be initiated by any member of the Assembly.39
A Private Member’s Bill is introduced by way of motion to which is attached 
the proposed draft of the bill. The Counsel to the Community has the obli-
gation to provide reasonable professional assistance in drafting the bill to 
any Assembly member who intends to move a Private Member’s Bill before 
it can be compiled by the clerk in order to be attached to the motion.40 In 
case the motion is carried, the clerk of the Assembly has the responsibility to 
print and publish the concerned bill in the Gazette,41 as it is a rule that every 
bill has to be printed and published in the Gazette before its introduction to 
37   See further on this issue Chapter 4.
38   See Art. 14(3)(b).
39   See Art. 59(1) of the Treaty and Rule. 64(1) of EALA Procedure.
40   Rule 64(2),(3) and (4) of the EALA Procedure.
41   Rule 64(6) EALA Procedure.
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the Assembly.42 It is worth mentioning that although Assembly members are 
entitled to introduce a Private Member’s Bill, such a bill cannot be proceeded 
if its purpose would amount to the imposition of any financial charge upon 
any Community’s fund, either directly or indirectly.43 Moreover, a bill, motion 
or amendment that is likely to result in the derogation from the enjoyment of 
human rights cannot be introduced before the Assembly.44
After introduction, every bill (either Council Bill or Private Member’s Bill) 
has to be read three times before being passed. The first reading is a kind 
of introduction of the bill to the Assembly. It consists of an aloud reading of 
the short title of the bill by the clerk. Afterwards, the bill is referred to the 
Committee which should analyze it and present its report to the Assembly 
within 90 days. This deadline can be extended for an extra period of 30 days 
with the permission of the Assembly if the Committee fails to complete its 
report within the given period.45 The work of the Committee is not ceremonial 
but rather is very critical as it is at this stage that the relevance of the bill is 
assessed. In order for a bill to progress, the Committee needs to be convinced 
that there is a positive balance between the advantages and the disadvantages 
of the bill. In case the Committee needs an external expertise to make its mind, 
it may be allowed to appoint experts for advice.46 The Committee’s assign-
ment also involves conducting widespread consultations with members of 
the Council of Ministers, representatives of Partner States’ institutions related 
to the matter of the bill, national parliaments, and the citizens who are basi-
cally the final beneficiaries of EAC acts.47
If after this scrutiny process the Committee finds that relevant amendments 
should be done to the bill, it may recommend so. Furthermore, the Committee, 
42   Rule 61 EALA Procedure. Exception to the publication rule is when a given bill is declared 
to be of an urgent nature by the Assembly on a motion by any EALA member. In this case 
the bill may be introduced without publication and such a bill may be taken through all 
the legislative stages in one day (Art. 62 EALA Procedure).
43   Art. 59(2) of the Treaty.
44   Rule 63 of the EALA Procedure. This is a strong token for the protection of human rights 
by the EALA, and the EAC at large.
45   Rule 66(6) of the EALA Procedure.
46   EAC, ‘Report of the Capacity Building Workshop for the Committee on General Purpose: 
“The Legislative process of Bills: From Initiation, enactment to oversight on enacted law” ’, 
Nairobi, 6–9 August 2014, p. 3 online at http://www.eala.org/new/index.php/key-docu 
ments/reports/500-capacity-building-workshop-for-the-eala-committee-on-general-
purpose?path=, accessed on 15 November 2016.
47   Ibid. Public consultation occurs through public hearing workshops that the committee 
has to undertake in all Partner States.
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through its chairperson, has competence to review and accept proposals for 
correction of blatant misprints and punctuation errors in the bill without any 
formal request from a member of the Assembly.48
When the Committee is satisfied of the bill’s relevance, it is submitted to the 
second reading upon the request of the Council chairperson or the Assembly 
member who initiated the bill, depending on whether it is a Council Bill or a 
Private Member’s Bill. The report of the Committee is presented to the whole 
Assembly by the chairperson of the Committee. This opens the bill to debate 
on its merits and principles, which will have the consequence of sending the 
bill to its next level, the Committee of the Whole House.49 This Committee 
is constituted of all the members of Assembly and is chaired by the Speaker 
who acts for this specific purpose as the chairperson of the Committee of the 
Whole House. At this stage, the Assembly proceeds with an article-by-article 
review and adoption of the bill. When amendments are suggested, they are 
debated and eventually adopted.
At the end of the second reading, the bill is submitted with the permission 
of the Speaker to the Assembly for the third reading, either immediately or on 
a day decided by the Speaker.
However, even after a bill is set for the third reading, any member can 
request that a given provision be deleted, amended or added.50 However, 
this must be done before the third reading is introduced. In case a bill is sug-
gested for a partial or whole amendment, it should go back through the pro-
cedure of the Committee of the Whole House as described above until the 
bill is adopted.51 The third reading constitutes the adoption of the bill by 
the Assembly,52 and indicates that the bill is ready to be sent to each of the EAC 
Heads of States for their assent.
A bill becomes an act of the Community when it receives the assent of all 
the Heads of State of the Community. In case one or more Heads of States 
48   Rule 67(3) of EALA Procedure.
49   Rule 69 of EALA Procedure.
50   Rule 72(1) of EALA Procedure.
51   Rule 72(3) of EALA Procedure.
52   It is noteworthy that the EALA decides on all questions by a majority of votes of the 
elected members present and voting on the basis of one person one vote. The speaker or 
the chairperson of committee does have neither an original nor a casting vote (Rule 54 
of EALA Procedure). Thus, if on an issue votes of the members are equally divided, the 
motion should be lost (art. 58(4) of the Treaty). Ex-officio members by virtue of article 
48(1)(b) of the treaty (minister, assistant minister in charge of EAC, the secretary general 
and the counsel to the community) do not hold a voting right in the deliberations of the 
EALA. See Art. 58(2) of the Treaty.
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withhold their assent to a bill, a notification is sent to the Speaker who informs 
the Assembly about this occurrence. The returned bill and the reason why 
assent was withheld are laid on the table of the Assembly by the member who 
initiated that bill for further referral to the relevant Committee in order to 
undergo scrutiny of the clauses objected by the Heads of State.53
3.5.2 Decision-making and Delegation of Powers
The Council is the policy organ of the EAC.54 For this reason, this section is 
mainly dedicated to the decision-making by this organ. According to Article 
15(4) of the Treaty, “the decisions of the Council shall be by consensus”, sub-
ject to a Protocol on the Decision-making.55 However, the provisions of this 
Protocol suggest that consensus is just one of the two modes on which Council 
decisions can be made. In fact, Article 2 of this Protocol exhaustively lists mat-
ters that require consensus. It includes granting observer status to an inter-
governmental organization or civil society organization; making the financial 
rules and regulations of the Community; submission of the annual budget to 
the Assembly; approval of the expenditures of the community; establishment 
of any sectoral council or committee under the Treaty; submission of Bills to 
the Assembly; decision policy-making for the efficient and harmonious func-
tioning and development of the community; and decisions on what should 
be recommended to the Summit on matters such as the amendment of the 
Treaty; the approval or amendment of any protocol; the admission of new 
members, the granting of observer status to foreign countries; the imposition 
of sanctions; the suspension of a member; the transformation into a political 
federation; and the expansion of areas of cooperation.
All other decisions are taken by simple majority.56 This provision may 
raise the question of knowing whether simple majority should also be used 
when the Council is acting pursuant to powers delegated to it by the Summit. 
As a reminder, Article 11(5) and (6) of the Treaty stipulates the possibility of 
power delegation from the Summit to the Council or to the Secretary General. 
The Summit may delegate any of its Treaty-conferred powers except the giving 
53   Rule 73(5) of EALA Procedure. In this case, the procedure to be followed is the same as the 
one prescribed by art. 72 applicable in case a member of the EALA suggests the amend-
ment of a bill after the second reading but before the third reading.
54   Art. 14(1) of the Treaty.
55   See on the vital importance of the shift towards Qualified Majority voting in EU decision-
making further EU Chapters 2 and 3.
56   Art. 2(2) of the Protocol on the Decision Making by the Council of the East African 
Community [2001].
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of general directions and impetus; the appointment of judges to the EACJ, the 
admission of new members and granting of observer status to foreign coun-
tries; and assent of bills.57 Given that the decisions of the Summit are made 
by consensus,58 and yet the Protocol on the decision-making of the Council 
does not mention the exercise of summit powers by the Council among the 
matters to be decided upon by consensus, one may wonder whether such deci-
sions are also made by simple majority pursuant to Article 2(2) of this protocol 
on the decision-making of the Council. Obviously, this does not seem to be 
the intention of the Treaty-makers especially that this would eventually have a 
consequence of turning this delegation into an alteration of the Summit com-
petence. Therefore, it makes sense to suggest that when the Council is deciding 
by virtue of the powers delegated to it by the Summit, such decision should be 
made by consensus as at that time the Council is not acting as the Council but 
rather as the Summit (in the name and on behalf of the Summit). 
57   Art. 11(9) of the Treaty.
58   Art. 12(3) of the Treaty.
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chapter 3A
The Legal Framework of the EU
Armin Cuyvers
3.1 Introduction
This chapter provides a brief overview of the main competences of the EU, 
as well as the tools and processes the EU has to translate these competences 
into legal action. In other words, what may the EU actually do, and how does 
it act?1 In addition, this chapter touches on a question that is increasingly 
important for the EU, certainly after Brexit, and that may become of increasing 
importance to the EAC as well: variable geometry. To what extent can integra-
tion differ per Member State or per group of Member States, or must all states 
integrate at the same pace? We begin, however, with the question which com-
petences the EU actually has, and how competence can be determined in a 
concrete case.
3.2 Conferral, Scope, Nature and Use of EU Competences
Fundamentally, the EU remains an organization established by its Member 
States. Consequently, the EU does not have a general competence to act in 
whatever field it wants to. In EU-speak, this is often summarized by saying 
the EU has no Kompetenz-Kompetenz.2 Instead, the EU only has those powers 
conferred on it by the Member States via the different Treaties.3 All powers that 
have not been transferred to the EU remain with the Member States.4
1   See generally on these issues inter alia L. Azoulai (ed), The Question of Competence in the 
European Union (OUP, 2014), A. Von Bogdandy and J. Bast (eds), Principles of European 
Constitutional Law (2nd ed., Hart Publishing 2010), A. Estella, The EU Principle of Subsidiarity 
and its Critique (OUP, 2002), P. Craig, ‘Subsidiarity: A Legal and Political Analysis’ (2012) 50 
JCMS 72, or S. Weatherill, ‘Competence Creep and Competence Control’ (2004) 23 YEL, 1.
2   Cf. the German Constitutional Court in BVerfGE, 2 BvE 123,267, 2 BvE 2/08 (2009) Lissabon 
Urteil or BverGE 2 BvR 1390/12, 2 BvR 1421/12, 2 BvR 1438/12, 2 BvR 1439/12, 2 BvR 1440/12, 2 be 
6/12 (2012) ESM Treaty.
3   D. Chalmers, European Union Law (CUP 2007), 140.
4   Of course, deciding where the boundaries of existing powers lie becomes a crucial element 
here.
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The basic principle of conferred powers is laid down in Articles 4, 5(1) and 
(2) TEU, which provide that:
1. The limits of Union competences are governed by the principle of con-
ferral. (. . .)
2. Under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the 
limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in 
the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein. Competences not 
conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member 
States.
If the EU wants to act in a certain field, therefore, it must first have received the 
competence from the Member States to do so. Concretely, this delegation of 
competences in the Treaties is done via legal basis provisions. These are provi-
sions in the TEU or TFEU that explicitly give the EU the competence to act in a 
certain field, and that also indicate the legislative process the EU should follow 
to adopt such acts.5 These legal bases can be very limited and specific, such 
as Article 157(3) TFEU, which only allows the EU to regulate in the field of sex 
equality in employment and occupation:
The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the 
ordinary legislative procedure, and after consulting the Economic and 
Social Committee, shall adopt measures to ensure the application of the 
principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women 
in matters of employment and occupation, including the principle of 
equal pay for equal work or work of equal value.
Other legal bases, however, are very open and wide-ranging. Article 114 TFEU 
on the creation of the internal market, the most important legal basis in EU 
law, provides a good example of such a broad legal basis. Article 26 TFEU states 
that EU should create one internal market.6 This provision itself, however, only 
provides the objective of creating a market. It does not provide a legal basis to 
turn this objective into reality by adopting legal acts. This legal basis can be 
found in the first paragraph of Article 114 TFEU:
5   See case 45/86, Commission v. Council, [1987] ECR 493. Such legal bases must be distinguished 
from the broader articles that determine the values and objectives of the EU, such as Articles 
2 and 3 TEU. Such Articles only indicate what the EU should aspire to, but do not give the 
competence to adopt any acts.
6   See for a further discussion of EU internal market law EU chapters 9–13.
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Save where otherwise provided in the Treaties, the following provisions 
shall apply for the achievement of the objectives set out in Article 26. The 
European Parliament and the Council shall, acting in accordance with 
the ordinary legislative procedure and after consulting the Economic and 
Social Committee, adopt the measures for the approximation of the pro-
visions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member 
States which have as their object the establishment and functioning of 
the internal market.
Article 114 TFEU, therefore, empowers the EU to adopt legislation to harmo-
nize all national laws that may hinder the free movement of goods, services, 
capital or people and therefore obstruct the internal market. Such a far-reach-
ing power of course also raises the question where the limits of EU compe-
tences lie, and who gets to decide on these limits. After all, as we know from 
the Commerce Clause in the US Constitution, almost anything can be said to 
affect the internal market, as almost all rules will have some (indirect) effect on 
cross-border-trade.7 Once we have established that the EU has been attributed 
a certain power, like regulating the internal market, we must then answer the 
additional question where the limits of this power lie.
3.2.1 The Scope of EU Competences
Crucially, when it comes to delineating EU competences, the line judge is 
the CJEU, and not the Member States or the EU legislative institutions.8 
Even though the EU does not have Kompetenz-Kompetenz, it is an EU 
institution that determines the scope of the competences that have been con-
ferred by the Member States.9 This exclusive power of the CJEU to determine 
7   J.H. Choper, R.H. Fallon, Y. Kamisar, and S.H. Shiffrin, Constitutional Law (10th edn. 
Thomson 2006), 87 and 91. Further see T.W. Merril, ‘Towards a Principled Interpretation 
of the Commerce Clause’, 22 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy (1998), 31, and 
D. McGimsey, ‘The Commerce Clause and Federalism after Lopez and Morrison: The Case for 
Closing the Jurisdictional-Element loophole’, 90, California Law Review (2002), 1675. Different 
from the US, however, the EU has less effective political counterbalances.
8   Case C-376/98 Tobacco Advertising I [2000] ECR I-8419, C-380/03 Tobacco Advertising II 
[2006] ECR I-11573, Case C-358/14, Poland v Parliament and Council (Tobacco Advertising 
III) ECLI:EU:C:2016:323, Joined Cases C-293 and 594/12 Data Retention Directive, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:238.
9   As will be discussed further below, not all national supreme courts accept this absolute claim 
of the CJEU in its full extent, although in practice it is the CJEU that determines the limits 
of EU competences. Of course the Member States do retain the option of changing the EU 
Treaties if they disagree, even though this requires unanimity of 28 states, and therefore is 
not often a realistic option.
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competence is important for the stability and effectiveness of the EU. Just 
imagine if each individual Member State or national court would be able to 
decide, for every single peace of EU legislation, whether the act was ultra vires 
or not. Similarly, the review by the EU Courts, and not the EU political institu-
tions, also means that the EU political institutions must respect the nature and 
limits of EU competences as well.
In determining the scope of EU competences, the CJEU follows a teleologi-
cal, or purposeful approach. It looks at the objectives and ambitions of the EU, 
and interprets EU competences in such a way that these objectives may be 
realized.10 The main argument is that the Member States intended to give the 
EU the necessary powers to realize its objectives, as it were the same Member 
States that formulated these objectives in the first place. The result of this 
teleological approach is that the CJEU often chooses a rather expansive inter-
pretation that increases EU competences. The best example of this purpose-
ful approach, and its expansive effects, is the (in)famous Tobacca Advertising 
case law.11
The tobacco cases concerned a directive prohibiting all advertising 
and sponsorship of tobacco products.12 The main legal basis for this act 
was the internal market clause of Article 114 paragraph 1 TFEU.13 The Council, 
the European Parliament and the Commission claimed that the many differ-
ences in national laws on tobacco advertising were a threat to the internal 
market. If Italy allowed tobacco advertising but Sweden did not, for example, 
Italian newspapers or journals with tobacco advertisements could not be sold 
in Sweden, hindering their free movement. Germany, however, claimed that 
the real objective of the directive was to reduce smoking and protect public 
health. This was problematic according to Germany because the EU only has 
very limited competences in the field of public health. In fact, Article 168(5) 
TFEU explicitly prohibits harmonization in the field of public health, even 
though it also does obligate the EU to ensure ‘a high level of human health 
protection’ in all Union policies and activities.14
10   S. Douglas-Scott, Constitutional Law of the European Union (Pearson 2002), 261.
11   Case C-376/98 Tobacco Advertising I [2000] ECR I-8419 and C-380/03 Tobacco Advertising II 
[2006] ECR I-11573. For a recent addition in this debate also see Case C-358/14, Poland v 
Parliament and Council (Tobacco Advertising III) ECLI:EU:C:2016:323.
12   Directive 98/43.
13   Under the old, pre-Lisbon and Amsterdam numbering this was still Article 100A and 95 
EC respectively.
14   With certain limited exceptions in Article 168(4) TFEU that were not applicable in this 
case.
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In two landmark judgments the CJEU first held that the directive did exceed 
the competence under Article 114 TFEU as it was overly broad. For exam-
ple, it also included advertisements on objects that would never cross the 
border.15 An amended directive, however, which excluded these objects, was 
later upheld by the CJEU. These judgments contain two key findings concern-
ing the delineation of EU competences. The first is the low threshold the CJEU 
requires before allowing the use of Article 114 TFEU. The second is that, once 
this low threshold has been met, EU measures based on the market com-
petence of Article 114 TFEU may also, or even predominantly pursue other 
objectives, including public health. The reasoning of the CJEU here is exem-
plary and an important window into the logic of effectiveness that shapes EU 
law and contributes to its actual success. The CJEU first reiterates the funda-
mental principle of attribution:
Those provisions, read together, make it clear that the measures referred 
to in Article [114(1)] of the Treaty are intended to improve the condi-
tions for the establishment and functioning of the internal market. To 
construe that article as meaning that it vests in the Community legisla-
ture a general power to regulate the internal market would not only be 
contrary to the express wording of the provisions cited above but would 
also be incompatible with the principle embodied in Article [5 TEU] that 
the powers of the Community are limited to those specifically conferred 
on it.
Moreover, a measure adopted on the basis of Article [114] of the Treaty 
must genuinely have as its object the improvement of the conditions 
for the establishment and functioning of the internal market. If a mere 
finding of disparities between national rules and of the abstract risk of 
obstacles to the exercise of fundamental freedoms or of distortions 
of competition liable to result therefrom were sufficient to justify the 
choice of Article [114] as a legal basis, judicial review of compliance with 
the proper legal basis might be rendered nugatory. (. . .)16
The CJEU therefore insists that a measure can only be based on a legal basis if 
it ‘genuinely’ pursues the objective behind that legal basis, which it is for the 
Court to assess. Both in Tobacco Advertising I and in Tobacco Advertising II, 
15   The directive also allowed Member States to impose stricter norms, but did not provide 
for a free movement clause (Tobacco I, paras. 101 a.o.). See on this issue the further discus-
sion on the free movement of goods in chapter 10.
16   Tobacco Advertising I, paras. 83–84.
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however, the CJEU subsequently held that there was a sufficient risk to free 
movement, now or in the future, to justify the use of Article 114 as a legal basis:
It is clear that, as a result of disparities between national laws on the 
advertising of tobacco products, obstacles to the free movement of goods 
or the freedom to provide services exist or may well arise.
In the case, for example, of periodicals, magazines and newspapers 
which contain advertising for tobacco products, it is true, as the applicant 
has demonstrated, that no obstacle exists at present to their importation 
into Member States which prohibit such advertising. However, in view 
of the trend in national legislation towards ever greater restrictions on 
advertising of tobacco products, reflecting the belief that such advertis-
ing gives rise to an appreciable increase in tobacco consumption, it is 
probable that obstacles to the free movement of press products will arise 
in the future.17
The EU therefore has a competence to regulate under Article 114(1) TFEU where 
there is an actual or potential obstacle, now or in the future to any of the fun-
damental freedoms.18 Even the risk of potential future obstacles, therefore, is 
sufficient to create a competence under Article 114 TFEU.
Once this already low threshold for the use of Article 114 TFEU has been 
met, moreover, the CJEU held that the EU was also allowed to pursue other 
objectives than the internal market, including public health:19
Furthermore, provided that the conditions for recourse to Articles [114], 
57(2) and 66 as a legal basis are fulfilled, the Community legislature can-
not be prevented from relying on that legal basis on the ground that pub-
lic health protection is a decisive factor in the choices to be made. On 
the contrary, the third paragraph of Article129(1) provides that health 
requirements are to form a constituent part of the Community’s other 
17   Tobacco Advertising I, paras. 96–97.
18   Cf. amongst many other confirmations of this line Case C-491/01 British American Tobacco 
[2002] ECR I-11453, par. 60, case C-434/02 Arnold André [2004] ECR I-11825, par. 30, case 
C-210/03 Swedish Match [2004] ECR I-11893, par. 29, or joined cases C-154/04 and C-155/04 
Alliance for Natural Health [2005] ECR I-6451, par. 28. Measures are not allowed, however, 
on a ‘mere finding of disparity between national rules’.
19   Note also in this regard that, even though the EU has no competence in public health, 
Article 168 TFEU does obligate the EU to take public health into account in all its 
legislation.
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policies and Article [114](3) expressly requires that, in the process of har-
monisation, a high level of human health protection is to be ensured.20
When safeguarding the internal market, therefore, the EU may also pur-
sue other objectives, further increasing the scope of EU competences. 
Here the CJEU clearly applied a very expansive doctrine of attribution to make 
sure the EU has sufficient competences to reach its objectives.21 Many further 
examples can be given. In the Ship Source Pollution cases, for example, the EU 
could use its environmental competence to require Member States to impose 
criminal sanctions for the dumping of ship waste, as this was absolutely neces-
sary to make the environmental competence effective.22 In ESMA, the CJEU 
upheld that the competence under Article 114 TFEU includes the power to 
create agencies with far reaching powers.23 In Digital Rights Ireland the CJEU 
found that Article 114 TFEU could also be used to require the retention of meta-
data from telephones, as the diverging rules on data retention formed a risk 
for free movement.24 Perhaps the most far-reaching example can be found in 
the Kadi-I saga.25 Here the CJEU invented the notion of an ‘implicit underly-
ing objective’, which could be transformed into a competence via Article 352 
TFEU.26
20   Tobacco Advertising I, par 88.
21   For further examples see, amongst others, the Ship Source Pollution cases, where the EU 
could use its environmental competence to require Member States to impose criminal 
sanctions for the dumping of ship waste, as this was absolutely necessary to make the 
environmental competence effective. In ESMA, the CJEU upheld that the competence 
under Article 114 TFEU includes the power to create agencies with far reaching powers. In 
Digital Rights Ireland the CJEU found that Article 114 TFEU could also be used to require 
the retention of meta-data from telephones, as the diverging rules on data retention 
formed a risk for free movement.
22   Case C-176/03 Commission v Council (Ship Source Pollution I) [2005] ECR I-7879. The EU 
is not competent, however, to determine the ‘type and level’ of criminal sanction. See 
case C-440/05 Ship Source Pollution II [2007] ECR I-9097 par. 70. After Lisbon the EU has, 
however, received further, and more explicit, competences in the field of criminal law. See 
especially art. 82–86 TFEU.
23   Case C-270/12, UK v Parliament and Council (ESMA), ECLI:EU:C:2014:18.
24   Case C-301/06  Ireland v Parliament and Council (Data Retention), ECLI:EU:C:2009:68.
25   For a further analysis of these cases see A. Cuyvers, ‘“Give me one good reason”: The uni-
fied standard of review for sanctions after Kadi II’, 51(6) Common Market Law Review 
(2014), 1759, and A. Cuyvers, ‘The Kadi II judgment of the General Court: the ECJ’s pre-
dicament and the consequences for Member States’. European Constitutional Law Review, 
7, 481.
26   Joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi I, par. 226.
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The expansive interpretation of competences followed by the CJEU has 
of course been criticized in many Member States, and one could say that the 
CJEU comes close to granting a general competence under Article 114 TFEU.27 
At the same time, the purposeful approach of the CJEU has been vital for 
enabling the EU and allowing it to be effective. As it only has a limited num-
ber of competences, these competences need to provide sufficient space for 
the EU to actually achieve its aims.28 Moreover, it must also not be forgotten 
that it is the political institutions, including the Member States as represented 
in the Council of Ministers, that first adopt legal acts, and hence are of the 
opinion that these acts fit within a certain competence. The CJEU only reviews 
these acts once adopted. It is not the CJEU, therefore, that expands EU law 
all by itself, but rather the CJEU that empowers the political institutions to 
achieve EU objectives by following a purposive and permissive doctrine of 
competences.
3.2.2 The Nature of EU Competences
In addition to establishing the existence and the scope of EU competences, it is 
also important to understand the different types of EU competence. For the EU 
has three different types of competences, being exclusive competences, shared 
competences and supporting competences.29
3.2.2.1 Exclusive Competences
An exclusive competence means that Member States transfer all their author-
ity in a certain area to the EU, and hence have no powers left to regulate that 
field themselves. Even if the EU has not yet acted on a certain issue, say devel-
oping a trade agreement with a new state like South Sudan, Member States 
are not allowed to act nationally. The only way to act in an area of exclusive 
competence is via the EU.
Exclusive competences, therefore, are the most far reaching competences 
the EU has. This also explains why there only are a few exclusive competences, 
27   Cf. P. Van Cleynenbreugel, ‘Meroni Circumvented? Article 114 TFEU and the EU Regulatory 
Agencies’, 21 Maastricht Journal 1 (2014), 64–88.
28   Note though that Article 352 TFEU also provides a residual competence for the EU. Where 
the Treaty provides an objective, but no explicit competence, Article 352 TFEU may be 
used as a fallback competence. The use of Article 352 TFEU, however, requires unanimity 
in the Council, and also separate approval of some national parliaments.
29   R. Schütze, ‘The European Community’s Federal Order of Competences A Retrospective 
Analysis’, in: M. Dougan and S. Currie (eds), 50 Years of the European Treaties: Looking Back 
and Thinking Forward (Hart Publishing 2009), 63.
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as in most fields Member States are not willing to transfer all their author-
ity to the EU. Article 3 TFEU provides an overview of the areas of exclusive 
competences:
1. The Union shall have exclusive competence in the following areas:
(a) customs union;
(b) the establishing of the competition rules necessary for the 
functioning of the internal market;
(c) monetary policy for the Member States whose currency is the 
euro;
(d) the conservation of marine biological resources under the com-
mon fisheries policy;
(e) common commercial policy.’
In these areas, such as the customs union or the common commercial pol-
icy, it was deemed necessary to have one coherent EU policy. For example, 
the EU customs union can only work effectively if all Member States use the 
exact same rules and rates. Similarly, the common commercial policy (CCCP) 
requires the EU to act as a single block externally. The effectiveness of this pol-
icy would be undermined if Member States could also negotiate trade deals 
bilaterally. Hence the decision was taken to create exclusive competences in 
these fields.
3.2.2.2 Shared Competences
The second, and largest group of competences are shared. As their name 
already indicates, these competences are shared between the EU and 
the Member States. This means that both the EU and the Member States 
are allowed to act in areas of shared competence. Article 4 TFEU provides an 
overview of the many and broad shared competences of the EU:
1. The Union shall share competence with the Member States where the 
Treaties confer on it a competence which does not relate to the areas 
referred to in Articles 3 and 6.
2. Shared competence between the Union and the Member States applies 
in the following principal areas:
(a) internal market;
(b) social policy, for the aspects defined in this Treaty;
(c) economic, social and territorial cohesion;








( j) area of freedom, security and justice;
(k) common safety concerns in public health matters, for the aspects 
defined in this Treaty.’
Such shared competences create the risk of conflict: What if a Member State 
and the EU both legislate to protect consumers on-line, for example, but 
the different regulations conflict? Three main principles regulate such con-
flict. Firstly, EU law always trumps national law, be it of an earlier of a later 
date. If there is a conflict, the EU law therefore trumps the national law.30 
Secondly, once the EU regulates a certain topic within a shared competence 
it ‘occupies the field’, which means that the Member States lose the author-
ity to regulate this topic as well. As soon as the EU acts in an area of shared 
competences, therefore, the Member States lose their competence on the issue 
covered by the EU act. For example, if the EU regulates the nicotine content 
of cigarettes under the shared internal market competence, Member States 
lose their competence to regulate nicotine content themselves. They remain 
competent, however, to regulate other topics such as tar content or the size of 
cigarettes. How much authority Member States have left in the areas of shared 
competences, therefore, depends on how much EU legislation has already 
been adopted. Thirdly, even on those issues where Member States remain 
competent to act, the principle of sincere cooperation obligates them not to 
undermine the effectiveness or objectives of existing EU obligations.31
3.2.2.3 Supporting, Coordinating and Supplementing Competences
Supporting, coordinating and supplementing competences are the third, and 
most limited, type of EU competences. These are areas where the Member 
States retain their authority to regulate, but where the EU can help out, for 
example by coordinating national policies or providing subsidies. In contrast 
to shared competences, EU action under a supporting competence does not 
occupy the field. Even if the EU acts, therefore, national competences are 
not reduced. Article 6 TEU provides an overview of these more secondary 
competences:
30   Also see the general discussion on the supremacy of EU law in EU chapter 4.
31   Article 4 TEU.
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The Union shall have competence to carry out actions to support, coordi-
nate or supplement the actions of the Member States. The areas of such 
action shall, at European level, be:




(e) education, vocational training, youth and sport;
( f ) civil protection;
(g) administrative cooperation.’
One of the most successful examples of a supporting competence is the 
Erasmus programme allowing students to study abroad. The area of educa-
tion is so sensitive and connected to national identity that the EU has received 
no competences to harmonize. The EU, therefore, cannot regulate curricula or 
school systems. The EU has, however, received the competence to support and 
supplement national education policy, for example by providing subsidies to 
certain programmes, or sharing best practises between Member States. The 
Erasmus programme is one example of such supporting action.
3.2.2.4 The Residual Competence of Article 352 TFEU
Article 352 TFEU forms an intriguing and important addition to the entire sys-
tem of EU competences. It provides a residual competence where the Treaties 
do provide an objective but, even under the expansive interpretation of the 
CJEU, no competence can be found in any of the legal basis provisions:
If action by the Union should prove necessary, within the framework of 
the policies defined in the Treaties, to attain one of the objectives set out 
in the Treaties, and the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers, 
the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and 
after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, shall adopt the 
appropriate measures. Where the measures in question are adopted by 
the Council in accordance with a special legislative procedure, it shall 
also act unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after 
obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.32
Besides an interesting legal conundrum, Article 352 TFEU creates a form of 
residual competence to ensure that objectives can be realized, and hence 
32   Article 352 TFEU.
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further ensures EU effectiveness.33 Here the EU system for attribution again 
has similarities to the federate US approach under the necessary and proper 
clause.34 Article 352 TEU in fact even goes one step further, as the text of the 
necessary and proper clause only refers to the powers of the federal govern-
ment, not the objectives.
The use of Article 352 TFEU, however, does require unanimity in the Council, 
which of course limits its use. In addition, because of its openness, some, 
including the Bundesverfassungsgericht, see it as a limited form of amend-
ment, and hence require approval by the German parliament for any use of 
Article 352, further complicating the use of this residual competence.35
3.3 The Use of EU Competences: The Principles of Subsidiarity and 
Proportionality
Having a competence does not automatically mean that you should also use 
it, or use it to its fullest extent. Once it is established that the EU has a certain 
competence, therefore, two new questions arise: 1) when should the EU use a 
certain competence, and 2) how far should the EU go when using that com-
petence? These questions are governed by the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality.
Under the principle of subsidiarity the EU ‘shall act only if and in so far as 
the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States.’36 Even if there is a competence, EU action is only called for 
where the Member States cannot achieve a similar result themselves. Although 
subsidiarity is a legal principle, it is highly political in nature, and difficult 
to adjudicate. The primary subsidiarity check takes place in the political 
33   A. Dashwood, ‘Article 308 as the Outer Limit of Expressly Conferred Community 
Competence’, in: C. Barnard and O. Odudu (eds) The Outer Limits of European Union Law 
(Hart Publishing 2009), 35 et seq.
34   See however also the attempt to at least somewhat limit the potential this opens up in 
Declaration No. 41 on art. 352 TFEU. For example, art. 352 TFEU is not to be used in rela-
tion to such lofty aims as ‘promoting peace’.
35   See especially its Lissabon Urteil of 30 June 2009, BVerfGE, 2 BvE 2/08. On the other 
hand also see Opinion 2/94 Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights 
[2006] ECR I-929, and the limits imposed by the CJEU therein. Further see J.H.H. Weiler, 
The Constitution of Europe: Do the New Clothes have an Emperor? (CUP 1999), 54–55.: 
‘No sphere of the material competence could be excluded from the Community acting 
under art. 352 TFEU’.
36   Article 5(3) TEU.
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institutions and the national parliaments.37 The CJEU primarily checks the 
formal subsidiarity requirements, for example if a legislative act actually con-
tains a paragraph assessing subsidiarity. Logically, subsidiarity only applies to 
shared competences and not to exclusive competences, where the Member 
States are no longer allowed to act anyway.
If the EU should act, the principle of proportionality demands that ‘the con-
tent and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the 
objectives of the Treaties.’38 For example, where a limited directive harmoniz-
ing product labels for chocolate would suffice, the EU should not adopt a regu-
lation completely regulating the manufacturing of chocolate. Like subsidiarity, 
the principle of proportionality is also rather political, and hence left primarily 
to the political institutions.39
3.4 Variable Geometry and Enhanced Cooperation
If the EU has a competence, and if it is allowed to use it, a further question 
that arises is if this competence may only be used where all Member States 
participate or if it may also be used by a smaller sub-set of Member States. This 
question brings us to the problem of variable geometry and flexibility.
The default position is that all Member States participate in any EU action. 
Especially as the EU expanded, however, the need was felt for more flexibil-
ity. As with the euro, for example, some Member States wanted to integrate 
faster and deeper than others. How much flexibility should be allowed, and 
in what form, however, has always been a highly contentious point. On the 
one hand, it is argued that flexibility is simply necessary in so large a union. 
In addition, flexibility may ultimately deepen integration as it allows a ‘coali-
tion of the willing’ to intensify integration in certain fields, with other Member 
States probably joining later. On the other hand, it is feared that a ‘Europe of 
37   See Protocol (No. 1) and (No. 2) on subsidiarity and the role of national parliaments 
that may give ‘yellow’ or ‘orange’ cards to legislative proposals where they think they 
infringe the principle of subsidiarity. On the complex nature of these concepts also see 
P.J.G. Kapteyn and P. VerLoren van Themaat, ‘Introduction to the Law of the European 
Communities’ (3rd edition, Kluwer 1998), 233 et seq.
38   Article 5(4) TEU and the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality.
39   At least in the field of competence determination. As we shall see in chapters 9–13, the 
CJEU does closely scrutinize proportionality where restrictions on free movement are 
concerned.
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multiple speeds’ is only the first step towards the unravelling of the EU, as it 
would undermine the necessary coherency and unity within the Union.
In practice, a great deal of flexibility already exists in today’s EU.40 Often 
this has been achieved by opt-outs in the Treaties, including accession treaties. 
For example, only 19 of the current 28 Member States participate in the Euro.41 
Similarly, some Member States, notably the UK, have an opt-out for Schengen, 
which lifts the borders between participating states, even though some non-EU 
states do participate. In the larger picture, there is also the European Economic 
Area (EEA) and the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) that provide a 
kind of alternative membership to the EU internal market.42
In addition to these existing forms of flexibility, Lisbon also further devel-
oped the Treaty mechanism for enhanced cooperation.43 This mechanism 
allows a group of at least nine Member States to establish closer coop-
eration with each other within the framework of EU, and whilst using EU 
institutions and competences. They may only do so, however, as a last resort. 
This means that they must first try to achieve the desired objective with all 
Member States, and may only resort to enhanced cooperation where this 
objectively proves impossible.44 The enhanced cooperation, furthermore, 
must always be open to other Member States that want to join. So far, however, 
this mechanism has only been used twice to adopt rules on divorce and Union 
patents, as the procedure is quite burdensome.
A third mechanism to allow for flexibility is to conclude international agree-
ments between all or a group of Member States. Such agreements are often 
intimately connected with EU law, but formally qualify as international agree-
ments between the Member States. The Fiscal Compact or the ESM Treaty pro-
vide clear examples of this practice, that is welcomed by some and seen as a 
threat to the ‘Community method’ by others.45
40   Cf already B de Witte, D. Hanf and E. Vos, The many faces of Differentiation in EU law (2001, 
Intersentia).
41   Of these, the UK, Denmark and Sweden even have a formal or informal exemption from 
the obligation to join the euro zone at some stage. See further EU chapter 13 on EMU.
42   See on these existing forms of flexibility and alternative membership also G. Davies, 
‘What Does It All Mean?’, German Law Journal Brexit Supplement (2016), en B. De Witte, 
‘Near-membership, partial membership and the EU constitution’, (2016) (4) European 
Law Review, p. 471.
43   Article 20 TEU and Articles 326 to 334 TFEU.
44   Article 20(2) TEU and Joined Cases C-274/11 and C-295/11 Spain and Italy v Council 
(Enhanced Cooperation), ECLI:EU:2013:240.
45   P. Craig, ‘The Stability, Coordination and Governance Treaty: principle, politics and 
pragmatism’, 37(7) 2102 European Law Review p. 231. See also the evidence given by 
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None of these mechanisms, however, seem to provide both the flexibility 
that seems necessary and the safeguards that are required to guarantee the 
unity and stability of European integration. Especially with Brexit looming, 
therefore, the search is on for alternative mechanisms and models that offer 
both, and that may satisfy those Member States that want deeper integration 
and those that want to remain more on the sidelines but remain part of the 
EU.46 Current suggestions include, for example, the creation of several circles 
of integration, which range from a deeply integrated core with even a common 
military to less integrated ‘outer circles’ that primarily participate in economic 
integration, although it is as yet wholly unclear if it is actually feasible to sepa-
rate these areas. In any event the question of flexibility and variable geometry 
is an important one for the EU, and will likely only increase in importance for 
the EAC as well. Consequently, it would seem an important area for further 
research and comparison.
3.5 EU Legal Instruments
Where the EU has a competence, it can only act through one of the legal instru-
ments provided for in Article 288 TFEU, being regulations, directives, decisions, 
recommendations and opinions.
A regulation can best be described as an EU law. From the moment of 
its publication a regulation applies fully and directly in all Member States. 
Regulations require no national implementation, rather it is even prohibited to 
transpose a regulation into national law. Consequently, once a regulation has 
been adopted and published, it is the applicable law throughout the entire EU.
A directive, on the other hand, is an indirect instrument addressed to the 
Member States. The directive tells Member States to achieve a certain result, 
for example giving a right of residence of three months to all EU citizens.47 
The Member States must then implement this directive in their national law, 
M. Dougan and P. Craig for the European Scrutiny Committee of the House of Commons. 
House of Commons—European Scrutiny Committee, Treaty on Stability, Coordination 
and Governance: impact on the rule of law (62nd report, 27 March 2012).
46   See in this context also the ‘Cameron-deal’ that was supposed to prevent Brexit, and the 
right of the UK not to participate in deeper integration, as well as the obligation of the UK 
not to interfere where other Member States would like to integrate more deeply. See the 
European Council Conclusions of 18–19 February 2016, Annex I, EUCO 1/16. For analysis 
see ‘‘Editorial comments: Presiding the Union in times of crisis: The unenviable task of 
the Netherlands’ (2016) 53(2) Common Market Law Review, 327–328.
47   Directive 2004/38.
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where they are free to choose the best national means and methods of doing 
so. Usually, Member States are given a period of two years for this implementa-
tion. Individuals and companies subsequently rely on the national laws trans-
posing the directive, not on the directive itself.48 The directive, therefore, is 
a less intrusive measure, as it allows Member States to make certain choices 
and to integrate a certain rule into their own national law and legal system. 
At the same time, directives also carry a higher risk of divergence between 
Member States, as the implementation may differ between Member States and 
as some Member States may fail to implement a directive or may implement 
it incorrectly.49
Decisions are legally binding acts addressed to specific addressees, and 
hence are not of general application. Examples are Commission decisions 
that grant specific farmers a subsidy or impose a fine on certain companies 
for violating of EU competition law. Recommendations and opinions, on the 
other hand, have no binding legal force. They can still have legal effect, for 
instance as soft law or via the principle of legitimate expectations, but are not 
binding as such.
3.6 EU Legislation and Decision-making
Where the EU wants to use a competence, for instance to adopt a regulation or 
a directive, it must act via one of the decision-making procedures provided for 
in the Treaty or secondary legislation.50 These procedures, therefore, regulate 
how the EU can act. The most important decision making procedures that will 
be discussed here are the ordinary legislative procedure set out in Article 294 
TFEU and the two main special legislative procedures.51
48   For the complex doctrine on the potential direct effect of directives see EU chapter 4.
49   As we shall see in EU chapter 7, it is then up to the Commission to check whether a 
directive has been implemented correctly and to start infringement proceedings where 
necessary.
50   For a discussion of non-legislative decision-making within the different institutions, see 
chapter 2, as these procedures often entail the Institutions taking decisions on their own 
and under their own internal rules, such as under Articles 31 TEU or 31, 106(3), 236, 290 or 
291 TFEU. The discussion here will focus on the legislative decision-making procedures. 
For secondary legal bases see Case C-133/06 Parliament v Council (Secondary Legal Basis) 
[2008] ECR I-3189.
51   Pre-Lisbon this procedure was known as the co-decision procedure, in light of the 
important role for the European Parliament as co-legislator with full rights. See also EU 
chapter 2.
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3.6.1 The Ordinary Legislative Procedure
The ordinary legislative procedure involves the Commission, the European 
Parliament and the Council in up to four ‘rounds’owhen trying to adopt legisla-
tion. The procedure starts with the Commission submitting a proposal to the 
European Parliament and the Council for the first reading. The Parliament then 
adopts a position whereby it rejects the Commission proposal, accepts the pro-
posal or, more commonly, proposes several amendments. The position of the 
Parliament is then communicated to the Council. If the Council approves with 
the position of the European Parliament, the act is adopted, and the procedure 
is finished. If the Council does not agree, it shall adopt its own position, for 
instance suggesting different amendments, and communicate this position to 
the European Parliament and the Commission. The Commission will then give 
its own views on the position of the Council to the Parliament.
The position of the Council and the views of the Commission then 
form the starting point for the second reading. If the Parliament agrees 
with the position of the Council at the end of the first reading, the act will 
be adopted as formulated by the Council. If the Parliament simply rejects the 
position of the Council, the proposed act is not adopted, and the procedure 
stops. Alternatively, however, the European Parliament may again suggest 
amendments. The Commission then gives an opinion on the amendments 
proposed by the Parliament, after which the ball is back again in the court of 
the Council. By a qualified majority the Council can then either approve all 
amendments by the Parliament and adopt the act, or, if it does not agree, con-
vene a so called Conciliation Committee.52
The Conciliation Committee is composed of an equal number of represen-
tatives of the Council and the European Parliament. These representatives 
negotiate with each other and have six weeks to arrive at a text that is accept-
able for both institutions.53 The Commission also takes part in this Committee 
to advise and suggest possible compromises. If no compromise is reached, 
the act is not adopted. If a joint text can be agreed upon, however, the proce-
dure continues to the third reading.
52   For a discussion of the qualified majority voting procedure see EU chapter 2. If the 
Commission has given a negative opinion on certain amendments of the European 
Parliament, however, the Council may only adopt these by unanimity. This require-
ment further safeguards the position of the Commission at this stage of the legislative 
procedure.
53   The representatives of the Council thereby have to approve the outcome with a qualified 
majority, the representatives of the Parliament by a normal majority, following the voting 
rules of their respective institutions.
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In the third reading, the European Parliament, by normal majority, and 
the Council, by qualified majority, each have six weeks to either accept 
or reject the compromise text drafted by the Conciliation Committee, 
no further amendments being allowed. If one or both of the institutions 
reject the text, the procedure ends and no act is adopted.
The ordinary legislative procedure therefore truly casts the Council 
and the European Parliament as co-legislators, and also provides significant 
influence to the Commission. As can already be guessed from the many dif-
ferent rounds, however, the ordinary legislative procedure can also take quite 
some time. Largely for this reason, the trialogue has been invented. Essentially, 
the trialogue moves the Conciliation Committee up to the first round. Instead 
of exchanging amendments for two rounds, a Committee with representatives 
from the Council and the Parliament is immediately set op to negotiate a joint 
text. This joint text is subsequently submitted to the Council and Parliament 
for an up or down vote, without any further amendments being allowed. The 
main advantage of the trialogue is its speed, certainly when compared against 
a normal ordinary legislative procedure. The downsides of trialogues, however, 
include the reduced space for open and transparent debate, as most of the 
negotiation takes place behind closed doors, and no further amendments are 
allowed. Benefits and advantages, therefore, have to be carefully weighed in 
practice.
3.6.2 Special Legislative Procedures
In addition to the ordinary legislative procedure, there are also some special 
legislative procedures. The key difference between special legislative proce-
dures and the ordinary legislative procedure is the role played by the European 
Parliament. In special legislative procedures the Parliament always plays 
a more limited role.54 The two main special legislative procedures are the 
Consent procedure and the Consultation procedure.
Under the Consent procedure, the European Parliament must consent to an 
act but does not have the power to table amendments. Formally, therefore, it 
can only say yes or no to the proposal on the table.55 Under the Consultation 
procedure, Parliament only has to be consulted, i.e. given a chance to express 
its view on a proposal. Parliament, however, cannot block legislation under 
54   Also see Article 289(2) TFEU. Particular legal bases can add certain additional elements to 
special legislative procedures.
55   See for examples of the consent procedure Articles 49 and 50 TEU, or 19(1), 218 and 352 
TFEU.
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this procedure. Usually, moreover, consent procedures require unanimity in 
the Council, preserving a veto for all Member States.56
3.6.3 Determination of Legislative Procedure and the Qualification of 
Legislative Acts
Which legislative procedure should be used for a specific act is determined 
by the legal basis. Each legal basis simply indicates the required procedure. 
Article 114(1) TFEU, for example, requires the ordinary legislative procedure, 
whereas Article 115 TFEU requires the special consultation procedure.57
The procedure used for the adoption of an act also determines its qualifica-
tion as a legislative or a non-legislative act. Here again the rule is very simple. 
All measures adopted via the ordinary legislative procedure or a special legis-
lative procedure qualify as legislative acts.58 This qualification is linked to the 
involvement of the parliament. Vice versa, all acts adopted via non-legislative 
procedures are non-legislative acts. This qualification is purely formal. It only 
depends on the procedure used, and does not look at the content of the act at 
all. The qualification of an act as legislative is relevant for the hierarchy of acts 
in the EU. Because they partake in the democratic legitimacy of the European 
Parliament, legislative acts are hierarchically placed above non-legislative 
acts. The qualification as legislative or not-legislative, moreover, is also rele-
vant for the remedies available against an act, as will be further discussed in 
chapter 7.
3.6.4 Delegation and Implementation
Often, EU legislative acts only provide a framework that needs to be further 
developed or implemented. The Council and the Parliament can decide to 
leave this task to the Commission, for example because it requires a certain 
administrative expertise or because they want to focus on more high level 
activities. In this context the EU Treaties distinguish between delegation and 
implementation.
56   See for examples Articles 103(1), 109 and 115 TFEU.
57   A complication can arise where an act must be based on multiple legal bases and the 
different legal bases cannot be combined. The selection or combination of legal bases 
in such cases is governed by Cases C-300/89 Commission v Council (Titanium Dioxide), 
ECLI:EU:C:1991:244, Case C-338/01 Commission v. Council (AGGF) [2004] ECR I-4829, Case 
C-411/06 Commission v. Parliament and Council (shipment of waste) ECLI:EU:C:2009:518, 
and Case C-166/07 Parliament v. Council (Irish Fund) [2009] ECR I-7135.
58   Article 289(3). See also on this point Case C-583/11 P Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and others v 
Parliament and Council, ECLI:EU:C:2013:625.
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Under the process of delegation a ‘legislative act may delegate to the 
Commission the power to adopt non-legislative acts of general application to 
supplement or amend certain non-essential elements of the legislative act.’59 
The delegated powers, however, may not concern the ‘essential elements of 
an area’, which must be dealt with in the legislative act itself.60 The use of del-
egated powers, moreover, can be subject to control by the Parliament and the 
Council.61
Sometimes legislation also requires further implementation at the EU level, 
for instance where the Commission has to grant subsidies based on a legisla-
tive act establishing a subsidy scheme.62 To this end, a legislative act may grant 
implementing powers to the Commission, or less commonly to the Council. 
These implementing powers can be significant and far-reaching in practice. 
For that reason, they are usually controlled by committees of national experts, 
reporting back to the Council and/or the European parliament, and with dif-
ferent powers of checking the Commission. This entire system of committees 
checking the implementation of EU law by the Commission is usually referred 
to as Comitology.63
The precise border between delegation and implementation can be difficult 
to draw in practice, as both can be very similar. For adopted acts, however, this 
should not create any headaches as each act is required to indicate, in its title, 
if it is delegated or implementing.64 
59   Article 290(1) TFEU.
60   See also ECJ, Case C-427/12 Commission v Parliament and Council (Biocidal Products), 
ECLI:EU:C2014:170.
61   Article 290(2) TFEU.
62   In addition, Member States of course always have the general obligation to implement EU 
law as well. See both the general obligation of sincere cooperation in Article 4(3) TEU and 
the specific obligation in Article 292(1) TFEU.
63   See Regulation 182/2011/EU laying down the rules and general principles concerning 
mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing 
powers, OJ 2011 L 55/13.
64   Articles 290(3) and 291(4) TFEU.
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This chapter examines the scope and origins of EAC law as well as its strength 
and validity with regards to the Partner States. It does so with a view to analyz-
ing the relevance of EAC law within the integration process. The importance 
of law within a regional bloc cannot be overstated, as there cannot be mean-
ingful integration without a solid regulatory framework to provide guidance 
to the process. Undoubtedly, EAC law is a regulatory framework envisaged 
by the Partner States to direct and control the integration process. However, 
having the law scribed on paper is one thing, whereas giving effect to the law 
is another. This chapter, in the spirit of studying this dichotomy, assesses the 
status and effect of EAC law bearing in mind the fact that EAC has all the char-
acteristics of a supranational organization.1
4.1.2 The Structure
In this chapter we open the discussion by examining the various sources of 
EAC law as provided by the Treaty which is the principal partnership accord 
as well as the parent instrument of the Community. With this background the 
study in this chapter goes on to analyze the range within which EAC law exerts 
its operation. The influence and consequence of EAC law in the national legal 
order is then evaluated before we proceed to look into the hierarchical relation 
* Hon. Justice Prof. John Eudes Ruhangisa, judge of the High Court of the United Republic of 
Tanzania and former registrar of the East African Court of Justice.
1   For more and detailed discussion on the supranational character of EAC see John Eudes 
Ruhangisa, “From Rules to Reality: Creating a Legal Community for the EAC”, A Key Note 
Address to the Second LEAC Conference on East African Integration Through law, organized 
by Leiden University in Collaboration with the East African Court of Justice, Held at EAC 
Headquarters, Arusha, Tanzania 5th May, 2016. See also Mbembe Binda, “Good Governance 
and Foreign Direct Investment: A Legal Contribution to a Balanced Economic Development 
in the East African Community”, PhD Thesis, Utrecht University, The Netherland, 25th August 
2015, at page 89.
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of this law vis-à-vis national law. The chapter will conclude with a discussion 
on how EAC law relates to other regional and international law.
4.2 Sources of EAC Law
In order to explain the scope of EAC law it is important to first consider its 
sources. Each country or region has its own sources of law, which largely influ-
ence its legal system. The most common sources of law are Constitutions, 
Parliamentary legislation (statutes), judicial decisions, treaties, protocols 
and circulars issued by various policy organs. In the EAC regime, the sources 
of law are: the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community 
(the Treaty) which came into force on 7th July 2000, following its ratification 
by the Partner States; Acts of the East African Legislative Assembly; decisions 
of the East African Court of Justice; Protocols; and formal directives and deci-
sions of the policy organs of the Community.2
Within the EAC framework, the Treaty is the main source of Community 
law and it outlines the areas of cooperation on which the Partner States of the 
Community have agreed to cooperate. Under the Treaty it is agreed that, with 
a view to strengthening their cooperation, the Partner States are resolved to 
adhere to the fundamental and operational principles that shall govern the 
achievement of the objectives set out in the Treaty and to the principles of 
international law governing relationships between sovereign states. In this 
regard, the relevant provisions of the Treaty are: Article 5 on the Objectives of 
the Community; Article 6 on the Fundamental Principles of the Community; 
Article 7 on the Operational Principles of the Community; and Article 8 on 
the general undertaking as to implementation. For their mutual benefit, 
Partner States have agreed to cooperate in the following fields: political, eco-
nomic, social, cultural, research, technology, defense, security, and legal and 
judicial affairs.
In modern democracies, the legislative function of the State is a preserve 
of the legislature (Parliament). This power is normally enshrined in the 
Constitution, which is the mother of all laws in a particular state.3 In the EAC, 
the Treaty regulates the powers and functions of the organs and institutions 
2   According to the East African Community structure the policy organs of the Community are 
mainly two: the Summit of Heads of State and the Council of Ministers.
3   For example Article 64 (1) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977 which 
provides that “legislative powers in relation to all Union matters and also in relation to all 
other matters concerning mainland Tanzania is hereby vested in Parliament”. Also Article 
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of the Community in the same way that Constitutions regulate the affairs of 
states. Article 49 (1) of the Treaty vests the lawmaking function in the East 
African Legislative Assembly (the Assembly) as it provides that “The Assembly 
shall be the legislative organ of the Community.”4 The Assembly plays its 
legislative role in the Community by passing Bills and having them assented to 
by the Head of States in the Summit. The Bills that have been duly passed and 
assented to are styled as Acts of the Community and are published in the East 
African Community Gazette.
However, under common law tradition, in the course of performing their 
duties, other state organs such as the judiciary can make law as well. Judges are 
not supposed to make laws as their duty is to interpret it, but through statutory 
interpretation a judge can make law. This is where the saying “[j]udges make 
law” derives its origin.5 The legal systems in the United Kingdom are based 
largely on judge-made law. Judge-made law is law developed through decisions 
by judges in the course of deciding cases brought before them. This is what is 
famously called “common law” or case-law. Although after the 17th Century 
new laws and law reforms in England have increasingly been brought about 
through Acts of Parliament, usually inspired by policies of the Government 
of the day, the development of case law still remains an important source of 
law. A statement of law made by a judge in a case can become binding on later 
judges and can in this way become the law for everyone to follow.6
The legal systems of the three founding countries of the EAC,7 which inci-
dentally were under British colonial control, are Common law. It is this back-
ground that not only influenced their respective Constitutions, but also the 
Treaty and the respect they give to the binding decisions of the East African 
Court of Justice (EACJ).
The EACJ is the judicial body of the Community whose role, under Article 
23 of the Treaty, is to ensure adherence to law in the interpretation and appli-
cation of and compliance with the Treaty. The EACJ has exercised its mandate 
of interpretation under Article 27 of the Treaty by hearing and determining 
94 (1) of the Kenya Constitution provides that “[t]he legislative authority of the Republic is 
derived from the people and, at the national level, is vested in and exercised by Parliament.”
4   Article 49 (1) of the Treaty, Ibid.
5   Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 883 (2006). “It is thus no longer 
especially controversial to insist that common law judges make law.”
6   Jan Komárek, Judicial Lawmaking and Precedent in Supreme Courts, (LSE Law, Society and 
Economy Working Papers 4/2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1793219.
7   The Republic of Kenya, the Republic of Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania. The 
Republic of Burundi and the Republic of Rwanda acceded to the Treaty on 18th June 2007 and 
became full members on 1st July 2007.
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cases relating to infringement and contravention of the Treaty. Under Article 
36 of the Treaty, the EACJ gives advisory opinions regarding questions of law 
arising from the Treaty which affect the Community. The EACJ also has juris-
diction under Article 32 of the Treaty to hear and determine any matter arising 
from an arbitration clause contained in a contract or agreement which confers 
such jurisdiction to which the Community or any of its institutions is a party 
or; arising from a dispute between the Partner States regarding the Treaty if 
the dispute is submitted to it under a special agreement between the Partner 
States concerned; or arising from an arbitration clause contained in a commer-
cial contract or agreement in which the parties have conferred jurisdiction to 
it. The Court can also hear and give preliminary rulings on matters referred to it 
by the national courts or tribunals of a Partner State concerning interpretation 
or application of the provisions of the Treaty or the validity of the regulations, 
directives, decisions or actions of the Community. Invariably the judges of the 
EACJ through judicial pronouncements have also made laws in the course of 
interpreting the Articles of the Treaty and developing regional jurisprudence.
One example is the landmark case of Callist Andrew Mwatella & 2 Others 
vs. EAC.8 In this historic9 case the applicants challenged the legality of the 
actions of the Council of Ministers and the Secretariat in assuming control 
over Assembly-led Bills. The Council had purported to withdraw four Private 
Members’ Bills from the Assembly. The application before the Court ques-
tioned the right of the Council to delay the presentation of the Bills to the 
House. It also challenged the validity of the meeting of the Sectoral Council on 
Legal and Judicial Affairs (the Sectoral Council) held on 13th to 16th September 
2005 and the decisions taken by it to write to the Speaker attempting to with-
draw the Bills pending before the Assembly, including the recommendation to 
legalize decisions through Protocols not through Community Acts. The appli-
cation sought an order by the Court that the report of the Sectoral Council 
meeting held on 13th to 16th September 2005 was null and void ab initio and 
requested the Court to find that all decisions, directives and actions contained 
in or based on it were null and void.
The Court found that the Sectoral Council on Legal and Judicial Affairs was 
not constituted per Treaty, in particular Article 14 which provided that the 
Council of Ministers shall “establish from among its members” only Sectoral 
Councils and that Sectoral Council members were restricted to “Ministers” 
as defined by the EAC Treaty. The Court found that Kenya and Tanzania were 
8   Reference No. 1 of 2005.
9   It is a historic case in the sense that it was the first ever case to be filed in the Registry of the 
Court since 2001 when the Court was inaugurated.
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represented by non-ministers (including Attorney Generals) at the disputed 
meeting of 13th to 16th September 2005 and therefore the meeting was not 
properly constituted and did not amount to a lawful Sectoral Council meet-
ing. In this regard, its decision regarding the two Bills was ipso facto invalid. 
However, the Court employed a prospective annulment principle as opposed 
to retrospective annulment in order not to take the Community back to square 
one on matters that the improperly constituted meeting had already decided. 
It was this particular decision of the Court that led to an amendment of the 
Treaty thereby validating participation of Attorney Generals in the Sectoral 
Council for Legal and Judicial Affairs.10
On another issue the Court found that under Article 59 (1) any Member of 
the Assembly may introduce a Bill. The Council does not have exclusive legis-
lative initiative to introduce Bills in the Assembly. It held that the Assembly 
owns all Bills once tabled in the Assembly, whether they came initially by 
way of Private Members’ Bills or Community Bills. As such, permission of the 
Assembly would be required for withdrawal of any Bill. Such approval must 
be sought and obtained through a motion passed by the Assembly and could 
only be withdrawn by the member from whom it originated. In this case the 
Council of Ministers was not the originator of the Bill. Thus, the Bill could not 
be withdrawn by the Council of Ministers as purportedly done. All the Council 
could do was to delay the debate.
As regards to the relationship between the Council and the Assembly, the 
Court found that each has its own enumerated areas of competency.11 It held 
that the Assembly is a creature of the Treaty as are the other Organs of the 
Community and its competencies lie only with matters conferred upon it by 
the Treaty, as is the case with all other Community Organs. In this regard, the 
Assembly could only legislate on matters on which the Partner States had sur-
rendered sovereignty to the EAC.
By interpreting these Articles of the Treaty, the Court dutifully discharged its 
major function under the Treaty and provided guidance for future operations 
of the affairs of the Community Organs. The Court boldly told the Ministers 
and the Attorney Generals that they had overstepped their boundaries and 
that this was not acceptable in the realm of integration, where institutions 
are created and given specific mandates to facilitate the integration agenda. 
10   Article 13 of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community was sub-
sequently amended to recognize the Attorneys General as Members of the Council by 
adding sub article (c).
11   Article 14 (3) (c) and Article 16.
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Moreover, the Court, in order not to cripple the activities of the Community, 
invoked the doctrine of prospective annulment.12
The EACJ has also played its interpretative role in the case of Attorney 
General of the Republic of Kenya vs. Independent Medical Legal Unit13 where the 
disputed issue among the parties regarded the interpretation of Article 30(2) 
of the Treaty. The raised issue was whether Article 30(2) of the Treaty, which 
provides a time limitation of two months, can be extended where there is a 
“continuous violation of human rights.” The Appellate Division held that the 
Treaty does not grant the EACJ any express or implied jurisdiction to extend 
the time limit of two months.
Other cases where the Court has performed its interpretative role and 
developed the Community jurisprudence include Christopher Mtikila vs. The 
Attorney General of the United Republic of Tanzania and the Secretary General 
of the East African Community;14 Prof Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o & others vs. AG of 
Kenya & 5 Others;15 and East African Law Society and 4 Others vs. Attorney 
General of Kenya and Others.16
The Council of Ministers is the policy organ of the Community. The role 
of the Council is to make regulations, issue directives, take decisions, make 
recommendations and give opinions which are binding on the Partner States; 
on all organs and institutions of the Community other than the Summit; the 
Court and the Assembly within their jurisdictions; and on those to whom they 
may under the Treaty be addressed.17 Thus, the Council also plays a law-mak-
ing function within the Community.
If we were to rank the sources of EAC law hierarchically, there is no doubt 
that the Treaty leads in this arrangement as it specially presents itself in the 
integration process the way national constitutions lead in creating the rest of 
the laws in the respective countries. Likewise, in any regional organization it 
is the treaty that stands on top of the legal order as a groundnorm from which 
all laws derive their strength and origin. Protocols, being creatures of the 
Treaty, come next in the lineage of sources of law in the EAC. However, for ease 
of enforceability, and to give them effect, the contents and spirit of the pro-
tocols have to be translated into law by the Assembly through the legislative 
process. Likewise, the decisions or directives of the Council of Ministers or of 
12   Reference No. 1 of 2005.
13   Appeal No. 1 of 2011.
14   Reference No. 2 of 2007.
15   Reference No. 1 of 2006.
16   Reference No. 3 of 2007.
17   Article 14 (3)(d) and Article 16 of the Treaty.
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other policy organs of the Community have to be translated into law in order 
to give them a binding effect and make them enforceable in the court of law.
In any case, a Council decision cannot legally contravene the legislation of 
the Assembly. If it does, wittingly or unwittingly, such decision of the Council 
shall be ultra vires the law and therefore void to the extent it contravenes that 
legislation. Could this be one of the reasons for the Council of Ministers’ reluc-
tance or very slow pace in presenting Bills that translate the protocols into 
Acts of the Assembly? For quite some time the Council of Ministers has been 
uncomfortable with demands and even attempts to translate the protocols 
into law. This prompted three members of the Assembly to seek the Court’s 
intervention in the case of Callist Andrew Mwatella & 2 others vs. EAC (Supra), 
where the Council decided to hold the Private Members’ Bills18 that were sent 
to the Council for input. The Council was of the strong view that there was 
no need for specific legislation in those areas since the relevant protocols, the 
Treaty and Council decisions were adequate.
It is important to note that in 2013 the Council of Ministers proposed an 
amendment to the Treaty which would somewhat ensure its full control of 
the Assembly. This was at the instance of one Partner State which was not 
happy with a Private Members’ Bill that sailed through to become an Act 
of the Assembly. It failed however, when the remaining three Partner States 
declined to support the proposal to amend the Treaty. The proposed amend-
ment intended to remove the part of Article 59 that states as follows: “subject 
to the rules of procedure of the Assembly, any member may propose any motion 
or introduce any Bill in the Assembly.”19 If the said proposed amendment sailed 
through, it would have substantially reduced the amount of legislation for 
passing through the Assembly, as most Bills are proposed by private members.
It is legitimate to state that there has been a running tension between the 
Council of Ministers and the Assembly, with the former heavily relying on pro-
tocols and Summit directives to move forward key aspects of the integration 
agenda, something viewed as a slight by the Assembly. This is particularly seen 
in the relationships between Protocols and Acts, whose contents can overlap.20 
18   The East African Community Trade Negotiation Bill, The East African Community Budget 
Bill, The East African Community Immunities and Privileges Bill, and The Inter-University 
Council for East Africa Bill.
19   At the 25th Meeting of the Council of Ministers held in Bujumbura in August, Tanzania 
proposed that article 59 of the Treaty be amended to remove the part that states that 
“subject to the rules of procedure of the Assembly, any member may propose any motion 
or introduce any Bill in the Assembly.”
20   EAC Regulatory Capacity Review.
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The Assembly is not in favour of protocols, because they limit its flexibility, 
while the Council prefers protocols, which are its own creation and within its 
control.
4.3 Scope of EAC Law
The scope of EAC law mostly covers matters related to the adherence to, appli-
cation of, and compliance with the Treaty. This means that EAC law restricts 
itself only to the areas of cooperation as identified and agreed upon by the 
Partner States and it is within these areas where EAC law takes precedence 
over similar laws of Partner States. The agreed areas of cooperation are: politi-
cal, economic, social and cultural fields, research and technology, defence, 
security and legal and judicial affairs.21
Although the EAC Partner States have expressed, through the Treaty, their 
common desire of ceding some elements of their sovereignty to the EAC 
(a supranational organization), they still maintain a considerable degree of 
sovereignty. In this regard it is only in the identified areas of cooperation that 
they have relinquished some sovereignty as it is only in these areas that Partner 
States are under an obligation to harmonize their policies and laws. Likewise, it 
is only in these areas that the Assembly can legislate. This scenario introduces 
the pertinent question of when and where EAC law can be relied upon. This 
question has two limbs, “when” and “where”. The answer to “when” is partly 
found in the discussion above but may also be personal. Legal persons (natural 
persons and fictitious persons such as corporations) may invoke EAC law at 
any time, if their rights under the Treaty have been infringed or violated by a 
Partner State or an institution of the Community. The Treaty clarifies this view 
by providing that “any person who is resident in a Partner State may refer for 
determination by the Court, the legality of any Act, regulation, directive, deci-
sion or action of a Partner State or an institution of the Community on the 
grounds that such Act, regulation, directive, decision or action is unlawful or is 
an infringement of the provisions of this Treaty.”22
The answer to the second limb of the question, “where”, is also answered 
by the Treaty in Articles 33 and 34. While the EACJ exercises jurisdiction over 
disputes that arise out of the Treaty, this jurisdiction is not exclusive to the 
EACJ; national courts also share part of this jurisdiction. The Treaty provides 
that except where jurisdiction is conferred on the Court by the Treaty, disputes 
21   Article 5 (1) of the Treaty, op. cit.
22   Article 30 of the Treaty.
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to which the Community is a party shall not on that ground alone, be excluded 
from the jurisdiction of the national courts of the Partner States.23 This appears 
strange and contradictory when the same Treaty goes on to say that decisions 
of the EACJ on the interpretation and application of the Treaty shall have pre-
cedence over decisions of national courts on a similar matter.24
It is the role of the Court to ensure that rules are adhered to in the course of 
integrational pursuits, and that the rights of the citizens are respected across 
the region. For there to be consistency in the way integration issues are being 
handled, EACJ decisions on integration matters should prevail over national 
courts and other tribunals, per Article 33 (2), despite Article 33 (1) calling for 
national courts to share jurisdiction with EACJ on Community matters.
Furthermore, the EACJ’s jurisdiction is circumscribed by other judicial 
mechanisms that have been introduced by subsequent Protocols to the Treaty. 
This can be seen in both the Customs Union Protocol and the Common 
Market Protocol. Article 41(2) of the Customs Union Protocol, which deals 
with dispute settlement, establishes committees to handle disputes arising out 
of the Protocol and gives these committees finality in determining such dis-
putes. The Court is excluded and denied a role in the entire process except if 
a party challenges the decision of the Committee on grounds of fraud, lack of 
jurisdiction or other illegality.25
Again, under Article 54(2) of the Common Market Protocol, jurisdiction to 
entertain Common Market related disputes has mainly been given to national 
courts the EACJ is given a very limited role. The national courts are responsible 
for dealing with complaints by businesses and citizens to protect their rights 
under EAC regulations. However, as stated earlier, while the national courts are 
given first priority on matters concerning the enforcement of rights and free-
doms arising out of the Common Market Protocol, Article 33(2) of the Treaty 
recognizes EACJ decisions on the interpretation of the Treaty and Community 
law as being superior to national court decisions on the same matter. This ten-
dency of ousting the jurisdiction of the EACJ is not conducive to the integra-
tion agenda and has the effect of undermining the Court itself and hindering 
the development of uniform regional jurisprudence.
23   Article 33 (1)of the Treaty.
24   Article 33 (2) of the Treaty.
25   Harold R. Nsekela, Overview of the East African Court of Justice, A Paper Presented 
During the Sensitisation Workshop on the Role of the EACJ in the EAC Integration, 
Imperial Royale Hotel, Kampala, Uganda, 1st–2nd November, 2011. See on the different 
situaiotn under EU law, where the CJEU has always claimed exclusive ultimate jurisdic-
tion, EU Chapter 4.
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Upon the opportunity to make a judicial pronouncement on the systematic 
erosion of its jurisdiction, the EACJ, while answering the issue whether it lacks 
jurisdiction over disputes arising out of the implementation of the Customs 
Union and the Common Market Protocols and after examining the impugned 
Articles of the Protocols, tried to find a way of guarding its jurisdiction by mak-
ing the following finding:
. . . we do not find, within the Customs Union and the Common Market 
Protocols, a provision that confers jurisdiction to resolve disputes arising 
from the interpretation of provisions of both Protocols either to an organ 
of a Partner State or of the Community, save this Court.26
The Court concluded that it has jurisdiction over disputes arising out of the 
interpretation and application of the Treaty which, for re-emphasis, includes 
the Annexes and Protocols thereto. However, the Court did not take time to 
either expound on the relevance of the impugned Articles of the Protocols or 
explain the intention of the Partner States in including the provisions which 
appear to suggest that the Court does not have jurisdiction over these matters. 
This issue is exemplified when the said impugned Articles of the Protocols are 
read together with a proviso to Article 27(1) of the Treaty which states:
Provided that the Court’s jurisdiction to interpret under this paragraph 
shall not include the application of any such interpretation to jurisdic-
tion conferred by the Treaty on organs of Partner States.
Throughout the hearing of the case the Counsel to the Community who repre-
sented the Respondent kept the Court under constant reminder of the inten-
tion of those who framed the impugned Articles of the Protocols, the exercise 
he coordinated, as being to oust the jurisdiction of the Court in these matters.
The submission by the Counsel to the Community about the Court not hav-
ing jurisdiction over such matters had been the position consistently taken 
by the Partner States. This view can be found in the submission by Mr. Amos 
Wako, the then Attorney General of the Republic of Kenya, during the hear-
ing of an Application for temporary injunction in the famous Anyang’ Nyong’o 
case27 where he said:
26   Case of East African Law Society v. The Secretary General of the East African Community, 
Reference No. 1 of 2011, at pg 23 of the Judgment.
27   Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o and 10 Others v. The Attorney General of the Republic of Kenya and 5 
Others, Reference No. 1 of 2002.
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. . . Since you have an Article in the treaty which is specific to that issue, 
Article 52 then you have no jurisdiction. This is because the matter for 
deciding on the validity of election is a matter for the national courts and 
not this court [EACJ]. In other words, at the stage in which we are today, 
with your limited jurisdiction, you should not wittingly or unwittingly, 
assume jurisdiction on matters on which the Treaty itself has said should 
be determined by the national courts.28
When the Court in its ruling rejected the Attorney General’s argument on this, 
the Treaty was immediately amended to mark the Partner States’ seriousness 
and a proviso to Article 27 (1) was added. The added amendment basically 
reflected the above Attorney General’s views. Considering this background, 
it is likely that the purpose for including the impugned controversial dispute 
settlement provisions in the two Protocols was to oust the jurisdiction of the 
Court, an outcome which would arguably be detrimental to integration.29
4.4 The Effect of EAC Law in the National Legal Order
The EAC Treaty came into force upon ratification by all three founding Partner 
States and upon the Partner States successfully depositing the instruments of 
ratification with the Secretary General.30 Once this was completed, the Treaty 
became part of the law of the land but it had no special position within the 
individual Partner States’ legal framework until it was formally accepted by 
their respective Parliaments. The EAC Partner States have dualist as opposed 
to monist systems regarding the relationship between their respective national 
law and international law or other regional law. In monist States, international 
or regional law does not require to be translated into national law, but it is sim-
ply incorporated and has an automatic effect in national or domestic systems. 
On the contrary, dualist States, the category to which the EAC Partner States 
belong, accentuate the difference between national and international law, and 
28   Pg 65 of the typed court proceedings of 24/11/2006 in the case of Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o 
and 10 Others v. The Attorney General of the Republic of Kenya and 5 Others, Reference 
No. 1 of 2002. [Emphasis added].
29   Compare in this regards also Opinion 2/13 on the draft agreement providing for the acces-
sion of the European Union to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, and the rules of the jurisdiction of the 
CJEU discussed in EU Chapter 4.
30   Article 152 of the Treaty.
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require the translation of international law such as Treaties and Protocols into 
national law by way of ratification or domestication. Therefore, in order to give 
effect to the Treaty, the Partner States had to incorporate it into their national 
legal systems by way of ratification/domestication.31 This incorporation was 
achieved by the passing of domestic legislation that gave effect to the Treaty 
within each national legal system.32 This is as provided by Article 8(2) of the 
Treaty which stipulates that:
Each Partner State shall, within twelve months from the date of signing 
this Treaty, secure enactment and the effective implementation of such 
legislation as is necessary to give effect to the Treaty, and in particular—
(a) to confer upon the Community the legal capacity and personal-
ity required for the performance of its functions; and
(b) to confer upon the legislation, regulations and directives 
of the Community and its institutions as provided for in this 
Treaty the force of law within its territory.33
In accordance with this Treaty provision, each Partner State enacted a specific 
law to give effect to the Treaty within the domestic legal order. In the case of 
Uganda for example, this law is the East African Community Act of 2002 (EAC 
Act). The EAC Act gives the force of law in Uganda to the Treaty34 since the 
Treaty provisions are also part of the law of the land35 and can be enforced and 
allowed in Uganda.36 In the case of the United Republic of Tanzania, through 
its Legislature the law was enacted to domesticate the Treaty.37 It is this par-
ticular Act, No. 4 of 2001 that provides for giving effect to the provisions of 
31   Articles 152 Ibid.
32   For Tanzania see The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community Act, 
2001 (Act No. 4 of 2001 / Cap 411). For Uganda see East African Community Act, 2002, for 
Kenya see The Treaty Establishing the East African Community Act (No. 2 of 2000), for 
Rwanda see Law No. 29/2007 of 27/06/2007, and for Burundi the information that was 
obtained during research was that Burundi has no specific law in place domesticating the 
treaty as the country ascribes to the principle of Monism. Accordingly when EAC Treaty 
was ratified it became part and parcel of the laws of Burundi. As such there was no need 
for enacting another law domesticating EAC Treaty.
33   Article 8 (2) of the Treaty, op. cit.
34   Section 3 (1) of East African Community Act, 2002 (Uganda).
35   Dora Byamukama, “The EAC Treaty has the force of law in Uganda”, op. cit.
36   Section 3 (2) of the East African Community Act, op. cit.
37   The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community Act, 2001 (Act No. 4 of 
2001 / Cap 411).
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the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community and for con-
nected purposes. This law applies to Tanzania Mainland as well as to Tanzania 
Zanzibar.38
In my view, the directive of Article 8(2) of the Treaty in relation to EAC law 
goes against direct effect. This is a major difference with EU law, and perhaps the 
breeding ground for problems in the future as integration gains momentum.39
Arguably this legal requirement for domestication of the Treaty and the 
Protocols40 represents an escape clause for direct effect of international agree-
ments as commonly understood under Public International Law. However, 
there is no such requirement for ratification of EAC laws enacted by the 
Assembly in exercise of its legislative powers. EAC laws, therefore, take imme-
diate and automatic effect in the Partner States after being signed by the Head 
of States of the Partner States. In other words, EAC laws have direct effect 
and take precedence over similar laws in the Partner States.41
The effect of EAC Protocols is unclear. Arguably the domestication of the 
Treaty by the Partner States was by extension and by necessary implication 
the domestication of the Protocols thereto as the Protocols form an integral 
part of the Treaty.42 The ambivalence here is whether subsequent Protocols 
signed by the EAC would by effect of the domesticated Treaty be automatically 
binding on the Partner States without being ratified first. The Treaty makes 
the situation even more confusing when it categorically provides that each 
Protocol shall be subject to signature and ratification by the parties thereto.43
Within the EAC structure, the Assembly is the only Organ mandated 
to enact the laws for the Community.44 By the term “laws”, we refer to Acts 
of the Assembly as opposed to other legal instruments45 originating outside 
the Assembly framework. Invariably the Assembly passes legislation the way 
National Parliaments legislate for the respective Partner States. However, 
38   Section 1 (2) Ibid.
39   Compare in this regard also EU Chapter 4 on the conditions for direct effect of EU law. 
under EU law, moreover, this direct effect depends on EU law itself, not on the national 
laws transposing EU law.
40   According to Article 151 (4) of the Treaty, Protocols are integral parts of the Treaty.
41   They can be compared in that sense to EU Regulations.
42   Article 151 (4) of the Treaty, Ibid.
43   Article 151 (3), Ibid.
44   Article 49 (1) of the Treaty, Ibid.
45   Other legal instruments include for example Protocols, Memorandum of Understanding, 
Regulations and Rules. Regulations and Rules are subsidiary legislation made by various 
authorities which derive the authority to do so from the Treaty, Protocol or any Principal 
Act made by EALA.
Eudes Ruhangisa152
according to the Treaty as earlier highlighted, the legislation to domesti-
cate the Treaty, effectively conferred upon the Community legislation, regu-
lations and directives, the force of law within its territory such that once 
passed as an Act of the Community then that law so enacted by the Assembly 
should also become a law domesticated, as provided under Article 8(2) (b) 
highlighted above.
Accordingly, under Article 8 (2) (b) any Community law enacted by 
the Assembly, as well as the regulations and directives of the organs of the 
Community have a direct effect such that there is no further ratification or re-
domestication of any EAC law required subsequent to the domestication of the 
Treaty by the Partner States. One such example is the Customs Management 
Act, 2004 which was enacted by the Assembly to replace the respective cus-
toms laws of the Partner States.46 This Community law did not undergo any 
ratification procedure in the Partner States.
The EACJ decisions on EAC matters do not only bind the Community and 
its organs but also the Partner States and their respective institutions includ-
ing national courts. The EACJ has to remain steadfast in the discharge of its 
functions as although under the Treaty the Partner States have undertaken to 
maintain the rule of law this does not necessarily translate into practice. The 
Partner States have demonstrated the lack of it especially when the Court ruled 
in the case of Anyang’ Nyongo’ in 2006 temporarily halting the business of the 
Assembly. The Partner States immediately embarked on a process of amending 
the Treaty which was also another subject of a Reference by the East African 
Law Society.47 The Court stood its ground and even in the subsequent judg-
ments in the case of Anyang’ Nyong’o and that of the East African Law Society it 
declared the process of amending the Treaty and some provisions introduced 
in the Treaty as infringing the same Treaty.
The Partner States have under Article 38 of the Treaty undertaken to accept 
and implement the judgments of the EACJ. Under Article 33 of the Treaty, deci-
sions of the Court on interpretation and application of the Treaty have prece-
dence over decisions of national courts on similar matters. This specific Article 
has implications for the national Courts as the decisions of the EACJ can there-
fore be used as precedents in the national courts.
46   Other such laws include: The East African Community standardization, Quality 
Assurance, Metrology and testing Act, 2006; The East African Community Competition 
Act, 2006; The Lake Victoria Transport Act, 2007.
47   East African Law Society and 4 Others v. Attorney General of Kenya and Others, Reference 
No. 3 0f 2007.
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Although the EACJ does not have execution mechanisms whereby it can 
compel the Partner State to comply with its decisions, there has not been any 
instance where the Partner States have declined to comply with the Court’s 
decisions. This can be evidenced from the cases of James Katabazi & 21 Others 
vs the Attorney General of the Republic of Uganda and the Secretary General of 
the East African Community;48 Plaxeda Rugumba vs the Attorney General of the 
Republic of Rwanda;49 Prof Anyang’ Nyongo & 10 Others vs the Attorney General 
of the Republic of Kenya and 5 Others.50 In these cases the Court made declara-
tions that the acts of the Partner States were in contravention of the Articles 
of the Treaty with which the Partner States complied by taking steps to cor-
rect or rectify the Act, regulations, directives, decisions or actions that had 
infringed the Articles of the Treaty. A good example is the case of Anyang’ 
Nyongo’ where the Republic of Kenya had to review its rules of elections of 
Kenyan representatives to the Assembly in order to comply with Article 50 
of the Treaty. Moreover, in the case of Katabazi suspects of terrorism were 
released by the state security agent which had initiated court martial crimi-
nal proceedings against them notwithstanding the fact that they were civilians 
and during which the suspects were denied bail and legal representation.
The effect of the EACJ not having execution mechanisms of its own is that 
under Article 44 of the Treaty it will depend on the process of execution in the 
Partner States regarding matters of pecuniary nature. However, where execu-
tion regards matters where the Court has made declaratory decisions then it 
will rely on the goodwill of the Partner States to implement or comply with the 
decisions of the Court.
4.5 The Hierarchy between EAC Law and National Law
Essentially, a discussion on the hierarchy between EAC law and national law 
is a discussion on which of the two sets of law is superior to the other if they 
were to be placed on a ladder to determine the order of precedence. This goes 
with the examination on the usefulness of EAC law to the people living in the 
Partner States.
In order to complement Article 8 (2) (b), the Treaty goes on to state cat-
egorically that Community organs, institutions and laws shall take precedence 
48   Reference No. 1 of 2007.
49   Reference No. 8 of 2010.
50   Reference No. 1 of 2006, This case is reported in EALS Law Digest, 2005–2011, pp. 173–195, 
published by EALS with leave of EACJ.
Eudes Ruhangisa154
over similar national ones on matters pertaining to the implementation of 
the Treaty. Further the Partner States are under a general obligation to make the 
necessary legal instruments to confer precedence of Community organs, insti-
tutions and laws over similar national ones. It is this particular character of pre-
cedence of Community institutions and Community laws that makes the EAC 
a supranational organization as opposed to an intergovernmental one.51 This, 
in essence, means that if there is a Community law on Customs Management, 
for example, like the East African Community Customs Management Act, 2004 
this law automatically takes precedence over similar national laws on matters 
pertaining to the Treaty.52 This view is supported by the essence of Section 3 of 
the East African Community Customs Management Act, 2004 which provides 
that “The Directorate of Customs as established by the Council under the Treaty 
shall be responsible for the initiation of policies customs and related trade mat-
ters in the Community and coordination of such policies in the Partner States”.
The hierarchy of EAC Law over national law can also be found in Article 33 
of the Treaty read together with Article 27 on Jurisdiction of the Court and 
Article 34 according to which national courts may refer matters on issues 
of interpretation of the Treaty for a preliminary ruling by the EACJ. This is 
one of the rare opportunities where national courts, at all levels, are given a 
chance to interact with an international court through litigation. When faced 
with a case requiring the application or the interpretation of the Treaty or any 
other EAC law, the national courts are required to refer the matter to the EACJ 
for preliminary ruling.53 Unlike other regional and international courts there 
is no requirement under the EAC Treaty that a party must exhaust local reme-
dies before coming to the EACJ. A party may file a case with the EACJ in respect 
of a violation or infringement of an Article without having to exhaust local 
remedies as long as he/she is resident in a Partner State.54
Under Article 33(2) of the Treaty, decisions of the EACJ on matters of inter-
pretation and application of the Treaty have precedence over decisions of 
the national courts on similar matters. Article 34 of the Treaty also provides 
51   It is interesting to note that whereas the Treaty recognizes East African Community as 
a supranational organization, the EAC Secretariat and the Partner States degrade it to 
the status of being an intergovernmental organization, and this is the meaning of EAC 
as posted on the EAC web site. Compare in this regard also the central importance of 
the supremacy of EU law for the nature and effectiveness of the EU, as described in EU 
Chapter 4.
52   See Dora Byamukama, “The EAC Treaty has the force of law in Uganda”, New Vision News 
Paper, Kampala, Uganda, 25th November, 2015.
53   Article 34 of the Treaty, op. cit.
54   Section 30 (1) of the Treaty, op. cit.
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that where a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Partner State 
concerning the interpretation or application of the provisions of the Treaty or 
validity of the regulations, directives, decisions or actions of the Community, 
that Court or tribunal shall, if it considers that a ruling on the question is nec-
essary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court to give a preliminary 
ruling on the question. The implementation of this provision requires the 
national judge before referring the issue to the EACJ to first satisfy himself that 
the following two conditions are fulfilled:55
1) A question concerning the interpretation or application of the 
Treaty or a question concerning the validity of the regulations, 
directives, decisions or actions of the Community must be raised in 
a case before him;
2) A ruling on the question must be necessary to enable the national 
judge to give judgment in the particular case.
With regards to the first condition, namely that “a question of Treaty interpreta-
tion must be raised”, the national court is solely entitled to appreciate whether 
or not a particular case raises a question of interpretation or application of the 
Treaty or a question concerning the validity of the regulations, directives, deci-
sions or actions of the Community. The answer by the EACJ to the question 
raised by national courts in the reference for preliminary ruling is binding on 
the court that made the reference and on other national courts when subse-
quently faced with a similar issue. The Treaty is silent as to who should raise 
this question. Arguably, the question could be raised by any party to the case 
before the national judge or by the judge himself/herself.
However, it follows from the second condition that any such question does 
not necessarily need to be referred to the EACJ for a preliminary ruling. The 
question must be necessary in order for the national court to give its judg-
ment. This of course leaves the national court very wide discretion to ascertain 
whether a decision on a question of Community law is necessary to enable it 
to give its judgment. In the exercise of this discretion, the national courts must 
be guided by a number of principles which are not provided for in the Treaty.56 
55   See for further details on this procedure under EAC and EU law Chapter 8 and EU 
Chapter 8.
56   Harold R. Nsekela, “Cooperation between the East African Court of Justice and the 
national courts of Partner States”, A Paper presented during the United Republic of 
Tanzania Judges Conference, Arusha, Tanzania, 31 August, 2009.
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To fill this void the EACJ formulated and published guidelines for national 
judges wishing to refer questions to the EACJ for preliminary ruling.57
The issue of hierarchy between EAC law and national law was discussed in a 
reference for preliminary ruling to the EACJ made by the High Court of Uganda 
under Article 34 of the Treaty in the proceedings involving The Attorney General 
of the Republic of Uganda and Tom Kyahurwenda.58 The High Court of Uganda 
had referred for a preliminary ruling on two questions:
(a) Whether the provisions of Articles 6, 7, 8 and 123 read together with 
Articles 27 and 33 of the Treaty are justiciable in the national courts 
of Partner States; and
(b) Whether the provisions of Articles 6, 7, 8 and 123 read together with 
Articles 27 and 33 of the Treaty are self-executing and confer suffi-
cient legal authority on the national courts of the Partner States to 
entertain matters relating to Treaty violations and to award com-
pensation and/or damages as against a Partner State.
At paragraphs 50 and 51 of its ruling the Court stated as follows:
50. The Court holds that by resorting to the use of the word “shall” in Arti-
cle 34 and having regard to the raison d’etre of the preliminary rul-
ing procedure expounded above, it was the intent and purpose of the 
framers of the Treaty to grant this Court the exclusive jurisdiction to 
entertain matters concerning interpretation of the Treaty and annul-
ment of Community Acts.
51. The Court deems it important to distinguish the application of the 
Treaty from interpretation of the same as found in Article 34. Whereas, 
as we held above, interpretation is the preserve of this Court, the 
same is not necessarily the case for the application of the Treaty by 
the national courts to cases before them. It would defeat the purpose 
of preliminary reference mechanism if the Court’s interpretation of 
Article 34 of the Treaty extended to “application of treaty provisions”. 
The purpose for the mechanism is for the national courts to seek 
57   The EACJ-Court Users Guide, page 35 (Guidelines on a Reference for Preliminary Ruling).
58   Case Stated No. 1 of 2014. This Preliminary Reference arose out of a Miscellaneous 
Application before the High Court of the Republic of Uganda (“the High Court”) arising 
from Civil Suit No. 298 of 2012 between Tom Kyahurwenda and The Attorney General of 
Uganda. The High Court stayed the proceedings pending the preliminary ruling of the 
East African Court of Justice (“the Court”).
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interpretation of the Treaty provisions in order that they may then 
apply them to a case at hand. Hence, to interpret Article 34 as requir-
ing “application of the Treaty provision” to be excluded from the pur-
view of national courts would “lead to a result which is manifestly 
absurd or unreasonable”. In this regard, Article 32 (b) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties cited above acknowledges an absur-
dity exception to the literal interpretation of any Treaty.
52. The national courts seek interpretation from this Court in order to be 
empowered to apply the Treaty provisions to the facts of the case(s) 
before them.
In conclusion the Court held that:
(a) Article 34 of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Com-
munity grants this Court exclusive jurisdiction to interpret the Treaty 
and to invalidate Community Acts.
(b) National courts and tribunals are entitled to entertain matters involv-
ing the violation of the Treaty and the application of the provisions of 
the Treaty within the context of Articles 33 and 34.
(c) Decisions of this Court in the interpretation of the Treaty take prece-
dence over decisions of the national courts and tribunals on similar 
matters.
(d) Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Treaty are justiciable before the national 
courts and tribunals of the Partner States.
(e) While they remain inoperative, Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of Article 123 
of the Treaty are not justiciable both before this Court and before the 
national courts and tribunals.
In East African Law Society vs the Secretary General of the East African 
Community, Reference No. 1 of 2011 the Court held that:
As Partner States, by virtue of their being the main users of the Common 
Market Protocol on a daily basis, it would be absurd and impractical 
if their national courts had no jurisdiction over disputes arising out of 
implementation if it did not provide for right of individuals to invoke it 
before national courts.
From the above explanation and cases, it appears that national courts can 
entertain matters related to Community law in respect of application of the 
Treaty but when it comes to interpretation of the Treaty it is the sole jurisdiction 
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of the EACJ. With regard to Article 33(2) which provides that the decisions of 
the Court on the interpretation and application of the Treaty shall have prece-
dence over decisions of national courts on a similar matter, the court opined at 
paragraph 60 that reading the Article together with Articles 27 and 34 it would 
be that the framers of the Treaty envisaged a situation where it is possible 
to contract out of the general norm of the EACJ having sole jurisdiction as to 
interpretation; and to give instead, concurrent jurisdiction of interpretation on 
a given subject matter to both the Court and the national courts. In such case 
the interpretation of the EACJ takes precedence.
It also appears that the Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the national 
courts. This matter was discussed in two cases where the Court was of the view 
that the Treaty needs to be amended to rectify this. In the case of East African 
Law Society and 4 Others vs the Attorney General of Kenya and 3 Others59 the 
Court observed the need to amend the new proviso that was introduced in 
Article 27(1) on Jurisdiction of the Court that states “Provided that the Court’s 
jurisdiction to interpret under this paragraph shall not include the application 
of any such interpretation to jurisdiction conferred by the Treaty on organs of 
Partner State”. This proviso should also be read together with Article 30(3) that 
provides “The Court shall have no jurisdiction under this Article where an Act, 
regulation, directive, decision or action has been reserved under this Treaty to an 
institution of a Partner State”. It should also be read together with 33(1) “Except 
where jurisdiction is conferred on the Court by this Treaty, disputes to which the 
Community is a party shall not on that ground alone, be excluded from the juris-
diction of the national court of the Partner States”. The Court has reiterated 
in several decisions as those mentioned hereinabove expressed the need to 
amend the Treaty in order to clear the confusion.
4.6 The Relationship between EAC Law and Other Regional and 
International Law
As indicated earlier in this work, the EAC Partner States have dualist as opposed 
to monist systems regarding the relationship between their respective national 
law and international or regional law. This means that international law has 
to be national law as well otherwise it will not be considered as law in dualist 
systems and judges cannot apply it nor can citizens rely on it.
59   Reference No. 3 of 2007.
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As the EAC is not, as of yet, considered to be a state, any international or 
other regional laws are of no effect to the EAC as a Community but only bind 
the individual Partner States that subscribe to that particular international law. 
In that case the usual dualist state procedure has to be followed for such inter-
national or regional law to be applied in a particular Partner State where EAC 
law has direct effect.
Arguably, the only international law that the Treaty recognizes and adopts 
within the EAC legal framework is the African Charter on Human and Peoples 
Rights which is explicitly mentioned in Article 6 of the Treaty:
The fundamental principles that shall govern the achievement of the objec-




(d) good governance including adherence to the principles of democ-
racy, the rule of law, accountability, transparency, social justice, equal 
opportunities, gender equality, as well as the recognition, promotion 
and protection of human and peoples rights in accordance with the 
provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.60
While, the EACJ is not bound by decisions of other regional and national 
courts, such decisions are considered to be of persuasive authority. The EACJ 
has drawn a lot of inspiration from the revolutionary case law of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) which can be evidenced in many of its 
judgments where it has cited some of the cases of the CJEU. This shows that the 
EACJ recognizes the potential advantages of the European notions of auton-
omy and primacy of Community law.61 Other regional Courts such as the SADC 
Tribunal and the COMESA Court of Justice have also gained inspiration from 
the decisions of the EACJ when handling cases before them and vice versa.
Furthermore, in playing its role of interpretation of the EAC Treaty the 
Court has largely drawn inspiration from the Vienna Convention on of the Law 
of Treaties and from other sources of persuasive value.
60   Article 6 of the Treaty, op. cit.
61   See further on these concepts EU Chapter 4.
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4.7 Conclusion
The discussion in this chapter has examined the sources of EAC law, its scope 
and its supranational character. It has been pointed out that the supranational 
character of EAC law as envisaged under the Treaty to a large extent puts the 
Partner States in a very difficult situation for they are not wholly ready to 
cede a substantive part of their sovereignty. This creates a dichotomy in that 
Partner States still wish to maintain their full sovereignty whereas their com-
mitments under the Treaty demand them to cede part of their sovereignty to a 
the Community. This is a paradoxical situation which Partner States find them-
selves in whenever they are called upon to propose Bills for legislation by the 
Assembly. As a result, Partner States prefer Protocols to Acts of the Assembly, 
the position that is vehemently opposed by the members of the Assembly who 
resort to tabling Private Members’ Bills. 
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chapter 4A
The Scope, Nature and Effect of EU Law
Armin Cuyvers
4.1 Introduction: ‘the very foundations of EU law’1
This chapter deals with some of the most foundational doctrines of EU law, 
including supremacy and direct effect.2 These doctrines have been vital for the 
success of the EU, also in the early days of European integration. It can safely 
be said that without these doctrines the EU would never have been as success-
ful and effective as it has been. Considering their vital role in EU integration, 
it may even be said that direct effect and supremacy form essential elements 
for any regional system that truly wants to be effective and deliver concrete 
benefits to its citizens.3 Both doctrines, therefore, are of vital interest to the 
EAC as well.
1   This chapter gratefully builds on the LEAC research report by T. Ottervanger and A. Cuyvers, 
‘The functioning of the East African Community: Common market, Court of Justice and 
fundamental rights, a comparative perspective with the European Union’ (Europa Instituut 
Leiden, 2013), pp. 1–206, and the excellent master Thesis of Merel Valk, written in 2015 under 
supervision of the LEAC, entitled ‘The Rule of the European Court of Justice and the East 
African Court of Justice: Comparing Potential Judicial Strategies for Early Stage Integration’. 
(on file with the author).
2   For further reading on these issues see inter alia See for one among several classics 
B. de Witte, ‘Direct Effect, Supremacy, and the Nature of the Legal Order’, in: P. Craig and 
G. De Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (OUP 1999), 209 et seq, or the updated version in 
P. Craig and G. De Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (2nd ed. OUP 2011), 324, as well as the 
different contributions in M.P. Maduro and L. Azoulai (eds) The Past and Future of EU Law: 
The Classics of EU law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Hart Publishing 
2010), especially see P. Pescatore, ‘Van Gend en Loos, 3 February 1963—A View from Within’, 
1, B. de Witte, ‘The Continuous Significance of Van Gend en Loos’, 9, F.C. Mayer, ‘Van Gend en 
Loos: The Foundation of a Community of Law’, 16, and of course D. Halberstam, ‘Pluralism 
in Marbury and Van Gend’, 26, as well as N. Fennely, ‘The European Court of Justice and the 
Doctrine of Supremacy: Van Gend en Loos; Costa v. ENEL; Simmenthal’, 39, and I. Pernice, 
‘Costa v. ENEL and Simmenthal: Primacy of European Law’, 47.
3   C.F. Nyman-Metcalf, Papageorgiou, Regional Integration and Courts of Justice. 1st ed. (Insertia, 
2005), p. 6. Mattli, The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond. 1st ed. (Cambridge 
University Press, 1999, p. 74. Also: De Burca, Scott. Constitutional Change in the EU. From 
Uniformity to Flexibility?. 1st ed. (Hart Publishing, 2000), p. 63.
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Before we look closer at the legal effect of EU law, however, it is necessary to 
first look at the scope of EU law, that is the question when and where EU law 
actually applies. For even EU law can only have direct effect and supremacy in 
those cases where it applies in the first place. The question of scope, moreover, 
is equally relevant for the EAC as the precise scope of EAC law seemingly has 
not yet been settled yet, but will equally be of crucial importance for the suc-
cess of regional integration in East Africa.
4.2 The Scope of EU Law
When one talks about ‘the scope’ of EU law, one basically asks which cases 
are governed by EU law. When two Portuguese companies conclude a con-
tract for IT services in Portugal, for example, does EU law apply? And what 
if an American undertaking imports products into Ireland, or participates in 
an American cartel that affects the EU market? Or is EU law applicable when a 
Spanish region directly awards a multi-million contract to a Spanish company?
Just as EU law determines the limits of EU competences, the CJEU also held 
that EU law determines its own scope.4 Whether a certain issue falls under 
EU law, therefore, is a question of EU law, not of national law. Moreover, the 
mere fact that a certain issues also falls under national law, does not mean it 
does not fall under EU law, as both can apply at the same time. The exclusive 
jurisdiction of the CJEU over the scope of EU law is also necessary to ensure 
the unity of EU law and to enable the CJEU to remain the ultimate arbiter of EU 
law. After all, if other courts could determine the scope of EU law, they could 
prevent the Court of Justice from safeguarding the correct interpretation and 
application of EU norms in certain cases, simply by declaring them outside the 
scope of EU law. Reducing the scope of EU law would then become an escape 
route for Member States or national courts to escape or reduce the direct effect 
and supremacy of EU law. Control over the scope of EU law, consequently, 
should also be seen as an important precondition for supremacy and direct 
effect, just like the ultimate jurisdiction over the correct interpretation and 
application of EU law.5
4   Case C-617/10 Akerberg Fransson, ECLI:EU:C:2013:105.
5   See already on this point Case C-459/03 Commission v Ireland [2006] ECR I-4635, as well as 
the much discussed CJEU Opinion 2/13 on the draft agreement providing for the accession of 
the European Union to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454.
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4.2.1 EU Actions and the Scope of EU Law
Logically, all actions by EU institutions and bodies fall under the scope of EU 
law. All EU legislation and all decisions from EU institutions and bodies, there-
fore, have to comply with EU law, including all fundamental rights guaranteed 
within the scope of EU law.6 More complicated is the question when actions 
by Member States fall under the scope of EU law.7
4.2.2 Member State Actions and the Scope of EU Law
Essentially, there are three ways in which Member State actions fall under the 
scope EU law. Firstly, any Member State action falls under the scope of EU law 
when the Member State is implements or applies EU measures.8 Any national 
legislation implementing a directive, for example, falls under the scope of EU 
law.9 Consequently, if an individual challenges a national act that implements 
or applies an EU rule, that decision falls under the scope of EU law. So for 
example, where two companies start legal proceedings against each other, and 
one company relies on a national law that implements an EU directive, this 
dispute between two private parties will fall under the scope of EU law.10
Secondly, any Member State action that derogates from EU rules or rights 
also falls under the scope of EU law.11 This category inter alia includes all cases 
where a Member State action restricts free movement. In Schmidberger, for 
example, Austria allowed a demonstration that blocked the Brenner Pas, one 
6    See for a highly principled position of the CJEU on this point the Kadi-saga: Joined cases 
C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P Kadi I [2008] ECR I-6351, and Case C-584/10 P Commission v. Kadi 
(Kadi II). or further analysis of these cases see M. Avbelj, F. Fontanelli and G. Martinico 
(eds), Kadi on Trial (Routledge, 2014), as well as A. Cuyvers, ‘“Give me one good reason”: 
The unified standard of review for sanctions after Kadi II’, 51(6) Common Market Law 
Review (2014), 1759, and A. Cuyvers, ‘The Kadi II judgment of the General Court: the ECJ’s 
predicament and the consequences for Member States’. European Constitutional Law 
Review, 7, 481.
7    See for a discussion in the context of the Charter K. Lenaerts, ‘Exploring the Limits of the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2012) 8 EUConst, 375.
8    See for example already case 5/88 Wachauf [1989] ECR 2609, paras 17–19, or Case 249/86 
Commission v. Germany [1989], ECR 1263, or Case C-578/08 Chakroun [2010] ECR I-1839.
9    For recent examples see amongst many others Case C-399/11 Melloni ECLI:EU:C:2013:107, 
Case C-131/12 Google v. Spain ECLI:EU:C:2014:317 or Case C-300/11 ZZ ECLI:EUC:2013:363.
10   For a further delineation of what exactly qualified as ‘implementing EU law’, see inter 
alia Case C-206/13 Cruciano Siragusa ECLI:EU:C:2014:126, par. 25, Case C-40/11 lida 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:691, case C-87/12 Ymeraga ECLI:EU:C:2013:291, par. 41, and Case C-198/13 
Julian Hernandez ECLI:EU:C:2014:2055, par. 34.
11   See for example Case C-260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I-2925. Similarly see for example Case 
C-470/03 AGM-COS.MET [2007] ECR I-2749 or Case C-390/12 Pfleger EU:C:2014:281.
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of the main transport routes to southern Europe. The Court held that allow-
ing this demonstration restricted the free movement of goods enjoyed by a 
transport company. Even though the Court found the restriction justified in 
the end, the mere fact that Austria had restricted free movement was enough 
to bring the dispute under the scope of EU law.12 As many national laws will in 
some way affect the free movement of goods, services, establishment, persons 
or capital, this second ground significantly expands the scope of EU law.
In addition to the two grounds set out above, there also is a third, rather 
vague ground for bringing a case under the scope of EU law. The CJEU some-
times finds that a case does not involve an implementation or a derogation of 
EU law, but nevertheless falls ‘within the scope of EU law’ in a generic sense 
because there is a sufficient link between the national act and EU law. The 
case of Fransson, for example, concerned Swedish tax penalties and a crimi-
nal prosecution that were not directly based on EU law, nor did they derogate 
from EU law. Nevertheless the CJEU found these penalties came under the 
scope of EU law because they were also designed to protect the collection of 
VAT, and therefore the financial interest of the EU.13 This indirect and partial 
link was sufficient to bring the case under the scope of EU law in the generic 
sense. In Kücükdeveci, the CJEU brought a case under the scope of EU law pri-
marily because the subject matter of the case was covered by a directive, even 
though the directive did not apply itself.14
Some further guidance on this third category of scope was given more 
recently in Hernandez, where the CJEU held that scope ‘presupposes a degree 
of connection between the measure of EU law and the national measure at 
issue which goes beyond the matters covered being closely related or one of 
those matters having an indirect impact on the other.’15 Despite this clarifica-
tion, however, this ground for scope remains relatively opaque and unpredict-
able. These same qualities, of course, may also be part of the appeal to the 
CJEU, as it sometimes may be in need of a ground to extend the scope of EU 
law beyond implementation or derogation.16
12   Case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659.
13   Case C-617/10 Fransson ECLI:EU:C:2012:340, paras. 24–28.
14   Case C-555/07 Seda Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH & Co. KG, [2010] ECR I-365.
15   Case C-198/13 Julian Hernandez ECLI:EU:C:2014:2055, par. 34.The CJEU thereby referred 
to its earlier case law in Case 149/77 Defrenne EU:C:1978:130, paras. 29 to 32, Case C-299/95 
Kremzow EU:C:1997:254, paras. 16 and 17, Case C-144/04 Mangold EU:C:2005:709, par. 75, 
and Siragusa EU:C:2014:126, paragraph 24.
16   For the more specific rules on the scope of EU law in the field of competition law, also 
see companion chapter 14. Essentially the scope of EU competition law is linked to the 
effect of the anti-competitive behavior on the EU market, as held in Joined cases C-89/85, 
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4.3 Direct Effect of EU Law
Direct effect is one of the hallmarks of the EU legal order. Van Gend en Loos, the 
case which established direct effect and the autonomy of the EU legal order 
has a near mythical status as the alpha and omega of the EU legal order.17 The 
essence of direct effect is as simple as it is fundamental. Direct effect means 
that individuals and companies can rely on EU law before all national courts 
and public bodies, just as they can on national law. EU law, therefore, is not 
some foreign or international law that must first be imported into the national 
legal order to have legal effect.18 Rather, direct effect means that EU law is part 
of national law.
This section first outlines the establishment of the direct effect of Treaty 
provisions in Van Gend en Loos, the criteria that a Treaty provision has to meet 
to have direct effect, and the main arguments given by the CJEU to justify 
direct effect of EU law. Subsequently, this section discusses the direct effect 
of secondary EU law. This discussion will also touch on the main complexi-
ties surrounding direct effect, including the direct effect of general principles 
and directives as well as the difference between vertical and horizontal direct 
effect.
4.3.1 Van Gend en Loos: Establishing Direct Effect of Treaty Provisions
Van Gend en Loos illustrates how small cases can make good law. The judg-
ment concerned the company of Van Gend en Loos that wanted to import the 
rather unspectacular chemical ureaformaldehyde into the Netherlands from 
Germany. The Netherlands wanted to impose an import duty of 8%, which 
was higher than the import tariff that applied when the Netherlands joined 
C-104/85, C-114/85, C-116/85, C-117/85, C-125/85, C-126/85, C-127/85, C-128/85 and C-129/85 
Woodpulp I ECLI:EU:C:1993:120.
17   Case C-26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, EU:C:1963:1. 
Direct effect and supremacy have inter alia been referred to as the ‘grounding principles’ 
in: K. Lenaerts and Gutierrez-Fons, The Constitutional Allocation of Powers and General 
Principles of EU law’ (2010) Common Market Law Review, 1631, or the ‘twin pillars’ in: 
S. Prechal, ‘Does Direct Effect Still Matter?’ (2000) Common Market Law Review, 1047. The 
Court referred to them ‘essential characteristics’ in Opinion 1/19 Draft Agreement relating 
to the creation of the European Economic Area [1991] ECR I-6979, para. 21.
18   At least as would be required in dualist systems. In pure monist systems even public inter-
national law can have direct effect, albeit based on the monist constitution. For a very 
far reaching position on this point see Cour de Cassation (Belgium), 27 May 1971, S.A. 
Fromagerie franco-suisse ‘Le Ski’ (1971) RTD eur 495.
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the EEC. Van Gend en Loos argued that this increase violated what was then 
Article 12 of the EEC Treaty, which read:
Member States shall refrain from introducing between themselves any 
new customs duties on imports or exports or any charges having equiva-
lent effect, and from increasing those which they already apply in their 
trade with each other.19
In its defense, the Dutch government argued that Article 12 EEC was an interna-
tional obligation only directed at the state, and that a private company like Van 
Gend en Loos could not rely on it. The CJEU disagreed, and held that Treaty 
provisions could have direct effect if they met three cumulative conditions:
i. The measure must be sufficiently clear and precise;
ii. It must be unconditional, and;
iii. It must leave no legislative discretion to the Member State.
Jointly, these criteria essentially require that, to be directly effective, a rule of 
EU law actually gives a right to an individual, and that this right can be suffi-
ciently determined on the basis of the Treaty provision alone, without requir-
ing further legislative action by the Member State. For example, imagine an 
EU rule saying that all Member States must strive to provide reasonable study-
ing grants to all students. This norm is vague and requires implementation by 
Member States to determine the actual right. How much would the grant be 
per month, for example, and who precisely would be entitled to it? In con-
trast, an EU rule holding that all people registered at a university have a right 
to a four year state sponsored grant of €250 per month, would be sufficiently 
clear and precise, as one can determine the core elements of an unconditional 
right from the provision itself. In practice, the CJEU is rather flexible in finding 
direct effect. It is enough if the core elements or the minimal content of a right 
can be determined.20
19   At this stage of European integration, not yet all import tariffs had been abolished. Rather, 
during the transitional stage, only increases were prohibited as gradually all tariffs were 
reduced to zero.
20   Case 43/75 Defrenne [1976] ECR 455. See for an example of which key elements must be 
sufficiently clear for a right to exist also Case C-479/93 Francovich [1995] ECR I-3843. By 
now, moreover, the CJEU has been able to rule on the direct effect of all Treaty provisions. 
When one is in doubt, therefore, if a certain Treaty provision fulfills the requirements for 
direct effect, this can simply be checked via the case law of the Court of Justice.
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Applying these criteria in In Van Gend en Loos, the CJEU held that the pro-
hibition to increase customs duties in Article 12 EEC was sufficiently clear, 
precise and unconditional. As a clear prohibition, furthermore, it required no 
further implementation.21 Consequently, Article 12 EEC had direct effect, and 
the company of Van Gend en Loos could directly rely on it to challenge the 
Dutch increase in import tariffs.
4.3.2 Justifying Direct Effect of EU Law
By holding that EU Treaty provisions could apply directly, the CJEU took a 
monumental step towards differentiating the EU legal order from ‘normal’ 
public international law and ensuring that EU law would become a living real-
ity rather than just another legal norm that applied only between states. Most 
importantly, the CJEU determined that individuals and companies derived 
certain rights directly from EU law and that they could directly enforce these 
rights at the national level.
With this single judgment, the CJEU transformed millions of individuals 
and companies into EU law policemen that could make sure Member States 
respected their rights under EU law. This greatly increased the enforcement of 
EU law. After all, it is extremely unlikely that the Commission would have ever 
started an infringement proceeding against the Netherlands over something 
as minor as increasing the tariffs for ureaformaldehyde to 8%. For a transport 
company like Van Gend en Loos, however, such an increase was important 
enough to undertake legal action. The principle of direct effect, therefore, 
linked the enforcement of EU law to the self-interest of individuals and com-
panies, self-interest being one of the more reliable incentives that legal sys-
tems can rely on. For no matter how technical or ‘minor’ an EU rule may seem, 
there is likely a company or individual deeply affected by it.
To support its monumental ruling, the CJEU essentially relied on four, inter-
connected arguments derived from the ‘spirit, general scheme and the word-
ing’ of the Treaty.22
Firstly, the CJEU pointed out that the EEC Treaty ‘is more than an agreement 
creating mutual obligations between the Member States’ alone, as it must have 
been intended to include individuals as well. Here the CJEU inter alia refers 
to the aim of establishing a common market. The functioning of such a mar-
ket necessarily concerns individuals as ‘stakeholders’. One simply cannot have 
21   Van Gend en Loos, therefore, also forms a good authority for the conclusion that prohibi-
tions will usually be sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional to have direct effect.
22   Note that the wording only comes last, further underscoring the fundamental as well as 
the creative exercise in Van Gend en Loos.
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a market without involving the market actors, so the logic goes.23 This logic 
is then further supported by the Preamble of the EEC which ‘refers not only 
to government but also peoples’. Both the text and the objective of the EEC 
Treaty, therefore, imply that it was intended to be more than just another inter-
national treaty only creating rights and obligations between states. Rather, 
the EEC Treaty was intended to be something more, a legal instrument that 
unlike traditional international law also included individuals as its objects and 
subjects.
This finding that the EEC Treaty must be more than an ordinary Treaty con-
nected to the CJEU’s second and even more fundamental argument on the 
nature and autonomy of the EEC legal order:
. . . the Community constitutes a new legal order of international law 
for the benefit of which states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit 
within limited fields, and the subject of which comprise not only Member 
States but also their nationals.24
The EEC Treaty, therefore, created a whole new legal order, and this legal order 
is autonomous from the Member States that created it.25 Both the Member 
States and individuals are members of this new autonomous legal order, and 
both can therefore rely on it directly. The autonomy of the EU legal order, 
and the fact that Member States have actually limited their sovereign rights 
to create it, also explains why it is EU law itself that can determine its own 
direct effect.
Thirdly, the CJEU supports these two teleological arguments with a more tex-
tual and straightforward argument: the existence of the preliminary reference 
procedure.26 The CJEU points out that the preliminary reference procedure 
allows national courts to ask questions to the CJEU on the correct interpreta-
tion and application of EEC law. This possibility implies, according to the CJEU, 
that these national courts were presumed to apply EEC law directly. Why, after 
23   F. Mayer “Van Gend en Loos: The Foundation of a Community of Law” in Maduro, Azoulai, 
The Past and Future of EU law. 2nd ed. (Hart Publishing, 2010), p. 20.
24   Van Gend en Loos, EU:C:1963:1.
25   Cf. also K. Lenaerts, “The Court of Justice as the Guarantor of the Rule of Law Within the 
European Union” in: G. De Baere and J. Wouters, The Contribution of International and 
Supranational Courts to the Rule of Law”, 1st ed. (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2015), 
243.
26   Article 177 EEC, now Article 267 TFEU. See for a more detailed discussion of this remedy 
EU Chapter 8.
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all, would national courts ask preliminary questions on EEC law to the CJEU 
if these courts were not even allowed to apply EEC law in the first place? The 
indirect remedy of the preliminary reference, therefore, implies the direct 
effect of EU law.
Fourth, and most fundamentally, however, the CJEU seems to base direct 
effect on effectiveness. If the Member States seriously wanted the EEC to 
achieve its objectives, they must have accepted the direct effect of EEC law, for 
without direct effect the EEC could not work.27 Not only is the participation 
of individuals necessary to achieve objectives such as the internal market, it is 
also necessary to ensure the effective enforcement and application of EU law. 
In the words of the CJEU:
The vigilance of individuals concerned to protect their rights amounts 
to an effective supervision in addition to the supervision entrusted 
by Articles 169 and 170 to the diligence of the Commission and of the 
Member States.28
This logic of effectiveness seems to be the most fundamental reason underlying 
direct effect, as well as many other key principles of EU law.29 If the ambitions 
of the EU are to be taken seriously, the EU legal order must be conceived as 
something that goes far beyond an ordinary international treaty. Innovations 
such as direct effect, therefore, are a necessary price to pay for effective regional 
integration, and as Member States surely must have wanted to create an effec-
tive regional organization, the CJEU also assumes they intended to pay this 
price. Consequently, even though it may not have been made explicit in the 
EEC Treaties, the CJEU found that the potential direct effect of Treaty provi-
sions was inherent in EEC law.30
27   For an explicit reference to the effet utile of EU law also see Case C-9/70 Franz Grad v 
Finanzamt Traunstein ECLI:EU:C:1970:78.
28   Van Gend en Loos, EU:C:1963:1.
   Referenced to as a “prophetic” statement, since the preliminary reference procedure 
seems to have “. . . effectively become the infringement procedure for the European citi-
zen”. See: “Van Gend en Loos, 3 February 1963—A View from Within” in: Maduro, Azoulai, 
The Past and Future of EU law. 2nd ed. (Hart Publishing, 2010), p. 7.
29   Also see EU chapter 6 on the general principles of EU law.
30   Note that even unwritten General Principles of EU law, which are also pat of EU primary 
law, can also have direct effect if they are sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional. 
Precisely because of their generality, many principles of EU law may struggle to meet 
this criterion, but for example the general principle prohibiting discrimination on the 
basis of age has been found to be directly effective. See Case C-144/04 Mangold [2005] 
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Treaty provisions, moreover, usually have both vertical and horizontal direct 
effect. Vertical direct effect refers to situations where parties rely on EU law 
against the state, or any entity wielding public authority.31 Horizontal direct 
effect concerns situations where none of the parties wield any public authority, 
for example in a dispute between two private companies. Even in such purely 
horizontal situations, where no party wields any public authority, the CJEU has 
found that most Treaty provisions apply directly and can therefore be relied 
upon against each other. For example, the Belgian stewardess Defrenne could 
rely directly on then Article 119 EEC, at least to the extent that it required equal 
pay for equal work for men and women.32 Equally, Mr. Angonese could rely on 
the freedom of workers against a private bank in Italy, which would only hire 
staff with a language certificate awarded in Bolzano.33 For some Treaty provi-
sions, including those on the free movement of goods and services, however, 
the CJEU seemingly has not yet fully made up its mind.34
4.3.3 Direct Effect of other EU Norms
Van Gend en Loos only established the direct effect of Treaty provisions. The 
question therefore remained if secondary EU law could also have direct effect, 
and if so under what conditions.35 By now the CJEU has also ruled on the direct 
effect of all forms of secondary legislation enumerated in Article 288 TFEU, 
being regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions. In 
ECR I-9981 and Case C-555/07 Kücükdeveci ECLI:EU:C:2010:21. The possible direct effect 
of the Charter of Fundamental rights of the EU remains a more contested issue, as the 
CJEU has so far avoided ruling on it. At the same time, any rights embodied in the Charter 
may also form General Principles of EU law as such, and in that capacity enjoy direct 
effect if they meet all the criteria. On the direct effect of the Charter see Case C-282/10 
Dominguez, ECLI:EU:C:2012:33, and especially the Opinion of AG Trstenjak in this case, as 
well as Case C-176/12 AMS ECLI:EU:C:2014:2. For a further discussion on the nature of EU 
General Principles as such see EU chapter 6.
31   See for examples Case 152/84 Marshall I [1986] ECR 723, Case 71/76 Thieffry [1977] ECR 
765, Case C-309/99 Wouters [2002] ECR I-1577, par. 120, Case 13/76 Dona [1976] ECR 1333, 
or Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch [1974] ECR 1405.
32   Case 43/75 Defrenne ECLI:EU:C:1976:56.
33   Case C-281/98 Angonese [2000] ECR I-4139.
34   See Case C-171/11 Fra.bo ECLI:EU:C:2012:453, as well as Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri 
ECLI:EU:C:2007:809.
35   For a more elaborate overview of the different regimes and requirements for direct effect, 
in a comparative perspective to the US, see K. Lenaerts ‘Constitutionalism and the Many 
Faces of Federalism’ 4 American Journal of Comparative Law (1990), 208, 212. et seq.
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addition, the CJEU has clarified that international agreements concluded by 
the EU law can also have direct effect.
4.3.3.1 Direct Effect of Regulations
The potential direct effect of directives is inherent in their very nature. As 
Article 288 TFEU provides, a regulation ‘shall be binding in its entirety and 
directly applicable in all Member States.’36 Regulations, therefore, do not 
require any support of or conversion into national law to directly apply in the 
national legal orders of the Member States. At the same time, this does not 
mean that all parts of all regulations apply directly. To be directly effective, a 
provision in a directive must also be unconditional, sufficiently clear and pre-
cise, and require no further implementation.37 For if a provision in a regulation 
does not contain a sufficiently specific right, there simply is nothing that can 
be applied directly.
4.3.3.2 Direct Effect of Directives
The possible direct effect of directives is one of the more complex and poten-
tially confusing parts of EU law.38 The starting point, however, is very clear. 
Directives normally do not have direct effect. As Article 288 TFEU states, 
directives are addressed to Member States, not to individuals. If all goes well, 
Member States implement directives in their own legal order within the pre-
scribed period. Individuals can then rely on the national law implementing 
the directive, and do not need to rely on the directive itself. If directives are 
implemented timely and correctly, therefore, they never acquire direct effect.
Problems arise, however, where Member States fail to implement a directive 
or implement a directive incorrectly. In such cases, individuals are unable to 
rely on a national implementing law to enforce any rights that the directive 
may have given them. To fill this gap, and make sure Member States do not get 
away with not implementing directives, the CJEU has found that directives can 
have vertical direct effect where they have not been correctly implemented 
and the implementation period is over. Compared to Treaty provisions and 
36   The existence of regulations, therefore, also provides a possible counterargument to the 
reliance of the CJEU on the preliminary reference procedure as proof of the fact that the 
EEC Treaty should have direct effect. The existence of directly effective regulations could 
have been sufficient explanation for the inclusion of the preliminary reference procedure 
in the EEC Treaty.
37   See for example C-403/98 Azienda Agricola Monte Arcosu v Regione Autonoma della 
Sardegna ECLI:EU:C:2001:6, paras 28–29.
38   For a more general analysis see S. Prechal, Directives in EC law (2nd edn., OUP 2005).
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regulations, therefore, directives must meet some additional requirements in 
order to have direct effect. The cumulative requirements for a provision in a 
directive to have direct effect are as follows:
i. The provision must be sufficiently clear and precise;
ii. It must be unconditional, and;
iii. It must leave no legislative discretion to the Member State.
iv. In addition, the implementation period must have passed, and;
v. The directive has not been implemented or has not been imple-
mented correctly.39
Directives, therefore, cannot have direct effect before the implementation 
period has expired.40 Moreover, the CJEU has consistently ruled that direc-
tives can only have so-called vertical direct effect. This means that the direct 
effect of directives can only be relied upon against the state or emanations of 
the state. Directives can never have horizontal direct effect, which means they 
cannot be relied upon against other individuals.41 In a conflict between two 
individuals, for example two private companies litigating over a commercial 
contract, neither party can therefore directly rely on any EU directives, even if 
these directives grant them a clear, precise and unconditional right.
The lack of horizontal direct effect of directives creates a certain gap 
in the legal protection of individuals and the effectiveness of EU law. Where 
Member States for example fail to implement a directive on consumer protec-
tion, consumers cannot invoke their rights under the directive against private 
companies violating these rights.42 The CJEU has, therefore, developed several 
other doctrines to at least reduce the impact this gap has and to ensure the 
39   See for example Case C-41–74 Van Duyn ECLI:EU:C:1974:133, paras. 4–7, Case C-148/78 
Criminal proceedings against Tullio Ratti ECLI:EU:C:1979:110, para. 46. Also note that there 
is a general obligation on National Courts to interpret national law in conformity with EU 
law. Even if a directive has not (yet) been implemented by a Member State, therefore, the 
national court is obliged to interpret national law in line with the directive. Only where 
this would require an interpretation contra legem is a national court allowed to choose an 
interpretation of EU law that conflicts with a directive. This obligation, moreover, applies 
to all EU norms, even those that are not directly effective. See Case C-397–403/01 Pfeiffer 
[2004] ECR I-8835.
40   Even before the implementation deadline has expired, however, Member States are obli-
gated to refrain from acting in ways that might nullify the effect of the directive, see Case 
C-129/96 Inter-Environment Wallonie ECLI:EU:C:1997:628, par. 50.
41   Case C-152/84 Marshall EU:C:1986:84, par. 48, Case C-91/92 Faccini Dori [1994] ECR I-3325.
42   See for example Cases 189 & 190/94 Dillenkofer v Germany, ECLI:EU:C:1996:375.
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effectiveness of EU law as much as possible. To begin with, the CJEU employs 
a very wide conception of the State, and therefore of vertical situations. Bodies 
that wield some form of public authority will rather quickly qualify as a part 
of the State, and hence have to accept that directives may be relied upon 
against them directly.43 In addition, the CJEU allows for so called triangular 
direct effect and, exceptionally, for indirect horizontal direct effect.44 Even 
where no direct effect can be created, moreover, the duty of conform inter-
pretation requires that national courts try and interpret national law in con-
formity with EU law, including directives, even where these do not have direct 
effect.45 Although national courts are never obligated to interpret national law 
contra legem, they must try to find a way to read any rights granted by a direc-
tive into national law. Lastly, the doctrine of Member State liability allows indi-
viduals to sue the Member State for any damages they have suffered due to the 
failure to (correctly) implement the directive.46 Ultimately, however, the fact 
remains that directives in principle do not have direct effect, and never have 
real horizontal direct effect.
4.3.3.3 Direct Effect of Decisions, Opinions and Recommendations
Decisions can have direct effect.47 According to the CJEU, the mere fact that 
the Treaty does not explicitly mention the direct effect of decisions, as it does 
for regulations, does not mean that decisions lack the capacity for direct 
effect.48 The addressee of a decision can, therefore, directly rely on the deci-
sion if it is sufficiently clear and precise, unconditional, and leaves no discre-
tion to Member States with regards to its implementation.49
Opinions and recommendations, on the other hand, lack binding legal force 
altogether and hence cannot have direct effect.50
43   See for example Case C-188/89 Forster [1990] ECR I-3313 or Case C-282/10 Dominguez, 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:33.
44   See Case C-201/02 Wells [2004] ECR I-723, and Case C-194/94 CIA Security [1996] ECR 
I-220.
45   This duty is part of the duty of sincere cooperation. Case 14/83 Von Colson & Kamann 
ECLI:EU:C:1984:153 and Case C-106/89 Marleasing. The duty of conform interpretation, 
moreover, does apply horizontally.
46   See Cases C-6/90 and 9/90 Francovich [1991] ECR I-5357, and Cases C-46 and 48/93 
Brasserie du Pêcheur [1996] ECR I-1029. For these principles also further see EU chapter 6.
47   Case C-9/70 Franz Grad v Finanzamt Traunstein ECLI:EU:C:1970:78, par. 9.
48   Idem, paras. 4–5.
49   Idem, par. 9.
50   In this respect, see also Berry, Homewood and Bogusz, EU Law—Text, Cases and Materials. 
2nd ed. (Oxford University Press, 2015). 90.
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4.3.3.4 Direct Effect of EU International Agreements
International agreements concluded by the EU form an integral part of EU law 
and can also have direct effect.51 Formally, the criteria for their direct effect 
are the same as the criteria for the direct effect of Treaty provisions, meaning 
a provision in an international agreement has to be legally binding as well as 
sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional.52 In practice, however, the CJEU 
has sometimes been more hesitant to accept the direct effect of international 
agreements. This hesitation is largely due to the different political and practi-
cal consequences of giving full direct to international agreements. The main 
example in this regard is WTO law, where the CJEU has generally been unwill-
ing to accept the direct application of WTO obligations or decisions from the 
WTO Dispute Resolution Body.53
4.4 The Supremacy of EU law
The principle of supremacy concerns the hierarchical relationship between EU 
law and national law, and forms the necessary counterpart to the principle of 
direct effect. What, after all, should happen where an EU rule enters into the 
national legal order but comes into conflict with a rule of national law? As we 
shall see, the answer from the CJEU is pretty clear: EU law always has absolute 
supremacy over all national law. At the same time, the view of most national 
constitutional courts tends to differ, even though they agree that in almost all 
cases EU law should indeed trump national law as well.
This section first outlines the principle of supremacy as developed in the 
case law of the CJEU, as well as the main arguments developed by the Court 
to support the absolute primacy of EU law. Subsequently, we briefly turn to 
some of the national responses to this absolute claim, and the functioning of 
primacy in daily reality.
51   On the status of such agreements see Article 216(2) TFEU as well as Case 181/73 Haegeman 
[1974] ECR 449, par. 5 and Opinion 1/91 (EEA Agreement) [1991] ECR 6079, par. 37.
52   Case C-12/86 Demirel ECLI:EU:C:1987:400.
53   See Cases 21–24/72 International Fruit Company [1972] ECR 1219, Case C-149/96 Portugal 
v. Council [1999] ECR I-8395 and Cases C-120 and 121/06 FIAMM [2008] ECR I-6513.This 
despite some complex and not always convincing legal meandering, for example in 
case C-69/89 Nakajima [1991] ECR I-2069 and Case C-280/93 Germany v. Commission 
[1994] ECR I-4873, as seemingly restricted again in Case C-351/04 Ikea Wholesale [2007] 
ECR I-7723.
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4.4.1 From Costa E.N.E.L. to Opinion 1/09: Establishing Absolute Primacy 
of EU Law
Although the supremacy of EU law was already implicit in Van Gend en Loos, 
the principle was only explicitly established in Costa E.N.E.L., another judg-
ment in the EU law hall of fame:54
The integration into the laws of each member state of provisions which 
derive from the Community, and more generally the terms and the spirit 
of the treaty, make it impossible for the states, as a corollary, to accord 
precedence to a unilateral and subsequent measure over a legal sys-
tem accepted by them on a basis of reciprocity. Such a measure cannot 
therefore be inconsistent with that legal system. The executive force of 
Community law cannot vary from one state to another in deference to 
subsequent domestic laws, without jeopardizing the attainment of the 
objectives of the treaty set out in article 5 (2) and giving rise to the dis-
crimination prohibited by article 7.
(. . .)
It follows from all these observations that the law stemming from the 
treaty, an independent source of law, could not, because of its special 
and original nature, be overridden by domestic legal provisions, however 
framed, without being deprived of its character as Community law and 
without the legal basis of the community itself being called into question.
In later cases such as Simmenthal and Internationale Handelsgesellschaft the 
CJEU confirmed and clarified that the supremacy of EU law also covered 
national legislation of a later date and national constitutional law.55 A more 
recent confirmation of this absolute supremacy doctrine was given in Opinion 
1/09:
It is apparent from the Court’s settled case-law that the founding trea-
ties of the European Union, unlike ordinary international treaties, estab-
lished a new legal order, possessing its own institutions, for the benefit of 
which the States have limited their sovereign rights, in ever wider fields, 
and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also 
their nationals. The essential characteristics of the European Union legal 
54   Case 6/64 Costa v E.N.E.L., ECLI:EU:C:1964:66.
55   Case 106/77 Simmenthal, ECLI:EU:C:1978:139 and Case 11/70, Internationale Handels-
gesellschaft, [1970] ECR 1125.
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order thus constituted are in particular its primacy over the laws of the 
Member States and the direct effect of a whole series of provisions which 
are applicable to their nationals and to the Member States themselves.56
From the EU perspective, therefore, the principle of supremacy is very straight-
forward. EU law has absolute supremacy over all national law, including 
national constitutional law.57 Article 4(2) TEU, which protects national iden-
tities, does not change this supremacy but only creates an obligation for the 
EU to respect these identities. Where a conflict arises, therefore, all national 
courts are obligated, by EU law itself, to disapply the conflicting national law 
and apply the relevant EU law instead.58 Note though that the national law is 
not annulled, but only has to be disapplied to the extent that it conflicts with 
EU law.59
4.4.2 Justifying Supremacy
The EU Treaties do not provide an explicit basis for the supremacy of EU 
law.60 Supremacy, therefore, is a judge made doctrine developed by the CJEU. 
56   Opinion 1/09 [2011] ECR I-1137, par. 65.
57   See also Case C-399/11 Melloni, ECLI:EU:C:2013:107, paras 58–59, and Ottervanger, Cuyvers, 
Ammeloot, Croft, Etienne, Gallerizzo, Harrer, Wernitzki, ‘The functioning of the East 
African Community: Common Market, Court of Justice and fundamental rights, a compara-
tive perspective with the European Union’. Leiden Centre for the Legal and Comparative 
Study of the East African Community (LEAC), November 2012, p. 31. For the pivotal 
importance of this doctrine also see J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The Tranformation of Europe’, 1991 
The Yale Law Journal, 2414, who also claims that here the relation between national law 
and Community law is ‘indistinguishable from analogous relationships in constitutions of 
federal states.’
58   This also means that even a court of first instance, which might normally not have the 
authority to disapply parts of the constitution, derives both the right and the obligation 
to do so where the constitution conflicts with EU law. Primacy, therefore, also affects the 
hierarchical ordering of national judicial systems.
59   Cf. for example Case C-10/97 to C-22/97 Ministero delle Finanze v IN.CO.GE.’90 Srl and 12 
others ECLI:EU:C:1998:498, par, 29.
60   An explicit recognition of supremacy was included in Article I-6 of the Constitutional 
Treaty, which however never entered into force. In the Lisbon Treaty, this explicit recogni-
tion was replaced by Declaration no. 17 Concerning Primacy. Not only is this Declaration 
very indirect in its recognition of supremacy, as a declaration it also has no legally bind-
ing effect. Cf. on the silence of the Treaties on primacy also A. Von Bodandy and S. Schill, 
Overcoming Absolute Primacy: Respect for National Identity Under the Lisbon Treaty” 
(2011) Common Market Law Review, 1417. And Gingsberg, Demystifying the European Union: 
the Enduring Logic of Regional Integration (2nd edn, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
2010), 112.
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Consequently, it is important to analyse which arguments were used by the 
CJEU to justify primacy, also as some of these arguments might also prove rel-
evant in the EAC context.
Logically, the four main arguments of the CJEU to justify primacy bear great 
resemblance to the arguments underlying direct effect.61 Firstly, the CJEU 
returns to its ruling in Van Gend en Loos on the autonomous nature of the EU 
legal order. This autonomy means that EU law determines its own validity, 
and that its validity cannot be undermined by national law. If EU law could 
be trumped by national law, after all, its validity would ultimately depend on 
national law, which would undermine its autonomy.
Secondly, the CJEU bases primacy on the principle of pacta sunt servanda, 
and does so much more explicitly than it did in Van Gend en Loos. It holds 
that the Member States accepted EU law ‘on the basis of reciprocity’, which 
means that each Member State promised the others it would respect all 
its obligations under EU law. If one Member State could unilaterally reject 
some obligations of EU law by changing its laws or its constitution, this would 
undermine the reciprocity of EU law.
Thirdly, the CJEU also provides some more textual arguments for the suprem-
acy of EU law. To begin with, it indicates that ‘wherever the Treaty grants the 
States the right to act unilaterally, it does this by clear and precise provisions.’62 
Applying an a contrario reasoning, this means that Member States are not 
allowed to deviate from EU law unilaterally, for example by adopting laws that 
violate EU law, where the Treaty does not explicitly allow this. In addition, the 
CJEU points to the definition of regulations in Article 288 TFEU, providing that 
regulations are ‘binding’ and ‘directly applicable in all Member States.’ This 
binding and direct effect would be effectively ‘nullified’ if Member States could 
adopt later national legislation that went against a regulation. Essentially the 
CJEU here also conflates bindingness and absolute supremacy.
The fourth, and de facto the most central argument, however, again con-
cerns the effectiveness of EU law and of European integration as a whole. The 
CJEU essentially argues that the effet utile of EU law would be undermined if 
Member States could unilaterally overrule parts of EU law. This risk is exacer-
bated if one takes into account the possible cumulative effects. If all Member 
States would start to deviate from different parts of EU law, even on a limited 
scale, the collective effect could undermine the unity and coherence of EU law 
itself. EU law would then differ from Member State to Member State based on 
national legislation, which is the opposite of the effective and unified regional 
61   See also I. Pernice Costa v ENEL and Simmenthal: Primacy of European Law’, in: 
M. Maduro and L. Azoulai, The Past and Future of EU law. (2nd edn, Hart 2010), 47.
62   Costa v. E.N.E.L. ECLI:EU:C:1964:66.
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system the EU wants to establish. As the CJEU states, this would call into ques-
tion ‘the legal basis of the Community itself ’.
From the perspective of the CJEU, therefore, defending the supremacy of 
EU law is of existential importance for the EU legal order and for European 
integration as such.63 Undermining supremacy risks opening the floodgates, as 
28 Member States may than (ab)use national law or constitutional principles 
to limit or distort the uniform application of EU law.64
4.4.3 The National Reception of EU Supremacy
From the perspective of national courts, and especially of national consti-
tutional courts, however, one may understand a certain hesitation to accept 
absolute supremacy of EU law, certainly over key principles of national con-
stitutional law. After all, one of the key functions of constitutional courts is to 
protect their own constitution, as well as the fundamental rights the constitu-
tion grants to individuals.
In practice, therefore, almost all national supreme or constitutional courts 
reject the absolute supremacy as postulated by the CJEU.65 Only a few national 
courts come close to accepting absolute supremacy, and this acceptance is 
linked to the monist nature of their constitution, and not EU law as such.66 
The overwhelming majority of national constitutional courts only accept 
63   See for a recent example of just how important the CJEU considers this task Opinion 2/13 
Accession of the EU to the ECHR ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454.
64   Cf. also Case C-399/11 Melloni, ECLI:EU:C:2013:107, paras. 58–59, where the CJEU finds that 
supremacy is an ‘essential feature’, and it ‘cannot be allowed to undermine the effective-
ness’ of EU law.
65   D. Chalmers, G. Davies, and G. Monti, European Union Law (CUP 2010), 190.
66   For Estonia see the conclusion of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of 
Estonia in the Euro Decision, Opinion No. 3-4-1-3-06 of 11 May 2006, par. 16, available in 
English translation at: http://www.nc.ee. For Belgium see the ruling by the Belgian Court 
de Cassation of 27 May 1971, S.A. Fromagerie franco-suisse ‘Le Ski’ (1971) RTD eur 495, 
which grants inherent and absolute supremacy to international law, including EU law. 
This line, which is not based on EU law as such, has been maintained, see for example 
Court de Cassation, 9 Nov. 2004, Pas., 2004, 1745 and Court de Cassation, 16 Nov. 2004, 
Pas., 2004, 1802. A second Belgian highest court, the Conseild’Etat, has so far generally 
followed the line of the Court de Cassation, yet following a different reasoning (Conseil 
d’Etat Case 62.922 of 5 November 1996 (Orfinger). J.T., 1997, 254). To complicate matters 
in Belgium, however, a third highest court was created in 2007, namely the Belgian Cour 
Constitutionnelle, and subsequently chose a different position than the other two courts. 
The Cour Constitutionnelle holds that the authority of EU law derives from the Belgian 
constitution, and hence must be limited by it as well. (Cour Constitutionnelle 16 October. 
1991, No. 26/91 and Cour Constitutionnelle, 3 February 1994, No. 12/94). For the Netherlands 
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a more relative form of EU supremacy that is based on and limited by the 
national constitution.67 The general line of reasoning is that Member States 
did accept a certain form of primacy when they joined the EU, as primacy 
is a necessary element of EU law. However, this primacy is ultimately based 
on the national constitution, and therefore also subject to any limitations 
that the national constitution imposes, such as fundamental rights or core 
constitutional values.68 In addition, because the EU is based on conferred 
powers, any ultra vires actions would not bind the Member States either.69 This 
means that it is ultimately up to the national constitutional courts to decide in 
specific cases if EU law manifestly violates certain key principles or provisions 
of the national constitution, or is ultra vires, and if it is, to disapply the relevant 
parts of EU law within ‘their’ national legal order.70
see Hoge Raad, 2 November 2011, LJN AR1797, R.O. 3.6, Hoge Raad 1 October 2004, LJN 
AO8913 and Raad van State 7 July 1995, AB 1997, 117.
67   For an overview of the classic national case law see A. Oppenheimer (ed) The Relationship 
Between European Community Law and National Law: The Cases Vol I and II (CUP 1994 and 
2003).
68   For several typical examples of this reasoning see the Czech Constitutional Court, Pl. 
ÚS 19/08, 26 November 2008 Lisbon I, and Pl. ÚS 29/09, 3 November 2009 Lisbon II, the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court, Decision 143/2010 (VII. 14.) AB, of 12 July 2010 Lisbon 
Treaty, the German Bundesvefassungsgericht in BVerfGE, 2 BvE 123,267, 2 BvE 2/08 (2009) 
Lissabon Urteil, the Italian Corte Costituzionale, Decision No. 348 and No. 349, 24 of 
October 2007 confirming the controlimiti doctrine, the Conseil constitutionnel, Decision 
2004–2005 DC of 19 November 2004, Traité établissant une Constitution pour l’Europe, 
Conseil constitutionnel, Decision 2600–540 DC of 27 July 2006, Loi transposant la directive 
sur le droit d’auteur, or the Spanish Constitutional Court Declaration 1/2004 of December 
13 2004 on the Constitutional Treaty, (BOE number 3 of 4 January 2005), the UK Supreme 
Court in R (on the application of HS2 Action Alliance Limited) (Appellant) v The Secretary 
of State for Transport and another (Respondents) (https://www.supremecourt.uk/ 
decided-cases/docs/uksc_2013_0172_judgment.pdf), or the Polish Constitutional Court 
in its decision on Poland’s Membership in the European Union (Accession Treaty), 
11 May 2005 (Polish Constitutional Tribunal), http://www.trybunal.gov.pl/eng/summaries/
documents/K_18_04_GB.pdfn.
69   See for example the judgment of the German Constitutional Court in BVerfGE 89, 155 
(1993) Maastricht Urteil, or the reasoning of the Czech Constitutional Court in its judg-
ment of 31 January 2012, Landtova Pl. ÚS 5/12.
70   See for instance the ruling of the Polish Constitutional Court of 11 May 2005, K18/04 
on Polish accession to the EU, or the Constitutional Court of Lithuania in joined cases 
No. 17/02, 24/02, 06/03 and 22/04, judgment of 14 March 2006. Cf. also B. De Witte, ‘Direct 
Effect, Supremacy, and the Nature of the Legal Order’, in: P. Craig and G. De Búrca (eds), 
The Evolution of EU Law (2nd ed. OUP 2011), 356: ‘Everywhere the national constitution 
remains at the apex of the hierarchy of norms, and EU law is to trump national law only 
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It should be stressed that so far the differing views on the basis, scope and 
limits of EU supremacy have largely remained in the realm of theory and prin-
ciple. In the day-to-day practice, the primacy of EU law, certainly over non-
constitutional national law, is generally accepted.71 Moreover, even in cases 
where important principles are at stake, national courts generally try to avoid 
an open conflict, or at least conflicting judgments.72 The CJEU, in return, has 
often incorporated concerns of the national high courts into its case law, for 
example improving the protection of fundamental rights or granting a certain 
leeway to a Member State on a politically or culturally sensitive issue.73 The 
only open conflict so far, where a national constitutional court has openly 
declared a judgment of the CJEU ultra vires, is the Landtova judgment of the 
Czech Constitutional Court, which concerned the sensitive issue of pensions 
after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia.74
From one perspective, precisely this lack of a formal and linear hierarchy, 
or ‘pluralism’, within the EU legal order can be seen as valuable in itself. It can 
be said to reflect the cooperative nature of the EU that depends on shared val-
ues and dialogue, rather than on force or formal authority.75 In any event the 
under the conditions, and within the limits, set by the national constitution.’ Also see the 
discussion in this context of the European Union Act of 2011, including its ‘sovereignty 
clause’ in art. 18 in P. Craig, ‘The European Union Act 2011: Locks, limits and legality’ 48 
CMLRev (2011), 1881.
71   G. de Búrca, ‘Sovereignty and the Supremacy Doctrine of the European Court of Justice’, 
in: N. Walker (ed), Sovereignty in Transition (Hart Publishing 2006), 454. See also House 
of Lords R v Secretary of State for Transport ex. p. Factortame (No. 2) [1991] A.C. 603 or 
the French Conseil constitutionnel, in Decision 2004–2005 DC of 19 November 2004, Traité 
établissant une Constitution pour l’Europe.
72   For a recent, very high stake, example of a dialogue where ultimately the German 
Constitutional Court accepted the position of the CJEU see the OMT saga resulting in 
the OMT decision [2016] - 2 BvR 2728/13, 2 BvR 2729/13, 2 BvR 2730/13, 2 BvR 2731/13, 2 
BvE 13/13, summary available via http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/
Entscheidungen/DE/2016/06/rs20160621_2bvr272813.html.
73   See inter alia Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125, or Case 
C-391/09 Runevič-Vardyn and Wardyn [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:291.
74   Judgment of 31 January 2012, Landtova Pl. ÚS 5/12, and the analysis by J. Komarek, ‘Czech 
Constitutional Court Playing with Matches: the Czech Constitutional Court Declares a 
Judgment of the Court of Justice of the EU Ultra Vires’ 8 European Constitutional Law 
Review (2012), 323.
75   See on the concept of pluralism especially N. MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty: 
Law, State and Nation in the European Commonwealth’ (OUP 1999), N. Walker, ‘The Idea 
of Constitutional Pluralism’, 65 The Modern Law Review (2002), 317, or M.P. Maduro, 
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EU demonstrates that ‘the system can work’ even where there is disagreement 
on such a fundamental point. From another perspective, however, this open 
disagreement also reflects the still unfinished nature of the EU, and that even 
now the EU still seems to be in a transitional phase. In addition, as long as 
this disagreement remains open, there is the risk that a more serious conflict 
arises that does threaten the stability of the EU, for example in the context 
or aftermath of Brexit. From this perspective, the search remains on for a more 
mature and nuanced doctrine of supremacy that can accommodate sufficient 
respect for national constitutional principles whilst still preserving a suffi-
cient level of unity and coherence of EU law.76 A quest that the EAC can join, 
benefiting from the experiences in the EU, when searching for a doctrine of 
supremacy that fits within its own legal and political context. 
‘Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in Action’ in: N. Walker (ed), 
Sovereignty in Transition, (Hart 2006), 501.
76   For a first attempt to create such a ‘softer’ variant of supremacy along confederal lines 
A. Cuyvers, The EU as a Confederal Union of Sovereign Member Peoples, Exploring 
the potential of American (con)federalism and popular sovereignty for a constitutional 
theory of the EU, (2013, Diss. Leiden), available via, https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/
handle/1887/22913.
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chapter 5
External Relations and the EAC
Leonard Obura Aloo
5.1 Introduction
An important element of co-operation between states is co-operation in 
external relations. In this Chapter some aspects of the external relationships of 
the East African Community (EAC) will be addressed. The relationships 
between the East African Community, other international organisations and 
states will be considered. Some comments will be made about the relationship 
between the Community and its Partner States. To begin with the Chapter con-
siders the Community’s capacity to enter into external relations or its exter-
nal competence. The EAC coordination of Partner States’ positions in foreign 
relations, defence and trade matters will then be considered. Given its sig-
nificance, the Chapter will briefly address trade negotiation between the EAC 
and the European Union (EU). A comment will be made about the EAC’s rela-
tions with the African Union and other regional economic communities. The 
Chapter concludes by evaluating the extent of the EAC’s external competence.
5.2 External Competencies of the East African Community
5.2.1 The East African Community Acting Directly in External Relations
The objectives of the EAC are to develop policies and programmes aimed at 
widening and deepening co-operation among the Partner States in political, 
economic, social, and cultural fields, research and technology, defence, secu-
rity and legal and judicial affairs.1 The ultimate goal of the EAC is a political 
federation.2 For these goals to be achieved, there is an inevitable demand that 
the Partner States transfer or surrender some level of sovereignty to the EAC 
and its institutions.3 Coordination presupposes some level of joint action. In 
1.  EAC Treaty Article 5(1).
2   EAC Treaty Article 5(2).
3   Oppong, R.F. “Re-imagining International Law: An Examination of Recent Trends in the 
Reception of International Law Into National Legal Systems in Africa” 30 Fordham Int’l L.J. 
296 (2006) 299.
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relations with external parties it presupposes that the organisation will have 
some level of capacity to interact with the third parties, in other words that 
the organisation will have external legal capacity. There is considerable debate 
about the exact nature of the international legal personality of inter-govern-
mental organisations.
Coordination in the external relations of EAC states is not a new develop-
ment. Under the defunct EAC, for example, Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya, in 
1969, entered into an agreement—the Arusha Agreement—with the then 
European Economic Community.4 This Agreement granted certain conces-
sions regarding access of goods from Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya to the 
European Economic Community.5 The tradition of entering into external 
agreements has continued into the current treaty arrangements. The question 
that remains is, to what extent can the Community enter into external arrange-
ments and are those arrangements binding on the Partner States and what gov-
erns the Community’s capacity to enter into these arrangements? To address 
these questions, the legal personality of the Community and its functions and 
powers need to be examined.
A reading of the current Treaty for the Establishment of the East African 
Community (the EAC Treaty) does not reveal a clear provision conferring 
upon the EAC a general competence with regard to foreign agreements. 
Article 138(1) of the EAC Treaty accords the EAC international legal person-
ality.6 This provision is similar to Article 47 of the Treaty on European Union, 
which explicitly recognises the legal personality of the EU.7 However, Article 
138(1) of the EAC Treaty appears to be pointed internally at the Partner States 
of the EAC. This internal outlook is suggested by both its full title ‘Status, 
Privileges and Immunities’ and its content in dealing with headquarter 
agreements and immunity of staff.8 Article 138(1) of the EAC Treaty, there-
fore, covers the privileges and immunities of the EAC within the territory 
of the Partner States rather than the EAC’s capacity to enter into external 
4   Agreement establishing an association between the United Republic of Tanzania, the Republic of 
Uganda and the Republic of Kenya and Annxed Documents, Brussels, 1969. See also Mukwaya, 
A.K.K. “A Survey of Relationships between the European Union and the East African States”, 
1961–1980. East Afr. Geogr. Rev Vol 19, No. 2 pp. 73092, 1997.
5   Cosgrove-Twitchett, C. Europe and Africa: from association to partnership. Surrey: Saxon 
House 1978 p. 146; see also Zartman, W. The Politics of Trade negotiations between Africa and 
the European Economic Community. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1971.
6   EAC Treaty Article 138(1).
7   Article 47 Treaty on European Union. See also EU Chapter 5 on the external standing and 
competences of the EU.
8   EAC Treaty Article 138(2) and (3).
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relationships. This ‘internal’ orientation is also seen in Article 4(1) of the EAC 
Treaty which indicates that the Community shall have capacity, within each 
of the Partner States, of a body corporate with perpetual succession, and shall 
have power to acquire, hold, manage and dispose of land and other property, 
and to sue and be sued in its own name.9
Although Article 4(1) of the EAC Treaty indicates that the EAC can sue and 
be sued in its own name, the Partner States undertake under the Treaty to grant 
the Community and its officers the privileges and immunities accorded to sim-
ilar international organisations within the Partner States’ territory.10 There is 
thus an apparent paradox with the EAC Treaty indicating, on the one hand, 
that the EAC can sue and be sued in its own name while, on the other 
hand, requiring the Partner States to grant the EAC similar immunities as 
accorded to international organisations.
Article 4(2) of the EAC Treaty provides that:
. . . the Community shall have powers to perform all the functions con-
ferred upon it by this treaty and to do all things, including borrowing, that 
are necessary or desirable for the performance of those functions.11
Article 9(4) indicates that the organs and institutions of the Community shall 
perform the functions, and acts within the limits and powers conferred upon 
them by or under the Treaty.12This restrictive framing has, however, not pre-
vented the EAC from activities in external relations. The argument may be 
made that an inter-governmental organisation can derive its competence from 
a wider reading of its respective treaty. It has been argued by Fin Seyersted 
that the legal capacity of an inter-governmental organisation to perform sov-
ereign and international acts is like those of states—not confined to what can 
be positively deduced from their constitutions but comprises all acts which 
are not precluded by their constitutions and which do not impose new obliga-
tions upon parties who are not subject to their jurisdiction.13 However, it is 
recognised that it is only to the extent that other subjects of international law 
9    EAC Treaty Article 4(1).
10   EAC Treaty Article 138(3); article 72(3) requires each partner state to respect the interna-
tional character of the responsibilities of the institutions and staff of the Community.
11   EAC Treaty Article 4(2).
12   EAC Treaty Article 9(4).
13   Seyersted, F. “Objective International Personality of Intergovernmental Organizations: 
Do their Capacities Depend Upon The Conventions Establishing Them?” Nordisk 
Tidsskrift for International Ret 34 p. 3.
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recognise a regional body as a member of the international community that it 
can take initiatives and play an active role in the international arena.14
However, apart from the general aspiration in the statements, the EAC 
Treaty itself is silent on the actual authority and power of the Community as 
far as external relations are concerned.15
The theoretical arguments notwithstanding, the reality is that the EAC has 
acted directly, for example the Community has signed development aid agree-
ments with third countries16 and has received diplomats.17 The Summit, the 
highest organ of the EAC, can also direct action on behalf of the EAC, for exam-
ple, designating the Chairperson of the Summit to sign an accession treaty 
with a new Partner State.18 A key example is the decision by the Summit to 
have the Partner States of the EAC negotiate as a bloc in matter of the African 
Caribbean and Pacific Countries, European Union (EU) and the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) that was arrived at in 2002.19
5.2.2 Co-ordination of Activities of Partner States
The EAC Treaty requires the Partner States to develop policies and pro-
grammes aimed at widening and deepening co-operation among the Partner 
States in political, economic, social and cultural fields, research and technol-
ogy, defence, security and legal and judicial affairs for the mutual benefit of the 
Partner States.20 Having provided for the areas of co-operation, the EAC Treaty 
proceeds to indicate the manner in which this co-operation will be achieved.
14   Mathinjsen, P.S.R.F A Guide to European Union Law. Thomson Sweet & Maxwell London 
2007 p. 491; article 38–39 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
15   Compare in this regard also the discussion in EU Chapter 5, as in the EU many of the 
external competences of the EAC also were derived by the CJEU from the internal compe-
tences, as no explicit competences had been granted in the Treaty.
16   For example EAC Grant Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany signed on 
the 23rd January 2016 see http://www.eac.int/news-and-media/press-releases/20160123/
eac-germany-sign-37-million-euros-agreement-support-regional-integration.
17   EAC receives Finnish Ambassador see http://www.eac.int/news-and-media/press- 
releases/20160122/eac-secretary-general-receives-credentials-finnish-ambassador.
18   East African Community Joint Communiqué 17th Ordinary Summit of the East African 
Community Heads of State item 11 see http://www.eac.int/news-and-media/statements/ 
20160302/joint-communique-17th-ordinary-summit-east-african-community-heads- 
state—Directing the Chairperson to sign the accession treaty with South Sudan.
19   See Communiqué of the 6th Extraordinary Summit of East African Community Heads of State 
held in Arusha on 20th August 2007 referring to the Summit of April 2002. (Communiqués 
and other sources refer to the Summit of 14th April 2002, the Communiqué of the Summit 
is dated 11th April 2002).
20   EAC Treaty Article 5(1).
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Article 5(2) of the EAC Treaty indicates the steps that will be taken in the 
journey to ultimate Political Federation: the Customs Union, a Common 
Market and the Monetary Union.21 The EAC Treaty then lists the approaches 
to co-operation: the Fundamental Principles of the Community; the 
Operational Principles of the Community; and a General Undertaking as to 
Implementation.22 The terms co-operation and co-ordination are recur-
rent themes throughout these provisions. For example, one of the funda-
mental principles of the Community is co-operation for mutual benefit,23 
and one of the operational principles is people centred and market driven 
co-operation.24
The Partner States have given a general undertaking, to amongst other 
things, pass legislation conferring the Community with legal capacity and per-
sonality required for the performance of its functions and to confer the legisla-
tion, regulations, and directives of the Community and institutions with the 
force of law within each Partner States territory.25 The Partner States are also 
required to give Community law precedence over similar national laws in mat-
ters covered by the Treaty.26
The EAC Partner States have agreed to co-operate in various areas and ulti-
mately to form a political federation. It can be concluded that, at least by their 
intention, some element of sovereignty has been ceded to the EAC. The clas-
sical definition of sovereignty is “independence from authority of any other 
state and equality with it in international law”.27 To the extent that the Partner 
States have pooled their decision making there is some ceding of sovereignty. 
The main responsibility for the achievement of the aims of the EAC is, however, 
retained by the Partner States who are ultimately in control of the process.
The EAC is a permanent entity that is established for an unlimited 
period.28 The fact that the ultimate aim is a political federation implies that 
the Treaty will have achieved its aims once a political federation is achieved. 
It can therefore be argued that the EAC, in the present form, is intended to 
exist until political federation is achieved. A Partner State can withdraw from 
the EAC Treaty provided the Partner States National Assembly resolves by not 
21   EAC Treaty Article 5(2).
22   EAC Treaty Articles 5(3), 6, 7 and 8.
23   EAC Treaty Article 6(f).
24   EAC Treaty Article 7(1)(a).
25   EAC Treaty Article 8(2).
26   EAC Treaty Articles 8(4) and (5).
27   Moregenathu, Hans. Politics Among Nations. Alfred Knoff. New York. 1950.p. 249.
28   EAC Treaty Article 144.
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less than two thirds majority of all members entitled to vote and the Secretary 
General of the Community is given twelve months notice of the intention to 
withdraw.29 A Partner State may also be suspended or expelled from the EAC.30
The fact that the Partner States are in control can be evidenced by the pro-
vision that decision making under the EAC Treaty is largely by consensus.31 
The main organs of the EAC are:32
(a) The Summit comprising head of government of the Partner States 
that gives general direction towards the realisation of the goals of 
the Community.33
(b) The Council of Ministers which is the main decision making body 
comprising ministers of the partner states responsible for regional 
co-operation and such other Ministers as the Partner States may 
determine.34
(c) The Co-ordinating Committee made up of permanent secretaries 
responsible for regional co-operation. It co-ordinates the activities 
of the sectoral committees and reports to the Council.35
(d) The Sectoral Committees which are established by the Council 
on recommendation of the respective Co-ordinating Committees. 
They develop and monitor the implementation of the programmes 
of the EAC.36
(e) The East African Court of Justice
(f) The East African Legislative Assembly
(g) The Secretariat
The Summit decision making process is by consensus.37 The consensus 
approach protects national interests as, effectively a Partner State can veto the 
decision of the Summit.
Moreover, under the earlier East African Community, the East African Court 
of Appeal in Okunda v Republic had held that the national constitutions were 
29   EAC Treaty Article 145.
30   EAC Treaty Articles 146 and 147.
31   EAC Treaty Article 12(3).
32   See summary in Lumumba, P.L.O. “The East African Community Two: Destined to 
Succeed or Doomed to Fail?” LSKJ 5(1)(2009) pp. 105–132 at p. 121.
33   EAC Treaty Chapter 4.
34   EAC Treaty Chapter 5.
35   EAC Treaty Chapter 6.
36   EAC Treaty Chapter 7.
37   EAC Treaty Article 12(3).
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superior to the provisions of the Treaty.38 In this case a prosecution was insti-
tuted by the Attorney-General of the Republic of Kenya against two persons 
under the provisions of the Official Secrets Act of the East African Community 
without the consent of the Counsel to the Community as required by the 
Act. Under the Constitution of Kenya, at the time, the Attorney-General con-
trolled prosecutions. There was therefore an apparent conflict between 
the Constitution of Kenya and the Official Secrets Act of the East African 
Community. The High Court of Kenya held that the Act of the Community 
was void to the extent of the inconsistency with the Constitution of Kenya. 
On appeal, the East African Court of Appeal, which at the time severed all 
the Partner States of Community held that the Constitution of Kenya was 
paramount and any law, whether it be of Kenya or the Community, or of any 
other country which had been applied in Kenya, which was in conflict with the 
Constitution was void to the extent of the conflict.
The legacy of the East African Court of Appeal decision in Okunda v Republic 
continues to inform the position of EAC laws vis-a-vis the national constitu-
tions. Decisions and actions at the EAC level are controlled by the national 
constitutional set up. Any authority surrendered to the EAC has to be done, it 
appears, within the constitutional context of the individual country.
5.3 Specific Co-operation in Foreign Policy
The EAC Treaty requires that Partner States establish common foreign and 
security policies.39 The objective of the common foreign and security policies 
include:
(a) safeguarding the common values, fundamental interests and inde-
pendence of the Community
(b) strengthening the security of the Community and its Partner States 
in all ways
(c) developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law and 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms
(d) preserving peace and international security among the partner 
states
(e) promote co-operation at international fora, and
38   Okunda v Republic [1970] E.A. 453.
39   EAC Treaty Article 123(1).
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(f) enhance the eventual establishment of a Political Federation of the 
Partner States40
The Partner States have bound themselves under the EAC Treaty to co-ordinate 
actions in international organisations and international conferences.41
The co-ordination in this area has been characterised by a cautious approach 
by the Partner States in yielding sovereignty to the EAC. This is shown by the 
fact that the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty on co-operation 
on political matters were to become operative when so determined by the 
Council. The Treaty also requires the Council to prescribe in detail how this 
co-operation is to be implemented.42 The provisions are not yet operational. 
The East African Court of Justice (EACJ) has been called upon to consider the 
justiciability of the provisions of the EAC Treaty on political cooperation. In 
the case of Attorney General of Uganda v Tom Kyahurwenda the EACJ consid-
ered the question and ruled that the provisions of paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of 
Article 123 of the Treaty on political co-operation are not justiciable before the 
EACJ or local courts until the provisions are operationalised.43
The EAC currently cites the joint support for citizens of the Community for 
international level positions as a tangible result of the co-ordination of efforts 
in the Partner States international relations.44 This promotion of a relatively 
minor achievement of co-ordination indicates the reluctance of the Partner 
States to yield greater authority to the EAC. A draft protocol on foreign policy 
co-ordination has been published.45 The provisions of the draft protocol fur-
ther indicate a cautious approach as it calls mainly for collaboration rather 
than the yielding of any authority to the Community. For example, the draft 
protocol calls for “collaboration” in diplomatic and consular activities, mul-
tilateral diplomacy, and in economic and social activities.46 The approach of 
the draft is cautious and calls for collaboration rather than action by the EAC. 
Furthermore, caution is emphasised by the fact that the protocol remains a 
draft and a final version is yet to be concluded.
40   EAC Treaty Article 123(3) (a)–(f).
41   EAC Treaty Article 123(4), see also Articles 5, 6, 7, 123, 124 and 125 of the EAC Treaty.
42   EAC Treaty Article 123(5).
43   Attorney General of Uganda v Tom Kyahurwenda Case Stated No. 1 of 2014.
44   www.eac.int/legal/index.
45   Draft East African Community Protocol on Foreign Policy Co-ordination Arusha March 2010.
46   Draft East African Community Protocol on Foreign Policy Co-ordination Arusha March 2010 
article 5, 6 and 7.
Obura Aloo190
The EAC has concluded a Protocol on Peace and Security47 and a Protocol 
on Corporation in Defence Affairs.48 Notably, these two protocols call for col-
laboration and do not themselves cede any decision making or action to the 
Community itself.
In the area of trade negotiations, the co-ordination effort has been insti-
tutionalised through the EAC Trade Negotiations Act of 2008.49 The Act was 
initiated as a private member’s bill in the East African Legislative Assembly.50 
The objectives of the Act include the establishment of joint negotiation of the 
Partner States in bilateral, regional and multilateral trade.51 The Act creates a 
Commission known as the East African Joint Trade Negotiation Commission 
which is the mechanism the Partner States use to negotiate as a bloc in mat-
ters relating to regional and multilateral trade.52 The Joint Trade Negotiation 
Commission is tasked with conducting trade negotiations on behalf of the 
Partner States of the EAC.53 The Joint Trade Negotiation Commission com-
prises two members nominated by each Partner State, the Secretary General 
of the EAC as a ex-offico member, one ex-offico member designated by the des-
ignated Ministry of each Partner State. The Director General of the Joint Trade 
Negotiating Commission is also an ex officio member.54
The negotiating mandate of the Joint Trade Negotiating Commission is 
given in writing by the Summit acting through the Council.55 Notwithstanding 
the existence of the Joint Trade Negotiating Commission, the co-ordination 
has not been seamless and implementation of the Act has not been a smooth 
process.56 The Partner States still send individual delegations to international 
trade negotiation forums and enter into multilateral trade agreements as 
47   East African Community Protocol on Peace and Security Arusha February 2013.
48   East African Community Protocol on Co-operation on Defence Affairs Arusha April 2012.
49   The East African Trade Negotiations Act of 2008.
50   EALA Achievements 2001–2009 bill initially introduced in 2003 http://www.eala.org/new/
index.php/the-assembly/achievements.
51   The EAC Trade Negotiations Act of 2008. Section 2.
52   The East African Trade Negotiations Act of 2008. Section 3 and 5.
53   The East African Trade Negotiations Act of 2008. Section 5(1)(c).
54   The East African Trade Negotiations Act of 2008. Section 6.
55   The East African Trade Negotiations Act of 2008. Section 12.
56   Ayeko, F. “East African States Still Negotiate Trade Pacts as One Despite 2008 Law” The 
East African Monday, October 4 2010 http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/EAC%20
states%20still%20to%20negotiate%20trade%20pacts/-/2558/1024814/-/9f3mip/-/index 
.htm.
 191External Relations And The Eac
individual countries.57 There has been apparent reluctance to implement the 
Trade Negotiations Act.58 This could be because, as indicated above, the Act 
was initiated as a private member’s bill and not by the Secretariat or by the 
Partner States. As will be seen below negotiating with the EU, for example, has 
seen apparent conflicts between Partner States.
5.4 EAC and EU Relationships
As noted above the EAC-EU relationship has a long history dating back at 
least to the 1969 Arusha Agreement between Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya 
and the European Economic Community.59 In the early 1970s, the three East 
African countries joined other African, Caribbean and Pacific states in a bloc, 
the ACP, to negotiate with the European Economic Commission. The nego-
tiations resulted in the first Lomé Convention in 1975 (Lomé I).60 The Lomé 
Convention was renegotiated and renewed three times: the second Lomé II 
was signed in 1980; Lomé III in 1985;61 and Lomé IV in 1990.62 The Lomé 
Convention’s provisions were viewed by other states as being incompatible 
with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the GATT) and subsequently 
the WTO. This resulted in complaints filed before the GATT, WTO and also the 
European Court of Justice.63 The Lomé Convention’s trade provisions included 
57   Ayeko, F. “East African States Still Negotiate Trade Pacts as One Despite 2008 Law” The 
East African Monday, October 4 2010 http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/EAC%20
states%20still%20to%20negotiate%20trade%20pacts/-/2558/1024814/-/9f3mip/-/index 
.htm.
58   Seatini. Uganda’s Trade Negotiation Framework. September 2013 p. 16.
59   Agreement establishing an association between the United Republic of Tanzania, the 
Republic of Uganda and the Republic of Kenya and Annxed Documents, Brussels, 1969.
60   The First Lomé Convention Lomé I (Negotiations began in 1973 and lasted for eigh-
teen months. The convention was signed on 28th February 1975 and cam into force on 
1st April 1976. See Babarinde, O.A. The Lomé Convention and Development: An Empirical 
Assessment. Brookfield: Avebury Press 1994 p. 20; Oumar Sy, S. “The Birth of the ACP 
Group” The Courier No. 93 September- October 1985 pp. 51–56. Full text see The Courier 
No. 31 Special Issue march 1975.
61   For full text see The Courier No. 89 January-February 1985.
62   For full text see The Courier No. 120 March-April 1990; Lomé VI bis The courier No. 155 
January-February 1996.
63   DS 27 European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of 
Bananas (Complainants: Ecuador; Guatemala; Honduras; Mexico; United States) see 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm; Federal Republic of 
Germany v Council of the European Union.
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trade preference arrangements including tariff rates that differed from the 
Most Favoured Nation (MFN) rate and discriminated against other develop-
ing countries as it granted more generous treatment than offered by the EU’s 
generalised system of preferences. The regime also had four protectionist pro-
tocols on beef and veal, rum, bananas and sugar.64
The Lomé Conventions were replaced in the year 2000 with a new agree-
ment, the Contonu Agreement, between the ACP countries and the EU.65 
Under Article 36(1) of the Cotonou Agreement, the EU and the ACP countries 
agreed to negotiate Economic Partnership Agreement (EPAs) which would be 
compatible with the WTO.66
Negotiations between the EAC and EU began immediately, and progressed 
for over a decade. The EU set 1st October 2014 as a deadline upon which the 
EAC states would forfeit their preferential treatment and revert to the less gen-
erous generalised system of preferences.67 The result would be that exports 
from Kenya to the EU would face higher tariffs while those from the other EAC 
Partner States would continue to enjoy duty free access to the EU under a com-
ponent of the EU generalised system of preferences—the Everything But Arms 
arrangement.68
The negotiation of the EU-EAC EPA was concluded in October 2015 and was 
expected to be ratified by October 2016.69 However, internal timelines have 
been missed, for instance an expected signing in July 2016 was missed resulting 
in speculation that the ratification is facing difficulty.70 Furthermore, following 
64   Grynberg, R. The WTO incompatibility of the Lomé Convention trade provisions Asia Pacific 
School of Economics and Management Working Paper 1998.
65   Agreement between the ACP and the EC the Contonu Agreement 2000. The agreement 
was revised in 2005.
66   Article 36(1) Cotonou Agreement; Gathii, James T. The Cotonou Agreement & Economic 
Partnership Agreements.
67   Ongónge, L. “The EAC-EU Economic partnership Agreement: Context, Content and 
Consequences”. Trade Notes. Institute of Economic Affairs. Nairobi 2015.
68   Kenya Human Rights Commission. The ABC of the EAC-EU Economic Partnership 
Agreement (EPA). Kenya Human Rights Commission. Nairobi; Ongónge, L. “The EAC-EU 
Economic partnership Agreement: Context, Content and Consequences”. Trade Notes. 
Institute of Economic Affairs. Nairobi 2015.
69   The European Commission. Economic Partnership Agreement between the EU and 
the Eastern Africa Community (EAC) October 2015 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/
html/142194.htm.
70   Ssemuwemba, Anne M. ËPA Negotiations: Is EAC at the crossroad?” The Daily Monitor 
Tuesday, August 2 2016 http://www.monitor.co.ug/Business/Prosper/EPA-negotiations--
Is-EAC-at-the-crossroads-/688616-3325520-kg1omdz/index.html.
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the vote by Britain to exit the EU in June 2016, the EAC Partner States’ position 
on the future of the EU-EAC EPA appear to be divergent.71
The negotiations with the EU indicate a coordinated approach by the EAC 
Partner States. However, the Partner States do enter into the agreements indi-
vidually and where national interest dictate, they can proceed even if contrary 
to the agreed coordinated position.
5.5 EAC and Other Regional Communities
Although the EAC Partner States aim at forming a political federation, this has 
not prevented the Partner States from joining different regional integration 
communities (RECs). The Partner States of the EAC are members of various 
other RECs including COMESA,72 SADC73 and IGAD.74 Indeed Eastern Africa 
has the largest number of RECs and intergovernmental regional bodies on the 
continent.








71   Kidanka, Christopher. “Tanzania dodges EPA to Protect Industrialisation, budget” The 
East African July 16, 2006; Bangaba, Julius. “Leaders Urge Review of EU-EAC Trade 
Deal” The East African July 23, 2016 http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Leaders-urge-
review-of-EAC-EU-trade-deal/2558-3307650-ua0oovz/index.html.
72   COMESA- Common Market for Eastern & Southern Africa see http://www.comesa.int/.
73   SADC- Southern Africa Development Community see http://www.sadc.int/.
74   IGAD—Intergovernmental Authority on Development see http://igad.int/.
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The multiple memberships of the various RECs can result in the duplication 
of roles and conflicting goals and policies.75 Membership of the different RECs 
can also allow a country to play on the differentials of timings, commitments 
and tariffs in the various RECs and can be a source of divided loyalty.76
It is with this realisation that COMESA-EAC-SADC held a tripartite summit 
in October 2008 during which it was agreed to establish a tripartite free trade 
area.77 The co-operation is not however between the various RECs but through 
the member states themselves making commitments.
5.6 EAC and African Union
As early as 1980 under the then Organisation for African Unity (OAU), the 
Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa called for 
the eventual convergence of various regional trade liberalisation regimes to 
form the African Common Market.78 The commitments in this plan were made 
concrete in 1991 when African countries signed the Treaty Establishing the 
African Economic Community (AEC) also known as the Abuja Treaty.79 
The Abuja Treaty came into operation in 1994 and provides a framework for 
continental integration. The Abuja Treaty is expected to take shape in six phases 
over a period of thirty-four years.80 The phases require the co-ordination and 
harmonisation of both tariff and non-tariff systems in the various RECs on the 
continent with a view to establishing a continental customs union. The various 
RECs are to be consolidated and then merged into a single block.
The EAC Treaty requires the Partner States to accord special co-operation 
with the African Union, the United Nations and other international organisa-
tions and bilateral and multi-lateral development partners interested in the 
objectives of the Community.81 As part of this effort the EAC enjoys observer 
status within the African Union. The EAC Secretary General is invited to the 
75   African Development Bank. East African Regional Integration Strategy Paper 2011–2015 
September 2011.
76   AFRODAD. Regional Integration and Debt in East Africa. High Gloss Prints Harare 2003 
p. 23.
77   United Nations Economic Commission for Africa Assessing Regional Integration in Africa 
V Towards an African Continental Free Trade Area Addis Ababa 2012 p. 21.
78   The Organisation of African Unity. Lagos Plan of Action for Economic Development of 
Africa 1980–2000. Lagos 1980 paragraph 250 (iv).
79   Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community 1991.
80   Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community 1991.
81   EAC Treaty Article 130(4).
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African Union Summit and is in charge of all relations with the African Union. 
In 2012, the EAC posted a liaison person to the African Union. The African 
Union also has a liaison person at the EAC Secretariat.
However, the EAC’s activities with the African Union are limited and do not 
involve actions that would directly bind any of the EAC Partner States. Partner 
States act independently albeit perhaps in a coordinated manner.
5.7 Conclusion
The EAC does have a limited amount of external competence. The areas where 
it has been applied is receiving envoys and entering into agreements with 
development partners. The EAC Partner States have not yielded significant 
sovereignty to the EAC and instead have adopted a co-ordinated approach to 
negotiations with third parties. The formal structure for co-ordination, the EAC 
Joint Trade Negotiation Act is yet to be fully implemented.
This co-ordination approach leaves each individual Partner State entering 
into multilateral and bilateral agreements as an individual state andwhere 
domestic interests dictate it, the Partner States will pull away from the co-
ordinated position. However, with political federation as the ultimate goal, 
the Partner States will have to consider moving beyond mere co-ordination in 
external relations and grant the EAC greater external competence. 
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chapter 5A
External Relations and the EU
Armin Cuyvers
5.1 Introduction
The area of EU external relations is a complex one. Over time, the EU has gradu-
ally developed more competences to act externally, but the competences of the 
EU vary significantly over the different areas of external policy.1 Institutionally, 
the area is complex as well. Multiple EU actors and the Member States all want 
to exert their influence, crowding the international stage. This ‘multiple-actor-
syndrome’, however, merely reflects one of the fundamental dilemmas of EU 
external relations: in principle it would be good if the EU could speak with one 
voice, but in most fields of external relations Member States are simply unwill-
ing to transfer the powers to the EU that this requires.
In line with the comparative aim of this book, the present Chapter focusses 
on the development of EU external relations in the early days, especially on the 
creation of implied external competences where the Treaties did not provide 
for explicit ones. In addition, it discusses the legal principles developed by the 
CJEU to ensure that Member States do not undermine the external policies of 
the EU with their own foreign policy. First, however, this Chapter briefly dis-
cusses the institutional landscape in EU foreign affairs, which is still haunted 
by the ghost of Kissinger.2
5.2 ‘Who do I call’: The Crowded European Stage
According to EU mythology, Henry Kissinger once complained in exasperation: 
‘if I want to talk to Europe, who do I call?’ Even though he may actually never 
1   See also for the major changes in this field after Lisbon P. Van Elsuwege, ‘EU External Action 
after the Collapse of the Pillar Structure: In Search of a New Balance Between Delimitation 
and Consistency’ (2010) 47 CMLRev, 987.
2   For more general overviews of EU external relations see for example G. De Baere, 
Constitutional Principles of EU External Relations (OUP, 2008), P. Eeckhout, EU External 
Relations Law, (OUP, 2011), or B. Van Vooren and R.A. Wessel, EU External Relations Law: Text, 
Cases and Materials (CUP, 2014).
 197External Relations And The Eu
have said this, the story survives as it so aptly captures one of the problems of 
EU external representation. There is no single institution or person that has 
the general authority to represent the entire EU, such as the US President or 
Secretary of State. Instead, multiple actors are usually involved.3
To begin with, in many external fields, certainly in the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP), the European Council and especially the Council of 
Ministers are the central actors, also demonstrating the often intergovernmen-
tal character of this field.4 Certainly in non-CFSP external relations, however, 
the Commission also plays an important role in representing the EU externally, 
for example also in negotiating international agreements on behalf of the EU.5 
In addition, in areas where the EU and the Member States share a competence, 
all 28 Member States may also be active themselves.6
The Treaty of Lisbon tried to streamline the external representation of the 
EU by creating the office of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy, who is supposed to ‘conduct the Union’s common 
foreign and security policy’.7 As the High Representative is simultaneously the 
Vice-President of the Commission for CFSP, the chair of the Foreign Affairs 
Council and may take part in the work of the European Council, the hope was 
that this function could unite the external representation of the EU and silence 
Kissinger once and for all. At the same time, however, the Treaty of Lisbon also 
created a permanent President of the European Council, who shall ‘at his level 
and in that capacity, ensure the external representation of the Union on issues 
concerning its common foreign and security policy.’8 Similarly, the responsibil-
ity of the President of the European Commission to represent the EU exter-
nally was not removed, nor was the external role of the rotating presidency of 
the Council.
An example of the complications that may arise with so many actors was 
provided when President Obama refused to come to a Summit in Spain in May 
2010. Again as EU mythology has it, the President of the European Council, 
the High Representative, the President of the Commission, the President 
of the European Parliament, the Member State holding the rotating presidency 
3   See also C. Tomuschat, ‘Calling Europe by Phone’ Guest Editorial 2010 (47) CMLRev, 3.
4   See generally title V of the TEU. For a general introduction of the different EU Institutions see 
EU Chapter 2.
5   See Article 17(1) TEU and Article 118 TFEU.
6   See on this situation also C. Hillion, and P. Koutrakos (eds) Mixed Agreements Revisited (Hart, 
2010).
7   Article 18 TEU.
8   Article 15(6) TFEU.
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of the Council and several of the heads of State or Government of individual 
Member States could not agree on protocol, including on the question who 
would shake Obama’s hand first.9 Clearly this is only an anecdotal illustration 
of the underlying problem identified above: the EU has no single institution 
with the authority and legitimacy to pick up the phone on behalf of the entire 
EU. As long as that is the case, the EU will need to coordinate and cooperate, 
and hence cannot be as unified externally as some would like.
5.3 EU External Competences
As discussed in EU Chapter 3, the EU is based on the principle of conferral. 
Consequently, it only has those competences conferred on it by the Member 
States, also in the field of external relations.10 In this regard Article 21 TFEU first 
spells out the objectives of the EU. Subsequently, Title V of the TEU (CFSP),11 
and Part V of the TFEU (non-CFSP external policies) provide the EU with most 
of its explicit external competences to actually realize these objectives.12
When the EEC was created in 1957, however, the Community lacked almost 
all of the explicit external competences it has today. The Treaty of Rome only 
provided for two explicit external competences: the Common Commercial 
Policy and the conclusion of Association agreements.13 This lack of external 
competences created a problem, as the (then) Community often had to act 
externally, already to be able to achieve its internal objectives. In line with its 
general teleological approach to competences, the CJEU developed the doc-
trine of implied powers to deal with this lacuna. Three types or categories of 
implied powers were developed by the CJEU.
The first category of implied powers was created in the seminal case of 
AETR. This judgment concerned the question if the (then) Community had 
the competence to sign an external agreement concerning the work of crews 
of vehicles engaged in international road transport (the AETR agreement). It is 
relevant to note that the EU already had adopted legislation on this topic inter-
nally, but the Treaty provided no express competence to adopt an agreement 
on this point externally. The CJEU held that:
9    See also A. Rosas and L. Armati, EU Constitutional Law, (Hart, 2010).
10   Article 4 and 5 TEU and Opinion 2/94 Accession to the ECHR [1996] ECR I-1759, par. 24.
11   See particularly Articles 24 and Article 37 TEU.
12   See especially Articles 207, 208, 209, 212, 214, 216, 218.
13   Articles 113 and 238 EEC.
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Although it is true that Articles 74 and 75 do not expressly confer on the 
Community authority to enter into international agreements, neverthe-
less the bringing into force, on 25 March 1969, of Regulation No. 543/69 
of the Council on the harmonization of certain social legislation relating 
to road transport (OJ L 77, p. 49) necessarily vested in the Community 
power to enter into any agreements with third countries relating to the 
subject-matter governed by that regulation.
This grant of power is moreover expressly recognized by Article 3 of 
the said regulation which prescribes that: ‘The Community shall enter 
into any negotiations with third countries which may prove necessary for 
the purpose of implementing this regulation’.
Since the subject-matter of the AETR falls within the scope of 
Regulation No. 543/69, the Community has been empowered to negoti-
ate and conclude the agreement in question since the entry into force of 
the said regulation.
These Community powers exclude the possibility of concurrent pow-
ers on the part of Member States, since any steps taken outside the frame-
work of the Community institutions would be incompatible with the 
unity of the Common Market and the uniform application of Community 
law.14
The use of the internal competence, in other words, had created an (implied) 
external competence. The CJEU thereby connected the existence and use of 
an internal competence to the existence of an external competence, greatly 
expanding the capacity of the (then) Community to act externally.
The second category of implied powers concerns those cases where the 
internal power to act for the attainment of a specific objective itself neces-
sitates external action.15 Some internal market rules, for example, may have an 
inherently international aspect.16
A third ‘implied’ external competence can be found in Article 352 TFEU. 
The residual competence granted by this provision may also be used for exter-
nal action where an EU action is necessary to attain a Treaty objective but no 
explicit of implied power can be found in the Treaties.17
14   Case 22/70 AETR [1971] ECR 263, paras. 28–31. Also see Cases 3, 4, and 6/76 Kramer [1976] 
ECR, 1279 paras. 19–20 and Opinion 1/03 ECLI:EU:C:2006:81, par. 115.
15   See Opinion 1/76 Laying-up fund [1977] ECR 741, par. 3 as well as Opinion 1/03 ECLI:EU: 
C:2006:81, par. 115.
16   In Opinion 1/76 regulating transport on the river Rhine, for instance, could only be 
achieved by international action as it needed to include non-EU Member States.
17   See Case 22/70 AETR [1971] ECR 263, par. 95.
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Through these three types of implied powers, the CJEU created a significant 
capacity for the EU to act externally based on internal competences and legis-
lation already adopted inside the EU. With the Treaty of Lisbon, the extensive 
and often complex, case law of the CJEU on implied external powers has been 
codified in Article 216 TFEU.18 For the EAC, however, especially the initial case 
law, linking internal competences to external competences via a logic of unity, 
coherence and effectiveness, may be most relevant.
5.4 Sincere Cooperation and the Negative Obligations of  
Member States
A last issue that may be relevant to the EAC, considering the fact that the 
Partner States participate in multiple international and regional bodies, 
is the obligation of EU Member States not to undermine or frustrate EU exter-
nal action. The precise obligation of Member States in this regard depends on 
the nature of the EU external competence at stake.
In areas where the EU has an exclusive external competence, such as in the 
Common Commercial Policy (CCP) or the Customs Union, Member States are 
in principle not allowed to act externally at all, unless they have permission 
from the EU to do so.19 Consequently, where Member States participate in an 
International Organization, like the G20, and issues are discussed that touch 
on an exclusive competence of the EU, they are under a legal obligation to 
act in the interest of the EU rather than to defend their own interests.20
In areas where the EU and the Member States share the competence, the 
principle of pre-emption usually applies.21 This means that Member States 
are no longer allowed to act externally themselves if the EU has exercised its 
shared competence. If the EU already has concluded an international agree-
ment on the free movement of workers, for instance on the mutual recognition 
18   P. Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law, (OUP, 2011), 112.
19   See also the similar effect of exclusive competences for the Member States internally, as 
discussed in EU Chapter 3.
20   F. Amtenbrink, N. Blokker, S. Van den Bogaert, A. Cuyvers, K. Heine, C. Hillion, 
J. Kantorowicz, H. Lenk and R. Repasi, The European Union’s Role in the G20, (2015) 
Working paper for the scientific bureau of the European Parliament, 41 and J. Wouters, 
J. Odermatt and T. Ramopoulos, “The EU in the World of International Organizations: 
Diplomatic Aspirations, Legal Hurdles and Political Realities”, in: Leuven Centre for 
Global Governance Studies, Working Paper no. 121.
21   See on this point R. Wessel and B. Van Vooren, EU External Relations Law: Text, Cases and 
Materials (CUP, 2014), 103.
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of diplomas, Member States can no longer act externally on this point. The 
pre-emptive effect in external relations, however, goes much further. The CJEU 
has given a very far reaching interpretation to the principle of sincere coop-
eration, holding that Member States are precluded from all unilateral action 
that is may adversely affect the realization of a Treaty objective. The PFOS case 
provides an illustration of just how far this obligation may extend.22 In PFOS 
Sweden wanted to have a certain chemical added to Annex A to the Stockholm 
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, which fell under a shared com-
petence with the EU. Despite several requests, the Commission and Council 
had not acted on this point, neither approving nor rejecting Sweden’s request. 
Briefly put, the Council had only started the process of coming to a joint 
position. The mere fact that the Council had discussed the issue in Council 
and was adopting a common position, however, already pre-empted Sweden 
from acting unilaterally. Even the initial stages of undertaking an EU external 
action, therefore, may pre-empt the right of Member States to act externally 
on their own.
The duty of sincere cooperation also leads to a general obligation of coop-
eration on Member States, and an obligation not to frustrate or undermine 
the effectiveness of EU external actions in any way. Even if Member States are 
acting in a field where the EU has no competence or has not used its shared 
competence, therefore, they are under an obligation not to use their own com-
petence in a way that might undermine the effective attainment of EU objec-
tives in another field.23 This obligation does not amount to a general obligation 
for Member States to coordinate all national external actions.24 In some cases, 
however, the duty of sincere cooperation may lead to a positive obligation on 
Member States to ensure coherence.25 Clearly, the extent to which these legal 
obligations can be enforced in a highly political area is another question, but 
the main point here is that EU law has developed a set of legal principles and 
obligations to control the external behaviour of its Member States, even in 
areas where the EU has only shared or even no external competences. 
22   Case C-246/07 Commission v Sweden (PFOS) ECLI:EU:C:2010:203.
23   See for example Case C-266/03, Commission v Luxemburg [2005] ECR I-4805 or Case 
C-433/03, Commission v Germany [2005] ECR I-6985.
24   See however Article 21(3) TEU on ensuring ‘consistency between different areas of its 
external action and between these and other policies.’
25   See especially C. Hillion, ‘Tous pour un, un pour tous! Coherence in the External Relations 
of the European Union’ in: M. Cremona, Developments in EU External Relations Law (OUP, 
2008), 10.
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chapter 6
General Principles Governing EAC Integration
Khoti Chilomba Kamanga and Ally Possi
6.1 Introduction
This chapter expounds on the general principles which govern the function-
ing and activities of the East African Community (EAC), while also reflecting 
on the European Union (EU) integration experience.1 From the outset, it is 
important to point out that the ‘general principles’ are a source of law as well 
as guidelines to which states in an integration arrangement should adhere. 
Thus, this chapter is preoccupied with the dual tasks of mapping the prin-
ciples of the EAC, as set out in the Treaty for the Establishment of the East 
African Community (the Treaty), as well as examining the broader legal import 
of these principles. The justification for such an examination is the role these 
principles play in promoting universally acceptable tenets of good governance, 
and more importantly, as a source of law, a dispute resolution tool. Central to 
this chapter is the thesis that beyond and above individual, specific and bind-
ing legal rules found in treaties, on statute books, regulations, by-laws, and case 
law, there are normative prepositions of a more abstract nature, and of ‘general 
applicability’, namely general principles.
6.2 General Principles
It has been observed that general principles perform a threefold function, as 
they “operate as aids to interpretation, as grounds for review, and as rules of 
law, breach of which may give rise to tortuous liability.”2 As a ‘source of law’, 
a general principle serves a ‘gap-filling’ function to the extent that a lacuna 
arises from the fact that a situation may arise which is not governed by a rule 
of law, be it statutory or judicial.3 However, the term “general principles”, as 
1   See also EU Chapter 6, particularly on the development of fundamental rights as General 
Principles of EU law in this regard.
2   T. Tridimas (2006), The General Principles of EU Law (2nd ed), Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, p. 29.
3   Ibid. p. 17.
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used in this chapter, draws inspiration from the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ). The ICJ Statute, an appendage to the United Nations 
(UN) Charter, is particularly notable for the direction it gives to the “princi-
pal judicial organ” of the UN, in respect of applicable law whenever the ICJ is 
carrying out its adjudication function. The pertinent part of the ICJ Statute 
enjoins the Court to have recourse, among others, to “general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations.”4
Unfortunately, the ICJ Statute fails to define or characterize such ‘general 
principles’. Therefore, this task inevitably falls on international judicial bodies 
and experts. The adoption of the UN Declaration on Principles of International 
Law was one response to the resulting lacuna.5 Experts from the United States 
of America also joined the fray, to argue that the term ‘general principles’ as 
used by the ICJ Statute could mean any of the following five categories:
a) Principles of municipal law recognized by civilized nations;
b) General principles of law derived from the specific nature of the 
international community;
c) Principles intrinsic to the idea of law and basic to all legal systems;
d) Principles valid through all kinds of societies in relationship of 
hierarchy and coordination; and
e) Principles of justice founded on the very nature of man as a rational 
and social being.6
However, in the case of the EAC, as well as the EU, the relevant general prin-
ciples are the source of less controversy, having been either captured by stat-
ute, or the subject of numerous judicial pronouncements. The situation in 
the EU is striking in that many of the principles under discussion have been 
developed by the case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) rather than 
finding an “explicit” formal basis in the Treaties. Conversely, in the EAC many 
of these principles are formally prescribed by the Treaty, even though there is 
4   Article 38, ICJ Statute, 1945.
5   More precisely, ‘Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations 
and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations’ 
reproduced, among others, in I. Brownlie (ed) (1995), Basic Documents in International Law 
(4th ed), pp. 36–45.
6   L.F. Damrosch et als. (2001), International Law: Cases and Materials (4th ed), St Paul, 
Minnesota: American Casebook Series, p. 118.
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of course also scope for unwritten principles to be discovered and developed 
by the EACJ.7
6.3 General Principles Under the EAC Treaty
Upon examination of the Treaty, it is easy for one to conclude that there is 
a generous intention for EAC integration to be governed by the enshrined 
Treaty principles. These principles may form a source of law as well as 
impact upon policy guidelines, with which Partner States should comply. 
However, it is fair to comment that as there are numerous provisions dealing 
with general principles,8 there is a superfluous restatement and repetition 
of principles to the point of generating incoherence.9 The structure of the 
principles within the Treaty is inconsistent, as for instance, some of the prin-
ciples are stated neatly and explicitly, while others are implicit and, while 
some form part of the main body of the Treaty, others only find articulation in 
the preambles.
As indicated above, there are instances of repetition. In the preambles of 
the Treaty, one encounters the solemn commitment to “adhere . . . to the fun-
damental and operational principles that shall govern the achievement of the 
objectives [of the Treaty], and to the principles of international law governing 
relationships between sovereign States.” Moreover, provisions which directly 
and explicitly dedicate themselves to articulating principles of EAC law, are 
to be found in Articles 6 and 7 of the EAC Treaty. The former carries the title 
‘Fundamental Principles’, whereas the latter, enumerates what are termed 
‘Operational Principles’. Interestingly, neither of the two Articles proclaims 
itself to be an exhaustive statement of principles of EAC law.10
It is equally important to note the rationale for classifying the principles 
into the two respective categories. Whereas the ‘Fundamental Principles’ are 
of general applicability, the ‘Operational Principles’ are meant to ‘govern the 
7    M.E. Mendez-Pinedo (2009), EC and EEA Law: A Comparative Study of the Effectiveness 
of European Law, Amsterdam: Europa Law Publishing, p. 15.
8    According to our count there are no less than 9 provisions, most notably, Articles 5, 6 and 
7 dedicated to the issue of general principles.
9    Article 7 (2) substantially repeats the contents of Article 6 (d) with questionable added 
value.
10   Both provisions contain the important refrain that the respective list “shall include . . .” 
the following principles.
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practical achievement of the objectives’ of the EAC,11 a situation suggesting 
that the former, enjoy a comparatively superior normative status to the latter. 
If this truly is the case, and we believe that to be so, the overlap between the 
contents of Article 6 (d) and, Article 7 (2) is rather unfortunate. On the one 
hand Article 6 (d) reads as follows:
The fundamental principles that shall govern the achievement of the 
objectives of the Community by the Partner States shall include [. . .] 
Good governance including adherence to the principles of democracy, 
rule of law, accountability, transparency, social justice, equal opportuni-
ties, gender equality as well as the recognition, promotion and protection 
of human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the provisions of the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.12
On the other hand Article 7 (2) reads, verbatim:
. . . Partner States undertake to abide by the principles of good gover-
nance, including adherence to the principles of democracy, the rule of 
law, social justice and the maintenance of universally accepted standards 
of human rights.13
Visibly, each of the two provisions makes reference to ‘good governance’, 
‘democracy’, ‘rule of law’, ‘social justice’, and ‘human rights,’ with no apparent 
justification for the repetition. Only the issues of “equal opportunities” and 
“gender equality” are unique to Article 6 (d). Our understanding of the basic and 
primary justification for isolating the general principles outlined in Article 6, 
and the ‘Operational Principles’ as set out in Article 7, is to underscore the 
wider, general applicability of principles in the former category. It therefore is 
clearly superfluous, to have the same principles articulated in Article 7, since 
principles of general applicability would apply to any isolated, specific matter 
anyway. Finally, and perhaps more critically, this repetition leaves us question-
ing the genuine rationale for the dichotomy of the classification and the atten-
dant legal ambiguity.
11   See the opening paragraph of Articles 6, in contrast to Article 7 (1).
12   Art 6 (d) of the EAC Treaty.
13   Art 7 (2) of the EAC Treaty.
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6.4 The Principle of Subsidiarity
In recent times, the concept of subsidiarity has gained significant weight and 
attention within the sphere of international institutional law. The concept 
implies the presence of authority between different levels of governance, in 
which the decision making process should start from the lowest level capable 
of achieving the objectives set. In the process of regional integration, it is a 
common place to find Partner States within an integration bloc clinging-on 
to their sovereignty. In order to provide protection to such sovereignty against 
unnecessary action by the center, principles such as subsidiarity are adopted 
in the constitutive integration treaties.14
The principle of subsidiarity, therefore, forms a compromise on the sensi-
tive themes of state sovereignty and a supranational form of a regional integra-
tion block.15 In the law-making process, subsidiarity provides guidance on the 
legislative powers of an integration bloc in areas in which both the bloc and 
the Partner States have common legislative competences. In the EAC, the pri-
mary goal of the subsidiarity principle is to ensure decisions, regarding an inte-
gration activity, originate from the people; in line with the ‘people-centered’ 
integration spirit. In essence, the principle of subsidiarity reaffirms democratic 
principles, within the context of regional integration.16
While relevant, subsidiarity as envisaged by the EAC Partner States’ federal 
regime should be approached with caution. Of course the principle is an impor-
tant component in the Treaty, overseeing the achievement of the objectives of 
the EAC as well as being a normative source of law. Undisputedly, subsidiarity 
sets the tune of interaction between the EAC and its Partner States. The Treaty 
defines subsidiarity as a ‘principle which emphasises multilevel participation 
of a wide range of participants in the process of economic integration’.17 For 
achieving the objectives of the Community, Partner States are required to 
adhere to the principle of subsidiarity in all activities involving EAC integra-
tion.18 However, the Treaty definition of subsidiarity is not clear. The scope of 
14   Historic, nationalist and economic factors cause states and their nationals to advance 
sovereign ideology overriding integration initiatives. See Ronald Tiersky, ‘Europe: 
International Crisis and the Future of Integration’ in Robert Tiersky (ed), Europe Today 
(2nd edn, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc. 2004) 3.
15   Deborah Cass, ‘The Word that Saves Maastricht? The Principle of Subsidiarity and the 
Division of Powers within the European Community’ (1992) 29 C.M.L. Rev. 1107, 1116.
16   Olivia Barton ‘An analysis of the principle of subsidiarity in European Union law’ (2014) 2 
North East Law Review 83, 84.
17   Art 1 of the EAC Treaty.
18   Art 7(1)(d) of the EAC Treaty.
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its application, as well as judicial and political mechanisms for enforcing the 
principle are not defined by the Treaty.
In determining whether the principle has been duly adhered to by the EAC, 
it is important to note that major decisions impacting EAC integration have 
not been widely debated by Community citizens. Notably, EAC Partner States 
have shown early signs of violating the subsidiarity principle, by hastily amend-
ing the Treaty in 2007, without eliciting the opinion of Community citizens.19 
This trend is contrary to the principle outlined in the EAC Treaty. It is clearly 
stated that for an ‘action to accomplish a legitimate government objective 
[it] should in principle be taken at the lowest level of government capable of 
effectively addressing the problem.’20 When looking at the functioning of the 
EACJ, there is a genuine question to be asked as to whether non-inclusion of 
domestic remedy requirement in the EACJ is within the spirit of the subsidiar-
ity principle as provided in the EAC Treaty.
The principle has positives and negatives. It is easy to note that the subsid-
iarity principle legitimizes the Community for its citizens.21 It also smooth-
ens the relationship between the Community and its Partner States. However, 
when the principle is subverted by Partner States for political reasons, it serves 
as a delaying tactic by Partner States unwilling to implement the Community 
agenda.
6.5 Variable Geometry
The principle of variable geometry allows Partner States in an integration bloc 
to implement integration projects at different paces. States within an integra-
tion arrangement are allowed to move-forward with integration activities, 
while leaving others to join at a later date.
As is the case with the principle of subsidiarity, the Treaty fails to clearly 
define the scope and applicability of variable geometry principle. The Treaty 
recognises the principle as a policy tool of ‘. . . flexibility which allows for 
19   Henry Onoria ‘botched-up elections, treaty amendments and judicial independence in 
the East African Community’ (2010) 54 Journal of African Law 74, 88. See also the case 
of East African Law Society and 4 Others v. The Attorney General of Kenya and 3 Others, 
Reference No. 3 of 2007.
20   George A. Bermann ‘Subsidiarity and the European Community’ (1994) 17 Hastings Int’l & 
Comp. L. Rev. 97, 97.
21   Reimer von Borries & Malte Hauschild ‘Implementing the subsidiarity principle’ (1999) 5 
Columbia Journal of Europe Law, 369, 369.
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progression in co-operation among a sub-group of members in a larger integra-
tion scheme in a variety of areas and at different speeds.’22 On a quick reading 
of the Treaty, the principle clashes with the requirement of consensus in the 
decision making process within the Summit23 and the Council of Ministers.24 
This was evident when the Council of Ministers approached the EACJ to seek 
clarity on the scope of application of the variable geometry principle within 
the EAC.25
It was clear that even the top-most officials of the Community could not 
contemplate the nature and scope on the implementation of one of the found-
ing principles of the Community; a principle derived from their own wis-
dom. In the quest for an advisory opinion, the EACJ was called upon to clarify 
the application of the principle of variable geometry vis-à-vis the require-
ment of consensus in the decision making process of the EAC. The Court 
was of the view that, if diligently applied, the principle of variable geometry 
is in harmony with consensus, when deliberating on integration decisions.26 
In clarifying, the EACJ stated:
The Court finds that the principle of variable geometry, as its definition 
suggests, is a strategy of implementation of Community decisions and 
not a decision making tool in itself. [. . .] The Court is of the opinion, 
therefore, that the principle of variable geometry can comfortably apply, 
and was intended, to guide the integration process and we find no rea-
son or possibility for it to conflict with the requirement for consensus in 
decision-making.27
22   Art 1 of the EAC Treaty. Variable geometry principle is also described under art 7(1)(e) of 
the EAC Treaty as ‘. . . the Principle of variable geometry which allows for progression in 
co-operation among groups within the Community for wider integration schemes in vari-
ous fields and at different speeds.’
23   See art 12(3) of the EAC Treaty.
24   Art 15(4) of the EAC Treaty, subject to the Protocol on Decision-Making by the Council of 
2001 under art 2(2), which provides that the decision of the Council is by simple majority, 
without disclosing the kinds of decisions to be reached by a simple majority.
25   In the matter of a request by the Council of Ministers of the East African Community for 
an Advisory Opinion, Application No. 1 2008, EACJ, First Instance Division.
26   In the matter of a request by the Council of Ministers of the East African Community for 
an Advisory Opinion, Application No. 1 2008, EACJ, First Instance Division, p. 29.
27   In the matter of a request by the Council of Ministers of the East African Community for 
an Advisory Opinion, Application No. 1 2008, EACJ, First Instance Division, p. 33.
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The EACJ is simply of the position that the principle of variable geometry is 
a strategy in realising a decision, which Partner States may agree by consen-
sus. Partner States may agree by consensus to implement certain integration 
projects, depending on the readiness of some members. It may happen that a 
particular state may choose to opt out in implementing an integration project, 
and join the rest at a suitable future time, or may decide to opt out altogether. 
The EACJ observed further that consensus in the realm of decision making 
process of the EAC does not imply unanimity, thus there is no need for veto 
power among Partner States.28
The main aim of the principle of variable geometry is to ensure that the 
integration agenda proceeds, even if unwilling states are reluctant to imple-
ment integration activities. Moreover, it is a way of avoiding any internal con-
flicts by forcing unenthusiastic Partner States to implement a certain program 
or policy.29 Learning lessons from the failure of the defunct EAC, the principle 
attempts to address the issue of inequality among Partner States.30 However, 
when applied under political influence, this may lead to the fragmentation 
of the integration bloc. In 2013, invoking the principle of variable geometry, 
Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda, under the tag of ‘coalition of the willing’, held 
a series of meetings while excluding Burundi and Tanzania.31 The meetings 
considered issues relating to the Customs Union, Common Market implemen-
tation, regional investment, infrastructure development, and the removal of 
non-tariff barriers. The move by the three countries was not well-received by 
the citizens and leaders of Burundi and Tanzania. Furthermore, the principle 
is at risk of being used as an escape route by an unwilling state to implement 
integration projects under the shield of the principle of variable geometry.
28   Joshua M. Kivuva ‘East Africa’s dangerous dance with the past: Important lessons the new 
East African Community has not learned from the defunct’ (2014) 10 European Scientific 
Journal 359.
29   In the matter of a request by the Council of Ministers of the East African Community for 
an Advisory Opinion, Application No. 1 2008, EACJ, First Instance Division, p. 35.
30   James Thuo Gathi ‘African regional trade agreements as flexible legal regimes’ (2010) 35 
N.C.J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg 571, 623.
31   African Development Bank Group ‘Is Variable Geometry Leading to the Fragmentation 
of Regional Integration in East Africa?’ http://www.afdb.org/en/blogs/integrating-africa/
post/is-variable-geometry-leading-to-the-fragmentation-of-regional-integration-in-east-
africa-12524/ (Accessed on 26 May 2016).
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6.6 The Principle of Complementarity
The principle of complementarity has gained prominence in international 
criminal law following implementation of the Rome Statute.32 There are differ-
ent methods through which the principle of complementarity is applied under 
international law. The principle delineates the relationship between interna-
tional institutions and those at the domestic level.33 The principle of comple-
mentarity in the EAC Treaty has taken on an economic approach, namely trade 
complementarity. According to the Treaty, the principle ‘defines the extent to 
which economic variables support each other in economic activity’.34 The prin-
ciple of complementarity in the EAC Treaty does not only cover the relation-
ship between the Community itself and its Partner States, but also attempts 
to create a bridge between the work of the EAC and other African institutions 
performing activities and functions similar to those of the EAC. Therefore, EAC 
complementarity operates with regard to both national and other regional 
and international institutions. Similarly to the principle of complementarity 
as envisaged in the Rome Statute, EAC complementarity calls upon relevant 
institutions at the Community and local level to act, when and where their 
counterparts are unable or less equipped to do so.
6.7 Fundamental Rights as a General Principle of the EAC Law
Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is essential in forming 
strong regional integration.35 Under contemporary international institutional 
law, respect for human rights has developed to be an important integration 
principle. For instance, it is common to find an integration bloc imposing 
respect for human rights as one of the prerequisites for accession to the bloc.36
The EAC Treaty expressly designates the “promotion and protection of 
human and peoples’ rights” as a ‘Fundamental Principle’ of the EAC. We also 
find, among the ‘Operational Principles’ of the EAC, the undertaking by Partner 
32   See the Preamble and art 1 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN 
Doc. A/CONF. 183/9*(1998).
33   Xavier Philippe ‘The principles of universal jurisdiction and complementarity: how do 
the two= principles intermesh?’ (2006) 88 International Review of the Red-cross 375, 380.
34   Art 1 of the EAC Treaty.
35   See on this point also the gradual development of fundamental rights protection in the 
EU, that kept pace with the level of integration, as described in EU Chapter 6.
36   See for example Article 3 (3) (b) of the EAC Treaty.
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States, to adhere to the “maintenance of universally accepted standards of 
human rights”. The legal principles are the source of EAC law, of which human 
rights, as they are protected by the Partner States and with the international 
treaties are incorporated in the EAC Treaty.37 However, when the EACJ started 
to receive cases concerning human rights allegations, the Partner States were 
not shy of vigorously opposing the binding nature of the principles within the 
EAC Treaty.38
The EAC does not have its own human rights catalogue, and therefore, 
places its reliance on other international sources of rights. The African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) is mentioned as one of the normative 
frameworks to be taken into account when conducting EAC activities,39 along 
with ‘universally accepted standards of human rights.’40 If the supremacy of 
the EAC law is firmly accorded by EAC Partner States, human rights norms 
in the Treaty have the potential of creating a Community with better human 
rights standards. In line with this objective, the EACJ itself is of the firm view 
that the mention of the ACHPR in the EAC Treaty ‘was not merely decorative 
of the Treaty’.41
Sadly, however, the EAC Treaty has shied away from taking one important 
legal step towards giving life to the principle of fundamental rights. The EACJ’s 
jurisdiction in respect of ‘interpretation and application’ of the EAC Treaty is 
set out in a manner that is forthright and unequivocal, but not in regard to the 
question of human rights. The pertinent provision limiting the Court’s jurisdic-
tion to determine human rights disputes reads:
The [EACJ] shall have such other original, appellate, human rights and 
other jurisdiction as will be determined by the Council at a suitable 
37   For a general discussion on principles and human rights in the EU, see Tanja 
Karakamisheva-Jovanovska ‘Legal principles versus fundamental rights post Lisbon’ 
(2013) 15 Rev. Eur. L. 41.
38   See for example the submissions of the Attorneys General in the cases of Mary Ariviza 
and Okotch Mondoh v. Attorney General of kenya and Secretary General of the East African 
Community, Reference No. 7 0f 2010 (First Instance Division); James Katabazi and Others 
v. Secretary general of the East African Community, Reference N0. 1 of 2007 (First Instance 
Division); Plaxeda Rugumba v. The Secretary General of the East African Community, 
Reference No. 8 of 2010 (First Instance Division); and The Attorney General of Rwanda v. 
Plaxeda Rugumba, Appeal No. 1 of 2012 (Appellate Division).
39   Art 6(d) of the EAC Treaty.
40   Art 7(2) of the EAC Treaty.
41   Plaxeda Rugumba v. The SG of the EAC & the AG of Rwanda, Ref No. 8 of 2010, First 
Instance Division.
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subsequent date. To this end, Partner States shall conclude a Protocol to 
operationalize the extended jurisdiction.42
This formulation exposes the reluctance of the drafters of the EAC Treaty 
towards paving the way for human rights litigation at the EACJ. This reluctance 
was demonstrated by not only handing the Council an open ended time frame 
for clarifying EAC human rights laws, but also through the additional require-
ment that this extended jurisdiction be effectuated through a fresh treaty, 
essentially requiring a human rights ‘Protocol’. Despite these hurdles, intrepid 
litigants have petitioned the EACJ on matters of a human rights nature. The 
presence of human rights norms in the EAC Treaty has placed the EACJ at a 
cross-roads, as it is now receiving more cases with human rights components 
than other Community norms enshrined in the EAC Treaty.43
It should be recalled that human rights did not feature in the now defunct 
EAC, just as they did not in the early days of the EU integration.44 The cur-
rent EAC Treaty recognises human rights, as one of the founding principles of 
the EAC, however, upon examination of the constitutions of the EAC Partner 
States, one of the findings that could easily be gathered is the difference in the 
level of human rights protection. To its credit, despite the Court’s explicit lack 
of jurisdiction to adjudicate human rights matters, it continues to play a lead-
ing role in advancing fundamental rights within the EAC. To this end, the Court 
has been applying law-making strategy in upholding fundamental rights and 
promoting freedom within the EAC.
In a string of cases, applications have been made, inter alia, on grounds of 
infringements with respect to both ‘fundamental’ and ‘operational principles’ 
of the EAC. They notably include the responsibility to respect human rights in 
accordance with the ACHPR, and maintenance of ‘universally accepted stan-
dards of human rights’. A notable example of one of these cases is the case of 
James Katabazi,45 the first ever case in which the EACJ took head on the issue 
of its jurisdiction with respect to human rights. The Katabazi case opened 
a Pandora’s box of human rights cases, as the Court now receives repeated 
42   Article 27 (3).
43   See A Possi ‘Striking a balance between community norms and human rights: The con-
tinuing struggle of the East African Court of Justice’ (2015) 15 African Human Rights Law 
Journal 192–213 http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/1996-2096/2015/v15n1a9.
44   Henrik Karl Nielsen ‘The protection of fundamental rights in the law of the European 
Union’ (1994) 63 Nordic J. Int’l L, 213 at 213 and in more detail, EU Chapter 6.
45   James Katabazi & 21 Others v Secretary General of the EAC & Attorney General of the 
Republic of Uganda, Reference No. 1 of 2007.
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reference to human rights infringements.46 Notably, in Katabazi, the Court 
gives an insightful if not groundbreaking position regarding the respondents’ 
contention that the EAC Treaty does not confer on the EACJ powers to enter-
tain matters pertaining to human rights violations, notwithstanding the con-
tents of Articles 6 and 7.
The Court began by acknowledging how an ‘ordinary meaning’ of Article 27 (2) 
of the EAC Treaty justifies the conclusion that the EACJ lacks jurisdic-
tion in matters of human rights.47 The Court then abandons the ‘textual’ 
approach in favor of a ‘contextual’ one.48 The Court’s dictum observes how 
important it is to take into account those provisions of the EAC Treaty govern-
ing objectives, principles, and obligations of Partner States. Having done so, 
the Court arrives at its groundbreaking conclusion, which reads:
While the Court will not assume jurisdiction to adjudicate on human 
rights disputes, it will not abdicate from exercising its jurisdiction of 
interpretation under Article 27 (1) merely because the reference [before 
the Court] includes allegation[s] of human rights violation.49
For a long period of time, the position of the EACJ Appellate Division was that 
the Court will only adjudicate on a matter containing a human rights allega-
tion only if the application contained a cause of action distinct from human 
rights,50 for example the rule of law, democracy and good governance. In the 
recent decision of Democratic Party v. SG of the EAC and Others, the EACJ 
stated as follows:
The wording “. . . in accordance with the provisions of the [ACHPR]”, cre-
ates an obligation on the EAC Partner States to act in good faith and in 
accordance with the provisions of the Charter. Failure to do so constitutes 
an infringement of the Treaty. Such violation can be legally challenged 
before the [EACJ] by virtue of its jurisdiction [. . .] Articles 6 (d) and 7(2) 
46   These are found at p. 3 of the judgment and in direct connection to Articles 6 and 7 of the 
EAC Treaty.
47   See pp. 14–15 of the judgment.
48   For details regarding the issue of interpreting treaties, see, among others, Ian Brownlie, 
Principles of Public International Law (7th ed), Oxford University Press, 2008, 
pp. 630–636.
49   See pp. 15–16 of the judgment.
50   Independent Medical Legal Unit v Attorney-General of Kenya, Appeal No. 1 of 2011, EACJ 
Appellate Division.
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of the Treaty empower the [EACJ] to apply the provisions of the Charter, 
the Vienna Convention, as well as any other relevant international instru-
ment to ensure the Partner States’ observance of the provisions of the 
Treaty, as well as those of other international instruments to which 
the Treaty makes reference. The role of the Court in the instant Reference, 
was to ascertain the Partner States’ adherence to, observance of, and/or 
compliance with the Treaty provisions—including the provisions of any 
other international instruments which are incorporated in the Treaty, 
whether explicitly [as in Article 6(d)], or implicitly [as in Article 7 (2)].51
The Democratic Party case is the latest case through which the EACJ has 
attempted to expand its authority to adjudicate human rights cases. The deci-
sion emanated from the Appellate Division of the Court, which was originally 
reluctant to give straightforward interpretations on human rights norms pro-
vided for in the EAC Treaty. The fresh approach by the Court towards human 
rights cases could be due to the presence of newly appointed judges. If that 
is indeed the case, their new approach may be tempered by the political atti-
tude of Partner States towards EACJ jurisdiction. This is evidenced by the 
events leading up to the suspension of the Southern African Development 
Community Tribunal, an unwanted experience to most human rights litigants 
in Africa. It also provides a referencing point for Partner States seeking to 
‘destroy’ a ‘misbehaving’ judicial body. The suspension of the SADC Tribunal 
demonstrates the negative effects that could emanate should the EACJ seek to 
overextend their human rights adjudicatory jurisdiction.
6.8 Other Principles
Seemingly, a caveat was entered to the effect that Articles 6 and 7 do not exhaust 
the range of provisions dedicated to espousing principles of EAC Law. It will be 
discovered that, besides the preambular section to the Treaty and Articles 6 
and 7, there are no less than another half a dozen provisions articulating gen-
eral principles, sometimes explicitly, and on other occasions implicitly.
The first, within this category, is the provision addressing the fundamen-
tal issue as to the ‘aims and objectives’ of the entire EAC enterprise, and how 
it is envisaged to unfold. The Treaty explicitly directs that ‘Partner States 
undertake to establish among themselves and in accordance with the provi-
sions of [the Treaty], a Customs Union, a Common Market, subsequently a 
51   Appeal No. 64 of 2014, EACJ Appellate Division.
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Monetary Union, and ultimately a Political Federation.’52 At least two further 
provisions shed light as to the principles governing the manner in which inte-
gration is expected to occur. These are the specific provisions in the Treaty 
relating to the creation of the Customs Union and Common Market. In 
both instances, the Treaty calls for the negotiation and adoption of a fresh 
treaty, a “Protocol”, to be specific.53 Read together, these provisions have led 
some observers to press for the argument that ‘gradualism and pragmatism’, 
are among key principles of EAC Law and integration, even if not explicitly 
acknowledged as such, by the Treaty.
Apart from the above narrated principles, the Treaty is enriched with other 
principles deserving mention. In order to meet the objectives of the EAC, 
Partner States are required to conduct their activities and make decisions 
based on mutual trust, political will and sovereign equality;54 peaceful coexis-
tence and good neighborliness;55 peaceful settlement of disputes;56 equitable 
distribution of benefits;57 and cooperation for mutual benefit.58 Also, Partner 
States have identified people-centred and market driven cooperation;59 obli-
gation to provide an adequate and appropriate enabling environment, such as 
conducive policies and basic infrastructure;60 establishment of an export ori-
ented economy accompanied with free movement of goods, persons, labour, 
services, capital, information and technology;61 and symmetry;62 as principles 
which govern the practical achievement of the EAC objectives.63
6.9 Conclusion
This chapter has identified what can be termed general principles of EAC Law, 
and has investigated their wider implications. The justification for general 
52   Article 5 (2) of the EAC Treaty.
53   See Articles 75, and 76 of the EAC Treaty.
54   Art 6(a) of the EAC Treaty.
55   Art 6(b) of the EAC Treaty.
56   Art 6(c) of the EAC Treaty.
57   Art 6(e) of the EAC Treaty.
58   Art 6(f) of the EAC Treaty.
59   Article 7(1)(a) of the EAC Treaty.
60   Art 7(1)(b) of the EAC Treaty.
61   Art 7(1)(c) of the EAC Treaty.
62   Art 7(1)(h) of the EAC Treaty. It is also defined under article 1 of the Treaty as ‘the principle 
which addresses variances in the implementation of measures in an economic integra-
tion process for purposes of achieving a common objective.’
63   Article 7.
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principles is their unique role in promoting the universally accepted tenants 
of good governance, in addition to their capacity as a ‘source of law’. They are 
consistent with the ideals enumerated in the Statute of the ICJ and also func-
tion as guiding tools for achieving integration objectives. In other words, and 
for this reason, it is the central assumption of this chapter that understanding 
EAC law requires giving due attention to the issue of EAC general principles. It 
is observed in this chapter that the development of ‘general principles’ within 
the EU evolved in a manner quite distinct from what unfolded in the EAC. 
In the former, ‘principles’ of EU law were left to evolve gradually through the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ, the constitutive instruments of the then European 
Communities shying away from making any explicit statement on the ques-
tion. In contrast, the EAC Treaty has given the issue of general principles, gen-
erous if not exaggerated attention while case law has been less robust in this 
regard. Articles 6 and 7 of the EAC Treaty are devoted to principles of the EAC. 
We also find additional principles littering the EAC Treaty elsewhere, begin-
ning with the preambular section. There is also a troubling repetition in stating 
the principles, especially between Articles 6 and 7. Nevertheless, conclusively, 
‘general principles’ enshrined in the EAC Treaty constitute a normative source 
of law and guidelines for achieving the targeted objectives of the EAC integra-
tion. It is, therefore, the duty of the Partner States to adhere and uphold the 
established principles, so as to make EAC integration a reality. 
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chapter 6A
General Principles of EU Law
Armin Cuyvers
6.1 Legal Dark Matter
In certain ways, general principles can be understood as the dark matter 
of EU law. They unify the law, fill gaps, and lend weight and legitimacy to 
the EU legal order as a whole. Like dark matter, moreover, legal principles can 
be hard to pin down and describe, as often it is their flexibility and fluidity 
that allows them to successfully fulfil the different role they play. Principles are 
also intimately connected to values, often giving a legal voice to considerations 
of morality and social convictions that cannot enter the legal plane directly.1 
Because of their flexibility, general principles may also enable a legal order to 
evolve and adapt, as the general principles themselves may develop along new 
realities and responsibilities, but they may also be used to re-interpret rules 
that block progress.
This Chapter briefly discusses the general principles of EU law. Because the 
EU legal order knows a great many general principles, and because these prin-
ciples play many roles, it is impossible to provide anything close to a complete 
overview here.2 Instead, taking into account the comparative aim of this book 
and the limited space available, this Chapter focusses on one issue that may 
be of particular importance for the EAC: the protection of fundamental rights 
as general principles of EU law. Several other important principles of EU 
law including direct effect, supremacy, subsidiarity and proportionality, are 
discussed in other EU Chapters.3
1   See for example R. Dworkin, ‘Taking Rights Seriously’ (Duckworth, 1977), Chapters 1 and 2 
and (for a different approach) J. Raz, ‘Legal Principles and the Limits of Law’, 81 Yale Law 
Journal 823.
2   For two impressive volumes dedicated to General Principles in EU law, which can provide a 
fuller if still not even complete overview, see T. Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law 
(2nd edn, OUP, 2006) and X. Groussot, General Principles of Community Law (Europa Law 
Publishing, 2006).
3   See EU Chapters 2, 3, and 4 for the principles of supremacy, direct effect, conferral and sub-
sidiarity. See the EU Chapters on the internal market and free movement for the application 
of the principle of proportionality and consistency.
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Before we engage with the issue of fundamental rights, the next section first 
provides an overview of the nature, legal basis and functions of general prin-
ciples in the EU legal order.
6.2 General Principles in the EU Legal Order
Unlike the EAC, many general principles of EU law are unwritten and judge-
made, even though over time many have been codified in the Treaty.4 Many of 
the more institutional-type of principles can now be found in the beginning 
of the TEU, such as the principle of sincere cooperation, conferral, Member 
State equality and the respect for national constitutional identity, subsidiarity, 
and proportionality.5 Article 6 TEU, which was only introduced with the 1992 
Treaty of Maastricht, now forms the central Treaty provision for the more sub-
stantive general principles relating to fundamental rights:
1. The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out 
in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 
7 December 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, 
which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties.
(. . .)
2. The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Such accession 
shall not affect the Union’s competences as defined in the Treaties.
3. Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as 
they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Mem-
ber States, shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law.
Some other provisions, moreover, contain important principles of non-dis-
crimination, including Articles 18, 45 and 157 TFEU. Several important princi-
ples of EU law, however, still have no Treaty basis and remain based on the case 
4   See on the different categories and types of general principles also A. von Bogdandy, ‘Founding 
Principles’ in: A. von Bogdandy and J. Bast (eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law 
(2nd edn., Hart, 2010), 11.
5   See Articles 4 and 5 TEU.
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law of the CJEU. These unwritten principles include direct effect, supremacy 
and effectiveness, three of the most distinctive principles of EU law.6
In terms of hierarchical status, the general principles are usually considered 
part of primary law (certainly when they are codified in the Treaty), or other-
wise as a special category of norms that are just below primary law but above 
all other EU law, including secondary legislation and international agreements 
signed by the EU. The hierarchical status of general principles is important 
for the question if principles can even trump the Treaties themselves, and 
thereby the will of the Member States as ‘Masters of the Treaty’. The orthodox 
position still is that this is not possible, although some recent case law may 
suggest that there are some core principles that may in some cases acquire a 
supra-Treaty status.7
One of the reasons that EU law has so many general principles, and that these 
principles play such an important role, is that on many points the Treaties only 
lay down a very limited and open framework. As we shall see moreover, this 
limited framework was primarily focussed on economic integration, and less 
on other legal issues such as fundamental rights. Consequently, it was often up 
to the CJEU to fill in the general framework, provide protection where neces-
sary, and generally breathe life into the bare bones of the Treaties.
This background of general principles can also be seen in the different func-
tions general principles fulfil in the EU legal order. Although alternative catego-
rizations are possible, one can say principles play at least four key roles. Firstly, 
general principles can form an aid to interpretation of primary or secondary 
law.8 Secondly, because of their hierarchical status, general principles can be 
used to review the legality of secondary EU law and international agreements 
6   The CJEU has also accepted multiple other, less far reaching principles in its case law, such 
as the principle of legal certainty, legitimate expectations or national procedural autonomy. 
See for example CJEU Case 112/77 Töpfer, Case C-453/00 Kühne & Heitz [2004] ECR I-837or 
Case C-234/04 Kapferer [2006] ECR I-2585. For an example of a principle that was rejected, 
however, see Case C-189/01 Jippes ECLI:EU:C:2001:420 on animal welfare. See on direct effect 
and supremacy also EU Chapter 4.
7   See especially Case C-402/05 P Kadi [2008] ECRI-6351, to which we will return below. See for 
the claim that these principle can trump primary law for example A. Rosas and L. Armati, EU 
Constitutional Law (Hart, 2010), pp. 38–39. For further discussion see. Idriz-Tescan, Legal con-
straints on EU Member States as primary law makers: a case study of the proposed permanent 
safeguard clause on free movement of persons in the EU negotiating framework for Turkey’s 
accession (Diss. Leiden 2015, Meijersreeks; MI-247) and A. Cuyvers, ‘The Kadi II judgment of 
the General Court: the ECJ’s predicament and the consequences for Member States’. 7 (2011) 
European Constitutional Law Review,. 481.
8   See for a far reaching and contested example Case C-402/07 Sturgeon ECLI:EU:C:2009:716.
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signed by the EU.9 Third, general principles form an independent basis for 
Member State liability.10 Fourth, general principles can be used as ‘gap fillers’. 
Where there is no relevant EU law, or the relevant rules simply do not provide 
an answer, general principles may be used to fill the gap in EU law in a way that 
is consistent with the overall body of EU law and the general principles.11
As indicated, the remainder of this Chapter focusses on two further topics 
that may be of particular interest to the EAC, starting with the pervasive, if not 
always visible, principle of effectiveness.
6.3 Fundamental Rights and General Principles in the EU
Like the EACJ, the CJEU does not have a separate fundamental rights jurisdic-
tion. In other words, individuals cannot go to the CJEU, or even rely on EU 
law, just because one of their fundamental rights may have been violated. 
Individuals and companies can only rely on any rights granted by EU law when 
they are under the scope of EU law, for example because they have moved to 
another Member State, or because they fall under a piece of EU legislation.
Even though EU law today contains multiple fundamental rights, includ-
ing a complete EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, these rights themselves, 
therefore, do not bring an individual within the scope of EU law or create juris-
diction for the CJEU, as will be explained in more detail below. Nevertheless, 
the EU has developed an effective protection of fundamental rights within the 
scope or EU law, largely through the creation and application of general prin-
ciples. This is quite an achievement if one considers that, in the beginning of 
European integration, the Treaties did not refer to fundamental rights at all, 
and the CJEU even explicitly refused to apply fundamental rights.
This section therefore outlines how the CJEU used general principles to go 
from a situation in which EU law offered no protection of fundamental rights 
to a situation where the EU legal order identifies itself as a bastion of funda-
mental rights protection.
9   Joined Cases C-293 and 594/12 Data Retention Directive ECLI:EU:C:2014:238.
10   Case C-6/90 and 9/90 Francovich [1991] ECR I-5357 and Case C-46 and 48/93 Brasserie du 
Pêcheur [1996] ECR I-1029.
11   See for example Case C-555/07 Kücükdeveci [2010] ECR I-365 or Case 294/83 Les Verts ECR 
1986 p. 1339.
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6.3.1 Genesis of Fundamental Rights in the EU
The evolution of fundamental rights in the EU starts with their firm denial by 
the CJEU in Stork.12 A German company wanted to rely on several fundamental 
rights contained in the German constitution against a secondary act of EU law. 
In its reply, the CJEU emphasized the economic nature of the Community:
under Article 8 of the Treaty the High Authority is only required to apply 
Community law. It is not competent to apply the national law of the 
Member States. Similarly, under Article 31 the Court is only required to 
ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaty . . . the law 
is observed. It is not normally required to rule on provisions of national 
law. Consequently, the High Authority is not empowered to examine a 
ground of complaint which maintains that, when it adopted its deci-
sion, it infringed principles of German constitutional law (in particular 
Articles 2 and 12 of the Basic Law).
The denial to protect fundamental rights, however, led to increasing concern 
at the national level. Especially some national constitutional courts were 
alarmed by a Community that claimed increasing authority, including suprem-
acy over national law, but did not offer fundamental rights protection. This 
concern was one of the reasons behind the landmark judgment in Solange I 
by the German Constitutional Court (GCC). The GCC held that as long as fun-
damental rights were not adequately protected in the Community legal order, 
it reserved the right to disapply Community law in Germany.13
Faced with the understandable claim that an increasingly powerful EU 
should protect fundamental rights, the CJEU changed course. In Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft and Nold the CJEU suddenly ‘discovered’ that EU law actu-
ally did contain fundamental rights in the form of general principles.14 in 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, for example, the CJEU held that:
However, an examination should be made as to whether or not any anal-
ogous guarantee inherent in Community law has been disregarded. In 
fact, respect for fundamental rights forms an integral part of the general 
principles of law protected by the court of justice.
12   Case 1/58 Stork ECR 1959 p. 17.
13   BVerfGE 37, 271 (1974) Solange I. See also EU Chapter 4 on the importance of this case law 
for the debate on supremacy of EU law as such.




The protection of such rights, whilst inspired by the constitutional tra-
ditions common to the Member States, must be ensured within the 
framework of the structure and objectives of the Community. It must 
therefore be ascertained, in the light of the doubts expressed by the 
Verwaltungsgericht, whether the system of deposits has infringed rights 
of a fundamental nature, respect for which must be ensured in the 
Community.15
Similarly, in Nold the CJEU found:
As the court has already stated, fundamental rights form an integral part 
of the general principles of law, the observance of which it ensures. In 
safeguarding these rights, the court is bound to draw inspiration from 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, and it cannot 
therefore uphold measures which are incompatible with fundamen-
tal rights recognized and protected by the constitutions of those states. 
Similarly, international treaties for the protection of human rights on 
which the member states have collaborated or of which they are signa-
tories, can supply guidelines which should be followed within the frame-
work of Community law.16
The CJEU, therefore, still refused to directly apply national fundamental or 
constitutional rights, also because doing so might threaten the autonomy and 
supremacy of EU law. At the same time, it used the open category of unwrit-
ten principles of EU law to create an ‘analogous’ protection at the EU level. 
The message to the national courts therefore was, do not worry, you do not 
need to apply your national constitutional rights, as EU law provides similar 
protection. In Nold, moreover, the CJEU further clarified that it would also take 
international treaties for the protection of human rights into account when 
determining the fundamental rights protection offered by the general prin-
ciples of EU law.
6.3.2 Consolidation of Fundamental Rights in the EU Legal Order
Once the principled decision had been taken that the EU legal order protected 
fundamental rights, the CJEU could further develop and consolidate this pro-
tection. This consolidation was also supported by national supreme courts 
15   Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125, par. 4 a.o.
16   Case C-4/73 Nold ECLI:EU:C:1974:51, par. 13.
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responding positively to the Internationale Handelsgesellschaft and Nold line 
of case law. The German Constitutional Court, for example, showed its good 
will by retreating from its Solange I position to a more deferential approach in 
Solange II.17 As long as fundamental rights would be adequately protected by 
the CJEU, the GCC would not exercise its right to disapply Community law in 
Germany, although it retained the authority to do so where manifest breaches 
of fundamental rights would occur.
An important step in the consolidation of fundamental rights as general 
principles came in Baustahlgewebe.18 In this judgment the CJEU loyally applied 
the ECHR and the case law of the European Court of Fundamental Rights in 
Strasbourg (ECtHR), even though the EU was not, and is not, a party to the 
ECHR. This confirmed the trend of the CJEU de facto respecting the ECHR as 
applied by the Strasbourg court. In addition, Baustahlgewebe was the first case 
where the CJEU actually found a violation of a fundamental right by an EU 
institution. The following paragraphs of the judgment show the transforma-
tion of Article 6 ECHR into a general principle of EU law, which could then be 
applied by the CJEU:
It should be noted that Article 6(1) of the EHRC provides that in the 
determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge 
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a 
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established 
by law.
The general principle of Community law that everyone is entitled to 
fair legal process, which is inspired by those fundamental rights(. . .), 
and in particular the right to legal process within a reasonable period, is 
applicable in the context of proceedings brought against a Commission 
decision (. . .).19
Even though the ECHR or national constitutional rights did not apply directly 
into the EU legal order, therefore, general principles could be used to ‘import’ 
them and transform them into principles that could be applied in the EU legal 
order.
The recognition of fundamental rights in the EU legal order, and the special 
significance of the ECHR in this regard, was further consolidated by the 1992 
Treaty of Maastricht, which introduced the provision that has now become 
17   BVerfGE 73, 339 (1986) Solange II.
18   Case C-185/95 P Baustahlgewebe ECLI:EU:C:1998:608.
19   Case C-185/95 P Baustahlgewebe ECLI:EU:C:1998:608, paras. 20–21.
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Article 6(3) TEU. As a result of this provision, fundamental rights as general 
principles, as well as the relevance of the ECHR, received a direct foundation 
in the Treaty, further cementing their standing and authority.20
6.3.3 The Ascension of Fundamental Rights: The Charter and Kadi
Despite the de facto application of the ECHR through general principles and 
their recognition in the Treaty, worries remained that the protection of funda-
mental rights within the EU might not go far enough, also because the ECHR 
only provides a minimum level of protection. For this reason, an EU Charter of 
fundamental rights was drafted, containing both the traditional fundamental 
rights and some more modern and social rights and ‘principles’.
The Charter was first only ‘solemnly proclaimed’ on 7 December 2007 
at the Nice European Council. Consequently, it did not have formal legal 
binding effect. Rather, it could be used as a tool for the EU to create or inter-
pret the EU general principles that were legally binding. Subsequently, 
however, the Charter eventually became legally binding after the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009. Somewhat embarrassingly, 
it was not considered politically opportune to include the Charter into the 
Treaties directly, this after the debacle of the Constitutional Treaty.21 Instead, 
Article 6(1) TEU only refers to the Charter, and declares that it has the same 
legal value as the Treaty. Consequently, the Charter is now part of EU Primary 
law, and one of the central sources governing fundamental rights in the EU. 
This also means that since Lisbon, fundamental rights are both protected 
under the Charter and under the General principles of EU law, which continue 
to apply.22
20   At the same time, however, it was the same CJEU that blocked the accession of the EU to 
the ECHR. It was argued that the importation of ECHR rights by the CJEU carried the risk 
that the CJEU might, knowingly or unknowingly, get it wrong at some point, and that there-
fore the EU itself should also accede to the ECHR. The CJEU, however, argued that there 
was no sufficient legal basis for accession in Opinion 2/94 Accession by the Community to 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
ECLI:EU:C:1996:140. After this legal basis was created with the Treaty of Lisbon, however, 
the CJEU again blocked accession, inter alia because it might undermine the autonomy of 
EU law. See Opinion 2/13 on the draft agreement providing for the accession of the European 
Union to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454.
21   See EU Chapter 1.
22   See however, section 3.4. below on the scope of the Charter, which is identical to those 
of the general principles and does not create a general human rights jurisdiction for the 
CJEU.
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In addition to the introduction of the Charter, however, recent years saw 
another increase in the importance and standing of fundamental rights and 
general principles in the EU legal order. The key example of this development 
is the Kadi saga. The Kadi cases concerned the imposition of sanctions on indi-
viduals suspected of supporting terrorism. On 17 October 2001 Kadi, a Saudi 
national, was placed on a UN sanctions list because he was suspected of sup-
porting Al Qaeda. This UN sanction was based on resolutions of the Security 
Council under Title VII of the UN charter, and hence claimed absolute primacy 
over all other international law.23 The EU automatically took over all UN sanc-
tions, so on 19 October 2001 Kadi was added to the EU sanctions list. As of that 
moment, all his European assets were frozen. Kadi challenged his EU sanction 
before the CJEU, arguing inter alia that his fundamental rights to a fair trial 
and an effective remedy had been violated. Consequently, the Kadi case lead 
to a direct conflict between EU fundamental rights and a resolution of the UN 
Security Council under Chapter VII.
The General Court essentially found that, under Article 103 UN Charter, the 
UN resolution trumped EU law, unless norms of jus cogens had been violated.24 
The CJEU, however, took the opposite approach. It stressed the foundational 
importance of fundamental rights for the EU legal order, holding inter alia:
Art. 307 EC may in no circumstances permit any challenges to the prin-
ciples that form part of the very foundations of the Community legal order 
(. . .).25
Kadi does not yet form a sufficient basis for the conclusion that some general 
principles may now trump EU primary law. At the same time, it is a striking 
example of just how far fundamental rights and general principles have come 
in the EU legal order since the initial denial of the CJEU in Stork to apply funda-
mental rights at all. At the same time, the impressive rise of fundamental rights 
23   See amongst others Resolution 1904 (2009) and the earlier resolutions mentioned therein, 
as well as Article 103 of the UN Charter.
24   T-315/01 Kadi I [2005] ECR II-3649.
25   ECJ, Case C-402/05 P Kadi [2008] ECRI-6351, par. 304. See for multiple other confirma-
tions of the fundamental importance and hierarchical standing of fundamental rights 
in the EU legal order also paras. 282–326 ECJ. This position was confirmed in Joined Cases 
C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P Kadi II, ECLI:EU:C:2013:518. See also A. Cuyvers, 
‘“Give me one good reason”: The unified standard of review for sanctions after Kadi II’, 
51(6) Common Market Law Review (2014), 1759.
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should not be confused with the creation of a general fundamental rights juris-
diction, as EU fundamental rights only apply within the scope of EU law.
6.4 Protection within the Scope of EU Law Alone
By its very nature, EU law only applies in situations that fall under the scope 
of EU law.26 Most importantly, this means that purely internal situation, i.e. 
situations that wholly take place in one Member State without any connec-
tion to EU law, do not fall under EU law.27 In such purely internal situations, 
EU law does not apply, and hence individuals cannot derive any protection 
from it. For example, if an Austrian police man were to torture an Austrian 
citizen in Austria, the case would likely not have any connection to EU law. 
Consequently, the Austrian citizen could not rely on Article 4 of the EU Charter 
or on the General Principle of EU law that, inspired by Article 3 ECHR, prohibits 
torture. Naturally, the Austrian citizen will have the protection of the Austrian 
constitution, as well as the ECHR directly as Austria, as all EU Member States, 
is a party to the ECHR.
When drafting the Charter, the Member States wanted to make it very clear 
that the Charter does not extend the scope of EU law, and most certainly does 
not create a general jurisdiction for fundamental rights violations. As Article 51 
of the Charter is at pain to stress:
1. The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions, 
bodies, offices and agencies of the Union with due regard for the 
principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they 
are implementing Union law. They shall therefore respect the rights, 
observe the principles and promote the application thereof in 
accordance with their respective powers and respecting the limits 
of the powers of the Union as conferred on it in the Treaties.
2. The Charter does not extend the field of application of Union law 
beyond the powers of the Union or establish any new power or 
task for the Union, or modify powers and tasks as defined in the 
Treaties.’
26   See also EU Chapter 4 par. 2 on the concept of scope.
27   Naturally, all acts by EU institutions or bodies fall under the scope of EU law, and hence 
under the scope of the Charter as well. Cf also Article 51(1) of the EU Charter.
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Despite the fact that Article 51(1) of the Charter only refers to Member States 
when ‘implementing’ Union law, the CJEU has held in Åkerberg Fransson that 
the scope of the Charter is the same as the scope of EU law as such:
Since the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter must therefore 
be complied with where national legislation falls within the scope of 
European Union law, situations cannot exist which are covered in that 
way by European Union law without those fundamental rights being 
applicable. The applicability of European Union law entails applicability 
of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter.
Where, on the other hand, a legal situation does not come within the 
scope of European Union law, the Court does not have jurisdiction to rule 
on it and any provisions of the Charter relied upon cannot, of themselves, 
form the basis for such jurisdiction.28
Over time, the CJEU has clarified that there are three ways of bringing an action 
by a Member State situation under the scope of EU law, and hence the Charter. 
Firstly, Member State actions fall under the scope of EU law where the Member 
State is implementing EU law, for example by implementing a directive. Where 
an individual, for example, is affected by a national law that directly or indi-
rectly implements a directive, she is under the scope of EU law, and hence can 
also rely on EU fundamental rights.29 Secondly, Member States fall under the 
scope of EU law where they are derogating from any rule of EU law. For exam-
ple, any national law that restricts a free movement right, even if it is justified, 
falls under the scope of EU law.30 Lastly, and most complexly, the actions of a 
Member State may also ‘generically’ fall under EU law. For example, this can 
be the case where the subject matter at stake is covered by an EU directive, even 
if the directive itself does not directly apply.31
28   Case C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson ECLI:EU:C:2013:105, paras. 20–21.
29   See for the broad concept applied by the CJEU, which does not just cover national acts that 
directly implement a directive, also Case C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson ECLI:EU:C:2013:105, 
paras. 27–28.
30   See in this context also Case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659.
31   See for example Case C-555/07 Kücükdeveci ECR I-365, where the dispute was brought 
under the scope of EU law based on the directive which did not apply horizontally. Once 
the dispute had been brought under the scope of EU law in this creative manner, the CJEU 
could apply a general principle of EU law to it. For another creative extension to the scope 
of EU law see Case C-34/09 Zambrano [2011] ECR I-1177.
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EU fundamental rights, therefore, have no general application, and the CJEU 
has no general fundamental rights jurisdiction. Despite these limitations, how-
ever, the protection offered by EU fundamental rights was seriously developed 
and improved by first developing substantive EU rights, both as general prin-
ciples and via the Treaties, and secondly, by expanding the scope of EU law as 
such. 
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chapter 7
Judicial Protection under EAC Law: Direct Actions
John Eudes Ruhangisa
7.1 Introduction
Judicial protection entails the guarantees offered by a legal order to the people 
as they individually or collectively enforce their rights or seek redress through 
litigation in the courts of law. In any country, rights on paper conferred by vari-
ous legislation have little meaning if they cannot be claimed by individuals 
and be enforced via available legal remedies.
The concept of judicial protection at national level as well as at interna-
tional level encompasses various elements such as access to justice, the right to 
an effective remedy and principles of fair trial and due process of law.1
The common place where redress or legal remedies can be sought in a 
national legal order is the court of law. Democratic States therefore are under 
obligation to provide to the citizens adequate procedural tools for the real-
ization of this mechanism. The East African Community (EAC) as a demo-
cratic regional organization which aspires to become a political federation 
is no exception and therefore, the EAC has developed mechanisms to enable 
individuals to realize their rights afforded to them under the Treaty for the 
Establishment of the East African Community (Treaty).
7.2 An Overview
In any active partnership, differences, disagreements or disputes are bound to 
happen in the course of realizing the agreed terms by the partners. Inevitably, 
partners in the integration agenda just like partners in a business venture may 
find themselves disagreeing on some matters and such disagreement neces-
sitates the intervention of a neutral person as an arbiter. The dispute requiring 
settlement may be between the member countries inter se, or the institutions 
of the organization against a member country or an individual citizen. In many 
1   For a discussion on judicial protection see: Linda Mario Ravo “The Role of the Principle of 
Effective Judicial Protection in the EU and its Impact on National Jurisdictions”, Ph.D Thesis, 
University of Trieste, pp. 102–104.
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cases the disputes involve the citizens of the member countries and their gov-
ernments or citizens among themselves in the course of interacting and enjoy-
ing the benefits of integration as provided by the Treaty.
Since disagreements among active partners cannot be avoided, it is impor-
tant that the contracting partners put in place a mechanism to deal with this 
eventuality when circumstance deems it necessary.
Being mindful of the above stated possibility and in anticipation of 
there being disagreements, the founding fathers of the EAC made a provision 
for the arbiter in the Treaty.2 The East African Court of Justice (EACJ) was spe-
cifically created as one of the ten organs of the Community,3 and was charged 
with settlement of disputes arising out of the Treaty.4 Its major responsibility 
is to ensure the adherence to law in the interpretation and application of and 
compliance with the Treaty. The EACJ therefore, as the judicial organ of the 
Community, provides judicial protection to the citizens of East Africa through 
judicial pronouncements on matters that are brought before it by anyone seek-
ing judicial protection on a point of EAC law and within the EAC framework.
Indeed the crucial role that both the laws and the courts play in the daily 
lives of citizens, and the crucial role that legal norms play in managing relation-
ships that exist between sovereign states that intend to deepen or widen their 
relationship in the form of regional integration, cannot be overemphasized.5 
Undoubtedly, the Court plays a crucial role in the process towards integra-
tion of the EAC. This role can be effectively realized through the Court’s effec-
tive and efficient execution of its mandate as an arbiter in dispute resolution, 
thereby contributing to confidence building in the region. Invariably the 
Court by playing its role effectively is expected to enhance the observance and 
upholding of human rights through good governance and democratic institu-
tions in the region. All these aspirations and objectives must be reflected in the 
ways the Court conducts its activities including the quality of its judgments 
and the arbitration awards.
The concept of judicial protection is reflected in the Treaty where it cre-
ates legal actions in order that the Partner States, Secretary General, Council of 
2   Chapter Eight of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community (The 
Treaty) is dedicated to the East African Court of Justice.
3   Articles 9 (1) (e) of the Treaty op. cit.
4   Article 23 (1) and 27 (1) of the Treaty op. cit.
5   RUHANGISA, John, “Establishing Independent and Effective Regional Courts: Lessons for 
the SADC Region from the EAC and ECOWAS”, A Paper presented during the SADC Regional 
Colloquium on the SADC Tribunal, Johannesburg, South Africa, 12th–13th March 2013.
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Ministers, legal and natural persons and employees of the Community are able 
to approach the Court for a remedy. These include
(a) A situation where a Partner State or an organ or institution of the 
Community fails to fulfil an obligation under the Treaty or infringes a 
provision of the Treaty;6
(b) An action to question the legality of any Act, regulation, directive, 
decision or action of a Partner State for being ultra vires or unlawful 
or an infringement of the provisions of the Treaty or any rule of law 
relating to its application or that it amounts to a misuse or abuse of 
power;7
(c) Where a Partner State has failed to fulfil an obligation under the 
Treaty or infringes a provision of the Treaty (not by natural persons);8
(d) An action to question the legality of any Act, regulation, directive, deci-
sion or action of a Partner State or an institution of the Community 
whenever such Act, regulation, directive, decision or action is unlawful 
or infringes the provisions of Treaty;9
(e) Whenever a dispute arises between the Community and its employ-
ees concerning the terms and conditions of employment of the 
employees of the Community or the application and interpreta-
tion of the staff rules and regulations and terms and conditions of 
service of the Community.10
The only remedy available in the above actions is court declaratory orders,11 
except for actions concerning terms and conditions of service of employees of 
the Community until when other original, appellate, human rights and other 
jurisdiction will be determined by the Council at a suitable subsequent date 
and a protocol concluded to that effect.12
Subject to the provisions of Article 27 of the Treaty, any person who is resi-
dent in a Partner State may refer for determination by the Court, the legality of 
any Act, regulation, directive, decision or action of a Partner State or an insti-
tution of the Community on the grounds that such Act, regulation, directive, 
6    Article 28 (1) of the Treaty op. cit.
7    Article 28 (2) Ibid.
8    Article 29 Ibid.
9    Article 30 of the Treaty op. cit.
10   Article 31 Ibid.
11   Articles 23(1), 27(1), 33, 34, and 38 of the Treaty.
12   Article 23(2) of the Treaty.
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decision or action is unlawful or is an infringement of the provisions of this 
Treaty.13
The actions that can be brought before the EACJ for judicial remedies 
include: actions for interpretation of the Treaty and Community laws, action 
for annulment, actions for liability, EAC employees’ conflict, reference by 
national courts on points of EAC law, infringement proceedings, arbitration 
and advisory opinions. In all these actions, there is no requirement for exhaus-
tion of local remedies as is the case with many regional and international 
courts.14
7.3 The Action for Annulment
An action for annulment is a legal procedure brought before the EACJ ques-
tioning the legality of an act/decision by a Partner State or by the organs/insti-
tutions of the Community and seeking the review of such acts or decisions. 
The Court shall annul the act concerned if the impugned act or decision is 
found to be contrary to the Treaty or any of the Community laws. Such action 
must be based on the violation or breach of the provisions of the Treaty by 
either the Partner State, or the organ or institution of the Community. This 
kind of intervention can be equated to judicial review under Common Law 
whereby the Court has power to issue the prerogative orders of mandamus and 
certiorari against the government, institutions of government or against the 
agents of government and people in service of the public institutions.
While the legislative and executive organs work towards the creation of an 
environment which furthers political integration by enacting Community laws 
and adopting policies for the implementation of these laws, the judicial organ 
plays the crucial role of interpreting the Treaty and other Community laws 
and in ensuring respect for the founding principles of the Community. The 
EACJ has on several occasions been called upon to invoke its powers to inter-
pret the Treaty and other Community laws with a view to measuring the acts 
of the Partner States or the organs/institutions of the Community against the 
dictates of the Treaty or Community law. The first case to test the waters in this 
area originated from the East African Legislative Assembly (the Assembly), in 
which three members of the Assembly approached the Court in the famous 
13   Article 30 (1) of the Treaty op. cit.
14   Ibid.
 233Judicial Protection under EAC Law
case Callist Andrew Mwatela and Others v. The East African Community.15 This 
was also the first case to be filed with the EACJ.
What gave rise to the dispute in Callist Andrew Mwatela were four Private 
Members’ Bills16 which were pending before the Assembly. The Council of 
Ministers decided that they could take over the Bills seeing as they were policy 
oriented Bills and had implications on the Partner States sovereign interest. 
The Sectoral Council for Legal and Judicial Affairs to which the Council for-
warded the Bills for their expert input, decided that, rather than having leg-
islative acts enacted by the Assembly, protocols would be sufficient and that 
the two Bills should be withdrawn from the Assembly. The Secretary General 
communicated this to the Speaker. Aggrieved by this Council decision, three 
members of the Assembly brought the case before the EACJ seeking the annul-
ment of the report of the Sectoral Council on Legal and Judicial Affairs includ-
ing all its decisions, directives and actions contained in or based on it. With 
reasoned analysis of the issues the Court made the following specific findings, 
considerations, conclusions and holdings:
1. That the Council is empowered under Article 14 of the Treaty to establish 
Sectoral Councils from among its members only. Membership of the Council 
under that Article is restricted to Ministers.
2. (a)  That for the Council of Ministers to be properly constituted, it must 
comprise the stipulated quorum of the “representatives of all Part-
ner States”, in conformity with Rule 11 of the Rules of Procedure of the 
Council
(b) That the Rule applies to Sectoral Council as well, since the decisions of 
Sectoral Council are deemed to be decisions of the Council of Ministers 
under Article 14(3) (i) of the Treaty. Accordingly the establishment of 
the Sectoral Council of September 2005, was inconsistent with the pro-
visions of Article 14(3)(i) of the Treaty.
3. That the meeting of 13th–16th September, 2005 was not lawful meeting of 
a Sectoral Council; and decisions it handed down in respect of the two 
Bills were not valid decisions of the Sectoral Council. Therefore the Court 
ordered annulment of the decisions of the purported “Sectoral Council” 
However, since that Sectoral Council had been in place from 2001 and had 
15   Reference No. 1 of 2005.
16   The East African Community Trade Negotiation Bill, The East African Community Budget 
Bill, The East African Community Immunities and Privileges Bill, and The Inter-University 
Council for East Africa Bill.
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undoubtedly made a number of decisions which it would be unwise to dis-
turb, the Court was of the considered opinion that this was a proper case to 
apply the doctrine of prospective annulment—which the Court held to be 
“good law and practice”. Accordingly, the Court ordered that its annulment 
of this particular Sectoral Council report would not have retrospective effect.
4. (a)  The Treaty does not provide for the members of the Council or the Sec-
toral Council to be represented at meetings by non members
(b) This was deliberate, to avoid distortion of the elaborate structural 
hierarchy of representation of Partner States at the different levels in 
the organizational framework of the Community, in order to uphold 
the objective of the separation of the functions of the different organs 
of the Community.
5. (a)  Ministers of Partner Stats cannot appoint persons who are not Min-
isters to attend meetings of Sectoral Councils or those of the Council 
purportedly on their behalf.
(b) To do so would be to make inroads into the very clear words of Article 
13 of the Treaty.
6. (a)  Although the composition of the Council is established under Article 13 
of the Treaty, the total membership is not readily ascertainable, since 
it is only the membership of Ministers responsible for Regional Coop-
eration which is static and ascertainable.
(b) Apparently membership of additional Ministers is determined by the 
agenda of a particular meeting of the Council. A more transparent 
way of knowing the composition of the Council Members should be 
evolved, to avoid uncertainty and disputes.
Following the Court’s findings, the Treaty was amended to legalize the status 
of Attorney Generals in the Sectoral Council for Legal and Judicial Affairs by 
formally recognizing them as members of the Council. After the amendment, 
the Treaty read:
The Council shall consist of:
(a) The Minister responsible for East African Community affairs of each 
Partner State;
(b)  Such other Minister of the Partner States as each Partner State may 
determine; and
(c) The Attorney General of Each Partner State17
17   Article 13 of the Treaty [Emphasis added].
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Invariably, none of the subsequent requests for annulments was successful 
to obtain an order with retrospective effect. For example, in the case of East 
African Law Society v. The Attorney General of Kenya & 3 Others,18 the Court was 
asked whether the amendments to the Treaty as carried out by the Summit 
could be stopped. The Court declined to invalidate the amendments and 
instead declared that the decision on the requirement of involvement of peo-
ple in the Treaty amendment process shall have prospective application.
In essence the Court hesitated to nullify the impugned amendments but 
warned the Partner States not to repeat the same mistake in future, and if they 
did, such amendments would ipso facto be null and void. This is technically 
known as prospective annulment19 or prospective overruling20 or the doctrine 
of temporary validity. Under normal circumstances nullification by the court 
is prospective, meaning that after the nullification of the action or the law, 
such act or law so nullified by the court becomes void and of no consequence 
from the date the court declares the impugned act or law null. This means 
the impugned affairs remain undisturbed even after the date when the court 
makes the declaration. It has the effect of outlawing new similar future acts. 
The doctrine was devised by the Supreme Court of the United States in the 
case of Linkletter v. Walker, 381 US (1965) 618 to alleviate the inconveniences 
which would have resulted from its new decision which was a departure from 
its previous ruling that impugned the law was constitutional. Likewise the 
EACJ was mindful of the fact that the Sectoral Council for Legal and Judicial 
Affairs had illegally taken many decisions of a policy nature concerning the 
development of the Customs Union. These decisions would be affected and 
18   The Applicants filed this Reference challenging the legality of the process for the December 
2006 Amendments of the EAC Treaty. The Applicants challenge was not directed to the 
substance of these amendments. Rather, they challenged the extra-ordinary hasty man-
ner and the impropriety of the amendment process as being an infringement of Articles 
1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 26, 38 and 150 of the Treaty: namely, failure to have the mandatory 90 days 
period for Partner States’ comments under Article 150(4) and (5): amending the Treaty 
while the EACJ was still seized of a live case on the matter (i.e. Reference No. 1 of 2006); 
and exclusion from the Amendment process of other EAC Organs, State governments, 
and the people and registered of East Africa.
19   The same approach was adopted by the Court in the case of Callist Andrew Mwatela and 
Others vs The East African Community, Reference No. 1 of 2005 when it was called upon to 
nullify the report of the Sectoral Council on Legal and Judicial Affairs including all its 
decisions, directives and actions contained in or based on it.
20   For a discussion on prospective overruling see the decision of the Supreme Court of 
Uganda in the case of The attorney General vs Paul K. Ssemogerere and Hon. Zachary Olum, 
Constitutional Appeal No. 3 of 2004 at pages 138–139.
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serious inconvenience would be caused to the advanced stage that had been 
reached in negotiating the Customs Union Protocol if the EACJ would have 
nullified all such decisions.21
7.4 The Action for Interpretation of the Treaty
In interpreting laws, courts play an important role complementing that of leg-
islators in as far as they give clear and detailed explanations of the content and 
spirit of the laws. In a context of a regional organization aimed at full integra-
tion of Partner States as is the case with the EAC, the judicial pronouncements 
and interpretation of the Community laws assist the policy makers to have a 
common understanding of these laws in order to take informed decisions con-
sistent with their spirit during the implementation stage. The EACJ has actively 
played this role as it transpires from its jurisprudence so far developed.
In the case of Callist Andrew Mwatella & 2 others v. EAC,22 discussed above in 
relation to annulment, the applicants also requested the Court to interpret var-
ious provisions of the Treaty against the actions and decisions of the Council of 
Ministers and the Sectoral Council for Legal and Judicial Affairs. As outlined, 
the Council of Ministers and the Secretariat had illegally assumed control over 
Assembly-led Bills. However, the Council had also purported to withdraw four 
Private Members’ Bills from the Assembly and therefore the application to the 
EACJ questioned the right of the Council to delay the presentation of the Bills 
to the House.
The Court found that the Sectoral Council on Legal and Judicial Affairs was 
not constituted per Treaty, in particular Article 14 which provided that the 
Council of Ministers shall ‘establish from among its members’ Sectoral Councils 
and that Sectoral Council members are restricted to ‘ministers’ as defined 
by the Treaty. The Court found that Kenya and Tanzania were represented by 
non-ministers at the disputed meeting of the 13th to 16th September 2005 and, 
therefore the meeting was not properly constituted and did not amount to a 
lawful Sectoral Council meeting. In this regard, its decision regarding the two 
Bills was ipso facto invalid.
21   See for the options to limit the retrospective effect of an annulment under EU law EU 
Chapter 8.
22   Application No. 1 of 2005. See also the case of Christopher Mtikila v. The Attorney General of 
the United Republic of Tanzania and the Secretary General of the East African Community, 
Reference No. 08 of 2007.
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On another issue the Court interpreted Article 59 (1) to the effect that any 
Member of the Assembly may introduce a Bill in the House as the Council 
does not have exclusive legislative initiative to introduce Bills in the Assembly. 
The Court held that the Assembly owns all Bills once in the Assembly, whether 
they came initially by way of Private Members’ Bills or Community Bills. As 
such, permission of the Assembly would be required for withdrawal of any Bill 
and such approval must be sought and obtained through a motion passed by 
the Assembly. The Court found that the Bills were already in the Assembly, so 
could not be withdrawn by the Council of Ministers as purportedly done and 
that all the Council could do was to delay the debate but could not withdraw 
the Private Members’ Bills.
On the issue concerning the relationship of the Council and the Assembly 
on legislation, the Court held that the decisions of the Council even on pol-
icy issues have no place in areas of jurisdiction of the Summit, Court and 
the Assembly.23 It held that the Assembly is a creature of the Treaty like the 
other organs of the Community and its competence is only on matters con-
ferred upon it by the Treaty as with all Community organs. In this regard, the 
Assembly could only legislate on matters on which the Partner States had sur-
rendered sovereignty or part thereof to the EAC.
By interpreting these Articles of the Treaty, the Court provided guidance 
for future operations of the affairs of the Community by its organs and insti-
tutions. The Court boldly told the Ministers and Attorney Generals that they 
had overstepped their boundaries which was not acceptable in any democratic 
institution.
Another significant case that was brought to the EACJ seeking interpretation 
of the Articles of the Treaty vis-à-vis the actions of a Partner State was Anyang’ 
Nyong’o & others v. The Attorney General of Kenya & Others.24 The main conten-
tion in this reference was whether Kenya’s process of electing the nine persons 
deemed to be its members in the Assembly and the rules of the Kenya National 
Assembly for Assembly elections infringed Article 50 of the EAC Treaty.
The EACJ considered the possible meanings of the expression “the National 
Assembly shall elect” as stated in Article 50 of the Treaty. The Court found that 
it can only mean “shall choose by vote” taking the ordinary meaning of the 
phrase and that reference to “democratic election of persons to political office” 
is understood to mean election by voting. Furthermore, the Court found that 
this interpretation of the meaning of “elect” is borne out by the practice in 
each Partner State of electing the Speaker and Deputy Speaker in the National 
23   Article 14 (3) (c) and Article 16 of the Treaty, op. cit.
24   Reference No. 1 of 2006.
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Assembly through voting. In all Partner States, the National Assembly executes 
the function of electing Speaker and Deputy Speaker by voting in one form or 
another and the extent of discretion of the National Assemblies is to deter-
mine what procedure should be applied for the voting. The Court held that 
the bottom line for compliance with Article 50 is that the decision to elect is a 
decision of and by the National Assembly not another caucus.
Finally, on whether the Kenyan rules complied with Article 50, the Court 
held that the election rules partially comply with Article 50 of the Treaty in 
so far as they provide for proportional representation of political parties. 
However, there was a significant degree of non-compliance in the failure to 
make a provision for gender and other special interest representation. The 
major deviation found in the Kenyan rules was the non-provision for election. 
The Court held that the election rules and actual process was the antithesis of 
an election, as the rules “deemed” the nine elected in order to circumvent the 
express Treaty provision.
7.5 EAC-Employee Conflicts
The jurisdiction of the EACJ includes hearing and determining disputes 
between the Community and its employees which arise out of the terms 
and conditions of their employment; the application and interpretation of 
the staff rules and regulations; or the terms and conditions of service of the 
Community.25 This is another area where the Court has not performed well in 
terms of statistics of cases that have been filed and determined. As of November 
2015, only two cases, Alloys Mutabingwa v. the Secretary General of the East 
African Community26 and Angela Amudo v. the East African Community,27 had 
been filed.
The former case concerned the claim by Mr Alloys Mutabingwa following 
the refusal by the Secretariat to compensate him full remuneration for the 
remainder of contract, which had been cut short by the EAC. Such remunera-
tion was a mandatory requirement under Rule 96(3) of the EAC Staff Rules and 
Regulations. However, the case could not go for trial as the claimant withdrew 
his claim.
25   Article 31 of the Treaty, op. cit.
26   Claim No. 1 of 2011.
27   Claim No. 2 of 2012.
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In the latter case, Ms Angela Amudo sought a declaration concerning the 
tenure of appointment given to her which was initially for a period of 20 
months with subsequent periodical extensions of the appointment up to 30th 
April 2012. Amudo submitted that such tenure was ultra vires, considering 
the powers of the Secretary General and his deputies, and also inconsistent 
with the Staff Rules and Regulations of the Respondent, and as such she was 
entitled to a contract of employment for a period of 5 years from the date of 
assumption of duty renewable for another 5 years. The claim was heard by the 
Court and judgment was partly entered in her favour. Ms Amudo appealed in 
relation to the part of her claim that she lost, however, the Appellate Division 
dismissed the appeal and allowed the cross-appeal on the basis that the 
Appellant’s position was not an established position in the Community and 
therefore Ms Amudo could not have been regarded as a member of staff under 
the Staff Rules and Regulations.
7.6 Direct Appeals from Other Courts on Points of EAC Law
The jurisdiction of the Court as presently constituted does not include direct 
appeals from national courts.28 Instead, the Treaty prescribes the jurisdiction 
of the Court to include references, by national courts, for preliminary ruling 
when a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Partner State con-
cerning the interpretation or application of the provisions of the Treaty or the 
validity of the regulations, directives, decisions or actions of the Community.29 
The procedure operates so that national courts or tribunals shall, if they con-
sider that a ruling on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, 
request the EACJ to give a preliminary ruling on the question.
Furthermore, under the proviso to Article 27(1), the Court’s jurisdiction to 
interpret the Treaty shall not include the application of any such interpreta-
tion to the jurisdiction conferred by the Treaty on organs of the Partner States. 
This Article should be read together with Article 33 which reads—
28   Such direct appeals should be distinguished from the preliminary questions procedure, 
discussed in Chapter 8, which allows national courts to ask questions to the EACJ during 
national proceedings, but does not allow parties to appeal to the EACJ.
29   Article 34 of the Treaty, op. cit.
Eudes Ruhangisa240
(1) Except where jurisdiction is conferred on the Court by thisTreaty, dis-
putes to which the Community is a party shall not on that ground 
alone, be excluded from the jurisdiction of the national court of the 
Partner States.
(2) Decisions of the Court on the interpretation and application of this 
Treaty shall have precedence over decisions of national courts on a 
similar matter.
The Court seems to have concurrent jurisdiction with national courts on the 
interpretation of the Treaty, but decisions of the Court take precedence over 
decisions of the national courts. This position, as it currently stands, may be a 
breeding ground for confusion. The EACJ in The East African Law Society and 
4 Others v. The Attorney General of Kenya and 3 Others,30 made the following 
pertinent observation on this issue—
By the provisions under Articles 23,33(2) and 34, the Treaty established 
the principle of overall supremacy of the Court over the interpreta-
tion and application of the Treaty, to ensure harmony and certainty. 
The new (a) proviso to Article 27; and (b) paragraph (3) of Article 30, 
have the effect of compromising that principle and/or of contradicting 
the main provision. It should be appreciated that the question of what 
“the Treaty reserves for an institution of a Partner State” is a provision 
of the Treaty and a matter that ought to be determined harmoniously 
and with certainty. If left as amended the provisions are likely to lead 
to conflicting interpretations of the Treaty by national courts of the 
Partner States.
Also in Prof. Peter Anyang’ Nyongo and 10 Others v. The Attorney General of 
Kenya and 2 Others and Abdirahim Haitha Abdi and 11 Others31, the Court had 
this to say—
The purpose of these provisions is obviously to ensure uniform inter-
pretation and avoid possible conflicting decisions and uncertainty in 
the interpretation of the same provisions of the Treaty. Article 33(2) 
appears to envisage that in the course of determining a case before it a 
national court may interpret and apply a Treaty provision. Such envis-
aged interpretation however, can only be incidental. The article neither 
provides for nor envisages a litigant directly referring a question as to the 
30   Reference No. 3 of 2007.
31   Reference No. 1 of 2006.
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interpretation of a Treaty provision to a national Court. Nor is there any 
other provision directly conferring on the national Court jurisdiction to 
interpret the Treaty.
It is important that this uncertainty in the Treaty provisions should be made 
clearer by amending the Treaty as appropriate. Therefore the Treaty, protocols 
and any Community law are the core generators of the work of the Court, and 
the Court can entertain any dispute arising out of these instruments. However, 
a continuing number of protocols contradicting the position of the Treaty 
have been enacted. Other parallel dispute resolution mechanisms (national 
courts and quasi-judicial bodies) have been established. For instance, 
Article 41(2) of the EAC Customs Union Protocol which deals with dispute set-
tlement, establishes committees to handle disputes arising out of the Protocol 
and gives these committees finality in determining the disputes. The Court is 
left out and therefore denied a role in this process except if a party challenges 
the decision of the committee on grounds of fraud, lack of jurisdiction or other 
illegality. Again, under Article 54(2) of the Common Market Protocol, jurisdic-
tion to entertain Common Market related disputes has mainly been given to 
national courts. At the same time Article 33(2) of the Treaty recognizes the 
EACJ’s decisions on the interpretation of the Treaty and Community law as 
being superior to a national courts decision on the same matter. Since the EACJ 
does not form part of the hierarchy of the national judicatures, the Common 
market related dispute to be handled by national institutions will also follow 
the relevant national court system in case a party seeks to appeal against the 
decision of such national institution. This tendency of the Partner States to 
oust the jurisdiction of their own joint Court, is not conducive to the integra-
tion agenda. It has the effect of undermining the Court itself and causing con-
fusion in the development of the uniform regional jurisprudence.32
7.7 Appeals as a Remedy
The Treaty provides that appeals from judgments and orders of the First 
Instance Division shall lie to the Appellate Division.33 However, there are two 
areas in the Treaty where such a mechanism may not be appropriate: firstly, on 
matters of referral of certain disputed questions from the national courts to 
32   Compare in this regard also the rulings of the CJEU defending its ultimate authority as 
final arbiter of EU law, also to protect the unity of EU law, as discussed in EU Chapter 4.
33   Article 35A of the Treaty, op. cit.
Eudes Ruhangisa242
the EACJ;34 and secondly, on matters of request for advisory opinions on ques-
tions of law arising from the Treaty.35
As alluded to earlier a national court or tribunal before which a ques-
tion arises as to the interpretation or application of the Treaty, is required to 
request the EACJ to give a preliminary ruling on the matter, in order to enable 
the national court or tribunal before which the question has arisen to give 
its judgment on the parent matter. Where should such a referral go to, First 
Instance Division or Appellate Division? The Court has taken the initiative 
and invoked its rule-making powers under Article 42 of the Treaty by amend-
ing the EACJ Rules of Procedure and introduced Rule 76 to address this issue. 
Rule 76 (1) provides as follows—
A request by a national Court or tribunal of a Partner State concerning 
the interpretation or application of the provisions of the Treaty or valid-
ity of any regulations directives, decisions or actions of the Community 
pursuant to Article 34 of the Treaty shall be lodged in the Appellate 
Division by way of a case stated.
This may be a stop-gap measure, however, it is imperative that proper jurisdic-
tional boundaries are provided for in the Treaty itself.
To date the national referral jurisdiction has remained essentially dormant 
in the EACJ with only two referrals from the High Court of Kenya and High 
Court of Uganda having been filed so far in the registry of the EACJ.36
The potential for referral is overwhelming, however, unfortunately, that 
potential has not been utilised. This failure cannot be attributed to a scar-
city of disputed questions in the Partner States’ national courts. The paucity 
of referrals is most likely due to various factors including lack of knowledge 
and non-awareness concerning the availability of this mechanism. The EACJ, 
national courts as well as the Bar Associations across the region have to sen-
sitize the litigating public and all other concerned stakeholders about this 
jurisdiction.
34   Article 34 of the Treaty, Ibid. See also Rule 76 (1) of the East African Court of Justice Rules 
of Procedure.
35   Article 36 of the Treaty, op. cit. See also Rule 75 (1) of the East African Court of Justice 
Rules of Procedure.
36   See on this point also chapter 8, as well as the very different situation in the EU as set out 
in EU Chapter 8.
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In the European Union, referrals for preliminary rulings from national 
courts do make up a significant part of the CJEU’s workload.37 Thus, the juris-
prudence of the European Court has seeped down and saturated the roots of 
the national courts of all European Member States.
7.8 Infringement Proceedings
All proceedings in the EACJ require the Court to interpret either the Treaty or 
other Community laws in order to determine the issues before it. Infringement 
proceedings like other actions involve the interpretation of the law vis-à-vis the 
impugned action. A significant number of actions for infringement in the EACJ 
have largely involved the examination of the facts relating to adherence to the 
principles of democracy, the rule of law, promotion and protection of human 
and peoples’ rights.
The regional cooperation put in place under the Treaty is people- 
centered and market driven.38 If democracy means the rule of the people by 
the people, and is one of the fundamental principles of the EAC, then the EAC 
working strategy must focus on participation of all social groups from the bot-
tom to the top.
When it was asked to consider if by reason of failure to carry out wide con-
sultations within Partner States on proposals for amendments, the process 
constituted an infringement of the Treaty in any way, the Court found that:
It is common knowledge that the private sector and civil society partici-
pated in the negotiations that led to the conclusion of the Treaty among 
the Partner States and, as we have just observed, that they continue to 
participate in the making of Protocols thereto. Furthermore, as we noted 
earlier in this judgment, Article 30 entrenches the people’s right to par-
ticipate in protecting the integrity of the Treaty. We think that construing 
the Treaty as if it permits sporadic amendments at the whims of officials 
without any form of consultation with stakeholders would be a recipe for 
regression to the situation lamented in the preamble of “lack of strong 
participation of the private sector and civil society” that led to the col-
lapse of the previous Community.39
37   See the discussion in EU Chapter 8.
38   Treaty, Article 7 (1) (a).
39   East Africa Law Society and 4 others v. Attorney General of Kenya and 3 others, type written 
judgment p. 30.
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The Court went on to conclude that:
[F]ailure to carry out consultation outside the Summit, Council and the 
Secretariat was inconsistent with a principle of the Treaty and therefore 
constituted an infringement of the Treaty (. . .).40
As regards, the principle of promotion and protection of human and peoples’ 
rights, it must be noted that for any regional court to be seen as an integrating 
institution, it has inter alia to facilitate the integration process through the rec-
ognition of the rights of individuals.
Although explicit human rights jurisdiction is yet to be operationalized, the 
Court has been courageous enough to ensure that basic rights of individuals 
are respected. On more than one occasion, the Court has had to consider pre-
liminary objections from defendants alleging lack of locus standi by individuals 
and legal persons. The Court has consistently upheld that individuals and legal 
persons have access to the Court under Article 30 of the Treaty,41 which is a 
basic right to the regional justice mechanism enabling the peoples to “partici-
pate in protecting the integrity of the Treaty.”42 An infringement of the rights of 
the citizens of East Africa by the Partner State or by the organs or institutions 
of the Community is therefore actionable in the EACJ. However, the Court has 
strictly entertained such proceedings if and only if the impugned action or deci-
sion is by either the Partner State or the organ or institution of the Community. 
In the case of Modern Holdings (EA) Limited v. Kenya Port Authority, Reference 
No. 1 of 2008 the Court held that the Kenya Ports Authority lacked the authority 
to be sued because it was not an institution of the Community created under 
Article 9 (2) of the Treaty or a surviving institution of the defunct EAC, instead 
it was created under section 3 of the Kenya Ports Authority Act as a statutory 
body with perpetual succession, a common seal and power to sue and be sued 
in its corporate name.
This ruling has been criticized as it is perceived that the Court “shot 
itself in the foot”. Critics would have wished in the seemingly borderline 
cases like this that the Court would have made a finding that it had jurisdiction 
40   As above p. 31.
41   Cases Prof. Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o and Others v. Attorney General of Kenya and Others; 
Christopher Mtikila v. The Attorney General of the United Republic of Tanzania and the 
Secretary General of the East African Community and East Africa Law Society and 4 others v. 
Attorney General of Kenya and 3 others.
42   East Africa Law Society and 4 others v. Attorney General of Kenya and 3 Others.
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just like it did in James Katabazi & 21 others v. The Secretary General of the East 
African Community & Another,43 where even after finding that it had no direct 
jurisdiction, it still found a way of dealing with the matter. In Katabazi, the 
Court read the Treaty in toto and invoked the spirit of the Treaty instead of con-
centrating on the wording of the Treaty. The Court in that case said inter alia:
Does this court have jurisdiction to deal with human rights issues? The 
quick answer is: No it does not have. . . . It is very clear that jurisdiction 
with respect to human rights requires a determination of the Council and 
a conclusion of a protocol to that effect. Both of those steps have not 
been taken. It follows, therefore, that this Court may not adjudicate on 
disputes concerning violation of human rights per se. . . . While the Court 
will not assume jurisdiction to adjudicate on human rights disputes, 
it will not abdicate from exercising its jurisdiction of interpretation under 
Article 27 (1) merely because the reference includes allegation of human 
rights violation.44
At the time of inception, the Court of Justice of the European Union had very 
limited jurisdiction as well, as Karen J Alter said:
The ECJ was created to fill three limited roles for the member states: 
ensuring that the Commission and the Council of Ministers did not 
exceed their authority, filling vague aspects of EC laws through dispute 
resolution, and deciding on charges of non compliance raised by the 
Commission or member states.45
However, even with that limited jurisdiction, over time the CJEU asserted itself 
and provided guidance to the policy organs by interpreting the Treaty for pros-
perity.46 In the words of Alec Stone Sweet and James A. Caporaso:
The community treaties started as a set of legal arrangements bind-
ing on the member states but with a lot of help from the creative ECJ 
have evolved into a vertically integrated legal regime conferring legally 
43   Reference No. 1 of 2007.
44   Ibid., typewritten judgment pp. 15–17.
45   Karen J Alter,” Who are the Master of the Treaty”?: European Governments and the 
European Court of Justice, International Organization 52 (1998) 121–147 p. 124.
46   See also EU Companion Chapters 4 and 9.
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enforceable rights and obligations on all persons and entities public and 
private within the EC territory.47
This was not achieved easily since the European Court was first and foremost 
established with limited roles, just like the EACJ.
The Court has also declined to entertain matters where its jurisdiction is 
in doubt.48 In Prof. Anyang’ Nyongo and Others v. the Attorney General of the 
Republic of Kenya and Others, Ref. No.1 of 2006, the Court struck out the refer-
ence against two individuals for lack of capacity as they were wrongly sued. To 
clarify on whether a person can bring action under Article 30 against a natural 
person who commits misfeasance that infringe on provisions of the Treaty the 
Court held:
. . . A reference under Article 30 of the Treaty should not be construed as 
an action in tort brought by a person injured by or through the misfea-
sance of another. It is action to challenge the legality under the Treaty of 
an activity of a Partner State or of an institution of the Community. The 
alleged collusion and connivance, if any, is not actionable under Article 
30 of the Treaty.49
7.8.1 Infringement Proceedings Initiated by a Partner State
Ordinarily, infringement proceedings which are initiated by a Partner State, 
like those instituted by individuals, are ordinary suits that come to the Court 
by way of reference.50 As highlighted earlier in this chapter, a Partner State 
which considers that another Partner State or an organ or institution of the 
Community has infringed a provision of the Treaty, may refer the matter to 
the Court for adjudication.51 Furthermore, the Treaty gives power to a Partner 
47   Alec Stone Sweet and James A.Caporaso, From Free Trade to Supranational Policy: 
The European Court and Integration in Waynes Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet (eds), 
European Integration and Supranational Governance, Oxford University, 1998, pp. 92–133 
at p. 102.
48   Christopher Mtikila and Others v. The Attorney General of the United Republic of Tanzania, 
Ref No.2 of 2007.
49   Prof. Anyang’ Nyongo and Others v. the Attorney General of the Republic of Kenya and 
Others, Ref. No.1 of 2006, page 7.
50   This term has no special meaning but it originates from the verb “refer” to represent and 
distinguish the cases in the East African Court of Justice with those in the national courts 
where such cases would be known as suits or claims.
51   Article 28 (1) of the Treaty, op. cit.
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State to refer for determination by the Court, the legality of any Act, regulation, 
directive, decision or action on the ground that it is ultra vires or unlawful or 
an infringement of the provisions of the Treaty or any rule of law relating to its 
application or amounts to a misuse or abuse of power.52
Despite the availability of this machinery, no single Partner State has ever 
dared bring action against another Partner State on ground of infringement 
of the Treaty. This inaction does not mean that there have not been Treaty 
infringements.53 Some infringements were, in fact, glaringly obvious. For 
example, the 2015 unfair and non-peaceful elections in the Republic of Burundi 
and the subsequent killings or disappearance of people who expressed 
dissatisfaction with the manner in which the entire election was conducted. 
Moreover, the post-2007 election violence in Kenya which led to the prosecu-
tion of the President and Vice President54 at the International Criminal Court, 
as well as the scramble for Mingigo Island between the Republics of Kenya and 
Uganda are further examples of unabated Treaty infringements.
7.8.2 Infringement Proceedings Initiated by the Secretary General
The Secretary General has powers to bring an action against a Partner State 
for infringement of the Treaty where he considers that a Partner State has 
failed to fulfil an obligation under the Treaty or has infringed a provision of 
the Treaty.55 However, the procedure for actualization of these powers by the 
Secretary General as laid down by the Treaty is cumbersome and makes it vir-
tually impossible for him to exercise these powers. The Secretary General is 
required, before approaching the Court, to first submit his or her findings to 
the Partner State concerned so that Partner State can submit its observations 
on the findings by the Secretary General.56
If the Partner State concerned does not submit its observations to the 
Secretary General within four months, or if the observations submitted are 
unsatisfactory, the Secretary General shall refer the matter to the Council 
which shall decide whether the matter should be referred by the Secretary 
52   Article 28 (2) Ibid.
53   At one point the Republic of Kenya was about to go to war with the Republic of Uganda, a 
fellow Partner State quarreling for Migingu a rocky island in Lake Victoria. Even the Kenya 
2007/08 post- election violence were never taken to the East African Court of Justice for 
their potential infringements of the Treaty until they found space in the ICC (The Hague) 
at the instance of the international community.
54   The charges against these Statesmen and top leaders of the Government of Kenya were 
subsequently dropped following lack of evidence.
55   Article 29 of the Treaty, op. cit.
56   Article 29 (1) of the Treaty Ibid.
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General to the Court immediately or be resolved by the Council.57 It is appar-
ent that the Secretary General’s powers to bring in Court an action for infringe-
ment of the Treaty against a Partner State is subject to two conditions: firstly; 
the Council should have failed to resolve the matter; and secondly, the Council, 
having failed to resolve the matter, should have directed the Secretary General 
to refer the matter to the Court. Short of that, the Secretary General cannot on 
his own imitative take action against a Partner State which infringes the Treaty. 
These conditions explain the non-existence of any reference by the Secretary 
General to date.
7.9 Arbitration before the EACJ
The EACJ can constitute itself as an arbitration tribunal.58 The Treaty confers 
arbitration mandate to the Court to the effect that:
The Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any matter:
(a) arising from an arbitration clause contained in a contract or agree-
ment which confers such jurisdiction to which the Community or any 
of its institutions is a party; or
(b) arising from a dispute between the Partner States regarding this Treaty 
if the dispute is submitted to it under a special agreement between the 
Partner States concerned; or
(c) arising from an arbitration clause contained in a commercial contract 
or agreement in which the parties have conferred jurisdiction on the 
Court.59
The Court formulated the rules to govern arbitration proceedings after con-
sulting its major stakeholders. These rules wait to be tested as soon as matters 
are referred to the Court for arbitration. It is a clear fact that, no arbitrator can 
arbitrate any matter unless the parties appoint him or include a clause in their 
agreement to the effect that in case of dispute they would all submit them-
selves to a certain arbitrator for arbitration.
57   Article 29 (2) of the Treaty, Ibid.
58   See also a discussion by John Eudes Ruhangisa, “Procedures and Functions of the East 
African Court of Justice”, in Kennedy Gastorn, Harad Sippel and Ulrike Wanizek (eds), 
Processes of Legal Integration in the East African Community,-TGCL Series 2, Dar es Salaam 
University Press, Dar es Salaam, 2011, pp. 145–172.
59   Article 32 of the Treaty, op. cit.
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Although appointing the EACJ as arbitrator has many advantages vis-à-vis 
other arbitration fora,60 it is doubtful whether any parties have actually 
appointed it, as there has not been any litigation to compel the parties to 
choose the Court. Even the governments of the Partner States have not utilised 
the seemingly free services of the Court as far as arbitration is concerned but 
find it easier to go abroad and exclude an institution of their own creation. 
Lawyers in East Africa have a big role to play in advising their clients of the 
arbitral jurisdiction of the EACJ especially at the time of drafting commercial 
agreements.
There could be many reasons for this unusual reaction by the people of 
East Africa especially the business community. The wait and see tendency 
could be one of the possible reasons explaining the slow momentum in utilis-
ing the Court’s arbitral jurisdiction. As the EACJ’s arbitral jurisdiction is new, 
people may hesitate to risk filing their matters in the institute whose work-
ings are unknown. Moreover, the double role being played by the Court, where 
on the one hand it functions as the Court of Justice and on the other hand 
as the arbitration tribunal, places it in difficult situation of making its stake-
holders understand its definite status. Stakeholders would like to be assured 
that Judges sitting as arbitrators will behave differently from the way they 
behave while presiding over matters in court rooms, bearing in mind the fact 
that arbitration is a specialised discipline of dispute settlement. Arguably, the 
arbitral jurisdiction puts the eminence of the EACJ as a court of law at risk. 
Furthermore, the multiple jurisdictions of the Court as the Court of Justice,61 
as a court of human rights,62 as a labour court63 and as an arbitration court64 
may negatively impact on its efficiency should all these jurisdictions be fully 
operationalised.
Despite the Court’s efforts in 2006 and thereafter to prepare itself for han-
dling arbitration disputes by providing its Judges with arbitration skills through 
training, all such Judges have since retired without arbitrating any matter. As 
a result, the Court has to retrain Judges every time they complete their con-
tractual tenure. The Court has spent a substantial amount of its financial 
resources to train the Judges who subsequently depart without leaving behind 
60   Such advantages include the fact that parties to arbitration are not required to pay arbi-
trators’ fee as the arbitrators are paid by East African Community in their capacities as 
Judges.
61   Article 27 of the Treaty, op. cit.
62   Article 27 (2) Ibid.
63   Article 31, Ibid.
64   Article 32, Ibid.
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the fruits of such investment. In effect, the Court has been turned into a train-
ing ground for arbitrators who do not benefit it. Since 2001, when the Court 
was inaugurated, only one case, Nayebare Alice v. East Africa Law Society,65 has 
been arbitrated. The Claimant’s claim was for a total sum of USD 48,387.00, 
which constituted payment for various employment benefits covering salary 
emoluments, leave and repatriation allowances, sundry and other termination 
benefits. In addition, the Claimant prayed for an order that: “the Respondent 
clears and/or signs the requisite NSSF forms to enable the Claimant access 
her NSSF savings.” The arbitral claim was heard and an award given on 9th 
May 2014 to the effect that the Claimant was entitled to a monetary award of 
USD 8,534 plus interest on the amount at the Tanzanian rate from 9th May, 
2014 until payment in full and that the Respondent should within 7 days of the 
award remit USD 724.50 to NSSF as its contribution for the claimant, covering 
a period between September–December 2004.
7.10 Advisory Opinions of the EACJ
The Treaty confers jurisdiction on the Court to give advisory opinions regard-
ing a question of law arising from the Treaty which affects the Community.66 
This is a rare, if not inexistent, in municipal jurisdiction in common law coun-
tries. It was however, sourced from the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(itself largely of the continental legal systems).67 Among the organs and insti-
tutions of the Community, it is only the Council of Ministers that may request 
advisory opinions from the Court.68 It makes sense to make the request for 
advisory opinions one of the functions of the Council of Ministers which is 
the policy organ of the Community. However, what is objectionable is to make 
the Council of Ministers the only and sole organ which can request advisory 
opinions from the Court. The Council is not an active and operational execu-
tive arm of the Community and therefore unable to encounter issues which 
may require the Court’s interpretation or advisory opinion. Ordinarily, it is 
only issues of policy nature about which the Council may require the Court’s 
opinion. The implementation of the Treaty and the decisions of the execu-
tive organs of the Community is the responsibility of the Secretary General. 
65   Arbitration Cause No. 1 of 2012.
66   Article 36, Ibid.
67   See EU Chapter 7.
68   Article 14 (4) of the Treaty, op. cit.
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However, paradoxically, the Secretary General who in the course of executing 
his duties is likely to encounter challenges that may necessitate judicial pro-
nouncement by way of advisory opinion, has no powers to approach the Court 
for advisory opinion on any matter. It can be argued that such powers for seek-
ing advisory opinion could be given to the Assembly provided due regard is 
taken to preserve separation of powers among these two organs. As a result, 
the Council of Ministers has been hesitant to approach the Court for an advi-
sory opinion although there have been disagreements especially at Council 
level which the Court would have given its advisory opinion if approached.
Bearing in mind the seriousness of such issues, should advisory opinions be 
rendered by Court of First Instance, subject to appeal to the Appellate Division 
or by the Appellate Division, whose decisions are final? There is no guidance 
in the Treaty on this issue so the Court took a decision to put a request for an 
advisory opinion, within the jurisdiction of the Appellate Division due to the 
fact that it is not appealable. Rule 75 (1) of the EACJ Rules of Procedure was 
introduced to the effect that:
A request for an advisory opinion under Article 36 of the Treaty shall be 
lodged in the Appellate Division and shall contain an exact statement of 
the question upon which an opinion is required and shall be accompa-
nied by all relevant documents likely to be of assistance to the Division.
This was yet another stop-gap measure taken by the Court to fill a void.
Only two cases, Advisory Opinion No. 1 of 2008 In the matter of a Request by 
the Council of Ministers of the East African Community for an Advisory Opinion 
and Advisory Opinion No. 2 of 2015 In the matter of a Request by the Council of 
Ministers of the East African Community for an Advisory Opinion have since 
been referred to the EACJ by the Council of Ministers.
In the first request the issues were whether the principle of variable 
geometry69 was in harmony with the requirement for consensus in decision-
making and whether the principle of variable geometry could apply to guide 
the integration process, notwithstanding the requirement on consensus in 
decision-making by the Community’s top organs (Summit of EAC Heads of 
State, and Council of Ministers). The First Instance Division of the Court deliv-
ered its opinion on 24th April 2009 that the principle of variable geometry is 
69   Under the principle of “Variable Geometry”, groups within the East African Community 
are allowed progression in cooperation for wider integration schemes in different fields 
and at different speeds. See Article 7 (1) of the Treaty.
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in harmony with the requirement for consensus in the decision-making pro-
cess of the EAC organs. Consensus is a purely decision-making mechanism; 
while variable geometry is a strategy for implementation of the decisions so 
made (bearing in mind the capacity of each Partner State to implement the 
particular decisions). Consensus does not mean unanimity when used in 
the EAC Treaty.
As for the second and most current request which is pending a ruling on 
19th November 2015, the issue was whether forfeiture of a position of a Deputy 
Secretary General by a Partner State under Article 67(2) of the Treaty for the 
purpose of making way for an incoming Secretary General from the same 
Partner State was in effect a withdrawal of such Deputy Secretary General.
The procedure for advisory opinions represents another dormant poten-
tial, waiting to be tapped, not only to resolve substantive questions of law that 
arise, but also to engage the Court which is waiting to contribute to the lively 
jurisprudence of the region.
7.11 Conclusion
Regional integration has become the world’s major inclination due to the effect 
of globalization. Africa as a continent and East Africa as a sub region has not 
been left out in this crusade due to the forces that dictate the prevailing world 
dimension. If any regional integration is to succeed those who are involved in 
the process should appreciate the need for building strong institutions instead 
of banking on the rarely available strong individuals to spearhead the process. 
Whereas effective and strong institutions can endure indefinitely, effective 
individual leaders come and go.
The EAC model of integration is unique in that it is structured as a State and 
aims ultimately to become a political federation. All its organs and institutions 
are working towards the achievement of this challenging goal. The EACJ for 
its part is participating in the process by providing judicial interpretation of 
the Treaty and other Community laws and in ensuring respect for the found-
ing principles of the Community. Its jurisprudence so far has proven that the 
Court has modeled itself to the standards of a respectable and independent 
organ that encourages public interest litigation.
The peoples of East Africa should know that the integration process on 
which the EAC has embarked is for them. The rights that flow from the Treaty 
are for them. They should enjoy them and claim them where necessary 
through the regional justice mechanism put in place by the Treaty as the Court 
attempts to create an environment conducive to public interest litigation.
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The discussion in this topic has highlighted the judicial protection mecha-
nisms under the Treaty within EAC framework. A section of the population 
has attempted to seek remedy and realize the rights afforded to them by the 
Treaty. However, reflecting on the discussion above, it may be questioned as to 
whether the existing judicial protection mechanisms are as effective as they 
could or should be. 
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chapter 7A
Judicial Protection under EU Law: Direct Actions
Armin Cuyvers
7.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the different direct actions under EU law.1 The term 
direct action indicates that these legal actions provide parties with a rem-
edy directly before the Court of Justice or the General Court. Only five direct 
actions exist under EU law, being the action for annulment, the action for inac-
tion, an action for damages against the EU, the infringement proceeding and 
the request for an advisory opinion from the CJEU. Most of these actions have 
a rather limited scope, or like the action for annulment are only open to a very 
limited category of applicants. The limited availability of direct actions fur-
ther emphasizes the point already made in chapter 2, namely the crucial role 
played by national courts in the interpretation and application of EU law.2 It 
also helps to explain the central importance of the preliminary reference pro-
cedure discussed in EU chapter 8.
7.2 The Action for Annulment
Article 263 TFEU allows certain applicants to bring an action for annul-
ment against all legal acts from EU institutions or other EU bodies, offices or 
agencies. An action for annulment, however, cannot be brought against EU pri-
mary law.3
1   For a more elaborate analysis on direct actions see amongst many others P. Craig and G. De 
Búrca, EU Law (6th edn, OUP 2015), chapters 12–16.
2   Also see on this point EU Chapter 8 par. 1.
3   For a discussion of the fascinating question if primary law or proposed Treaty amendments 
can ever violate (even) higher principles of EU law, and for that reason be annulled or disap-
plied see Unierecht N. Idriz-Tescan, Legal constraints on EU Member States as primary law 
makers: a case study of the proposed permanent safeguard clause on free movement of persons in 
the EU negotiating framework for Turkey’s accession (Diss. Leiden 2015, Meijersreeks;MI-247), 
or A. Cuyvers, ‘The Kadi II judgment of the General Court: the ECJ’s predicament and the 
consequences for Member States’. European Constitutional Law Review, 7, pp. 481–510.
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These acts may be challenged ‘on grounds of lack of competence, infringe-
ment of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaties or 
of any rule of law relating to their application, or misuse of powers.’4 Especially 
considering the inclusion of the catch-all ground of ‘infringement of the 
Treaties’ this essentially means that an act can be challenged for any violation 
of EU law. This includes, for example, the use of an incorrect legal basis as dis-
cussed in EU chapter 3, or a conflict with a fundamental right. An EU act can 
only be annulled, however, where it violates a higher norm of EU law. A legis-
lative act adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure, for example, can 
only be annulled for a conflict with higher norms such as a General Principle 
of EU law, the Charter, or provisions in the TEU or TFEU, but not for a conflict 
with lower rules such as delegated or implementing acts.
The most complex and contested issue under Article 263 TFEU concerns the 
three different categories of applicants that are allowed to bring an action for 
annulment, and especially the very limited standing of individuals to do so.5 As 
EAC law does not impose similar restrictions on individuals that want to bring 
an action for annulment, a detailed overview on this point would be of limited 
comparative value. Consequently, this section only gives a general overview of 
the legal complexities surrounding the standing of individuals under Article 
263 TFEU.6
The first category, the so-called privileged applicants, consists of the 
Member States, the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission. 
These applicants have a general right to start an action for annulment against 
any EU legal act, without having to prove any legal interest whatsoever.
The second category consists of the Court of Auditors, the European Central 
Bank and the Committee of the Regions. These semi-privileged applicants may 
bring an action for annulment against any EU act that affects their own pre-
rogatives. They therefore do have to establish a certain legal interest in the act 
being challenged, and must prove that this act in some way affects their own 
powers or responsibilities.
4   Article 263(2) TFEU.
5   Cf. T. Tridimas and S. Poli, ‘Locus Standi of Individuals under Article 230(4): The Return of 
Eurydice?’ in: A. Arnull, P. Eeckhout, and T. Tridimas (eds), Continuity and Change in EU law: 
Essays in Honour of Sir Francis Jacobs (OUP, 2008), ch. 5, or S. Balthasar, ‘Locus Standi Rules 
for Challenges to Regulatory Acts by Private Applicants: The New Article 263(4) TFEU’ (2010) 
35 ELRev, 542.
6   For the very broad standing under the EAC equivalent action see Chapter 7. For a more 
detailed analysis on standing under Article 263 TFEU see A. Ward, Judicial Review and the 
Rights of Private Parties in EU law (OUP, 2nd edn, 2007).
Cuyvers256
The third category consists of all natural or legal persons that are not privi-
leged or semi-privileged, usually referred to as ‘individuals’. These individuals 
only have standing to bring an action for annulment against an EU act in one of 
three scenarios. To begin with, individuals can institute annulment proceed-
ings against an act specifically addressed to them. This includes for example 
companies that receive a decision from the Commission lowering a grant or 
imposing a fine for a violation of competition law. In such cases, standing will 
be easy to establish, as the parties will be identified by name in the act they 
want to challenge.
Additionally, individuals can also bring an action for annulment against an 
act that is not addressed to them if this act ‘is of direct and individual concern 
to them’. The criterion of direct concern requires that the EU act ‘directly affects 
the legal situation of the individual’ and leaves no discretion to those imple-
menting it, such as a Member State.7 It is the criterion of ‘individual’ concern, 
however, that forms the real bottleneck. In the (in)famous Plaumann ruling, 
the CJEU gave an extremely restrictive interpretation of individual concern:
Persons other than those to whom a decision is addressed may only claim 
to be individually concerned if that decision affects them by reason of 
certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of circum-
stances in which they are differentiated from all other persons and by 
virtue of these factors distinguishes them individually just as in the case 
of the person addressed. In the present case the applicant is affected 
by the disputed Decision as an importer of clementines, that is to 
say, by reason of a commercial activity which may at any time be prac-
tised by any person and is not therefore such as to distinguish the appli-
cant in relation to the contested Decision as in the case of the addressee.8
Essentially, the CJEU thereby restricts individual concern to those situa-
tions where an act is so specifically affecting a certain party that it is de facto 
addressed to it. The main test the CJEU uses for this purpose is the idea of an 
‘open group’. Whenever an act affects an ‘open group’, that is a group to which 
new members can accede, the member of this group are not individually con-
cerned, even if they can be identified very precisely. In Plaumann, for example, 
the contested act affected importers of clementines. The CJEU held that this 
7   Case C-386/96 P Dreyfus v Commission [1998] ECR I-2309, par. 43, or Joined Cases C-445/07 P 
and C-455/07 P Ente per le Ville vesuviane [2009] ECR I-7993, par. 45.
8   Case 25/62 Plaumann ECLI:EU:C:1963:17, my italics.
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is an open group, as any person may decide to become a clementine importer 
and join this group. As a result, clementine importers were not individually 
concerned, and had no standing under Article 263 TFEU. Any act, therefore, 
that affects an open group, such as a certain profession or industry, will not 
be of individual concern to the members of this group, and consequently they 
will not be able to bring an action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU.
The interpretation given by the CJEU in Plaumann is extremely restrictive, 
and indeed individuals almost never succeed in proving that they are individu-
ally concerned.9 Despite serious criticism that the Plaumann doctrine exces-
sively limits the legal protection of individuals, however, the CJEU has so far 
refused to soften is approach.10 The CJEU instead argued that expanding stand-
ing for individuals under Article 263 TFEU required a Treaty amendment.
With the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, the standing for individuals was indeed 
somewhat extended, albeit in a rather complex way. Individuals can now 
also bring an action for annulment against ‘a regulatory act which is of direct 
concern to them and does not entail implementing measures.’ Under this 
ground, the restrictive requirement of individual concern no longer has to be 
met. In its place have come two new requirements, namely that the act is regu-
latory in nature, and does not require any implementing measures. The term 
‘regulatory act’ however, was new and was not defined anywhere in the Treaty. 
The CJEU therefore, had to provide its own definition of regulatory action 
in Inuit:
The General Court concluded, in paragraph 56 of the order under appeal, 
that ‘the meaning of “regulatory act” for the purposes of the fourth para-
graph of Article 263 TFEU must be understood as covering all acts of gen-
eral application apart from legislative acts’. Consequently, a legislative act 
may form the subject matter of an action for annulment brought by a nat-
ural or legal person only if it is of direct and individual concern to them.11
9    For a rare example, and a nice illustration of just how specific an act needs to tar-
get a particular individual for individual concern to exist, see Case C-309/89 Codorniu 
ECLI:EU:C:1994:197.
10   For an authoritative criticism on this restrictive interpretation, as well as the refusal of 
the CJEU to change its case law, see the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in C-50/00 P 
Union de Pequeños Agricultores v Council, ECLI:EU:C:2002:462, as well as the judgment 
of the General Court being reviewed and the General Court’s openly critical judgment in 
Case T-177/01 Jégo-Quéré [2002] ECLI:EU:T:2002:112.
11   Case C-583/11 P Inuit ECLI:EU:C:2013:625, par. 12.
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The third possible ground of standing for individuals, therefore, only allows 
them to challenge non-legislative acts, i.e. acts that were not adopted under 
a legislative procedure, which do not require any implementation, such as for 
example some implementing regulations.12
All categories of applicants, moreover, must bring their action for annul-
ment within two months, starting from the publication of the measure. If the 
measure was not published, the time limit starts to run from either the noti-
fication to the plaintiff, or, if there was no notification or the plaintiff hears 
about the measure before notification, from the day on which the measure 
came to the knowledge of the plaintiff.
7.3 The Action for Inaction
The action for failure to act in Article 265 TFEU can be used where an EU insti-
tution, body, office has a legal obligation to act but fails to do so. Again there is a 
group of privileged applicants, consisting of the Member States, the European 
Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the Commission and the ECB 
with unlimited standing. Individuals, on the other hand, only have limited 
standing, and can only bring an action where the body concerned should have 
addressed an act specifically to them. Before a plaintiff can start an action for 
inaction, he or she first must call on the relevant body to act.
The main difficulty for the action of inaction is to prove a sufficiently 
clear and well-defined obligation to act that can also be enforced by a Court.13 
Partially in light of this difficulty, the action for inaction is not used very 
frequently.14
12   See Article 289(3) TFEU for the concept of legislative act. For an example of a regulatory 
act that does not require implementation, see Case T-262/10 Microban ECLI:EU:T:2011:623.
13   See on this difficulty especially Case 13/83Parliament v Council (Transport Policy), 
ECLI:EU:C:1985:220.
14   For further examples see Case 4/69 Lütticke ECLI:EU:C:1971:40 or Case T-395/04 Air One 
ECLI:EU:T:2006:123.
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7.4 The Action for Damages
The action for EU liability under Article 30 TFEU should be distinguished 
from the possibility to hold Member States liable for violations of EU law.15 
Article 340 TFEU can only be used to hold EU institutions and bodies liable 
for any damages caused by them or their servants. A distinction should further 
be made between the contractual liability of the EU and the non-contractual 
liability. Contractual liability of the EU is determined by the law applicable 
to the relevant contract, and by the national civil court that has jurisdiction 
under the rules of Private International Law. Only the non-contractual liability 
of the EU for violations of EU law is determined by EU law itself.
Any party that claims to have suffered damages caused by an unlawful act 
of an EU institution or body can start an action for damages before the CJEU. 
The defendant is not the EU as such, but the institutions whose alleged unlaw-
ful act has caused the damage. Three criteria have to be met for EU liability 
to exist: 1) an illegal act by an EU institution or body, 2) actual damage, and 
3) a causal relation between the illegal act and the damage.16 The most com-
plex and restrictive criterion is the existence of an illegal act, which requires 
a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of EU law intended to confer rights 
on individuals. In turn, a breach is sufficiently serious where the institution 
concerned ‘manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits on its discretion.’17 
Consequently, the more discretion an institution had, the more difficult it 
will be to hold it liable for any damages caused by its actions.18 This means 
that it is extremely difficult to establish liability of for instance the European 
Parliament for legislative choices made, but easier to establish liability where 
the Commission wrongly implements a very straightforward rule that leaves 
almost no discretion.19
Under Article 46 of the Statute of the Court, a time-limit of five years 
applies.20
15   On this principle see EU chapter 6 as well as Case C-6/90 and 9/90 Francovich [1991] ECR 
I-5357 and Case C-46 and 48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur [1996] ECR I-1029. At the same time, 
the substantive criteria for the non-contractual liability of a Member State for violations 
of EU law are identical to the ones for EU liability. See Case C-352/98P Bergadem [2000] 
ECR I-5291.
16   Case C-352/98P Bergadem [2000] ECR I-5291.
17   Case C-46 and 48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur [1996] ECR I-1029.
18   See for example Case C-472/00 P Fresh Marine ECLI:EU:C:2003:399, or for liability of the 
EU Courts themselves, case C-385/07 P Der Grüne Punkt ECLI:EU:C:2009:456.
19   See for example Case T-260/97 Camar ECLI:EU:T:2005:283.
20   For the details see Case C-51/05 P Cantina Sociale ECLI:EU:C:2008:409.
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7.5 The Plea of Illegality
The plea of illegality under Article 277 TFEU is not an independent remedy. 
Instead, it is an argument that parties which are already in front of the CJEU 
may rely on to question the legality and validity of an EU act.21 For example, 
a farmer may bring an action for annulment against a Commission deci-
sion refusing to grant the farmer a milk-subsidy. The farmer, as addressee of 
this decision, is then allowed to start an action for annulment against this 
Commission decision under Article 263 TFEU. In the context of this annul-
ment procedure, the farmer may then rely on the plea of illegality to challenge 
another relevant EU act, such as the directive on which the Commission deci-
sion was based. After all, if the farmer can prove that the directive underly-
ing the Commission decision itself is invalid, this will also affect the validity 
of the Commission decision itself. The plea of illegality itself, however, does 
not provide a self-standing remedy.22
7.6 Infringement Proceedings
The infringement procedure is another atypical remedy that allows Member 
States or the European Commission to bring a Member State before the 
CJEU for violating its obligations under EU law.23 As it is highly exceptional 
for Member States to start infringement procedures against each other, also 
in light of the political costs, it is almost exclusively the Commission that 
starts infringement proceedings under Article 258 TFEU.24 Partially because 
of the reluctance of Member States to infringe each other, the independent 
and autonomous power of the Commission to start infringement proceedings 
against Member States has proven of great importance to ensure the respect 
for EU law.25
When considering the infringement procedure, it is important to realize that 
the main purpose of infringement is not to impose a penalty on the Member 
21   Joined cases 31/62 and 33/62 Wöhrmann ECLI:EU:C:1962:49.
22   See for an example Case C-11/00 Commission v European Central Bank, ECLI:EU:C:2003:395.
23   Articles 258–260 TFEU.
24   So far, only four infringement proceedings were started by Member States against each 
other, all in situations that were already at an advanced stage of political escalation. See for 
the most recent example Case C-364/10 Hungary v. Slovak Republic ECLI:EU:C:2012:3798.
25   See in this context also the institutional responsibility of the Commission as ‘guardian’ of 
the acquis as described in EU Chapter 2.
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State. Rather, the main purpose is to ensure that EU law is applied correctly, 
preferably without having to proceed to the CJEU and asking for sanctions.26 
This main purpose is reflected in the set-up of the infringement procedure, 
which is divided into several stages.
An infringement starts with a first administrative, or pre-litigation, phase, 
in which the Commission becomes aware of a possible violation of EU law 
by a Member State.27 This can either be based on the own investigations of 
the Commission or on complaints that the Commission received.28 The 
Commission then engages in an informal dialogue with the Member State 
to further explore if EU obligations are indeed not respected, and if that is 
the case, to request the Member State to make the necessary improvements. 
If the matter is not solved during the informal dialogue, the Commission 
can decide to send a letter of formal notice. The letter contains a brief over-
view of the problems found and allows the Member State to react or make 
improvements. If the Commission is still not satisfied with the explanation or 
improvements it can decide to issue a reasoned opinion. This is an important 
step in the entire proceedings. The reasoned opinion formally has to set out 
all the complaints that the Commission has concerning the way in which the 
Member State fulfils its obligations, and must give the Member State a reason-
able period to comply.29 If the Member State does not comply, the reasoned 
opinion becomes the basis for the next phase, which is the first judicial phase. 
It has to be stressed though that at this stage over 90% of all infringements 
have been resolved, as either the Commission has been convinced that there 
is no violation of EU law or the Member State has already made the necessary 
improvements to ensure future compliance.
In the first judicial phase the Commission brings the Member State before 
the CJEU. The case before the CJEU is delineated by the reasoned opinion, 
and may for example not include any alleged violations that were not already 
26   See on this point for example Case 293/85 Commission v Belgium (University Fees), 
ECLI:EU:C:1988:40.
27   It does not matter which organ or body of the state actually violated EU law. Under EU law 
the central government is responsible for the behaviour of all public bodies, including the 
courts. The infringement, therefore, will always be addressed to the central government.
28   Where the Commission receives complaints from third parties on possible violations 
of EU law it has absolute discretion to initiate infringement proceedings or not. This 
allows the Commission to effectively use its limited resources. See Case 247/87 Star Fruit 
ECLI:EU:C:1989:58.
29   Case 293/85 Commission v Belgium (University Fees), ECLI:EU:C:1988:40, and Case 
C-304/02 Commission v France, ECLI:EU:C:2005:444.
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included in the reasoned opinion.30 If the CJEU agrees with the Commission 
that the Member State has indeed failed to fulfil its obligations under EU law, 
it will render a declaratory judgment detailing the failure of the Member State 
and ordering it to bring an end to the violation.31 In this first judicial phase, 
therefore, no sanction is yet imposed on the Member State, as the main aim is 
still to ensure compliance.32
In the exceptional cases where Commission thinks the Member State is not 
complying with its obligations under EU law and the judgment of the CJEU, 
it can start the second administrative, or pre-litigation, phase of the infringe-
ment procedure.33 The Commission again starts with an informal dialogue, 
potentially followed by a letter of formal notice. In the second pre-litigation 
phase, however, no reasoned opinion is given or necessary, as the dispute is 
already clearly delineated by the judgment of the CJEU.
If the Commission is still not convinced that the Member State has fully 
complied at the end of the second pre-litigation phase, it can initiate the sec-
ond judicial phase. In this phase, the Commission may request the Court to 
impose a lump sum fine and/or a penalty payment for every day the Member 
State fails to comply. Ultimately, it is then up to the CJEU to determine if a 
sanction should be imposed and if so how severe this sanction should be. 
If sanctions are imposed, however, they can be very serious indeed, running 
into the tens of millions of euros.34 So far, Member States have always com-
plied with such penalties when imposed, but if they were not such penalties 
could probably simply be deducted from any EU subsidies the Member State 
receives from the EU.
30   Cf. Case C-350/02 Commission v Netherlands, ECLI:EU:C:2004:389. Also note that the CJEU 
will judge the situation in the Member State at the end of the reasoned opinion. Any 
improvements made after the time period allowed in the reasoned opinion has expired 
will therefore not be taken into consideration by the CJEU, and will not prevent a viola-
tion from being found. See already Case 167/73 Commission v France (Merchant Navy), 
ECLI:EU:C:1974:35.
31   Article 260(1) TFEU.
32   Cf. Case 128/78 Commission v United Kingdom (Tachographs), ECLI:EU:C:1979:32. See how-
ever the exceptional possibility under Article 260(3) TFEU to already impose a sanction 
in the first judicial phase if the violation at stake was a failure to notify the Commission 
on the measures taken to transpose a directive. If the infringement concerns the incor-
rect implementation of a directive itself, the normal procedure with two judicial rounds 
applies.
33   Article 260(2) TFEU.
34   See for example Case C-387/97 Commission v Greece, ECLI:EU:C:2000:356 or Case C-304/02 
Commission v France, ECLI:EU:C:2005:444.
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As stated, the infringement procedure is an important instrument in the 
EU law toolbox to make sure Member States comply with their obligations 
under EU law. Even if the Commission only has a limited capacity, and hence 
has to strategically choose which infringements to choose, it still contributes 
significantly to the effectiveness of EU law and the trust in the overall system. 
Moreover, most infringement actions are already successful in the first pre-
litigation phase, meaning that they do not necessarily have to take very long or 
become litigious.35
7.7 Arbitration Before the CJEU
Under Article 272 TFEU the CJEU has jurisdiction to give a judgment based on 
any arbitration clause contained in a contract concluded by or on behalf of 
the EU. This may be in a contract governed by public or private law. In addi-
tion, Article 273 TFEU allows for CJEU jurisdiction where any dispute between 
Member States which relates to the subject matter of the Treaties is submitted 
to it under a special agreement between the parties.
So far the CJEU has not yet been active under these provisions. In recent 
years, however, the use of public international law instruments to support or 
supplement EU action, where collective action under EU law proved impos-
sible, has increased significantly. Increasingly, these fascinating hybrids of EU 
and Public International law also involve EU institutions outside the boundar-
ies of EU law proper. This includes the grants of jurisdiction to the CJEU. The 
coming years, therefore, might see some actual uses of these special heads of 
jurisdiction, which may also be of interest to the comparable heads of jurisdic-
tion enjoyed by the EACJ.36
35   Of course where disputes become extremely political, such as in the contested changes to 
the Hungarian constitution, even the infringement procedure might be limited in what it 
can achieve. See Case C-286/12 Commission v Hungary, ECLI:EU:C:2012:687.
36   For such additional jurisdiction of the CJEU see especially Article 8 of the Treaty 
on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the EMU (Fiscal Compact), signed on 
2 March 2012 by all EU Member States except UK and the Czech Republic, as well as the 
Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism, Brussels, February 2 2012 T/ESM 
2012/en 1.
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7.8 Advisory Opinions of the CJEU
Article 118(11) TFEU allows the Member States, the European Parliament, 
the Council or the Commission to request an opinion of the CJEU on the 
compatibility of an envisaged international agreement with the Treaties. 
If the CJEU finds that the envisioned agreement is not compatible with the 
Treaties, the agreement may not enter into force, unless the parts that conflict 
with the Treaties are sufficiently amended. Asking an opinion is not manda-
tory. Not asking an opinion, however, runs the risk of the CJEU annulling the 
entire agreement at a later stage if conflicts with the Treaties are found. Such 
an annulment would of course create even more legal and political headaches, 
including possible liability towards the other signatories to the agreement.37
Over time, the capacity to give legal opinions has led to some of the most 
important rulings given by the CJEU, often dealing with foundational ques-
tions on the nature of the EU legal order itself, and its relation to other legal 
regimes. This also in part because legal opinions provide the CJEU with the 
opportunity to settle such questions in a relatively general manner.38 
37   See in this context the recent Opinion 2/15 of the CJEU on the trade agreement between 
the EU and Singapore, considered to be the model for CETA and TTIP.
38   See for example Opinion 2/94 Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights 
[2006] ECR I-929, Opinion 1/09 Patent Court [2011] ECR I-1137, or the highly contentious 
recent Opinion 2/13 on the draft agreement providing for the accession of the European 
Union to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454.
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CHAPTER 8
Preliminary References under EAC Law
Emmanuel Ugirashebuja
It was envisaged by the drafters of the Treaty establishing the East African 
Community (EAC Treaty) that the responsibility of applying its provisions 
belonged concurrently to the national courts and the East African Court of 
Justice (EACJ). With this responsibility, a potential challenge of ensuring uni-
form application of the Treaty was envisioned. In order to avoid the likely pos-
sibility of inconsistency in the application of Community law, the EAC Treaty 
embedded a procedure of preliminary rulings. It should be noted that such a 
procedure had been earlier adopted in the European Union, and there has con-
siderably enhanced the uniform application of EU law in the European setting.1 
Article 34 of the EAC Treaty establishes a procedure which enables domestic 
courts of EAC Partner States to refer to the EACJ questions on Community law 
which would help them to arrive at a judgment in a substantive case before 
them. It provides as follows:
Where a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Partner State 
concerning the interpretation or application of the provisions of this 
Treaty or validity of the regulations, directives, decisions or actions of the 
Community, that court or tribunal shall, if it considers that a ruling on 
the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court 
to give a preliminary ruling on the question.
The following sections will discuss Article 34 of the EAC Treaty in the light 
of its practical applicability. The first section reviews the standing of national 
courts and tribunals in the context of the preliminary reference procedure. The 
second section analyzes the obligation of national courts to refer questions for 
preliminary rulings. The third section reviews whether there is an obligation 
on the part of the EACJ to provide an answer in the form of a preliminary rul-
ing to all references made by national courts. The fourth section discusses the 
nature and effect of the preliminary ruling made by the EACJ. Finally, the fifth 
1   See EU Chapter 8 for an analysis of this procedure under EU law and the crucial role it played 
in European integration.
Ugirashebuja266
section will review the relationship between the national courts and the EACJ 
in light of the established procedure of preliminary reference.
8.1 Standing of National Courts and Tribunals
National courts and tribunals do not explicitly feature in the judicial archi-
tecture of the Community. The only reference to national courts in the Treaty 
appears in Article 34 of the EAC Treaty establishing the preliminary reference 
procedure. However, the national courts and tribunals are vital parts of the 
Community to the extent that they directly apply Community law to the cases 
before them where relevant. In East African Law Society v. the Secretary General 
of the East African Community (2013), the First Instance Division of the EACJ 
held that:
As Partner States, by virtue of their being the main users of the Common 
Market Protocol on a daily basis, it would be absurd and impractical 
if their national courts had no jurisdiction over disputes arising out of 
implementation of the Protocol. Indeed, Community law would be help-
less if it did not provide for the right of individuals to invoke it before 
national courts.2
This view of the First Instance Division was adopted by the Appellate Division 
in Tom Kyahurwenda (2015) when it stated:
This Court agrees with the postulation of the law by the First Instance 
Division of this Court that it would be absurd if national courts and tribu-
nals were to be excluded from the application of Treaty provisions should 
the occasion arise before them.3
2   Case No. 1 of 2011 East African Law Society vs. the Secretary General of the East African 
Community [2013] (EACJ, 2013) 28. The First Instance Division’s view was by Van Gend Loos 
where the ECJ held that: “[t]he fact that Article 169 and 170 of the EEC Treaty enable the 
Commission and the Member States to bring before the Court a State which has not fulfilled 
its obligations does not deprive individuals of the right to plead the same obligations, should 
the occasion arise, before a national court”, see Case 26/62 Van Gend Loos [1963] ECR I.
3   Case Stated No. 1 of 2014 Attorney General of Uganda vs. Tom Kyahurwenda [2015] (EACJ, 2015) 
[54].
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The starting point for any preliminary reference procedure lies with the ques-
tion which national courts or tribunals are entitled to ask a question to the 
EACJ.
Article 34 of the Treaty provides that “where a question is raised before 
any court or tribunal of a Partner State concerning the interpretation or 
application of the provisions of this Treaty or the validity of the regulations, 
directives, decisions or actions of the Community, that court or tribunal 
shall . . .”. The crucial point is that a question has to be posed by “any court or 
tribunal” and not any other entity. In the quest to determine what a “court 
or tribunal” is, the EACJ, in the preliminary ruling on questions posed by the 
High Court of the Republic of Uganda, drew inspiration from the jurispru-
dence established by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the 
Pretore di Salò v. Persons unknown.4 In this case, the CJEU held the following:
The Court has jurisdiction to reply to a request for a preliminary ruling 
if that request emanates from a court or tribunal which has acted in the 
general framework of its task of judging, independently and in accor-
dance with the law, cases coming within the jurisdiction conferred on 
it by law, even though certain functions of that court or tribunal in the 
proceedings which gave rise to the reference for a preliminary ruling are 
not, strictly speaking, of a judicial nature.5
Inspired by this landmark case, the EACJ held that:
. . . for a national entity to be considered a “court or tribunal” for pur-
poses of preliminary reference, the entity should possess the following 
attributes: established by law; have permanent existence; endowed with 
compulsory jurisdiction; have ability to entertain procedures inter partes; 
apply rules of law; and, be endowed with functional independence.6
Any entity which does not fulfil these attributes is not a court or tribunal in 
the perspective of Article 34 of the EAC Treaty. This would imply that certain 
tribunals such as arbitral tribunals; commissions of inquiry or tribunals fully 
controlled by the executive or the legislative arms of government; ad-hoc 
4   Case 14/86, Pretore di Salò v Persons unknown [1987] ECR 2545. See further on the EU system 
EU Chapter 8.
5   Case 14/86 Pretore di Salò v Persons unknown [1987] ECR 2545 [7].
6   Tom Kyahurwenda [40].
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tribunals; prosecution authorities; and national competition authorities do 
not have standing for purposes of referring questions to the EACJ.
8.2 Obligation of a National Court to Refer to the EACJ
This section inquires whether national courts are under an obligation to 
refer questions to the EACJ and the extent of such an obligation. In Tom 
Kyahurwenda, the Partner States made different contentions regarding the 
interpretation of Article 34 of the Treaty in as far as the obligation of national 
courts to refer cases is concerned.
The Republic of Uganda contended that the interpretation of the Treaty 
was a prerogative of the EACJ and that consequently, national courts, at all 
levels, were barred from interpreting the Treaty. Uganda argued that the sole 
purpose of Article 34 was to allow national courts to entertain matters of 
enforcement of the Treaty, but not its interpretation, which squarely fell under 
the sole purview of the EACJ. The United Republic of Tanzania, held a similar 
view. The Republic of Kenya, on her part, argued that, in general terms, with-
out looking at each and every specific Article, the Treaty is justiciable before 
the national courts. The argument of Kenya essentially meant that the EACJ 
and the national courts have concurrent jurisdiction on the interpretation of 
the Treaty, and that the discretion to refer a question to the EACJ lies with a 
national court when faced with a case involving Community law. The Secretary 
General of the EAC held a similar view to that of Kenya on the basis that the 
wording of Article 34 (“. . . if it considers that a ruling on the question of inter-
pretation or application of the Treaty is necessary to enable it to give judg-
ment”), should be construed to mean that Partner States were endowed with 
the discretion whether or not to refer a question to the EACJ.
In order to determine the extent of the obligation of national courts to 
make preliminary reference, the EACJ reviewed the wording of Article 34 of 
the Treaty, in Tom Kyahurwenda.7 The EACJ held that:
Article 34 of the Treaty further provides that where a court or tribunal is 
faced with “. . . the interpretation or application of the provisions of this 
Treaty or the validity of the regulations, directives, decisions or actions 
of the Community, that court or tribunal shall if it considers that a ruling 
7   It is important to note here that the EACJ in this case resorted to the canons of interpretation 
established by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in particular, Articles 31 and 32. 
See, Tom Kyahurwenda [33].
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on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the 
Court to give a preliminary ruling on the matter”. The provision uses 
the emphatic word “shall”. In the general scheme of legal drafting, the use 
of the word “shall” would presuppose that when the national courts or 
tribunals are faced with a question of interpretation, application or valid-
ity, they have no option, but to refer the matter to this Court.8
The EACJ’s ruling made it clear that it possesses the monopoly of interpreta-
tion of the EAC Treaty. In other words, when any national court is faced with 
the question of interpreting the Treaty, it has no choice but to refer the ques-
tion to the EACJ.
In answering to the apparent discretion of national courts in Article 34, the 
EACJ noted that:
. . . the discretion afforded to national courts by Article 34 is the discre-
tion to refer or not to refer a question of interpretation to this Court. 
However, the condition precedent to the exercise of this discretion is this: 
“if the national court or tribunal considers that a ruling on the question 
is necessary to enable it to make a judgment . . .” Once a national court or 
tribunal considers an interpretation to be necessary, then it has no option 
but to refer the question to this Court. Hence, the discretion is narrow. 
It is confined to determining whether or not a ruling on the question is 
necessary to enable the court to make its judgment.9
In determining the parameters of the discretion of national courts to deter-
mine the necessity to refer a question, the Court noted that the discretion was, 
“in the great majority of cases,” limited to: cases where the Community law 
is not relevant to the matter before national courts (“an irrelevant question”); 
cases where the EACJ has already clarified the point of law in its previous cases 
(“acte eclairé”); and, instances where the interpretation of the Community 
law is obvious (“acte clair”).10 Simply put, under Article 34 of the EAC Treaty, 
a reference must be made unless the national court has recognized any of the 
above reasons for not doing so.11
In Tom Kyahurwenda, the EACJ distinguished the discretion endowed to the 
national courts by the Treaty to refer or not to refer a question for interpretation 
8    Tom Kyahurwenda [41].
9    Ibid. [56].
10   Ibid. [57].
11   Cf. in this regard the CILFIT doctrine under EU law, discussed in EU Chapter 8.4.
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from the obligation to refer where the subject matter involves invalidation of 
the regulations, directives, decisions or actions of the Community. The EACJ 
stated that it would be “disastrous were national courts and tribunals permit-
ted to declare Community Acts, regulations, directives and actions invalid in 
the absence of a ruling to that effect by the East African Court of Justice”.12 It is 
very clear from this that the EACJ has exclusive powers to invalidate any acts, 
regulations, directives and actions of the Community and therefore, if such 
a question arises, a national court is under an obligation to refer to the EACJ.
8.3 Obligation of the EACJ to Provide an Answer
From the outset, it is paramount to note that the role of the EACJ in a prelimi-
nary ruling is to interpret Community law and determine the validity of Acts 
of the Community. The Court cannot apply Community law to the facts of the 
case at hand. Consequently, the function of the EACJ in a preliminary ruling 
is to provide an abstract interpretation of Community law. It is also important 
to mention that the EACJ cannot interpret or apply national law. Hence, the 
Court can decline to answer a question from a national court where it is called 
upon to apply Community law to a case before that national court or to inter-
pret or apply national laws.
As a vital condition precedent for the EACJ to provide an answer, there has 
to be a live case before a national court requesting a preliminary ruling. The 
rationale for this is that the ultimate purpose of a preliminary reference is to 
enable a national court to resolve a matter before it. The EACJ will therefore 
reject a reference where the questions referred are hypothetical in nature. 
In Alcon International Limited, even though it did not come through the chan-
nel of preliminary reference, the EACJ adopted the well-known principle of 
mootness or academic adventure. The Court observed that “the raison d’être 
of Courts of Justice is to give binding decisions to live disputes . . .” and that in 
the absence of a live dispute, they may not engage in a “futile and vain expo-
sition of the law”.13 The same outcome would be adopted in the event that a 
preliminary reference is moot or academic.14
It is also important that the question referred should be relevant to the case 
pending before the national court. Otherwise, the question would suffer the 
12   Ibid. [48].
13   Appeal No. 3 of 2013 Alcon International Limited vs. Standard Chartered Bank of Uganda 
and 2 Others [2015] (EACJ, 2015) [99].
14   See the similar approach under EU law as set out in EU Chapter 8.5.
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same fate as a moot or academic question. In order for the EACJ to be able to 
deliver a relevant and useful preliminary ruling or to determine whether the 
question is moot or academic, the reference should contain detailed relevant 
information about the factual background to the case and/or the relevant pro-
visions of the national law in question.
Once the conditions of a live case and relevance of the question to the case 
at hand are fulfilled, then the Court is under the obligation of giving an answer 
in the form of a preliminary ruling. Article 35(1) of the Treaty is very clear in 
as far as the obligation is concerned. It provides: “The Court [the EACJ] shall 
consider and determine every reference made to it pursuant to this Treaty in 
accordance with the rules of the Court and shall deliver in public, a reasoned 
judgment”. The emphatic use of the word “shall” in delivering a judgment 
would suggest that once a given reference including a preliminary reference 
satisfies the conditions established by the Rules of Procedure of the EACJ, then 
the Court is under the obligation to deliver a reasoned judgment.
8.4 The Nature and Effect of the Preliminary Ruling
As discussed above, a preliminary ruling is by its very nature a ruling of the 
Court and it has all the attributes and effects of any other ruling by the EACJ. 
The rulings and judgments of the EACJ, as one of the organs of the Community, 
are binding and take precedence over any national organ of the Partner States. 
To this end, Article 8(4) of the EAC Treaty provides: “Community organs 
[including the EACJ], institutions and laws shall take precedence over similar 
national ones on matters pertaining to the implementation of this Treaty”. In 
an even more specific provision to the rulings of the Court, Article 38(3) of the 
Treaty provides: “A Partner State or Council shall take, without delay, the mea-
sures required to implement a judgment of the Court”. Implementation of a 
judgment of the Court would include the application of a preliminary ruling of 
the EACJ by both the court which asked the question and also all other courts 
in EAC Partner States in similar cases. In other words, once the EACJ delivers a 
preliminary ruling, it is binding on all courts in the Community. To emphasize 
the binding nature of a preliminary ruling, the EACJ in Tom Kyahurwenda held 
that:
This Court deems it apposite to draw attention to two points of funda-
mental importance. The first fundamental point is that this Court’s pre-
liminary ruling is binding on the national court or tribunal which has 
sought a preliminary ruling. The second fundamental point is that a 
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preliminary ruling is binding erga omnes (towards all). It is erga omnes 
in the sense that it is binding on all national courts and tribunals in all 
Partner States of the Community.15
To put it otherwise, the court that made the reference and all other courts 
in the EAC Partner States that encounter the same subject matter are bound 
by the operative part of the preliminary ruling. The Tom Kyaruhwenda prelimi-
nary ruling implies that the ruling is capable of applying retrospectively since 
it is binding on all national courts. Furthermore, the ruling establishes a prec-
edent which the EACJ will itself follow in similar matters.
It is also important to note that in Tom Kyaruhwenda the EACJ decided that 
since the ruling was a step towards the resolution of the dispute before the 
Ugandan Court, “the decision as to costs is the matter for that Court [High 
Court of Uganda] to pronounce in the context of the proceedings before it”.16 
As to the costs incurred by the Secretary General and the Partner States in 
submitting their observations in matters of preliminary references, the EACJ 
opined that they are not recoverable.17
8.5 The Relationship between the National Courts and the EACJ
As previously discussed, the EAC Treaty envisages no particular relationship 
between national courts and the EACJ, except for Article 34 which creates the 
procedure of preliminary references, detailed throughout this chapter. The 
EACJ has so far entertained one preliminary reference in its fifteen years of 
existence. However, the importance of the preliminary reference procedure 
should not be gauged from the number of cases referred but the potential 
it has to significantly impact on the process of the EAC integration through 
developing Community law.
The success of the preliminary reference procedure lies in the cooperation, 
or what is widely referred to as a “judicial dialogue” between the EACJ and the 
national courts. The preliminary ruling procedure promotes preservation of 
legal unity through uniform interpretation and application of Community law. 
In stressing the importance of the “judicial dialogue” through the preliminary 
reference, the EACJ in Tom Kyahurwenda stated:
15   Tom Kyaruhwenda [58].
16   Tom Kyaruhwenda [76].
17   Tom Kyaruhwenda [76].
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It is of utmost importance to understand the significance of the prelim-
inary ruling procedure. The procedure is the keystone of the arch that 
ensures that the Treaty retains its Community character and is inter-
preted and applied uniformly with the objective of its provisions hav-
ing the same effect in similar matters in all the Partner States of the East 
African Community. In the absence of this procedure, it is possible that 
legions of interpretation of the same Treaty would emerge drifting hither 
and thither, aiming at nothing. This would at best create a state of confu-
sion and uncertainty in the interpretation and application of the Treaty; 
and at worst, ignite an uncontrolled crisis which would destabilise the 
integration process. The situation could even be more disastrous were 
national courts and tribunals permitted to declare Community Acts, reg-
ulations, directives and actions invalid in the absence of a ruling to that 
effect by the East African Court of Justice.18
National judges apply Community law as well as the interpretation of the law 
through preliminary rulings manufactured by the EACJ as part of the Partner 
States’ national laws. The procedure ensures that individual rights under 
Community law which have been infringed are legally redressed. Preliminary 
references have created a forum of cooperation between national judges and 
EACJ judges in resolution of domestic cases with aspects of Community law 
and further development of Community law.
Even though, as discussed earlier, the importance of the instrument of 
preliminary reference lies in the appropriate division of labor in the develop-
ment and application of Community law, it is nonetheless imperative to ana-
lyze why the instrument has not generated a voluminous amount of workload 
for the EACJ as it has in the CJEU.19 The number of all the references filed in 
the EACJ is way below those filed annually at the CJEU. It should be noted 
that, with the exception of the one preliminary reference and the two advisory 
opinions, the rest of the cases filed in the EACJ have been by persons (both 
natural and legal).
18   Ibid. [48].
19   In the ECJ, preliminary reference accounts for over 50% of the Court’s workload. In 2014 
alone, the total number of references were 622. See further EU Chapter 8. Whereas in the 
lifespan of the EACJ today, it has received two references and delivered one preliminary 
ruling.
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The EAC Treaty affords individuals the right to directly file cases with the 
EACJ,20 whereas such a right of direct action by persons is permitted only 
exceptionally before the CJEU.21 It would be a viable assumption that individu-
als might have opted to use the route of direct action under the EACJ setting 
and this would explain why preliminary references are very rare as opposed to 
the CJEU where direct action is restricted.
Another possible explanation of why the preliminary reference procedure 
has not been used is the absence of knowledge of its existence by both the resi-
dents of the Community and judges of national courts. The EACJ has sought 
to rectify this problem and has embarked on a sensitization program of judges 
through actively organizing and being part of conferences in the Partner States.
The importance of the preliminary reference instrument as a source of 
dialogue between national judges and the EACJ cannot be stressed further. 
With the Court having delivered its first preliminary ruling, it is hoped that 
it will open the way for many more preliminary references in the future with 
a view of developing and promoting cohesion of Community law and deeper 
integration.
20   Article 30(1) of the EAC Treaty provides: “Subject to the provisions of Article 27 of this 
Treaty, any person who is a resident in a Partner State may refer for determination by the 
Court, the legality of any Act, regulation, directive, decision or action of a Partner State, or 
institution of the Community on the ground that such Act, regulation, directive, decision 
or action is unlawful or is an infringement of the provisions of this Treaty.”
21   According to Arnull, “If the Court took a liberal approach on the question of the category 
of acts susceptible to review and the status of the European Parliament in annulment 
proceedings, its attitude to the standing of private parties has on the whole been more 
restrictive” in Anthony Arnull, The European Union and its Court of Justice (2nd edn, OUP, 
2006) 69 See for the precise rules on standing before the CJEU also EU Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 8a
Preliminary References under EU Law
Armin Cuyvers
8.1 Introduction
The preliminary reference procedure allows national courts to ask questions 
on EU law to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The impor-
tance of preliminary references becomes readily apparent when one realizes 
the EU has over 500 million citizens and companies, but there are only 84 
judges in the EU Court in Luxembourg. Consequently, it is the tens of thou-
sands of national judges that have to uphold and apply EU law in practice. It is 
these national judges that have to turn EU law into a living, enforceable reality 
within each Member State.1
Because of their central role, it is essential that all these national courts 
apply EU law correctly and consistently. The application of EU law, after all, 
should not depend on which national judge you happen to end up with. At 
the same time, a uniform application of EU law is far from automatic. Each 
lawyer is shaped by his or her own national legal system and culture, and will 
unavoidably approach EU law from this national perspective, even if it is often 
unwittingly so. Without guidance, therefore, it is likely that a British lawyer 
with a common law background and a French lawyer with a civil law back-
ground would arrive at different interpretations of the same EU law concepts, 
even though these concepts have their autonomous EU meaning and should 
not be affected by national law. To protect the unity and effectiveness of EU 
law, therefore, it is essential that the Court of Justice provides guidance on the 
correct interpretation of EU law, and is enabled to assist national courts that 
are faced with certain doubts about the right interpretation of EU law.2
The preliminary reference mechanism is one of the key instruments 
enabling the CJEU to provide this guidance, and cooperate with national 
1   For more elaborate discussion of the preliminary reference procedure see inter alia M. Broberg 
and N. Fenger, Preliminary References to the European Court of Justice (OUP, 2nd edn, 2014), 
and on the process in new Member States, which maybe of special interest to the EAC, 
M. Bobek, ‘Learning to talk: Preliminary Rulings, the Courts of the New Member States and 
the Court of Justice’ (2008) 45 CMLRev 1611.
2   Cf. Opinion 1/09 Patent Court [2011] ECR I-1137.
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courts. Indeed, many of the most foundational rulings on EU law, including 
Van Gend & Loos and Costa v. E.N.E.L. were given in preliminary reference pro-
ceedings, further illustrating the importance of this mechanism.3 This chapter 
systematically discusses the different legal issues and complications prelimi-
nary references may give rise to, and the legal solutions developed in the EU to 
ensure the proper functioning of this mechanism. To structure this discussion, 
it follows the different steps of a preliminary ruling procedure, starting with 
the question of which bodies are allowed to ask references, and if national 
law is allowed to limit the right of courts to ask a reference. Subsequently, this 
chapter discusses when national courts may actually have an obligation to ask 
a preliminary reference, instead of just a right, or conversely, when the CJEU 
may declare a preliminary reference inadmissible. Lastly, it must be discussed 
what the CJEU may rule on in a preliminary judgment, and what a national 
court should do with the preliminary judgment it receives from the CJEU.
8.2 Courts and Tribunals Allowed to Refer a Preliminary Question
Article 267 TFEU states that a preliminary question may be asked by ‘any court 
or tribunal of a Member State’. The CJEU by now has clarified that to qualify 
as a court or tribunal, a body must meet all, or at least most, of the following 
criteria to a high degree:
i. It has to be established by law;
ii. It has to be permanent;
iii. It must have compulsory jurisdiction;
iv. It must deal with procedures inter partes;
v. It must apply rules of law
vi. And lastly it must be independent.4
Whether a specific body qualifies has to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, 
whereby the CJEU tends to be supportive of the body wanting to refer where 
possible.5 The CJEU has, however, adhered to its position that normally arbitral 
tribunals do not qualify as a court or tribunal under Article 267 TFEU, unless 
3   See also F. Mancini and D. Keeling, ‘From CILFIT to ERT: The Constitutional Challenge 
Facing the European Court’ (1991) 11 YBEL, 1.
4   See Case C-14/86 Pretore di Salò ECLI:EU:C:1987:275, or more recently Case C-210/06 Cartesio 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:723.
5   See for example Case C-408/98 Abrahamsson ECLI:EU:C:2000:367.
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there is a very close link between the arbitration and the ordinary judicial sys-
tem of a Member State.6 This might be understandable as many arbitral pro-
ceedings fail to meet many of the criteria given and many arbiters might not 
even want to ask a reference, taking into account the year and a half it takes 
on average to get an answer. Yet the inability of arbiters to refer questions to 
the CJEU is also increasingly problematic. To begin with, arbitration is becom-
ing increasingly common. In addition, the CJEU has also held that arbiters are 
obligated to respect EU law of public order, such as EU competition law, in 
their awards. A failure to respect EU law therefore leads to an obligation on 
national judges to annul an arbitral award and to refuse execution.7 Arbiters, 
therefore, are bound by EU law, but are unable to ask guidance on it.
In the EAC context, the EACJ has already directly referred to Pretore di Salò 
in determining which Courts and Tribunals are allowed to refer a question to 
it.8 Building on this solid start, one may also consider if these criteria could 
perhaps be further developed to take the specific context of East Africa into 
account, for example by including systems of customary law or dispute settle-
ment into the circle of courts and tribunals that are allowed to refer. In addi-
tion, the EAC may have an opportunity to reconsider the standing of arbitral 
awards, and perhaps find a more balanced solution than the one chose in 
the EU.
8.3 The Sacred Right to Refer
The CJEU has made it very clear that the right of a court or tribunal to refer 
a question to the CJEU may never be limited.9 Neither national law nor 
higher courts are allowed to limit the freedom of a court to refer. For exam-
ple, national higher courts may not prohibit lower courts to ask a preliminary 
question in a specific case or on a point they have already ruled upon in an 
injunction. Similarly, the CJEU held that a French draft-law that would obligate 
lower courts to first refer a question to the French Constitutional Court before 
6   See for example Case C-102/81 Nordsee ECLI:EU:C:1982:107 or Case C-377/13 Ascendi Beiras 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:1754.
7   Case C-126/97 Eco Swiss v. Benneton ECLI:EU:C:1999:269.
8   See Chapter 8 par.1 and Case Stated No. 1 of 2014 Attorney General of Uganda vs.and Tom 
Kyahurwenda [2015]. (EACJ, 2015) [54].
9   See already Case 166/73 Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf ECLI:EU:C:1974:3.
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they could refer a preliminary question to the CJEU violated the right of lower 
courts under Article 267 TFEU.10
No limit may be imposed, therefore, on the right of any court to ask a pre-
liminary reference to the CJEU. By defending this absolute right of national 
courts, the CJEU also ensures that the channel of communication with lower 
courts remains open. Any risk that national law or higher courts may try to 
prevent any questions from reaching the CJEU is thereby addressed. In addi-
tion, this allows lower courts to enlist the support of the CJEU when they for 
example think a ruling of their own supreme court or an act of parliament con-
flicts with EU law. Lower courts may, justly so, have some reservations before 
overruling their own supreme courts through the supremacy of EU law, and 
may hence prefer some confirmation and borrowed authority from the CJEU.11 
At the same time, lower courts must also carefully consider if, in a concrete 
case, it might perhaps not be better to leave it to the Court of Appeal to refer 
a question, as at that stage of the proceedings the facts of the case and the rel-
evant legal issues may have been clarified and come into sharper focus.
8.4 A Right or an Obligation to Refer?
Article 267 TFEU makes a distinction between lower courts, which may refer a 
preliminary question and ‘a court or tribunal of a Member State against whose 
decisions there is no judicial remedy’, which shall refer a question to the CJEU 
when a question of EU law arises. In some cases, therefore, national courts 
actually have a legal obligation under EU law to ask a preliminary question.12
When deciding if an obligation to refer exists, it is useful to first distinguish 
between questions on the validity of EU law and questions on the interpreta-
tion of EU law. Subsequently, it is necessary to establish which courts fall under 
the obligation to refer, and which exceptions the CJEU has developed through 
its case law on the obligation to refer.
10   Case C-188/10 Melki en Abdeli ECLI:EU:C:2010:363.
11   See EU chapter 4 on the doctrine of supremacy. One of the effects of this supremacy is 
that lower courts can escape the normal judicial hierarchy, as their power to overturn or 
ignore a ruling from their own supreme court, or even a provision of their own constitu-
tion, derives from EU law itself, not just from their own judicial authority.
12   The failure to do so may even lead to Member State liability for the breach of this obliga-
tion to refer, even if this action will only be successful in extreme cases. See Case C-224/01 
Köbler [2003] ECR I-10239.
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8.4.1 Questions on Validity versus Questions on the Interpretation of  
EU Law
National courts can refer two different kinds of question to the CJEU. The first 
type of question concerns the validity of EU law. Such a question essentially 
asks if a certain rule of EU law might be invalid because it conflicts with a 
higher norm of EU law. In Digital Rights Ireland, for example, the High Court 
of Ireland and the Austrian Verfassungsgerichtshof both asked a prelimi-
nary question on the validity of the data retention directive, as they thought 
this directive inter alia violated fundamental rights protected under the EU 
Charter.13 The second type of questions concerns the interpretation of EU law, 
and basically asks how a certain rule of EU law should be interpreted.
Since the CJEU is the only court with the authority to declare EU law invalid, 
national courts are always under an obligation to refer a validity question to 
the CJEU if they want to question the validity of an EU act. National courts 
are, therefore, allowed to hold that an EU act is valid, but not that an EU act 
is invalid.14 Consequently, the entire question of whether a court may or must 
refer a preliminary question only concerns the second type of questions, being 
questions on the interpretation of EU law.
8.4.2 Courts with an Obligation to Refer
Only courts against whose decision there is no remedy can be under the obli-
gation to refer. This is a factual test that requires a case-by-case assessment. For 
example, national law may not allow an appeal from a court of first instance 
to a court of appeal if the monetary interest at stake is too low, or if the case 
concerns a labor dispute. In such cases, no remedy exists against the court of 
first instance, and even a court of first instance might be obligated to ask a 
preliminary reference. It is incorrect, therefore, to summarize Article 267 TFEU 
as holding that only supreme courts or constitutional courts are under an obli-
gation to refer. The fact that a remedy depends on a supreme court accepting 
a case, or that an appeal to the supreme court is only allowed on points of 
law, however, does not make the decision of a court of appeal into a decision 
13   Joined Cases C-293 and 594/12 Data Retention Directive, ECLI:EU:C:2014:238.
14   The only, very limited, exception is that national courts may, in exceptional circum-
stances where irreparable harm may be caused by enforcing a rule of EU law, provide an 
interim measure disapplying that rule of EU law in the particular case whilst they await 
the preliminary ruling of the CJEU on validity. See Case 314/85 Foto-Frost [1987] ECR 4199.
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against which there is no remedy, even if the supreme court in the end refuses 
to hear the case.15
8.4.3 Exceptions to the Obligation to Refer: The CILFIT Doctrine
Even where no legal remedy exists, however, national courts may not be obli-
gated to refer a question. In the famous CILFIT judgment the CJEU formu-
lated three exceptions to the obligations to refer. Firstly, no obligation exists 
where the question of EU law ‘is not relevant, that is to say, if the answer to 
that question, regardless of what it may be, can in no way affect the outcome 
of the case.’16 Secondly, a reference is not required ‘where previous decisions of 
the Court have already dealt with the point of law in question, irrespective 
of the nature of the proceedings which led to those decisions, even though the 
questions at issue are not strictly identical.’17 This second exception is known 
as the acte eclairé doctrine, and means that courts do not have to ask questions 
of law that, in their opinion, have already been clarified in previous judgments of 
the CJEU. Of course whether the question at stake has really been settled by 
previous CJEU case law is an assessment the national courts has to make.
The third exception is known as the acte clair doctrine, and removes the 
obligation to refer where the correct interpretation of EU law is so obvious for 
the national court that no reference is deemed necessary. In the words of the 
CJEU: ‘Finally, the correct application of Community law may be so obvious as 
to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt as to the manner in which the ques-
tion raised is to be resolved.’18 This third exception is potentially the most far 
reaching, as it creates the risk of national courts imposing their own, incorrect 
interpretation on EU law, either intentionally or unwittingly. For this reason 
the CJEU adds several warnings to national courts, and implores them to not 
assume that the correct interpretation is clear too easily:
Before it comes to the conclusion that such is the case, the national court 
or tribunal must be convinced that the matter is equally obvious to the 
courts of the other Member States and to the Court of Justice. Only if 
those conditions are satisfied, may the national court or tribunal refrain 
from submitting the question to the Court of Justice and take upon itself 
the responsibility for resolving it.
15   Case C-99/00 Kenny Roland Lykkeskog, ECLI:EU:C:2002:329 and Case C-210/06 Cartesio 
[2008] ECR I-9641.
16   Case 283/81 CILFIT ECLI:EU:C:1982:335, par. 10.
17   Idem, par. 14.
18   Idem, par. 16.
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However, the existence of such a possibility must be assessed on the 
basis of the characteristic features of Community law and the particular 
difficulties to which its interpretation gives rise.
To begin with, it must be borne in mind that Community legislation is 
drafted in several languages and that the different language versions are 
all equally authentic. An interpretation of a provision of Community law 
thus involves a comparison of the different language versions.
It must also be borne in mind, even where the different language 
versions are entirely in accord with one another, that Community law 
uses terminology which is peculiar to it. Furthermore, it must be empha-
sized that legal concepts do not necessarily have the same meaning in 
Community law and in the law of the various Member States.
Finally, every provision of Community law must be placed in its con-
text and interpreted in the light of the provisions of Community law as a 
whole, regard being had to the objectives thereof and to its state of evolu-
tion at the date on which the provision in question is to be applied.19
At the same time, this does not mean that national high courts must refer 
every time some doubt remains. After all, it is part of the responsibility of high 
courts to settle doubts, even if there may be disagreements on the law with or 
between lower courts. As the CJEU recently clarified in Ferreira da Silva:
In itself, the fact that other national courts or tribunals have given con-
tradictory decisions is not a conclusive factor capable of triggering the 
obligation set out in the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU.
A court or tribunal adjudicating at last instance may take the view 
that, although the lower courts have interpreted a provision of EU law in 
a particular way, the interpretation that it proposes to give of that provi-
sion, which is different from the interpretation espoused by the lower 
courts, is so obvious that there is no reasonable doubt.
However, so far as the area under consideration in the present case 
is concerned and as is clear from paragraphs 24 to 27 of this judgment, 
the question as to how the concept of a ‘transfer of a business’ should 
be interpreted has given rise to a great deal of uncertainty on the part of 
many national courts and tribunals which, as a consequence, have found 
it necessary to make a reference to the Court of Justice. That uncertainty 
19   Idem, paras 17–20. See for further discussion also D. Edward, ‘CILFIT and Foto-Frost in 
their Historical and Procedural Context’, in: The Past and Future of EU Law: The Classics of 
EU law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Hart Publishing 2010), 173.
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shows not only that there are difficulties of interpretation, but also that 
there is a risk of divergences in judicial decisions within the European 
Union.
It follows that, in circumstances such as those of the case before the 
referring court, which are characterised both by conflicting lines of case-
law at national level regarding the concept of a ‘transfer of a business’ 
within the meaning of Directive 2001/23 and by the fact that that con-
cept frequently gives rise to difficulties of interpretation in the various 
Member States, a national court or tribunal against whose decisions 
there is no judicial remedy under national law must comply with its obli-
gation to make a reference to the Court, in order to avert the risk of an 
incorrect interpretation of EU law.20
Although the CJEU therefore allows the acte clair doctrine to be applied where 
national lower courts disagree, it does not allow it where there is disagreement 
or confusion between the courts of multiple Member States. Such disagree-
ment between Member States would threaten the uniformity of EU law and 
indicate the necessity of a preliminary ruling to provide an authoritative EU 
interpretation.
These exceptions to the obligation to refer, and the leeway granted to 
national courts by the CJEU, reflect the cooperative nature of the preliminary 
reference procedure. The CJEU heavily relies on the national courts to refer 
the important cases to it, and to correctly implement the preliminary rulings 
it gives. Even though EU law itself is supreme, and national courts are under 
a legal obligation to implement any preliminary ruling given, the entire pre-
liminary question mechanism depends on mutual respect and a good working 
relation between the CJEU and national courts. This mutual respect includes 
trusting national courts, certainly national supreme courts, to assess when 
a preliminary reference is required and when it is not. Vice versa, national 
courts must take seriously their duty to refer questions on interpretation, also 
as referring the right questions allows the CJEU to ensure the correct and uni-
form interpretation of EU law.
20   Case C-160/14 Ferreira da Silva ECLI:EU:C:2015:565, paras 41–44.
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8.5 Admissibility of Preliminary References
When a national court refers a question, the CJEU is in principle obligated to 
provide a preliminary answer.21 Ultimately, however, the CJEU retains the final 
say over its own jurisdiction, which means that it can also declare preliminary 
references inadmissible. Generally, the CJEU does not want to reject references, 
both out of respect for the national courts asking them and because it needs 
preliminary questions to fulfill its function. The CJEU will even try to ‘rescue’ 
poorly drafted questions where possible, so as to provide a helpful response to 
the national court. Over time, however, the CJEU has developed three general 
grounds on which a reference may be declared inadmissible.
Firstly, a reference is inadmissible where the question asked is obviously 
irrelevant to solve the dispute before the national court.22 Secondly, a refer-
ence may be declared inadmissible where the dispute between the parties 
is hypothetical. This concerns disputes that have been construed by the par-
ties with the sole purpose of acquiring a judicial ruling on a certain question, 
but where there is no real dispute between the parties.23 Test-cases, however, 
are allowed, as long as there is a real dispute concerned. Lastly, the CJEU may 
also declare a reference inadmissible where the case file sent by the national 
court does not provide sufficient factual and legal information to usefully 
answer the questions posed.24 Of course a national court is then allowed to 
improve the file and resend it.25
The fact that a question asked by a national court has already been clari-
fied in earlier case law, or the correct interpretation is obvious, is not a ground 
for inadmissibility. These CILFIT exceptions only remove the obligation of 
national courts to refer, they do not remove the right to refer where national 
courts want to do so.
21   See for example case C-220/05 Auroux ECLI:EU:C:2007:31.
22   Cf. Case C-293/03 My ECLI:EU:C:2004:821 or Case C-152/03 Ritter-Coulais ECLI:EU: 
C:2006:123.
23   Case 244/80 Foglia ECLI:EU:C:1981:302 or Case C-225/02 Garcia Blanco ECLI:EU:C:2005:34.
24   See for example Case C-567/07 Sint-Servatius ECLI:EU:C:2009:593.
25   The CJEU has also provided national courts with a communication providing recommen-
dations on how to submit preliminary references, published in OJ [2012] C 338/1.
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8.6 Status and Effect of the Preliminary Ruling
In a preliminary ruling, the CJEU may only rule on the validity of EU law or 
provide the correct interpretation of a rule of EU law. The CJEU is not allowed 
to interpret national law, or to settle the underlying dispute between parties. It 
remains up to the national court to apply the interpretation given by the CJEU 
to the case at hand. What the CJEU can do, however, is to provide an interpre-
tation of EU law that is so specific, and is so closely linked to the facts of the 
case, that it de facto determines the decision the national court should take.26 
In other cases, the CJEU may only provide a more general interpretation of EU 
law, and thereby leave a broad discretion to the national court, for example to 
determine the proportionality of a measure.27
A preliminary answer is legally binding on the national court that referred 
the question to the CJEU.28 In addition, a preliminary ruling is also binding on 
all other national courts, as it provides the authoritative interpretation of EU 
law.29 Preliminary rulings, therefore, have an erga omnes binding effect, and 
function as legal precedents. Normally, the interpretation provided by the CJEU 
also has retroactive effect, meaning it determines how the provision should 
always have been interpreted, also in the past (ex tunc).30 In exceptional cases, 
however, the CJEU may limit the effect of a preliminary reference in time, for 
example because legal certainty requires so or the practical implications of ex 
tunc application would be to severe. In Defrenne, for example, the CJEU limited 
the effects of its ruling on equal pay between men and women based on (now) 
Article 157(1) TFEU, as full retroactive effect would require governments and 
companies to compensate lower wages going back for more than a decade.31
26   See for example Case C-180/04 Vasallo ECLI:EU:C:2006:518.
27   See for an overview and analysis of different approaches T. Tridimas, ‘Constitutional 
Review of Member State Action: The Virtues and Vices of an Incomplete Jurisdiction’, 
(2011) 9 I-CON 737.
28   Case 52/76 Benedetti ECLI:EU:C:1977:16.
29   This obligation also derives from Article 4(3) TEU. See also Joined Cases 28–30/62 
Da Costa ECLI:EU:C:1963:6.
30   J. Komarek, ‘Federal Elements in the Community Judicial System: Building Coherence in 
the Community Legal System’, (2005) 42 CMLRev, 9.
31   43/75 Defrenne v SABENA (Defrenne II), ECLI:EU:C:1976:56. Also see Case C-262/88 
Barber ECLI:EU:C:1990:209.
©  kennedy gastorn and wanyama masinde, ���7 | doi ��.��63/97890043��073_0�8
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC-BY-NC License.
CHAPTER 9
The EAC Common Market
Kennedy Gastorn and Wanyama Masinde
9.1 Introduction
On the 1st July 2010 the East African Community Common Market became oper-
ational. The actual negotiations on the establishment of the Common Market 
started in April 2008 and ended in November 2009 when the East African 
Community (EAC) Heads of States signed the Protocol on the Establishment 
of the EAC Common Market.1 The ratification process was completed by each 
respective Partner State and, in July 2010, the Common Market came into force.
A common market is essentially an arrangement whereby member or part-
ner countries of a regional economic community operate as a single market for 
goods, services, capital and labor, having common revenue and trade laws. Two 
main economic grounds in favor of a common market or absence of internal 
barriers are: firstly, that freedom of trade and movement tends to bring about 
that each kind of production undertaken in the area will be endeavored in the 
sectors that suit it best; and secondly, it tends to ensure that, where there is an 
advantage in large-scale production of a commodity, it will be produced on 
large scale in one or a few places, for the whole area, instead of being produced 
on an uneconomically small scale in a large number of places.2
Article 5(2) of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African 
Community (the EAC Treaty) enjoins Partner States to establish among them-
selves a Customs Union, a Common Market, a Monetary Union and ultimately 
a Political Federation. The Common Market is therefore the second stage of 
integration after the Customs Union which was achieved through the EAC 
Protocol on the Customs Union in 2004.3
1   Gastorn, K. ‘The Legal Analysis of the Common Market of the East African Community as 
Market Freedoms in the Open Market Economy’, Law in Africa, 2011:1:143–154.
2   Newman, P., ‘The Economics of Integration in East Africa’, in Colin T. Leys and Peter Robson 
(eds), Federation in East Africa: Opportunities and Problems, Oxford University Press, London/
New York (1965), 58.
3   Pursuant to Article 75 of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, 
1999. The Protocol on the Establishmentof the East African Community Customs Union 
was signed on 2nd March 2004, and launched in 2005 with the aim of removing tariff and 
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9.2 History of Common Market in the Region
The region has rich history of uncoordinated experiences of common 
markets.4 Cooperation among the Partner States of the EAC has a history dat-
ing back over a century. From 1884 to 1919, Burundi, Rwanda and Tanganyika 
were one territory (German East Africa) under German colonial rule. Uganda 
and Kenya existed as separate territories under British colonial rule. The defeat 
of the German power during the First World War changed the geographical 
frontiers of German East Africa. Two provinces were split from the territory 
and became autonomous territories and were renamed Burundi and Rwanda 
under Belgian colonial rule. The remaining part became Tanganyika (later 
Tanzania) under British rule, first as a mandate under the League of Nations 
and later as a trust territory under the rule of the United Nations. In short, the 
victorious powers divided the previous German territory among themselves 
under the Versailles Treaty of 1919 in which Germany was forced to surrender 
all its foreign occupations. By examining the historical development of the 
region, four stages of common market integration can be noted.
Generally, the pre-colonial African communities were not organized along 
countries, tribes or ethnic groups. Their identities and vernacular languages 
simply shaded into one another, and for them cooperation was more impor-
tant than competition. All this changed when the Europeans came to Africa 
as colonialists. They invented colonies, drew frontiers across the map at will 
to exclusively suit their imperial interests and convenience at the whim of few 
cartographers in London, Berlin or Paris. They also classified peoples of Africa, 
sorting them out into what they called tribes, producing a whole new ethnic 
map to show the frontiers of each one. They simply wanted recognizable units 
they could easily control.
In 1895 the first phase of integration of the region began through the con-
struction of the Uganda railway starting from Mombasa and linking the two 
countries of Kenya and Uganda. This provided a basis for the first creation 
of a common market in 1900 between Kenya and Uganda after the latter had 
made formal customs arrangements with Kenya for Mombasa to become 
the Customs Collection Centre. In 1905, the common currency (East African 
Shilling) was introduced in the two countries.5 Therefore, Kenya and Uganda 
non-tariff barriers on intra-regional trade, establishment of the common external tariff for 
goods imported from outside the region, and implementation of the common customs law.
4   See also Gastorn, K., cited supra note 1.
5   Apuuli, D.P., ‘Fast Tracking East African Federation: Asking the Difficult Questions’, Paper 
Prepared and Presented at a Development Network of Indigenous Voluntary Associations 
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had by that year passed through the three main stages of integration, namely 
(a) customs union, (b) common market, and (c) monetary union. The coopera-
tion between Uganda and Kenya was largely facilitated by the fact that both 
countries were under one colonial master, the British. However, at the time, 
Tanganyika (then German East Africa) was under German rule and therefore 
could not easily be brought into this cooperation.
The second phase of the common market took place after the defeat of 
Germany in the First World War which culminated in the takeover of the terri-
tory by the British. The interests of the British could then be better served with 
Tanganyika joining its empire. Tanganyika was therefore brought within the 
already established arrangements of cooperation. In 1922, Tanganyika joined 
the customs union package. In 1933 it had already acceded to the free exchange 
of locally produced goods and the Postal Union, and finally the Common 
Market between Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda was established.
The third phase of the common market was provided for in the Treaty for 
East African Cooperation6 adopted by Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda in 1967. 
The principal common market machineries included the Common Market 
Council and the Common Market Tribunal.7 The operation of this common 
market was very much influenced by historical accidents which ultimately 
made Kenya take a lead by gaining substantial benefits that accrued from the 
common market. Uganda also benefited, although not as much as Kenya, while 
Tanganyika gained the least. Such unequal benefits were among the reasons 
that led to the collapse of the common market in 1977 which was viewed as 
slowing down the economic development of some individual states.8
After the independence of Tanganyika (1961), Uganda (1962) and Kenya 
(1963), there was a big interest, especially on the part of Tanganyika, to move 
towards a political federation, an idea imbued in Pan-Africanism. Tanganyika 
wanted to build on the already achieved stages of integration, namely customs 
union, common market and monetary union, and to have a political federation. 
Tanganyika was also prepared to delay its independence for a year to wait for 
(DENIVA), Public Dialogue on Fast Tracking East African Federation Dialogue, Hotel 
Equatoria Kampala, 24th November, 2006, 5; Ruhangisa, J.E., ‘The Institutions of the East 
African Community (EAC) with Emphasis on the East African Court of Justice’, A Course 
Material for TGCL Students, University of Dar es Salaam (2010), 2 (unpublished).
6   Part II of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community.
7   Part III of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community.
8   Ndegwa, P., ‘The Common Market and Development in East Africa’, Eastern Africa Publishing 
House, Kampala (1965), 136.
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Kenya and Uganda, so that an East African Federation would be established.9 
Thus in 1963, a Declaration for the establishment of a political federation was 
signed. From the point of view of Nyerere, then President of Tanganyika:
A federation of at least Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika should be com-
paratively easy to achieve. We already have a common market and run 
many services through the Common Services Organization which has 
its own Central Legislative Assembly and an Executive composed of the 
Prime Ministers of the three states. This is the nucleus from which a fed-
eration is the natural growth.10
However, disagreements about the idea of a political federation prevented the 
establishment of the federation and instead the East African Cooperation was 
instituted. The main issues of disagreement include division of state and fed-
eral powers, citizenship, borrowing powers and conceptual structures. In any 
event, the Prime Minister of Uganda, Hon. Apollo Milton Obote, was instru-
mental in the failure of the idea of federation as he thought that Uganda might 
become extinct overnight.11 Moreover, it was still too soon to aim for a federa-
tion, both considering the complexities of federating and given the fact that 
all the preceding stages of integration were not people-centered and were not 
systematically and incrementally achieved.12
The current Common Market set-up is the fourth phase, built on the ruins of 
the extinct East African Cooperation that collapsed in 1977. It should be noted 
that the 1967–1977 East African Common Market, and the Central American 
Common Market (CACM)13 were by then frequently cited as the two most eco-
nomically integrated areas among the least developed countries. In particular, 
the East African Common Market was viewed as a more perfect customs union 
with somewhat more coordination of economic policies, while the CACM was 
more a free trade area.14
9    Apuuli, D.P., cited supra note 6, 5.
10   Apuuli, D.P., cited supra note 6, 4.
11   Ibid., 6–7.
12   Gastorn, K., cited supra note 1, 147.
13   The CACM was established in 1960 and is headquartered in Guatemala city, and includes 
Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, and Costa Rica.
14   Fred H. Lawson (ed), ‘Comparative Regionalism’, Ashgate (2009), 9.
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9.3 Aims and Objectives
The foundation of the current Common Market is derived from Articles 76 and 
104 of the EAC Treaty. Article 76 of the Treaty provides that:
1. There shall be established a Common Market among the Partner 
States. Within the Common Market, and subject to the Protocol pro-
vided for in paragraph 4 of this Article, there shall be free movement of 
labor, goods, services, capital and the right of establishment.
2. The establishment of the Common Market shall be progressive and in 
accordance with schedules approved by the Council.
3. For purposes of this Article, the Council may establish and confer 
powers and authority upon such institutions as it may deem necessary 
to administer the Common Market.
4. For the purpose of this Article, the Partner States shall conclude a 
Protocol on a Common Market.
Furthermore, Article 46 of the Common Market Protocol requires the Council 
of Ministers to establish an authority or institution to manage the Common 
Market. This authority is not yet established.
The stated overall objective of the Common Market is to widen and deepen 
cooperation among the Partner States in economic and social fields for their 
benefit.15 The Common Market is the second out of the four envisaged stages 
for current EAC integration,16 namely the Customs Union, the Common 
Market, the Monetary Union, and the Political Federation. The achievement of 
the above stages is to be governed by the fundamental principles of coopera-
tion for mutual benefit, mutual trust, political will and sovereign equality, good 
governance, equitable distribution of benefits, and peaceful co-existence and 
good neighborliness.17
The EAC Common Market focuses mainly on four freedoms, namely free 
movement of goods, free movement of labor, free movement of services, and 
free movement of capital. It therefore involves the integration or amalgama-
tion of the four markets; (a) the goods market, (b) the labor market, (c) the 
15   Article 4 of the EAC Common Market Protocol.
16   Article 5(2) of the EAC Common Market Protocol.
17   Article 6 of the EAC Common Market Protocol.
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services market, and (d) the capital market.18 On the account of Article 2(4) 
of the Common Market Protocol, the right of establishment, the right of resi-
dence, and the right of free movement of persons (other than labor) are an 
integral part of the Common Market. To this end, rights of establishment and 
residence may be added to as the fifth freedom under the Common Market.
Free movement of goods entails the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers 
(barriers to trade), thus easing the movement of goods.19 Non-tariff barriers do 
not involve direct payments of money. They are quantitative restrictions and 
specific limitations that act as obstacles to trade, and which appear in the form 
of rules, regulations and laws that have a negative impact on trade.20
Free movement of labor relates to the unhindered movement of workers 
within the territories. It entails the principle of non-discrimination in labor 
laws and policies on grounds of nationality.21 Article 10 of the Common Market 
Protocol provides for the free movement of workers and their accompanying 
spouse or children (family members).
Free movement of services is provided for under Part F of the Common 
Market Protocol and refers to the movement of services supplied by nationals 
of the Partner States within the Community. The current schedule of commit-
ments on free movement of services identifies seven sectors to be liberalized, 
namely (a) business services, (b) communication services, (c) distribution 
services, (d) education services, (e) financial services, (f) tourism and other 
related services, and (g) transport services.
Free movement of capital is provided for under Part G of the Common 
Market Protocol and entails the removal of restrictions on the movement of 
capital supplied by nationals of Partner States, and the removal of discrimina-
tion based on nationality.
The right of establishment is provided for in Article 13 of the Common 
Market Protocol and entitles a national of a Partner State to undertake and 
pursue economic activities as a self-employed person, and set up and manage 
economic undertakings in the territory of another Partner State. It also entitles 
a self-employed person who is in the territory of another Partner State to join 
the social security scheme of that Partner State in accordance with its national 
18   Tax, S.L., (2010), ‘East African Community Integration: Marching towards a Common 
Market’, Paper Presented at the University of Dar es Salaam, East African Community 
Students’ Union, 26th June 2010, 6 (unpublished).
19   Part C of the EAC Common Market Protocol.
20   See on this point also the distinction in EU law between financial and non-financial 
restrictions to the free movement of goods discussed in EU Chapter 10.
21   Part D of the EAC Common Market Protocol.
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laws.22 The implementation of the right of establishment is done according to 
the specific regulations.23
The right of residence24 relates to persons from other Partner States who 
have been admitted to the country as workers25 or self-employed persons 
under the right of establishment as provided above.26 Under this right, citizens 
of the Partner States would be entitled to a residence permit in the host State 
provided that they have been employed or self-employed in accordance with 
the respective national policies and laws of that country. The implementation 
of the right of residence is also done in accordance with specific regulations.27
The abovementioned freedoms are the subject of the following chapters 
in which they will be discussed in more detail. Suffice it to say at this stage 
that the Common Market has created opportunities within the region as 
it seeks to remove all obstacles to intra-community trade and to merge the 
national markets into one unified market, and thereby make a place where 
the individual freedom of economic activity would be exercised regardless of 
borders between Partner States. The unified EAC Common Market encom-
passes more than 143.5 million people and a combined Gross Domestic 
Product of $110.3 billion (2014).28 Opportunities include (a) a deeper under-
standing and integration of the East Africans which in return would strengthen 
peace and stability in the region, (b) an expanded market for goods, services, 
capital, and labor likely to boost and expedite economic and social develop-
ment in the region, (c) the creation of a strong basis on which common fiscal 
policies including currency may be established.
9.4 Levels of Economic Integration
In terms of levels of economic integration, a common market is normally the 
third level, after a free trade area (an area within which customs duties and 
other trade restrictions between member states are prohibited) and a customs 
union (a free trade area, together with a system whereby a common duty is 
charged on goods entering the free trade area from a non-member state).29 
22   Article 13(3) of the EAC Common Market Protocol.
23   Article 13(12) of the EAC Common Market Protocol.
24   Article 14 of the EAC Common Market Protocol.
25   Article 10 of the EAC Common Market Protocol.
26   Article 13 of the EAC Common Market Protocol.
27   Article 14(8) of the EAC Common Market Protocol.
28   EAC Facts & Figures Report 2014.
29   Cf, also EU Chapter 9 on the internal market in the EU.
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It is a stage in which there is free flow of factors of production, a common 
external tariff and no tariffs or quotas. However, the EAC common market 
today is a label more widely applied than practiced. Also the concept of levels 
tends to employ stages, the sequence of which is often confusing in practice. 
For instance, the European Common Market achieved partial free flow of fac-
tors of production before it became a full free trade area and customs union 
in July 1968.30
9.5 The Relationship between the EAC Treaty and the Protocols
The EAC Treaty is the basic rule constituting the integration process. In the 
scheme of constitutional principles within a state, the EAC Treaty is similar 
to a national constitution or grundnorm of the legal orders.31 The EAC Treaty 
defines “Treaty” as including its annexes and protocols. Article 1 of the EAC 
Treaty defines a “protocol” as an agreement that supplements, amends or qual-
ifies the Treaty. Protocols therefore derive their legitimacy and legality from 
the Treaty and thereby become an integral part of the EAC Treaty.32
In principle, protocols are negotiated and concluded “for purposes of spell-
ing out the objectives and scope of, and institutional mechanisms for, coopera-
tion and integration”.33 The protocol is therefore a tool that is used to open up 
a sector of cooperation between the Partner States.
In the EAC, a protocol may be concluded on any matter specifically pro-
vided for in the Treaty. For example, Article 27(2) specifically requires Partner 
States to conclude a protocol to operationalize the extended jurisdiction of the 
East African Court of Justice on matters like appellate and human rights juris-
diction. Furthermore, a protocol may be concluded on any matter necessary 
to achieve the agreed objectives in each area of cooperation. However, each 
protocol must be approved by the Summit of the Heads of State on a recom-
mendation from the Council of Ministers, and is also subject to signature and 
ratification by the Partner States.34
30   Fred H. Lawson, cited supra note 15, 8.
31   Mchome, S.E. ‘The Treaty of the East African Community: Is it the Equivalent of a National 
Constitution?’, in in Kennedy Gastorn et al. (eds.), ‘Processes of Legal Integration in the 
East African Community’, Dar Es Salaam University Press, Dar es Salaam, 83–102.
32   Article 151(4) of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community.
33   Mwapachu, J.V. ‘Ten Years of the EAC—Achievements, Challenges and Prospects’, 
in Kennedy Gastorn et al. (eds.), ‘Processes of Legal Integration in the East African 
Community’, Dar Es Salaam University Press, Dar es Salaam, 62.
34   Article 151 of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community.
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CHAPTER 9A
The EU Common Market
Armin Cuyvers
9.1 Introduction
The internal market is both an end in itself and a means to a higher end.1 
Article 2 of the 1957 Treaty of Rome already declared that the (then) European 
Economic Community (EEC) aimed to establish a Common Market between 
the Member States.2 The EEC, therefore, already had a clear economic objec-
tive of increasing economic integration and the living conditions in a Europe 
impoverished after two world wars.3 At the same time, the market was also a 
means to an end. It was thought that by integrating markets and economies, 
peace and stability would follow. Not only would Member States become 
accustomed to cooperation and dialogue, economic integration would also 
lead to a de facto solidarity and would make waging war economically impossi-
ble. The economic costs of conflict would simply become too high, preventing 
conflicts as long as some form of rational decision making would be in place. 
It was this dual purpose of the internal market that formed part of the genius 
of European integration.
This chapter will briefly introduce some of the main features of the EU inter-
nal market, focusing on the early stages of integration the combined use of 
negative and positive integration and the increasing convergence between the 
freedoms. Subsequently, EU chapters 10 to 13 will separately discuss the four 
individual freedoms underlying the internal market, being the free movement 
1   For a more detailed analyses of the internal market and its development see inter alia N.N. 
Shuibne, The Coherence of EU Free Movement Law. Constitutional Responsibility and the Court 
of Justice (OUP, 2013), S.C. Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU. The Four Freedoms (4th edn, 
OUP 2015), or P.J.G. Kapteyn, A.M. McDonnell, K.J.M. Mortelmans, and C.W.A. Timmermans 
(eds), The Law of the European Union and the European Communities (4th revised edition, 
Kluwer Law International 2008).
2   The objective can currently be found in Article 3(3) TEU. Note that in the early days of 
European integration the term Common Market was used, as currently in the EAC, before the 
terminology of an internal market was adopted to stress the complete removal of barriers.
3   See for some economic analysis of the internal market inter alia W. Molle, The Economics of 
European Integration (Aldershot, 2006) or J. Pelkmans, European Integration: Methods and 
Economic Analysis (Longman, 1997).
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of goods, services and establishment, persons, and capital. We begin, however, 
with the concept of an internal market as such.
9.2 The Concept of an Internal Market
Article 26 TFEU defines the internal market as ‘an area without internal 
frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital 
is ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty’. This very broad 
concept was further developed, albeit still in a very general manner, by the 
CJEU in its Schul judgement:
The concept of a common market as defined by the court in a consis-
tent line of decisions involves the elimination of all obstacles to intra- 
community trade in order to merge the national markets into a single 
market bringing about conditions as close as possible to those of a genu-
ine internal market.4
The essential aim of an internal market, therefore, is to make trade between 
Member States as easy as trade within a single state. Geographic realities such 
as distance and mountains aside, a Danish company should be able to sell its 
goods or services just as easily in Italy as in Denmark itself. The main idea is 
that such an internal market allows all the factors of production, labour, capi-
tal and enterprise, to move freely, generating maximum allocative efficiency 
and hence increasing overall wealth.
An internal market, therefore, is a far reaching form of economic integra-
tion. It goes beyond a free trade area and a customs union, as it aims to remove 
all obstacles to free movement and create a market that functions as if all 
Member States are one country. The ambitious nature of this aim comes into 
focus when one realizes that almost any national rule may be able to affect free 
movement, as we shall see in more detail in the coming chapters on the spe-
cific free movement rights. Creating an internal market, therefore, is not just 
an economic but also a major political project. An internal market, however, 
is not yet the most intense form of economic integration beyond statehood. 
For in the final step, a full economic union, an internal market is combined 
with the complete integration of monetary and fiscal policy as well. The EU 
has moved a long way towards economic union as well, as will be discussed in 
4   Case 15/81, Schul, [1982] ECR 1982, 1409.
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more detail in EU chapter 13, even though that process has run into significant 
challenges, which other regional systems should try to avoid.5
9.3 The Time Line of the EU Internal Market
Something as complex as an internal market cannot be established overnight, 
already because Member State economies and legal systems need time to 
adjust. Establishing an internal market, therefore, requires several phases and 
transition periods. The first step in the development of the EU internal market 
was the creation of a customs union, on which the internal market, according 
to Article 28 TFEU, remains based:
The Union shall comprise a customs union which shall cover all trade in 
goods and which shall involve the prohibition between Member States of 
customs duties on imports and exports and of all charges having equiva-
lent effect, and the adoption of a common customs tariff in their rela-
tions with third countries.6
The crux of a customs union, which forms one step up from a free trade area, 
is that not only the tariffs and quotas internally, so between members, are 
removed, but that the members also agree to apply a common tariff externally, 
so on goods entering the union from outside. Once goods have entered this 
customs union, they can be moved around freely in the entire union, inter alia 
removing the need for burdensome rules of origin.7 The uniformity of the cus-
toms regulation then becomes vital, as the conditions for access to the terri-
tory of the customs union must be the same in all Member States, which also 
explains why the customs union is an exclusive competence of the EU.8
The customs union was established in phases, allowing Member States to 
gradually reduce tariffs and adjust, whilst prohibiting new tariffs. The cus-
toms union was completed on 1 July 1968, when all ‘internal’ tariffs between 
5   In addition, as also pointed out in Chapter 10, para. 2, these distinctions and steps are 
theoretical constructs, and ‘In practice, regional cooperation does not fit exactly into 
these theoretical pigeon holes’. In practice integration can blend certain steps or only com-
plete certain steps incompletely.
6   Compare also the former Article 23 EC, holding that ‘The Community shall be based upon a 
customs union (. . .).’
7   See on the EAC challenges on this point also Chapter 10.3.4.
8   Article 3(a) TFEU.
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the (then six) Member States had been removed, and common customs tariff 
for the entire Community had been established. At this date, however, a real 
internal market, originally planned to be in place by 1 January 1970, was, still 
a long way off. In fact, European integration was facing several political crises, 
and political faith in the entire project had been reduced significantly.9 During 
the political stagnation, however, it was the CJEU that picked up the integra-
tion gauntlet, as will be discussed in more detail below and the next chapters. 
It really was the CJEU’s case law on free movement that provided the most 
important contribution to the development of the internal market in the 1960’s 
and 70’s. This case law probably saved the project from a complete demise, and 
progressively turned the internal market into a legal reality.
In the eighties, different political elites in Europe got their second European 
wind, as economic growth increased and political support for the internal 
market project picked up. The re-launch of the European internal market 
that followed is usually linked to an important White Paper on ‘Completing 
the Internal Market’ by the Commission that appeared on 14 June 1985.10 
The White Paper laid out an ambitious agenda to create a truly internal mar-
ket. It included a list of 279 legislative measures that should all be in place by 
31 December 1992, the date on which the market should be ‘complete’.11
Partially based on the economic benefits that such integration would 
bring,12 the White Paper was followed by decisive political action in the form 
of the Single European Union Act (SEA) 1986.13 Crucially, the SEA both for-
mulated the Treaty objective to create an internal market as now formulated 
in Article 26 TEU, and provided the political mechanisms to actually create 
it. One of the most important changes was the introduction of the current 
Article 114 TFEU, which allowed internal market legislation to be adopted by 
9    See also EU chapter 1 for a further description of some of these crises in European integra-
tion, which show that the EU has often developed in a pattern of crisis followed by deeper 
integration.
10   Commission White Paper ‘Completing the Internal Market’ COM(85)310.
11   This White Paper, therefore, creates an interesting blue print for comparison, for example 
with the East African Community Elimination of Non-Tariff Barriers Act 2015.
12   See for contemporary analyses for example M. Emerson, M. Aujean, M. Catinat, P. Goybet, 
and A. Jacquemin, The Economics of 1992: The EC Commission’s Assessment of the Economic 
Effects of Completing the Internal Market (OUP, 1988), or P. Cecchini, The European 
Challenge 1992: The Benefits of a Single Market (Gower, 1988). For later analysis see inter 
alia W. Molle, The Economics of European Integration (Aldershot, 2006).
13   For further analysis on why the SEA could be adopted politically, aside from economic 
benefits, see for example P. Craig, ‘Integration, Democracy and Legitimacy’ in P. Craig and 
G. de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (2nd edn, OUP 2010), ch. 1.
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qualified majority. This removed the veto-power of each individual Member 
State, which had often blocked political decision making before.
With new political vigour and qualified majority voting, the internal mar-
ket project took off, and was for the major part ‘finished’ in 1992.14 Work was 
then started on economic integration with the Maastricht commitment to 
introduce a single European currency.15 In addition, work continued to fur-
ther develop the internal market, which was of course not yet fully finished 
even though the main aims of the 1992 project had been achieved. Currently, 
the main areas where the EU internal market needs to be improved concern 
services and the digital market.16 After all, the EU internal market was largely 
developed in a time where the trade in goods made up over 70% of the econ-
omy and the internet did not yet exist. In our current digital age and services-
driven economic reality, however, some adjustment may be in order. The need 
for adjustment and modernisation also creates opportunities for more recent 
forms of regional integration. They can leap-frog ahead and develop their 
internal market law with these new challenges and opportunities in mind. In 
addition, newly formed internal markets may also learn from the EU struggles 
to include a social dimension in the internal market, as a failure to do so may 
undermine the legitimacy of the market in the longer run.17
9.4 Combining Negative and Positive Integration
The EU internal market depends on a combination of negative and positive 
integration. A full understanding of the internal market therefore requires a 
proper understanding of both mechanisms, as well as their interaction.
The term negative integration denotes the use of legally enforceable pro-
hibitions that forbid Member States to restrict free movement. For example, 
Article 34 TFEU prohibits any Member State rule that restricts the free 
14   See the Commission Recommendation of 12 July 2004 on the transposition into national 
law of directives affecting the internal market, O.J. [2005], L 98/47.
15   See further EU chapters 1 and 13 on this process.
16   See for more discussion EU chapter 12, as well as the newly launched Commission ini-
tiative on the Digital Internal Market, available via <https://ec.europa.eu/priorities/
digital-single-market_en>.
17   See on this increasingly problematic issue B, de Witte, ‘Non-Market Values in Internal 
Market Legislation’, in N. Nic Shuibhne (ed), Regulating the Internal Market (Edward Elgar, 
2006), 75 or the 210 Monti report ‘A New Strategy for the Single Market, At the Service of 
Europe’s Economy and Society’.
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movement of goods unless it can be justified.18 As this prohibition is directly 
applicable and supreme, it allows individuals and companies to challenge any 
national rules that limit their free movement before a national court.19 Aided 
by the CJEU and national courts, negative integration therefore allows individ-
uals and companies to act as a kind of legal bulldozers that remove all obsta-
cles to free movement.20 The functioning of negative integration, moreover, 
depends on courts and individuals, not on political action. It can therefore sur-
vive, or even thrive, in periods of political stagnation.
Negative integration in the EU is based on a collection of Treaty provisions 
that prohibit restrictions on all four freedoms and provide some exceptions 
for rules that serve public interests.21 The structure of the Treaty provisions 
concerning the different freedoms is very similar. First, the Treaty contains 
a general prohibition on any obstacles to the specific freedom, then it pro-
vides for a limited set of exceptions to the prohibition, based on such issues 
as public health and national security.22 As indicated above, the Court of 
Justice has played a key role in making negative integration effective in the 
EU. For example, it was the CJEU that found all these prohibitions had direct 
effect, allowing them to be effectively enforced. In addition, the CJEU devel-
oped a very wide definition of restriction, meaning that the free movement 
clauses could be used to challenge an extremely broad array of national rules 
that de facto limited free movement, even if they were not even indirectly 
discriminatory.23 Exceptions, on the other hand, were interpreted narrowly, 
meaning that it becomes harder for Member State to justify restrictions on 
public interest grounds.
Negative integration, however, has its limits. To begin with, it can only 
remove national obstacles, it cannot create new, better laws to replace the 
ones that have been disapplied. Negative integration also depends on indi-
vidual actors, which may lead to incoherence as some restrictions are chal-
lenged and others are not. In addition, negative integration cannot harmonize 
18   See for a further discussion of this prohibition EU chapter 10.
19   See EU chapter 4 on the concept of direct effect and its pivotal importance for EU law.
20   On the importance of national courts in this process also see K. Lenaerts, ‘The Court’s 
Outer and Inner Selves: Exploring the External and Internal Legitimacy of the European 
Court of Justice’, in M. Adams, H. De Waele, J. Meeusen and G. Straetmans (eds), Judging 
Europe’s Judges, The Legitimacy of the Case Law of the European Court of Justice (Hart, 
2013), 40, as well as EU chapter 9.
21   Articles 30, 34, 35, 45, 49, 56, 63 and 110 TFEU.
22   See generally C. Barnard, ‘Derogations, justifications and the Four Freedoms’, in 
C. Barnard and O. Odudu (eds.) The Outer Limits of European Union Law, (OUP, 2009).
23   See for example Case 8/74, Dassonville, [1974], ECR 837, and EU chapters 10–13.
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the restrictive laws that are justified and remain in place. After all, many rules 
that restrict free movement, such as consumer protection or food safety rules, 
are highly desirable, and can also be justified under EU law. Free movement 
is not the same as total deregulation. Where all Member States adopt differ-
ent but justifiable laws on, for example, food safety, however, free movement 
of food stuffs would still be seriously undermined. A Dutch dairy producer, 
for instance, would still have to deal with different food laws in each Member 
State, which de facto undermines the free movement of his product.
For all these reasons, negative integration needs to be complemented by 
so-called positive integration.24 The concept of positive integration essen-
tially denotes the use of EU legislation to harmonize or replace national laws.25 
Such EU rules can then serve the required public interests, such as food safety, 
without creating unnecessary obstacles to free movement. For example, the 
EU could adopt a directive on the minimum standards for dairy products. This 
directive could provide effective and uniform protection to all consumers in 
the EU, but would also allow producers that meet these minimum standards to 
sell their product throughout the entire EU. By harmonizing the level of pro-
tection at the EU level, therefore, legislation that protects public interests does 
not have to create differences between national laws that hinder free move-
ment. Under the Tedeschi principle, moreover, free movement prohibitions 
no longer apply once secondary EU legislation is in place. The free movement 
clauses cannot be used, therefore, to challenge national restrictions to free 
movement that are based on EU legislation.26
The introduction of harmonization by qualified majority voting under 
the Single European Act, therefore, was so important because it enabled the 
24   Negative integration also creates its own push towards positive integration, for as 
national rules are set aside, the need arises for EU law to replace them. The East African 
Community Standardisation, Quality Assurance, Metrology and Testing Protocol and the 
2006 East African Community Standardisation, Quality Assurance, Metrology and Testing 
Act can also be seen as an example, or at least anticipation, of this process.
25   This is often done via directives, usually under Article 114 TFEU, which require all 
Member States to adopt certain national laws. As a result, all national laws adopt simi-
lar provisions, and hence are ‘harmonized’. See for the instrument of a directive EU 
chapter 3.
26   See Case C-5/77 Tedeschi ECLI:EU:C:1977:144 and Case C-573/12, Alands ECLI:EU:C: 
2014:2037. Naturally the validity of the EU legislation itself can be challenged, for instance 
for a violation of free movement principles, under Article 263 TFEU. See EU chapter 7 
and K.J.M. Mortelmans, ‘The Relationship between the Treaty Rules and Community 
Measures for the Establishment and Functioning of the Internal Market: Towards a 
Concordance Rule’ (2002), CMLRev, 1303.
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necessary positive integration to complement the negative integration already 
spearheaded by the CJEU. In addition to qualified majority voting, how-
ever, successful future positive integration also depended on more effective 
methods of harmonization. Initially, the main method used was that of total 
harmonization. Member States would for instance try to exhaustively regulate 
all product requirements for a certain product. Such total harmonisation, how-
ever, could take a very long time to reach agreement, as all details needed to 
be agreed upon.27 After the SEA, therefore, the EU also moved towards a new 
approach towards harmonization that depended more on the setting of mini-
mum standards and mutual recognition.28 This new approach significantly 
sped up harmonization and improved the quality and effectiveness of the leg-
islation adopted.
In line with the interaction between negative and positive interaction 
described above, each of the different freedoms discussed in the next chapters 
will show a similar pattern. First, negative integration is used, with the sup-
port of the CJEU, to challenge a host of national regulations. Subsequently, EU 
legislation is gradually developed to harmonize or replace national legislation, 
whereby increasingly more modern forms of harmonization are employed. 
Again, more recent forms of economic integration may learn from some of the 
detours and dead ends in this process of European integration, as they may 
try to jump directly towards more effective forms of negative and positive 
integration.
9.5 Convergence in Negative Integration
Before the next chapters discuss each individual freedom separately, how-
ever, it is useful to highlight one further overarching development in internal 
market law, being the gradual convergence of the different freedoms.29
27   See already J. Pelkmans, ‘The New Approach to Technical Harmonization and 
Standardization’ (1987) 25 CCMS, 249 as well as the White Paper of the Commission on 
this point COM(85)310.
28   See <www.newapproach.org>. See also more generally C. Janssens, The Principle of 
Mutual Recognition in EU Law (OUP, 2013), F. Kostoris Padoa Schioppa (ed), The Principle 
of Mutual Recognition in the European Integration Process (Palgrave MacMillan, 2005) 
or (on the difficulties of this approach) J. Pelkmans, ‘Mutual Recognition in Goods: 
On Promises and Disillusions’ (2007) 14 JEPP, 699, and M. Dougan, ‘Minimum 
Harmonization and the Internal Market’ (2000) 37 CMLRev, 853.
29   See also Niamh Nic Shuibne, The Coherence of EU Free Movement Law. Constitutional 
Responsibility and the Court of Justice (OUP, 2013).
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Each freedom depends on different Treaty prohibitions and exceptions. In 
addition, there are obvious differences between the different freedoms, since 
goods, services, capital and especially people have some rather significant dif-
ferences. Nevertheless, the different freedoms also have a lot in common, and 
share the purpose of creating an internal market. In line with these commonal-
ities, the case law of the CJEU is showing an increasing convergence and unity 
in the application of free movement prohibitions and exceptions.30
This convergence can first of all be seen at the general level. In all freedoms, 
for example, the CJEU has interpreted the prohibitions very broadly, whereas 
the exceptions that can justify restrictions are interpreted very narrowly. 
Equally, for all freedoms the CJEU has accepted a category of non-Treaty based 
exceptions, the so called Rule of Reason exceptions. The CJEU also applies the 
principle of mutual recognition to all freedoms, even though it was established 
in the context of the free movement of goods.31 Lastly, in most free movement 
cases, the actual assessment eventually comes down to the proportionality 
test, which is normally very similar in all freedoms.32
By now, however, the convergence extends even further than just the gen-
eral structure of free movement provisions. Case law from different freedoms 
is now often used interchangeably. Futura, for example, concerned the free-
dom to provide services, yet the CJEU also refers to case law on establishment, 
workers, and goods, which apparently are also relevant for services.33 Such 
convergence can help to increase legal certainty and promote the unity of 
internal market law. In light of the differences between the freedoms already 
referred to above, convergence can of course not be total, and differences do 
and will probably remain. These for example concern direct horizontal effect, 
the extra-territorial scope of the freedoms or the detailed legislation regulat-
ing free movement of persons. Equally, the Keck-exception has so far not been 
30   See inter alia S.C. Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU. The Four Freedoms (4th edn, 
OUP 2015), 24, or already J. Snell, Goods and Services in EU Law. A Study of the Relationship 
between the Freedoms (OUP, 2002) and H.D. Jarass, ‘A Unified Approach to the Fundamental 
Freedoms’, in M. Andenas and W.-H. Roth (eds), Services and Free Movement in EU Law 
(OUP, 2002).
31   Case C-120/78, Cassis de Dijon ECLI:EU:C:1979:42.
32   For an overview of this ordinary structure as well as an example of a deviatoin in the con-
text of games of chance see S.C.G. Van den Bogaert and A. Cuyvers: ‘Money For Nothing: 
The Case Law of the EU Court of Justice on the Regulation of Gambling’ Common Market 
Law Review 48 (4), 1175.
33   Case C-250/95 Futura ECLI:EU:C:1997:239. For further examples of convergence also 
see Case C-379/87, Groener ECLI:EU:C:1989:599, Case C-340/89, Vlassopoulou ECLI:EU: 
C:1991:193, or Case C-19/92, Dieter Kraus ECLI:EU:C:1993:125.
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applied outside the freedom of goods, and in certain areas the CJEU seems less 
and less committed to its position that Rule of Reason exceptions can only 
justify non-discriminatory restrictions.34
The following chapters will further explore these similarities and differ-
ences, as they systematically discuss the four different freedoms and their 
development over time. Considering the comparative objective of this book, 
moreover, these chapters will focus on the initial and foundational case law in 
the earlier stages of European integration and the basic structure this case law 
provided to get the European internal market going.
34   Joined Cases C-267 & 268/91, Keck and Mithouard ECLI:EU:C:1993:905, Case C-2/90, 
Commission v. Kingdom of Belgium ECLI:EU:C:1992:310, and Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:160.
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CHAPTER 10
Free Movement of Goods in the EAC
Leonard Obura Aloo
10.1 Introduction
This Chapter addresses the free movement of goods within the East African 
Community (EAC). A central feature of regional integration and any common 
market are the “four freedoms”—the free movement of goods, labour, services 
and capital.1 Free movement of goods paves the way for the other freedoms and 
is usually one of the initial steps in the integration process. Free movement of 
goods is sometimes referred to as the pioneer economic freedom and it is a key 
component of the East African integration process.2
Free movement of goods means that goods can be moved freely within the 
defined common territory.3 The idea is that the Community will constitute 
a single economic area similar to the domestic market of any of the Partner 
States. It is generally agreed that free trade contributes to wealth creation.4 
Free movement of goods enables a producer in the EAC to have access to a 
potential market of 143.5 million people.5
This Chapter will cover the free movement of goods in the EAC under the 
Customs Union as well as subsequent developments under the Common 
Market. Firstly, it will examine the extent to which free movement of goods 
is envisaged under the Community instruments.6 Some historical review will 
1   East African Community Treaty (adopted 30 November 1999, went into force 7 July 2000) 
(EAC Treaty) art 76(1): “There shall be established a Common Market among the Partner 
States. Within the Common Market, and subject to the Protocol provided for in paragraph 4 
of this Article, there shall be free movement of labour, goods, services, capital, and the right 
of establishment.”
2   For the similar role movement of goods played in European integration see EU chapter 9 
and 10.
3   P.S.R.F., Mathijsen, A Guide to the European Union Law (8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2004) 173.
4   For the theory of comparative advantage put forward by David Ricardo in 1817 see William J. 
Baumol & Alan S. Blinder, Economics: Principles & Policy (11th edn, South-Western Cengage 
Learning 2008) 50.
5   EAC Facts & Figures Report (2014).
6   For the reality on the ground, which sometimes does not accord with what reality intended 
on paper, see East African common market scorecard 2014: tracking EAC compliance in the 
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explain the progression of law under these instruments. Next, there will be a 
brief examination of the free movement of goods under the Customs Union, 
including the rules of origin and the rules on elimination of non-tariff barriers. 
This discussion includes a brief look at developments under the Common 
Market Protocol. Finally, the chapter examines the question of whether the 
theory on the free movement of goods accords with the reality experienced by 
traders.
The Chapter is descriptive and introductory and is intended to enable the 
reader to navigate through the various EAC instruments dealing with the free 
movement of goods.
10. 2 Historical Development of the Free Movement of Goods in the East 
African Community
Some understanding of the historical development of free movement of goods 
in the East African region is necessary in order to contextualise the way in 
which the EAC has developed and continues to develop its rules on the free 
movement of goods.7
The EAC in its current format comprises six states. The founding Partner 
States which signed the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African 
Community (the EAC Treaty) in 1999 were Kenya Tanzania and Uganda. They 
were subsequently joined by Rwanda and Burundi in the year 2007. South 
Sudan became the sixth Partner State in 2016.
Free movement of goods has already been a central feature of East African 
cooperation since early in the last century. As early as 1917, Kenya and Uganda 
established a Customs Union with the amalgamation of their customs 
authorities.8 In 1922, Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika agreed on a common 
movement of capital, services and goods (Vol. 2): Main report (English), < http://documents 
.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/01/23862386/east-african-common-market-scorecard-
2014-tracking-eac-compliance-movement-capital-services-goods-vol-2-main-report> 
accessed June 28 2016.
7   For a detailed discussion on the early history of co-operation amongst East African coun-
tries see Thomas M. Franck, East African Unity Through Law (Yale University Press 1964); 
Y.P. Ghai and J.P.W.B. McAuslan. Public Law and Political Change in Kenya: A Study of the Legal 
Framework of Government from Colonial Times to the Present (Oxford University Press 1970) 
Chapter 12 and Chapter X above.
8   Ibid. 460; Henry Kibet Mutai, Compliance With International Trade Obligations: The Common 
Market For Eastern and Southern Africa (Kluwer Law International 2007) 116–118; See gen-
erally Thomas M. Franck, East African Unity Through Law (Yale University Press 1964); See
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external tariff. In 1923, free interchange of domestic products was achieved. 
Four years later the three territories agreed on free movement of imported 
goods.9 However, these early arrangements were often not legally secured 
and depended on the goodwill of the parties.10 The early Customs Union “was 
maintained only as a result of inter-territorial negotiations and Kenya-Uganda 
and Tanganyika retained their separate customs administrations until 1949.”11
In 1947, the East African High Commission was established through the 
East African (High Commission) Order in Council.12 The High Commission’s 
mandate did not cover the Common Market sufficiently, with emphasis being 
placed instead on the common services.13 The effectiveness of the Common 
Market was left to the authority of the Colonial Secretary. Though effective, the 
benefits of the early Common Market were not evenly distributed amongst 
the three territories. Just before independence of the three territories in the 
early 1960s, the problem was significant enough that a Commission to review 
the workings of the common services and common market was established.14 
Between 1961 and 1967 the East African Common Services Organisation was 
established, briefly providing an anchor for the Common Market. However, due 
to an uneven distribution of benefits, Uganda and Tanzania imposed restric-
tions on the access of Kenyan goods into their territories. Efforts to resolve 
disputes over these restrictions culminated in the establishment of the Treaty 
of East African Co-operation in 1967.15
This Treaty arrangement lasted between 1967 and 1977 and contained elab-
orate provisions to cover the free movement of goods within the territories 
in addition to common external tariffs. Despite these provisions, the 1967–
1977 Treaty was plagued by many of the same complaints as its predecessor, 
namely free movement of goods benefiting Kenya at the expense of the other 
generally Robert W. Strayer, The Failure of Closer Union in East Africa 1919–1931 (disserta-
tion, University of Wisconsin-Madison 1966).
9    Y.P Ghai and J.P.W.B. McAuslan. Public Law and Political Change in Kenya: A Study of the 




12   East African (High Commission) Order in Council, S.I. No. 2863 of 1947.
13   Y.P. Ghai and J.P.W.B. McAuslan. Public Law and Political Change in Kenya: A study of 
the legal framework of government from colonial times to the present. Nairobi. Oxford 
University Press. 1970. p. 470.
14   Ibid. 472.
15   Ibid. 478.
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territories.16 These complaints, coupled with other political factors, led to the 
eventual collapse of the old EAC. However, the EAC of the 1970s made signifi-
cant progress towards the free movement of goods within the Community.17 
Lessons drawn from the collapse of the old Community and the pre-indepen-
dence arrangements continue to inform the approach towards the free move-
ment of goods in the current Community.18 Specifically, safeguards were built 
into the framework for integration to ensure that the economies that were 
relatively less developed were not swamped by goods from the relatively better 
developed economies. The principles of variable geometry and asymmetry are 
integral to the EAC Treaty.19
Under Article 5(2) of the EAC Treaty, the Partner States undertake to estab-
lish among themselves and in accordance with the provisions of the treaty, 
“a Customs Union, a Common Market, subsequently a Monetary Union and 
ultimately a Political Federation.”20 In implementing these, the Operational 
Principles of the Community include the principle of variable geometry, equi-
table distribution of benefits and principle of asymmetry.21
Free movement of goods is an essential feature of a fully-fledged customs 
union and a given in a functioning common market.22 Regional economic inte-
gration regimes theoretically proceed from the preferential trade area (PTA) 
where partners offer each other preferential trade terms relative to the rest of 
the world, to a free trade area (FTA), where trade amongst the partners is con-
ducted free from tariff and non-tariff barriers. Meanwhile, each partner in the 
16   Ngila Mwase, ‘Regional Economic Integration and the Unequal Sharing of Benefits: 
Background to the Disintegration and Collapse of the East African Community’ (1979) 4 
Africa Development 2/3; Y.P. Ghai and J.P.W.B. McAuslan. Public Law and Political Change 
in Kenya: A Study of the Legal Framework of Government from Colonial Times to the Present 
(Oxford University Press 1970) 478.
17   Ngila Mwase, ‘Regional Economic Integration and the Unequal Sharing of Benefits: 
Background to the Disintegration and Collapse of the East African Community’ (1979) 4 
Africa Development 2/3.
18   Henry Kibet Mutai, ‘Regional trade integration strategies under SADC and the EAC: 
A comparative analysis’ (2011) 1 SADC Law Journal 81, 90.
19   Ibid. 85.
20   EAC Treaty Article 5(2).
21   EAC Treaty Articles 7(1)(e), 7(1)(f) and 7(1)(h).
22   Report of the Heads of Delegation to the Foreign Ministers at the Messina Conference, 
21 April 1956. This report, which emphasized the benefits of the free movement of goods, 
was presented at the conference and paved the way for future negotiations which cul-
minated in a European customs union and common market (known colloquially as the 
Spaak Report).
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FTA has an independent trade policy to the rest of the world. Next comes the 
customs union, where the free trade amongst member states is supplemented 
by the free movement of goods, and is extended to include free movement 
of capital, services, labour, and persons and a right of establishment. Finally, 
the monetary union, has all the aspects of the common market, in addi-
tion to cooperation on economic and monetary issues including a common 
currency.23
In practice, regional cooperation does not fit exactly into these theoretical 
pigeon holes,24 and the EAC developments are no exception. The develop-
ments in the EAC have been pragmatic, from trade liberalisation to a Customs 
Union and proceeding to the Common Market. However, not all aspects of the 
Customs Union are fully implemented as of yet.25
With this background in mind, we may now discuss the provisions of the 
EAC legal regime on the free movement of goods.
10.3 Free Movement of Goods
As indicated above, the EAC Treaty was signed on the 30th November 1999. 
The Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Community Customs 
Union was concluded five years later in 2004 and implementation began in 
January 2005. Implementation of the Customs Union was to be progressive for 
a period of five years. The Partner States have formally eliminated tariffs on 
goods for intraregional trade. However, measures of equivalent effect, rules of 
origin, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, additional taxes and charges in 
addition to technical barriers all remain.26 Below we examine the framework 
for the free movement of goods and the way in which the barriers to trade are 
dealt with in the EAC.
The legal framework of the Customs Union consists of the EAC Treaty; 
the Protocols; the laws enacted by the East African Legislative Assembly; the 
23   EAC, Study on the Establishment of an East African Community Common Market: Final 
Report (M.A. Consulting Group, August 2007) 10. See on this point also EU Chapter 9.
24   Ibid.
25   Ibid. 11; Bela Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration (first published in 1961, Routledge 
2011) 2.
26   East African common market scorecard 2014: tracking EAC compliance in the move-
ment of capital, services and goods (Vol. 2): Main report (English), The World Bank/
EAC Secretariat, 4 <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/01/23862386/east-
african-common-market-scorecard-2014-tracking-eac-compliance-movement-capital-
services-goods-vol-2-main-report> accessed June 28 2016.
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regulations and directives of the Council; relevant principles of internal law; 
and applicable decisions made by the East African Court of Justice.27 The cur-
rent institutional framework for the implementation of the Customs Union 
is made up of regional policy organs and national institutions. In respect 
of customs, the Council is responsible for policy decisions. The Directorate of 
Customs coordinates the policy development and the customs authorities 
in each respective Partner State are responsible for the day-to-day customs 
operations including revenue collection, accountability and enforcement 
of the East African Community Customs Management Act (EACCMA).28 At 
the national level customs is administered under the revenue authority 
through national legislation implementing the EACCMA.
10.3.1 The Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Community 
Customs Union
The EAC trade regime is informed by Chapter Eleven of the EAC Treaty 
which is entitled “Co-operation in Trade Liberalisation and Development”. 
Article 74 of the EAC Treaty provides that in order to achieve the EAC’s objec-
tives the Partner States shall adopt an East African Trade Regime and co-oper-
ate in trade liberalisation and development in accordance with the regime.
Under Article 75 of the EAC Treaty, the Partner States agreed to establish 
a Customs Union, details of which were to be contained in a Protocol. Under 
Article 75(7) of the EAC Treaty, the Partner States agreed to conclude a Protocol 
on the Establishment of a Customs Union within four years. The EAC Partner 
States took the unusual route of implementing the free trade area and the cus-
toms union simultaneously.29 The Protocol on the Establishment of the East 
African Community Customs Union (the Customs Union Protocol) was signed 
in March 2004.30
The EAC Treaty required the Customs Union Protocol to contain certain 
details including:
27   EAC, Framework for the Attainment of the East African Community Single Customs Territory 
(November 2013) 2.1.2(e).
28   East African Community Customs Management Act 2004 (Revised Edition 2009); see also 
EAC, Framework for the Attainment of the East African Community Single Customs Territory 
(November 2013) 2.1.2(e).
29   Henry Kibet Mutai, ‘Regional trade integration strategies under SADC and the EAC: A 
comparative analysis’ (2011) 1 SADC Law Journal 81, 83. Economic literature suggests the 
conventional approach would be to move from a free trade area to a customs union and 
then to a common market. In the EAC the first two stages were implemented together.
30   Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Community Customs Union (2004).
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(a) Application of the principle of asymmetry;
(b) The elimination of internal tariffs and other charges of equivalent 
effect;
(c) The elimination of non-tariff barriers;
(d) Establishment of a common external tariff;
(e) Rule of Origin;
( f ) Dumping;
(g) Subsidies and countervailing duties;
(h) Security and other restrictions to trade;
(i) Competition;
( j) Duty drawback, refund and remission of duties and taxes;
(k) Customs co-operation;
(l) Re-exportation of goods; and
(m) Simplification and harmonisation of trade documentation and 
procedures.31
The Customs Union Protocol dealt with these issues in 44 comprehensive 
articles. The articles are divided into nine parts. These parts cover inter-
pretation; establishment of the East African Community Customs Union; 
Customs Administration; Trade Liberalisation; Trade Related Aspects; Export 
Promotion Schemes; Special Economic Zones; Exemption Regimes; and 
General Provisions.32
The Customs Union Protocol provides that the implementation of the 
Protocol would be progressive over a five year period ending in 2010.33
The most significant aspects of the EAC Customs Union Protocol were: the 
removal of internal taxes on intra-EAC trade; the removal of non-tariff barriers 
on intra-EAC trade; the introduction of common external trade policy through 
the Common External Tariff; the introduction of a list of sensitive products 
that were to be provided with additional protection; and the legal and insti-
tutional mechanisms which have been developed to govern free movement 
of goods within the EAC.34 Having provided an outline of the Customs Union 
Protocol, we can now examine how it dealt with each of these major areas.
31   EAC Treaty Article 75(1).
32   EAC Customs Union Protocol.
33   EAC Customs Union Protocol Article 11.
34   EAC, Study on the Establishment of an East African Community Common Market: Final 
Report (M.A. Consulting Group, August 2007).
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10.3.2 Removal of Internal Tariffs of Intra-EAC Trade under EACCU 
Protocol
As indicated above, elimination of internal tariffs on goods under the Customs 
Union Protocol was envisioned to be progressive and asymmetrical. The 
Customs Union Protocol defines goods as:
[A]ll wares, articles, merchandise, animals, matter, baggage, stores, mate-
rials, currency and includes postal items other than personal correspon-
dence, and where any such goods are sold under the auspices of this 
Protocol, the proceeds of the sale.35
Under Article 11 of the Customs Union Protocol, there was an immediate elimi-
nation of duty for goods to and from the Republic of Uganda and the United 
Republic of Tanzania.36 Goods from Tanzania and Uganda destined for Kenya 
also enjoyed immediate duty free access on coming into force of the Customs 
Union Protocol.37
However, goods from Kenya destined for Uganda and Tanzania were divided 
into two categories: firstly, those eligible for immediate duty free access to the 
markets in Uganda and Tanzania were placed in category A;38 and secondly, 
other goods were placed in category B and were eligible for a gradual tariff 
reduction.39 Category B goods from Kenya destined for Uganda had a phased 
reduction of tariffs of 10, 8, 6, 4 and 2 per cent in each of the first to fifth years 
respectively and thereafter tariff free access would be applied.40 Category B 
goods from Kenya destined for Tanzania had a phased reduction of tariffs that 
was specified in Annex II to the Customs Union Protocol.41
Internal tariffs specified in the Customs Union Protocol were not to exceed 
the Common External Tariff with regard to any of the specified products.42
35   EAC Customs Union Protocol Protocol Article 1(1).
36   EAC Customs Union Protocol Article 11(2)(a); The language of the is not unequivocal but 
the intention is clear.
37   EAC Customs Union Protocol Article 11(2)(b).
38   EAC Customs Union Protocol Article 11(3)(a).
39   EAC Customs Union Protocol Article 11(3)(b).
40   EAC Customs Union Protocol Article 11(4); Annex II to the Protocol in respect to Uganda 
contains 443 categories of goods each with different schedules for reduction of tariffs, see 
www.eac.int/customs/index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (last accessed 2nd December 2015).
41   EAC Customs Union Protocol Article 11(5); Annex II to the Protocol in respect to Tanzania 
contains 859 categories of goods each with different schedules for reduction of tariffs, see 
www.eac.int/customs/index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (last accessed 2nd December 2015).
42   EAC Customs Union Protocol Article 11(6).
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The current state of implementation of the Customs Union Protocol is that 
it has now been fully implemented. Since the coming into force of the Customs 
Union Protocol the Partner States have eliminated internal tariffs and apply 
a common external tariff. “Goods procured in the region are not subject to 
import duty when transferred to another Partner State if they meet the rules 
of origin requirements. The goods are however, subject to domestic taxes (VAT, 
excise and other levies) levied on international trade upon arrival at the inter-
national borders.”43
10.3.3 Intra-EAC Trade—Common External Tariff
In a fully flagged customs union states apply a common external tariff 
on imports. A common external tariff is a commercial policy towards third 
countries.44 In the EAC, due to the progressive approach to integration, there 
are exemptions to the common external tariff.
Under Article 12 of the Customs Union Protocol the Partner States estab-
lished a three band common external tariff with a minimum rate of zero per 
cent, a middle rate of ten per cent and a maximum rate of twenty five per cent 
in respect of all products imported into the Community.45 Exceptional mea-
sures may be taken to remedy any adverse effects which any Partner State may 
experience by implementation of the Common External Tariff.46 Rates higher 
than 25 per cent are applied to some selected items (termed the sensitive list).47 
These include such items as maize, cement, rice, cotton fabrics, milk and 
dairy products.48 The rates are published in the EAC Common External Tariff 
Handbook,49 and EAC Gazette Notices.50
The EAC Customs Management Act provides the legal framework for the 
implementation of duties and the Common External Tariff. Section 110 of 
the EAC Customs Management Act indicates that the rate of duty payable 
shall be the rate specified under the Customs Union Protocol. Goods originat-
ing from the Partner States are to be accorded Community tariff treatment in 
accordance with the Rules of Origin and the Customs Union Protocol.51
43   EAC Customs Union Protocol Article 25(2)(b).
44   P.S.R.F., Mathijsen, A Guide to the European Union Law (8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2004) 
175.
45   EAC Customs Union Protocol Article 12(1).
46   EAC Customs Union Protocol Article 12(3).
47   EAC Trade Report 2014 Section 5.2.; Sensitive Goods.
48   Ibid.
49   The EAC Common External Tariff (CET) Handbook.
50   EAC Gazette.
51   The East African Community Customs Management Act Section 111.
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The classification of goods is in accordance with a Harmonised Customs 
Commodity Description and Coding System.52
The EAC Partner States are also members of other regional trading arrange-
ments which complicates application of the Common External Tariff. Burundi, 
for example, is a member of the EAC, the Economic Community of Central 
African States (ECCAS), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA) and COMESA Free Trade Area. Kenya is a member of the EAC, 
COMESA, and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). 
Rwanda is a member of the EAC, the ECCAS, COMESA and COMESA Free Trade 
Area. Tanzania is a member of the EAC and the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC). Uganda’s membership is in the EAC, COMESA, COMESA 
Free Trade Area and IGAD.53 The Customs Union Protocol in Article 37 
requires Partner States to honour commitments in respect of all other multi-
lateral and international organisations to which they belong. In particular the 
Partner States are required to identify the issues arising from membership of 
other integration blocks in order to establish convergence. Article 37 specifi-
cally allows Partner States to enter into other regional arrangements although 
a procedure for notifying other Partner States is provided.54
Under Section 112 of the EAC Customs Management Act, notwithstand-
ing the Common External Tariff, preferential treatment is applied to goods 
imported under the COMESA and SADC arrangements in the Partner States as 
prescribed by the Partner States legislation and also for other tariff arrange-
ments approved by the Council.55 The preferential treatment for COMESA and 
SADC was supposed to cease in 2008, however, the preferential treatment for 
goods approved by the Council continues.56 The multiple and overlapping 
membership of regional trading arrangements complicates the application of 
the Common External Tariff and makes the EAC Partner States reluctant to 
eliminate internal boundaries and also increases the significance of the rules 
of origin regime.57
52   EAC Customs Union Protocol Art. 8 and 12(4).
53   Adam Ihucha, ‘Comesa, Sadc imports get tariff relief again’ (The East African 5 2013) 
<http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Comesa-Sadc-imports-get-tariff-relief-again-/-/ 
2558/1658344/-/ugt2mi/-/index.html> accessed July 6, 2016.
54   EAC Customs Union Protocol Article 37.
55   S. 112 The East African Community Customs Management Act.
56   S. 112 (2) The East African Community Customs Management Act.
57   Ron Sandry, Intra-REC trade and overlapping membership: review of COMESA, EAC, 
SADC (Trade Law Centre, August 2015).
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10.3.4 Removal of Internal Tariffs of Intra-EAC Trade-Rules of Origin
In order to implement free movement of goods, it is necessary to establish 
the origin of the goods so as to determine which goods benefit from the rules 
on free movement and which goods do not. In a fully-fledged customs union, 
rules of origin are of less significance because states apply a common external 
tariff.58 However, in the EAC due to the progressive approach to integration 
and the exemptions to the Common External Tariff, an absence of rules of ori-
gin would result in trade deflection where goods would enter the region via the 
country with the lowest external tariff which would deny customs revenue to 
the other Partner States.59
Article 14 of the Customs Union Protocol provides for the rules of origin. 
The rules specify that goods are accepted as being eligible for the Community 
tariff treatment if they originate from the Partner States.60 Goods are consid-
ered to originate from the Partner States if they meet the criteria set out in 
the EAC Customs Union (Rules of Origin) Rules specified in Annex III to the 
Customs Union Protocol.61
The EAC Customs Union (Rules of Origin) Rules 2015 are the current edition 
of these rules.62 The Rules of Origin provide that the purpose of the rules is to 
“ensure there is uniformity among Partner States in the application of the Rules 
of Origin and that to the extent possible the process is transparent, account-
able, fair, predictable and consistent with the provisions of the Protocol.”63
Rule 4 of the Rules of Origin provides two criteria for goods to be considered 
as originating in the Partner States.
Firstly, goods are accepted as originating in a Partner State where the 
goods have been wholly produced in the Partner State from which they are 
58   What is the Common Customs Tariff, (European Commission) <http://ec.europa.eu/ 
taxation_customs/customs/customs_duties/tariff_aspects/index_en.htm> accessed 
July 6, 2016.
59   Henry Mutai, ‘Regional trade integration strategies under SADC and the EAC: A compara-
tive analysis’ (2011) 1 SADC Law Journal 81–97 at 86.
60   EAC Customs Union Protocol Article 14(1).
61   EAC Customs Union Protocol Article 14(2) and Article 14(3); East African Community 
Customs Union (Rules of Origin) Rules, 2015 available at http://www.customs.eac.int/
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=106&Itemid=135.
62   East African Community Customs Union (Rules of Origin) Rules, 2015 available at 
http://www.customs.eac.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=106&Ite
mid=135.




consigned.64 Rule 5 of the Rules of Origin sets out the criteria for determining 
products as wholly produced in the Partner States. The rule states:
1. For the purposes of rule 4 (a), the following products shall be regarded 
as wholly produced in a Partner State:
(a) mineral products extracted from the ground or sea-bed of the 
Partner State;
(b) vegetable products including plant and plant products har-
vested, gathered or picked within the Partner State;
(c) live animals born and raised within the Partner State;
(d) products obtained from live animals within the Partner State;
(e) products from slaughtered animals born and raised within 
the Partner State;
( f ) products obtained by hunting or fishing conducted within the 
Partner State;
(g) products of aquaculture, including mariculture, obtained 
within the Partner State where the fish is raised;
(h) products of sea fishing and other products taken from the 
exclusive economic zone of the Partner State;
(i) products of sea fishing and other products taken from the 
waters in the high seas by a vessel of a Partner State;
( j) products manufactured in a factory ship of a Partner State 
exclusively from the products referred to in sub-paragraph (i);
(k) products extracted from marine soil or subsoil outside the ter-
ritorial waters of a Partner State provided that the Partner 
State has the sole right to work on that soil or subsoil;
(l) used articles fit only for the recovery of materials, provided 
that such articles have been collected from users within the 
Partner State;
(m) scrap and waste resulting from manufacturing operations 
within the Partner State; and
(n) goods produced within the Partner State exclusively or mainly 
from the following—
i. products referred to in this paragraph; and
ii. materials which do not contain elements imported 
from outside the Partner State or which are of unde-
termined origin.65
64   East African Community Customs Union (Rules of Origin) Rules 2015; Rule 4(1)(a).
65   East African Community Customs Union (Rules of Origin) Rules 2015; Rule 5(1).
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Secondly, goods will be considered as originating from the Partner States where 
the goods are produced in a Partner State incorporating materials which have 
not been wholly obtained in the Partner State provided that such materials 
have undergone sufficient working or processing in the Partner State.66
Products are considered to meet the criteria of being sufficiently worked 
or produced on a case-by-case basis when they meet the criteria provided for 
under the First Schedule of the Rules of Origin.67
The current Rules of Origin appear more complex than the previous rules 
which were based on the percentage of local material or value addition in the 
product.68
Some processes are specifically indicated as not providing origin. These 
include packaging, bottling, placing in bags, simple mixing of ingredients, sim-
ple assembly of components, and simple painting or polishing.69
In determining the origin of the goods, energy and fuel; plant and equip-
ment; machines and tools; and goods which do not enter and are not intended 
to enter into the final composition of the product are considered neutral ele-
ments and are not considered part of the goods.70
In order to obtain a Certificate of Origin, the Rule of Origins require that 
an application is made to the competent authority in the consignees Partner 
State and that application is to be accompanied by documents verifying that 
the goods meet the required criteria.71 The Certificate that is issued is valid for 
a period of six months.72
10.4 Elimination of Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade
Free movement of goods will not be achieved, even where the tariffs have been 
fully eliminated, unless non-tariff barriers are also eliminated. Non-tariff bar-
riers (NTBs) are defined as any device or government practice that directly 
impedes the entry of imports into a country. They are restrictions other than 
tariffs that act as obstacles to trade and may be imbedded in government 
66   East African Community Customs Union (Rules of Origin) Rules 2015; Rule 4(1)(b).
67   East African Community Customs Union (Rules of Origin) Rules 2015; Rule 6.
68   For discussion of previous rules see Henry Mutai, ‘Regional trade integration strategies 
under SADC and the EAC: A comparative analysis’ (2011) 1 SADC Law Journal 81–97 at 86.
69   East African Community Customs Union (Rules of Origin) Rules 2015; Rule 7.
70   East African Community Customs Union (Rules of Origin) Rules 2015; Rule 14.
71   East African Community Customs Union (Rules of Origin) Rules 2015; Rule 17.
72   East African Community Customs Union (Rules of Origin) Rules 2015; Rule 21.
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laws, regulations, practices and requirements at both the national and local 
levels.73 Article 1 of the EAC Treaty defines NTBs as “administrative and techni-
cal requirements imposed by a Partner State in the movement of goods.”74 The 
Customs Union Protocol goes into more detail and defines non-tariff barriers 
as “laws, regulations, administrative and technical requirements other than 
tariffs imposed by a Partner State whose effect is to impede trade.”75
The EAC Secretariat has attempted an operational definition and defines 
NTBs in the EAC as quantitative restrictions and specific limitations, other 
than tariffs, that act as obstacles to trade. Such obstacles, it observes, may be 
embedded in government laws, regulations, practices and requirements at the 
national and local level. A wide range of measures have the potential of fall-
ing within the scope of NTBs. A report prepared for the EAC in 2008 identi-
fied numerous NTBs, including non-recognition of EAC Certificates of Origin; 
import bans of various products including milk, dairy products, multiple road 
blocks and weighbridges; levies charged on various imports; and road consign-
ment notes required of transports.76
Article 75 of the EAC Treaty provides that the Customs Union Protocol will 
cover amongst other things the elimination of non-tariff barriers.77 Article 13 
of the Customs Union Protocol provides that:
1. Except as may be provided for or permitted by this protocol, each Part-
ner State agrees to remove, with immediate effect, all the existing non-
tariff barriers to the importation into their respective territories of the 
goods originating in the other Partner States and, thereafter, not to 
impose any new non-tariff barriers.
2. The Partner States shall formulate a mechanism for identifying and 
monitoring the removal of non-tariff barriers.78
Given the wide variety of measures that can potentially be classified as NTBs 
the EAC Treaty and implementation organs have developed various approaches 
73   Imen Trabelsi, ‘Agricultural trade face to Non-Tariff barriers: A gravity model for the Euro-
Med area’ (2013), 3 Journal of Studies in Social Sciences 1, 20–32.
74   EAC Treaty Article 1.
75   EAC Customs Union Protocol Article 1.
76   EAC, Implementation and Impact of the East African Community Customs Union (2009).
77   EAC Treaty Article 75(1)(c).
78   EAC Customs Union Protocol Article 13.
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to dealing with them.79 A number of institutions with the responsibility for 
monitoring the imposition of NTBs have been created. The monitoring is 
mainly done through reports and investigations. The institutions include the 
EAC Sectoral Committee on Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment; the EAC 
Trade Remedies Committee; the EAC Secretariat; and National Monitoring 
Committees.
The EAC Sectoral Committees are mandated under the EAC Treaty to 
monitor progress of implementation of the Treaty in their sectors and sub-
mit reports.80 The main Sectoral Committee for the elimination of NTBs is the 
Sectoral Committee on Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment.
The Trade Remedies Committee was established under Article 24 (1) of the 
Customs Union Protocol.81 The main duty of the Committee is to handle mat-
ters relating to rules of origin; anti-dumping measures; subsidies and coun-
tervailing measures; safeguard measures; and implementation of the Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism.82
National Monitoring Committees work through regional forums that 
enable the Partner States to exchange experiences. The National Monitoring 
Committees’ reports are sent to the EAC Secretariat through the national 
ministries.83
In 2008, the EAC Council directed the Secretariat to develop a time bound 
mechanism for the elimination of current and future NTBs.84 The Secretariat 
developed the mechanism which guides the process of elimination of NTBs.
10.4.1 The East African Community Non-Tariff Barriers Act, 2015
The mechanisms discussed above have been criticised for their failure to signif-
icantly reduce NTBs in the EAC.85 The weakness led the East African Legislative 
79   EAC, Status of Elimination of Non-Tariff Barriers in the East African Community (2014, 
Volume 8); Phyllis Osoro, ‘The East African Community and Non-Tariff Barriers A 
Hindrance to the Trade Liberalisation Policy and Legal Proposals for Eliminating Non-
Tariff Barriers’, University of Nairobi LL.M. Thesis (2015).
80   EAC Treaty Articles 20, 21 and 22.
81   EAC Customs Union Protocol Article 24(1).
82   EAC Customs Union Protocol Article 24(4).
83   National Monitoring Committees . . .
84   EAC, East African Community Time Bound Programme for the Elimination of Non-Tariff 
Barriers, EAC Arusha 2008.




Assembly to put in place the process of binding legislation to deal with NTBs.86 
This process culminated in the enactment of the East African Community 
Elimination of Non-Tariff Barriers Act, 2015 on the 30th March 2015.87 The Act 
awaits Presidential assent by the Heads of States of the Member States. Once 
it receives the necessary assent, it will be the basis for handling NTBs within 
the EAC.
The short statute has 18 sections divided into five parts. The objective of the 
Act is to facilitate trade, and create an environment conducive to the move-
ment of goods within the region.88 The NTBs are categorised according to the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) categories set out in the Schedule to the Act.89 
The Schedule has categorised NTBs into seven categories.90 The categories are 
government participation in trade and restrictive practices tolerated by govern-
ment; customs and administrative entry procedures; technical barriers to trade 
including standards, testing and packaging; sanitary and phytosanitary mea-
sures; specific limitations including quantitative restriction, exchange control, 
export taxes and quotas; charges on imports; and other procedural problems 
including arbitrariness, discrimination, costly procedures and documentation.
Bureaucratic activities of public officers and institutions of the Partner 
States which waste time and increase the cost of movement of goods are also 
specifically designated as NTBs to trade under the Act.91
National Monitoring Committees comprising representatives of both public 
and private sector representatives are to be established for each Partner State.92 
The National Monitoring Committees, as the name suggests, are required to 
outline the process of elimination of NTBs in the respective Partner States and 
monitor the process.93 The National Monitoring Committees are to advise the 
Partner States on policies and laws that contain or lead to NTBs. Each Partner 
State is to identify a National Focal Point which is to be a particular Ministry to 
champion the elimination of NTBs.94
86   East African Legislative Assembly, Official Report of the Proceedings of the East African 
Legislative Assembly (Fifth Meeting—Fifth Session—Second Assembly, 2012).
87   The East African Community Elimination of Non-Tariff Barriers Act, 2015.
88   The East African Community Elimination of Non-Tariff Barriers Act, 2015 Article 3.
89   The East African Community Elimination of Non-Tariff Barriers Act, 2015 Article 4.
90   The East African Community Elimination of Non-Tariff Barriers Act, 2015 Schedule.
91   The East African Community Elimination of Non-Tariff Barriers Act, 2015 Article 6.
92   The East African Community Elimination of Non-Tariff Barriers Act, 2015 Article 7 & 7(2).
93   The East African Community Elimination of Non-Tariff Barriers Act, 2015 Article 7(1).
94   The East African Community Elimination of Non-Tariff Barriers Act, 2015 Article 8.
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The Act sets out a procedure for the elimination of NTBs. The elimination 
is to be by mutual consent of Partner states; by implementation of the East 
African Community Time Bound Programme for Elimination of Identified 
Non-Tariff Barriers; and through directives of the EAC Council.95
The Act provides that where a Partner State fails to eliminate the NTBs the 
Secretary General shall refer any matter that is not resolved by the Council to 
the EAC Committee on Trade Remedies.96 The Council may recommend to the 
Summit that sanctions are imposed on a Partner State that fails to comply with 
any directive, decision or recommendation of the Council.97
The Act has been criticised for being silent on what action is to be taken 
against a Partner State which fails to eliminate NTBs.98 The scheme of the Act 
may be faulted for relying on the potential beneficiaries of the NTBs for their 
elimination. The National Monitoring Committees comprising private and 
public sector officials of a Partner State may not be motivated to eliminate the 
NTBs that affect goods from third Partner States.
10.5 Harmonisation and Development of EAC Standards
As indicated above, the EAC has recognised that the application of standards 
can be classified as a NTB and hinder the free movement of goods. In 2001, in 
order to reduce the chances of the application of different standards acting as 
a barrier to the free movement of goods, the EAC Partner States concluded the 
East African Community Standardisation, Quality Assurance, Metrology and 
Testing Protocol.99 Furthermore, in 2006 the East African Legislative Assembly 
passed the East African Community Standardisation, Quality Assurance, 
Metrology and Testing Act, 2006,100 which is aimed at the further harmonisa-
tion of standards.
95   The East African Community Elimination of Non-Tariff Barriers Act, 2015 Article 9.
96   The East African Community Elimination of Non-Tariff Barriers Act, 2015 Article 12 & 15.
97   The East African Community Elimination of Non-Tariff Barriers Act, 2015 Article 16.
98   Phyllis Osoro, ‘The East African Community and Non-Tariff Barriers A Hindrance to the 
Trade Liberalisation Policy and Legal Proposals for Eliminating Non-Tariff Barriers’ (2015) 
University of Nairobi LL.M.
99   The East African Community Standardisation, Quality Assurance, Metrology and Testing 
Protocol, 15th January 2001.
100   The East African Community Standardisation, Quality Assurance, Metrology and Testing 
Act, 2006.
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10.5.1 The East African Community Standardisation, Quality Assurance, 
Metrology and Testing Protocol
The EAC Standardisation, Quality Assurance, Metrology and Testing Protocol 
requires that Partner States evolve and apply a common policy on standardisa-
tion, quality assurance, metrology and testing of products which are produced 
and tested within the Community.101 A common policy on the relationship 
between the standard bodies in each Partner State, termed Bureauxs, must also 
be developed.102 The Protocol requires that Partner States develop capacity in 
standard enforcement.103 The Partner States are also required, by the Protocol, 
to recognise standards developed and adopted by the African Regional 
Organisation for Standardisation.104 The Protocol requires that Partner States 
apply uniform standards and procedures for formulation of national standards 
and must also adopt and implement East African Standards alongside these 
national standards.
10.5.2 The East African Community Standardisation, Quality Assurance, 
Metrology and Testing Act, 2006
The EAC Standardisation, Quality Assurance, Metrology and Testing Act, 
2006105 has provided further legal force to the efforts for harmonisation of 
standards within the EAC. The Act establishes the East African Standards 
Committee,106 the Liaison Office,107 and the East African Accreditation Board.108 
Each of these bodies assists in the efforts towards harmonisation of standards. 
101   Article 3.1 of The East African Community Standardisation, Quality Assurance, Metrology 
and Testing Protocol, 15th January 2001.
102   Article 3.1(b) of The East African Community Standardisation, Quality Assurance, 
Metrology and Testing Protocol, 15th January 2001.
103   Article 3.1(b) of The East African Community Standardisation, Quality Assurance, 
Metrology and Testing Protocol, 15th January 2001.
104   Article 4.1 of The East African Community Standardisation, Quality Assurance, Metrology 
and Testing Protocol, 15th January 2001.
105   The East African Community Standardisation, Quality Assurance, Metrology and Testing 
Act, 2006 Legal Notice No. 01/2007 of the East African Community.
106   The East African Community Standardisation, Quality Assurance, Metrology and Testing 
Act, 2006 Legal Notice No. 01/2007 of the East African Community Section 4.
107   The East African Community Standardisation, Quality Assurance, Metrology and Testing 
Act, 2006 Legal Notice No. 01/2007 of the East African Community Section 5.
108   The East African Community Standardisation, Quality Assurance, Metrology and Testing 
Act, 2006 Legal Notice No. 01/2007 of the East African Community Section 11.
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A detailed examination of the workings of these bodies would be beyond the 
scope of this work,109 however, a brief overview is given below.
Among other things, the Standards Committee is required to undertake and 
coordinate activities related to standardisation, including establishment of 
procedures for the development, approval, gazetting and withdrawal of East 
African Standards.110 The Liaison Office provides administrative support to 
the Standards Committee. The Liaison Office is the custodian of the catalogue 
and authoritative texts of the East African Standards that have been adopted. 
The East African Accreditation Board is made up of the chief executives of the 
national accreditation bodies. They seek to avoid duplication of functions at 
the national and regional levels.
Under Section 19 of the EAC Standardisation, Quality Assurance, Metrology 
and Testing Act, 2006, the Council may declare an East African Standard, or 
provision of the Standard, to be compulsory. Before such declaration, the 
Standard has to published in the East African Community Gazette and at 
least one newspaper of national circulation in each of the Partner States. The 
Standards Act provides sanctions for the manufacture or distribution of prod-
ucts not in conformity with the standards. The Act provides:
No person shall manufacture, trade, distribute, sell, supply or bring 
a product that is within the scope of a compulsory standard into the 
Community unless the product confirms with the requirements of 
the compulsory standard.111
Partner States are required to apply their national legislation in enforcement 
of the standards.112 Partner States are also required to ensure that their regula-
tory authorities suspend the manufacture, trading and distribution or sale of 
non-conforming products. Products that do not comply may be removed from 
the market, returned to the country of origin or confiscated and destroyed.113 
109   For a summary see East African Community Understanding of the East African Community 
Legislation on Standardisation, Quality Assurance, Metrology and Testing Act (SQMT) 
Arusha.
110   The East African Community Standardisation, Quality Assurance, Metrology and Testing 
Act, 2006 Legal Notice No. 01/2007 of the East African Community Section 4.
111   The East African Community Standardisation, Quality Assurance, Metrology and Testing 
Act, 2006 s. 22(1).
112   The East African Community Standardisation, Quality Assurance, Metrology and Testing 
Act, 2006 s. 22(4).
113   The East African Community Standardisation, Quality Assurance, Metrology and Testing 
Act, 2006 Section 22(3) & (4).
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A person aggrieved by a decision under this section may appeal to the East 
African Standards Committee within 14 days of the decision.114 The exact 
authority of the Committee within the domestic and regional judicial frame-
work is not clear and there appears to be an area of potential conflict between 
the Committee and domestic courts.
Each Partner State is required to notify the Council of the product certifica-
tion marks within the jurisdiction of the State. The Partner States are required 
to recognise as equal to their own, product certification marks awarded by 
national quality systems institutions of the other Partner States.115
Pursuant to the powers under Section 29 of the EAC Standardisation, Quality 
Assurance, Metrology and Testing Act, 2006, the Council of Ministers has made 
a number of regulations to govern standards making and implementation.116
10.6 Free Movement of Goods and The Protocol on the Establishment of 
the East African Community Common Market
The Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Community Common 
Market (Common Market Protocol) was signed on the 9th of November 2009, 
ten years after the signing of the EAC Treaty.117
114   The East African Community Standardisation, Quality Assurance, Metrology and Testing 
Act, 2006 Section 22(5).
115   The East African Community Standardisation, Quality Assurance, Metrology and Testing 
Act, 2006 Section 24(2) & (3).
116   Subsidiary Legislation passed includes:
   1) East African Community Standardisation, Quality Assurance, Metrology and Testing 
(Product Certification in the Partner States) Regulations, 2013. EAC Statutory Instruments 
Supplement No. 1 of 6th December 2013 EAC Gazette No. 15 6th December 2013. Uganda 
Printing and Publishing Corporation, Entebbe.;
   2) East African Community Standardisation, Quality Assurance, Metrology and 
Testing (Enforcement of Technical Regulations in Partner States) Regulations, 2013. EAC 
Statutory Instruments Supplement No. 2 of 6th December 2013 EAC Gazette No. 15 6th 
December 2013. Uganda Printing and Publishing Corporation, Entebbe;
   3) East African Community Standardisation, Quality Assurance, Metrology and Testing 
(Designation of Testing Laboratories) Regulations, 2013. EAC Statutory Instruments 
Supplement No. 1 of 6th December 2013 EAC Gazette No. 15 6th December 2013. Uganda 
Printing and Publishing Corporation, Entebbe.
117   EAC Common Market Protocol.
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Under the Common Market Protocol, the Partner States undertake to 
accord to each other’s nationals treatment which is not less favourable than 
that accorded to nationals of third party states (Most Favoured Nation), and 
to observe non-discrimination of nationals of other Partner States on grounds 
of nationality (national treatment).118 In addition, under Article 5 (2)(c) of the 
Common Market Protocol, the Partner States agree to eliminate tariff, non-
tariff and technical barriers to trade; harmonise and mutually recognise stan-
dards; and implement a common trade policy for the Community.119
Part C of the Common Market Protocol covers the free movement of goods. 
Article 6 of the Common Market Protocol indicates that the free movement of 
goods between the Partner States of the Community is to be governed by the 
Customs law of the Community specified in Article 39 of the Customs Union 
Protocol.120 In addition to the Customs law of the Community, the free move-
ment of goods is to be governed by:
(a) The East African Community Protocol on Standardisation, Quality 
Assurance, Metrology and Testing;
(b) The East African Community Standardisation, Quality Assurance, 
Metrology and Testing Act, 2006;
(c) The provisions of the Customs Market Protocol;
(d) Other protocols that may be concluded in the areas of cooperation on 
sanitary and phyto-sanitary and technical barriers to trade; and any 
other instrument relevant to the free movement of goods.121
10.7 Free Movement of Goods in the East African Community Theory 
and Reality
In this part of the Chapter we look at the theory of the EAC free movement of 
goods regime as spelt out in the regional legal regime reviewed above, against 
the reality of its implementation. In the last few years, with the assistance 
of the World Bank, “Score Cards” on the implementation of the EAC Treaty 
which track the implementation of the provisions of the EAC Treaty and the 
118   EAC Common Market Protocol Article 3.
119   EAC Common Market Protocol Article 5(2)(a).
120   EAC Common Market Protocol Article 6(1).
121   EAC Common Market Protocol Article 6(2).
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protocols have been prepared.122 The 2014 Score Card notes that the laws 
and regulation of the Partner States continue to be a barrier to increased 
cross-border trade. The progress to eliminating restrictions is slow and new 
measures are introduced despite the provisions of the protocols. There is, 
according to the 2014 Score Card, a lenient attitude towards exemptions which 
is consequently slowing down the development of the EAC Common Market.
The 2014 Score Card notes that, although formally all Partner States have 
eliminated tariffs on intra-regional trade, measures of equivalent effect to tar-
iffs still remain. It is noted, for example, that certificates of origin are often not 
recognised by the Partner States. It is also noted that although the Common 
External Tariff is formally in place, it is not implemented fully due to the fact 
that the EAC Partner States belong to a multiplicity of different free trade areas.
The 2014 Score Card evaluates the extent to which the Partner States have 
implemented their obligations under Article 5(2(c)of the Customs Union 
Protocol. The areas evaluated are, the elimination of tariffs and measures 
of equivalent effect; the elimination of NTBs; the implementation of a com-
mon external tariff and the harmonisation of mutual recognition of sanitary 
and phytosanitary standards; and standards preventing technical barriers to 
trade.123 The general consensus is that more could be done by the Partner 
States for the Community in order to fully realise free movement of goods 
within the EAC.
10.8 Conclusion
This Chapter briefly described the EAC regime for the free movement of goods. 
It has been noted that the current structure of the free movement of goods is 
122   East African common market scorecard 2014: tracking EAC compliance in the move-
ment of capital, services and goods (Vol. 2): Main report (English), The World Bank/
EAC Secretariat, 4 <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/01/23862386/east- 
african-common-market-scorecard-2014-tracking-eac-compliance-movement-capital-
services-goods-vol-2-main-report> accessed June 28 2016; see also Maximillan Haller, ‘The 
East African Community (EAC) The Difference between theory and practice based on the 
example of free movement of goods and services’ (University of Sussex, 2014) Master of 
Arts.
123   East African Common Market Score Card, 2014: tracking EAC compliance in the move-
ment of capital, services and goods (Vol. 2): Main report (English), The World Bank/
EAC Secretariat, 4 <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/01/23862386/east-
african-common-market-scorecard-2014-tracking-eac-compliance-movement-capital-
services-goods-vol-2-main-report> accessed June 28 2016.
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informed by the historical relationships between the Partner States and their 
experiences, in part experiments, with cooperation. It has been noted that the 
Customs Union Protocol is very clear on the free movement of goods. In theory 
free movement of goods is operative within the Community. However, it has 
been noted that the existence of exceptions and the overlapping member-
ship of regional trade regimes affects the effective implementation of the free 
movement of goods. There is also discord between the commitments that the 
Partner States have to free movement of goods and the reality as indicated by 
their domestic legislation.
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CHAPTER 10A
Free Movement of Goods in the EU
Armin Cuyvers
10.1 Goods: The Foundation of the EU Internal Market
When the EU internal market was established, goods accounted for more than 
70% of the European economy. Consequently, goods formed the primary focus 
when the Treaty rules on free movement were drafted, and most of the early 
internal market cases concerned goods as well. Many of the most fundamental 
and groundbreaking judgments on the internal market, therefore, were made 
in the context of goods. As a result, the free movement of goods forms a useful 
starting point for any analysis of EU free movement law.
This Chapter provides an overview of EU rules on the free movement of 
goods. In light of the comparative aim of this book, the focus will lie on the 
main rules and doctrines of negative integration, which were gradually devel-
oped in the early days of EU integration and still form the foundation of EU 
free movement law today. In this discussion, pride of place will go to the case 
law of the CJEU, which was instrumental in developing the rather vague and 
general provisions in the Treaties, and turning them into effective rights.1
The Treaty framework for the free movement of goods, laid down in Articles 
28–37 and Article 110 TFEU, distinguishes between financial and non-financial 
restrictions. Financial restrictions can either be customs duties or internal 
taxes that protect national products. Non-financial restrictions, on the other 
hand, are all national rules that impose quantitative limits on foreign goods 
or in any other way limit their access to the national market. The reason for 
removing both financial and non-financial restrictions is to allow goods to be 
traded freely throughout the entire territory of the EU, ensuring that, for exam-
ple, the French cannot use their tax laws to block German beer, or the Germans 
their product standards to bar French wine.
This Chapter discusses the EU rules on financial obstacles before moving 
on to the rules on non-financial restrictions. Before doing so, however, it is 
1   For more detailed discssions see inter alia P. Oliver (ed.), Oliver on Free Movement of Goods 
in the European Union (5th edn, Hart, 2010) or C. Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU. The 
Four Freedoms (4th edn., OUP 2013).
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necessary to discuss some preliminary issues, including the concept of a good 
and the scope of the free movement of goods.
10.2 Goods Falling under EU Free Movement Law
The Treaties do not define ‘goods’, but the CJEU has defined them as: ‘products 
which can be valued in money and which are capable, as such, of forming the 
subject of commercial transactions.’2 This is a very broad definition that can 
even include electricity or waste that no longer has any commercial value.3 
Fishing rights, on the other hand, formed intangible rights that did not qualify 
as goods.4
The right to free movement applies to all goods that originate from a 
Member State or that that have been legally brought into free circulation 
somewhere in the EU.5 Once a good has been imported into one EU Member 
State, therefore, it can move just as freely as any good produced in the EU, 
without requiring any certificate of origin.6 Free movement rights only apply, 
however, in cross-border situations. A Czech car, built in the Czech Republic 
and sold in the Czech Republic, for example, has never crossed a border, and 
therefore does not fall under EU free movement law.7 However, a cross-border 
effect may already be present where a national rule ‘facilitates the marketing of 
goods of domestic origin to the detriment of imported goods’, even if the rule 
only applies to national products.8 In other words, even if a national rule does 
2   Case 7/68 Commission v. Italy [1968] ECR 617 and Case C-65/05 Commission v. Greece [2006]
ECR I-10341.
3   Case C-379/98 Preussen Elektra [2001] ECR I-2099 and Case C-2/90 Wallonian Waste [1992] 
ECR I-4431.
4   Case C-97/98 Jägerskiöld [1999]ECR I-7319.
5   See Article 29(2) TFEU and Case 2/69 Sociaal fonds voor de Diamantarbeiders [1969] ECR 211, 
paras. 24–26.
6   Case 41/76 Donckerwolcke [1976] ECR 1921, para. 17. To enter legally they have to comply with 
all rules in the EU Common Customs Code and pay the required duties. See Regulation 
450/2008 on the Modernised EU Common Customs Code, OJ [2008] L145/1.
7   Note though that the CJEU has sometimes also applied free movement prohibitions against 
measures that differntiated between regions within a Member State. This apporach might 
be of particulr interest in the EAC, where some barriers may lie within Member States, for 
example in Tanzania. See for example Case C-363/93, Lancry [1994] ECR I-3957, par. 26 or 
Case C-72/03 Carbonati Apuani ECLI:EU:C:2004:506, par. 22.
8   Case C-321/94, Pistre, [1997] ECR I-2343.
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not even apply to foreign products but grants a benefit to national products, a 
cross-border effect is present and EU law applies.
When they apply, the rules on the free movement of goods have direct 
effect. This means that they can be directly relied on before national courts or 
other public bodies to challenge any national rule or practise that restricts free 
movement.9 Consequently, individuals and businesses do not have to wait for 
public enforcement against restrictions, but can directly attack them them-
selves on the basis of EU law.10 So far, the Treaty provisions on goods, do not 
yet seem to have horizontal direct effect, even though they can be relied upon 
against private bodies that wield certain public authority.11
10.3 Financial Restrictions
The first category of prohibited restrictions concern financial restrictions, 
which can either be customs duties and charges having an equivalent effect 
(Article 30 TFEU), or internal taxation measures restricting free movement 
(Article 110 TFEU).
10.3.1 Customs Duties and Charges Having an Equivalent Effect
Customs duties include any form of payment that has to be made because a 
good crosses a border, also of a fiscal nature. All customs duties are prohibited 
under Article 30 TFEU, without exception. In practice, customs duties no lon-
ger occur in the EU, which attests to the effectiveness of this prohibition.
Article 30 TFEU, however, also prohibits ‘charges having an equivalent effect 
to customs duties’. This means that Member States are not allowed to adopt 
other measures that are technically speaking not a customs duty, but in prac-
tice have the same effect. Consider, for example, Portugal imposing an obliga-
tory veterinary check at the border and charging a mandatory fee of 10 euros 
per animal. Such a measure would not be a customs duty, but would have the 
same effect of increasing the price of imported live stock.
9    The CJEU has even held that a statement by a public official can be a prohibited restriction 
under Article 34 TFEU. See Case C-470/03, A.G.M.-COS.MET [2007] ECR I-2749, par. 58.
10   See EU chapter 4 on the concept of direct effect and supremacy of EU law. For the direct 
effect of the free movement of goods provisions see inter alia Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos 
[1963] ECR 1, and Case 74/76, Iannelli [1977] ECR 577.
11   See for example Case 311/85 Vereniging voor Vlaamse reisbureaus [1987] ECR 3801, paras. 11 
and 30, and recently Case C-171/11, Fra.bo ECLI:EU:C:2012:453.
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To make sure Member States do not develop creative alternative measures 
to circumvent the prohibition of Article 30 TFEU, the CJEU has given a very 
broad and effect-based interpretation to the concept of ‘charges having an 
equivalent effect’, which covers:
any pecuniary charge, however small and whatever its designation and 
mode of application, which is imposed unilaterally on domestic or for-
eign goods by reason of the fact that they cross a frontier, and which is 
not a customs duty in the strict sense.12
All charges having an equivalent effect are in principle prohibited, as the Treaty 
provides no possible justifications for them.13 The CJEU, however, has allowed 
two very narrow exceptions. Firstly, a charge may be allowed where it covers 
the actual costs of an inspection required by EU law itself. Where the EU, for 
example as during the BSE crisis, imposes mandatory health inspections on 
beef at the border, Member States may recover the costs of these inspections 
from importers. The charges imposed, however, may never exceed the actual 
costs of the inspections.14
Secondly, charges are allowed where they only form compensation for ser-
vices rendered to the importer on a voluntary basis. For example, an importer 
may voluntarily request to use a warehouse with cooling facilities owned by the 
state whilst awaiting further shipping of the goods. If so, the state may charge 
a reasonable fee for this service.15 As soon as there is any form of obligation, 
directly or indirectly, to make use of a specific service, however, or if there is no 
real benefit to the individual importer, no charges may be imposed.16
10.3.2 Internal Taxation as a Restriction on Free Movement of Goods
Member States are also not allowed to effectively recreate customs duties via 
their internal taxes. Just imagine France imposing an additional VAT of 20% on 
German cars, which would undo the prohibition of Article 30 TFEU completely. 
12   Case 24/68 Commission v Italy [1969] ECR 193, par. 9. This remains the case ‘even if the 
charge is not imposed for the benefit of the State, is not discriminatory or protective in 
effect and if the product on which the charge is imposed is not in competition with any 
domestic product.’ See Joined Cases 2/62 and 3/62, Commission v Belgium and Luxemburg 
ECLI:EU:C:1962:45.
13   Case 24/68 Commission v Italy, par 10.
14   Case 18/87 Commission v Germany, ECLI:EU:C:1988:453.
15   Case 132/82 Commission v Belgium, ECLI:EU:C:1983:135, par. 8.
16   See for the strict scrutiny of the CJEU on this point for example Ford España v Spain 
ECLI:EU:C:1989:306, or Case 87/75 Bresciani [1976] ECR 129.
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Therefore, even though Member States retain the competence to organize 
their own tax system, they may not use their taxes to restrict free movement 
of goods.17 For ‘whenever a fiscal levy is likely to discourage imports of goods 
originating in other Member States to the benefit of domestic production’, it is 
caught by the prohibition of Article 110 TFEU.18
To protect free movement, Article 110 TFEU prohibits both discriminatory 
taxation and more subtle measures that do not discriminate but still have the 
effect of protecting national products. Discriminatory taxes are prohibited in 
Article 110(1) TFEU, which determines that ‘No Member State shall impose, 
directly or indirectly, on the products of other Member States any internal 
taxation of any kind in excess of that imposed directly or indirectly on similar 
domestic products.’
For Article 110(1) TFEU to apply, one must first assess if a tax is imposed on 
‘similar’ products. Here the CJEU primarily looks at the comparability of prod-
ucts from the perspective of the consumer. As the CJEU held in Commission 
v France, similarity must be assessed on the basis ‘not of the criterion of the 
strictly identical nature of the products but on that of their similar and compa-
rable use.’19 This may lead the CJEU into rather factual assessments involving 
substances as fruit wine, whiskey or that evergreen of EU law, bananas.20
If products are sufficiently similar, one must next assess if the tax at issue 
discriminates between them, either directly or indirectly. Direct discrimina-
tion means that imported products are taxed differently precisely because they 
originate from another Member State. Indirect discrimination, which is more 
common, means that taxation differs based on a criterion that seems neutral as 
to nationality, but in reality affects imported goods more than national goods. 
The case of Humblot provides a good example of indirect discrimination, and 
how Member States may use it to protect their own industries.21 In Humblot, 
the French tax on cars with more than a 16 cylinder engine volume rose sharply 
from 1.100 French francs to 5000 francs. It just so happened that no car pro-
duced in France had a cylinder engine volume over 16, but many German cars 
did. The French tax measure, therefore, did not directly discriminate based on 
nationality, but the criterion of engine volume indirectly discriminated against 
17   See inter alia Case 168/78 Commission v France [1980] ECR 347.
18   Case 252/86 Bergandi ECLI:EU:C:1988:112, par. 25.
19   Case 168/78 Commission v France [1980] ECR 347. See also already Case 45/75 Rewe-Zentral 
[1976] ECR 181.
20   Cf. Case 243/84 Johnnie Walker [1986] ECR 875 and Case 184/85 Commission v Italy [1987] 
ECR 2013.
21   Case C-112/84 Humblot, ECLI:EU:C:1985:185.
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imported cars. The CJEU saw through this attempt to indirectly protect French 
car producers and found the measure to violate Article 110(1) TFEU.22
Article 110(2) TFEU may come in play where the products concerned are 
not similar, but the taxes nevertheless provide indirect protection to domestic 
products against competing importing products.23 For a tax to be caught by 
Article 110(2) two conditions must be met. First, the relevant products must 
be in a competitive relationship. This logically is a lower threshold than the 
similarity that is required for Article 110(1) TFEU to apply.24 A competitive rela-
tionship essentially concerns substitutability, i.e. the question if consumers 
might choose product A instead of product B, for example if A becomes 5% 
cheaper. The classic example of products that are not comparable but do com-
pete is beer and (cheap) wine. In Commission v. UK, the tax imposed on wine 
was more than four times higher than the tax on beer, especially in the case 
of the lower segments of wine.25 As in Humblot, it just so happens that the UK 
produces almost no wine, but does produce a lot of beer. Ultimately, the CJEU 
held that wine and beer were not similar enough to fall under Article 110(1) 
TFEU, but they were substitutable enough for consumers to be in competi-
tion with each other in the meaning of Article 110(2) TFEU, as consumers can 
switch from beer to wine.
Second, if products compete with each other, the tax may not protect the 
domestic product. Here the CJEU primarily looks at the effect of the tax on 
consumers. In Commission v. UK, for example, the CJEU found that the much 
higher taxes on wine did protect the domestic beer, and hence was prohib-
ited under Article 110(2) TFEU, because the tax difference was so high that 
it affected consumer choices and the tax difference could not be objectively 
justified on any ground. Member States, therefore, do of course retain the 
freedom to differentiate their taxes on different products based on objective 
criteria. For Article 110(2) TFEU to apply, therefore, a real protective effect must 
be shown, the mere existence of a difference in tax rate is not enough.26
22   For another example, see Case C-402/09, Tatu ECLI:EU:C:2011:219. Directly discriminatory 
taes can never be justified. Whether indirectly discriminory taxes can ever be justified, 
even though the Traety provides no exceptions, remains a contested question. See for 
a case that perhaps provides an opening Case 140/79 Chemial Farmaceutici v DAF [1981] 
ECR 1.
23   On the difficculties that may arise in distinguishing between 110(1) and 110(2) TFEU see 
for example Case 169/78 Commission v Italy [1980] ECR 385 or Case 171/78 Commission v 
Denmark [1980] ECR 447.
24   Case 27/67 Fink-Frucht [1968] ECR 223.
25   Case 170/78 Commission v UK [1983] ECR 2265.
26   Cf. on the leeway of Member States also Case 243/84 Johnnie Walker [1986] ECR 875.
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Article 30 and 110 TFEU jointly aim to prevent financial obstacles to free 
movement, The two provisions are mutually exclusive. A case, therefore, can 
never fall under both provisions. A financial charge is either based on the prod-
uct crossing the border, and hence a customs duty under Article 30 TFEU, or 
not, in which case it falls under Article 110 TFEU. For example, if an identical 
charge is levied from both imported and domestic products, this forms an 
internal tax, even if the tax for imported products just happens to be collected 
at the border.27 For in such situations, the charge itself does not depend on the 
crossing of the border, only the time and place of collection does.
10.4 Non-Financial or Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs)
As the EAC experience has also shown, real free movement of goods cannot be 
achieved by just removing financial or tariff barriers.28 For in practice, trade in 
goods is obstructed at least as much by so called non-tariff barriers (NTBs) as 
it is by tariff barriers. For example, consider a producer of child-safety seats in 
a situation where each Member State has different safety standards for child-
safety seats. Even if there are no tariffs and equivalent charges, he will still find 
it difficult to sell his child-safety seats in other Member States. Not only will he 
have to meet different standards in all Member States, the national producers 
he competes with only have to meet their own national safety standards, giv-
ing them a competitive advantage. Previous experiences have clearly shown, 
therefore, that NTBs create major obstacles to trade. A lesson, in reality, the UK 
will have to relearn the hard way if it chooses to fall back on WTO rules after 
Brexit, as these rules do not deal with NTBs.29
In the EU, non-tariff barriers are prohibited under articles 34 and 35 TFEU, 
unless they can be justified under Article 36 TFEU or a rule of reason excep-
tion. The next paragraphs will first set out how the CJEU developed these two 
27   Case C-221/06 Stadtgemeinde Frohnleiten [2007] ECR I-9643, Case 29/87 Denkavit [1988] 
ECR 2965 or Joined Cases 441–442/98 Mikhailidis [2000] ECR I-7145. Of course difficulties 
may arise in practise to dinstinguish, but a choice must then be made. See for example 
Case 105/75 Interzuccheri [1977] ECR 1029 or Case C-28/96 Fricarnes [1997] ECR I-4939.
28   See also chapter 10 par. 4.on NTBs in the EAC.
29   Cf also S. Dhingra en T. Sampson, ‘Life after Brexit: What are the UK’s options outside 
the European Union?’ Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics 
Working PaperBrexit 01, HM Government, ‘Alternatives to membership: possible models 
for the United Kingdom outside the European Union’ March 2016, available at <https://
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/504604/
Alternatives_to_membership_-_possible_models_for_the_UK_outside_the_EU.pdf>.
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provisions into very broad prohibitions that are capable of capturing almost 
any national rule. Subsequently, they describe the exceptions EU law provides 
to Member States to defend NTBs that serve a public interest, and the way the 
CJEU balances restrictions to free movement and such public interests.
10.4.1 The Prohibition on Quantitative Restrictions and Measures Having 
Equivalent Effect
Article 34 TFEU forms the key prohibition behind the free movement of goods 
in the EU. It provides that:
Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent 
effect shall be prohibited between Member States.30
The concept of a ‘quantitative restriction’ thereby refers to measures that 
directly concern the quantity or the number of products that may be imported 
or exported.31 This, of course, includes a total ban, that allows zero products 
to be imported or exported,32 but also partial restrictions that allow only a 
certain number of products to be imported.33 Like customs duties, however, 
quantitative restrictions are relatively rare in the EU. The main prohibition in 
Article 34 TFEU, therefore, concerns ‘measures having an equivalent effect to 
quantitative restrictions’ or MEQRs.
As MEQR is a rather vague concept, it was once again up to the CJEU to pro-
vide a definition. One route the CJEU could take, in line with Article 18 TFEU, 
was to interpret this concept narrowly as a prohibition on national measures 
that discriminated against imported goods. In Dassonville, its seminal judg-
ment on the free movement of goods, however, the CJEU took a very different 
approach and provided a very wide definition of MEQRs as:
All trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of 
hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community 
trade (. . .)34
30   Article 35 TFEU contains an almost identical prohibition for the, less common, restric-
tions on export, and wil not be discussed separately here.
31   Case 2/73, Geddo [1973] ECR 865.
32   Case 34/79, R Henn and Darby, [1979] ECR 3795.
33   See for example Case 13/68, Salgoil [1968] ECR 453 or Case 170/04, Rosengren [2007] ECR 
I-4701.
34   Case 8/74, Dassonville, [1974], ECR 837.
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Under this definition, even measures that are capable of potentially hinder-
ing trade in an indirect fashion qualify as measures of equivalent effect, and 
hence are in principle prohibited under Article 34 TFEU. Crucially, the CJEU 
also did not require any form of (indirect) discrimination to be present, but 
only looked at the actual or possible effect of a measure on trade.
The broad Dassonville definition of MEQR was further developed in Cassis 
de Dijon, another seminal judgment on the free movement of goods. In this 
case, the applicant wanted to import the liqueur ‘Cassis de Dijon’ into Germany 
from France. Under an interesting German approach to consumer protection, 
however, the liqueur did not contain enough alcohol. German law required 
that liqueurs such as Cassis de Dijon had an alcohol content of at least 25%, 
whereas the French liqueur only contained 15–20% alcohol. The German 
authority, therefore, refused to allow the importation. The applicant claimed 
this constituted a prohibited MEQR. Germany contended, however, that the 
measure did not discriminate in any way as it applied equally to German and 
French drinks, and therefore also did not violate Article 34 TFEU. The CJEU was 
not convinced:
In practice, the principal effect of requirements of this nature is to pro-
mote alcoholic beverages having a high alcohol content by excluding 
from the national market products of other Member States which do not 
answer that description
It therefore appears that the unilateral requirement imposed by the 
rule of Member State of a minimum alcohol content for the purposes of 
the sale of alcoholic beverages constitutes an obstacle to trade which is 
incompatible with the provisions of Article [34] of the treaty.35
Even measures that in no way distinguish between national and foreign prod-
ucts, therefore, qualify as MEQRs if they in any way hinder foreign goods that 
want to enter the national market.
Cassis de Dijon also introduced another far reaching doctrine that continued 
to play an important role in EU free movement law: the principle of mutual 
recognition.36 In principle, Member States should trust each other’s regula-
tions to be sufficient and adequate, and therefore recognize and allow prod-
ucts that have been legally produced according to the standards of another 
35   Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentrale AG v. Bundesmonopolverwalting für Branntwein (Cassis de 
Dijon) [1979], ECR 649.
36   See for the importance of this principle for free movement and its role in newer forms of 
harmonization EU Chapter 9.
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Member State. In the case of Cassis de Dijon, the fact that the liqueur complied 
with French legislation should in principle suffice for the German authorities, 
unless they could prove why in this particular case French products should not 
be trusted.
It is difficult to exaggerate just how broad the definition of an MEQR under 
Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon is. The definition only requires that a national 
rule in some way makes it more difficult for a product to enter the market, 
not that the rule is harder on foreign products or imposes a dual burden.37 In 
practice, however, almost any rule that is worth having will require something, 
and therefore make it more difficult to enter the market than if the rule did 
not exist. For example, any product standard such as requiring real cocoa in 
chocolate or prohibiting certain additives in baby milk will make it more dif-
ficult for foreign producers to enter the market than if these standards did not 
apply. All such national standards, therefore, qualify as MEQRs under Article 
34 TFEU. In addition, the CJEU has also held that Member States have a positive 
obligation to prevent or stop any behaviour by private individuals that might 
interfere with the free movement of goods. In Spanish Strawberries, for exam-
ple, the French government was found to have violated Article 34 TFEU by not 
stopping French farmers from attacking and destroying trucks with Spanish 
fruit that was outcompeting French fruit.38 Such a general positive obligation 
to actively remove any restrictions to free movement caused by private indi-
viduals could also be a far reaching instrument in the EAC context.
Now as we will see, EU law does not just set aside such eminently desirable 
rules as health standards for baby milk, as these may often be justified.39 The 
only point here is that the very broad definition developed by the Court does 
qualify all such rules as MEQRs (or NTBs) and therefore brings them under the 
scope of the prohibition in Article 34 TFEU, and under the scrutiny of EU and 
national courts.
The benefit of this very broad definition was that it covered all potential 
NTBs, and removed any space that Member States might have to develop cre-
ative NTBs that do protect national products fall outside a narrower definition. 
The main downside of this definition, however, was that almost all national 
37   The MEQR, moreover, may even consist if some practises or factual behaviour of pub-
lic officials. In one extreme case, even a negative statement by a government official on 
Italian car lifts was found to constitute an MEQR under Article 34 TFEU. See Case C-470/03 
AGM-COS.MET [2007] ECR I-2749.
38   Case C-265/95 Commission / France (Spanish Strawberries) [1997] ECR I-6959. See also 
Case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659.
39   See paragraph 10.5 below.
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rules now qualified as MEQRs and could therefore be challenged on the basis of 
EU law. After Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon, therefore, national courts and the 
CJEU were increasingly flooded with cases. Many of these challenged national 
rules that did technically qualify as MEQRs, but in reality were not concerned 
with restricting the free movements of goods. Symbolic in this regard became 
the Sunday Trading cases in which traders challenged national rules requiring 
shops to close on Sunday. As this meant traders could not sell their products 
on a Sunday, this indeed restricted their access to the market, but it was not the 
kind of restriction Article 34 TFEU was intended to capture.40
Consequently, the search was on for a way to limit the definition of an MEQR 
in a way that would prevent abuse of Article 34 TFEU but would not under-
mine the effectiveness of Article 34 TFEU in targeting real MEQRs. In the end, 
the CJEU opted for a less than convincing approach. In Keck, another landmark 
judgment, it introduced a problematic distinction between product norms and 
selling arrangements, holding that under certain conditions selling arrange-
ments do not fall under the scope of Article 34 TFEU.41
Keck concerned two traders, Keck and Mithouard, which were being pros-
ecuted in France for reselling goods at a loss, something that was prohibited 
under French law. The law, however, only prohibited resellers from doing so, as 
manufacturers were allowed to sell at a loss. Keck and Mithouard claimed this 
French rule violated, amongst other things, Article 34 TFEU. Considering its 
importance, and because it gives a good insight into the reasoning of the Court 
at this stage of the internal market development, the relevant paragraphs of 
the judgement are reproduced below:
By virtue of Article [34], quantitative restrictions on imports and all mea-
sures having equivalent effect are prohibited between Member States. 
The Court has consistently held that any measure which is capable of 
directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, hindering intra-Community 
trade constitutes a measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative 
restriction.
40   Case C-145/88 Torfaen Borough [1989] ECR I-3851 and Case C-169/91 B & Q [2002] ECR 
I-6635. See for a critical discussion for example A. Arnull, ‘What Shall We Do on Sunday?’, 
26 European Law Review (1991), 112 or J. Steiner, ‘Drawing the Line: Uses and Abuses of 
Article 30 EEC’, 29 Common Market Law Review (1992), 749.
41   Case C-276/91, Keck and Mithouard, [1993], ECR 6097.
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National legislation imposing a general prohibition on resale at a loss 
is not designed to regulate trade in goods between Member States.
Such legislation may, admittedly, restrict the volume of sales, and 
hence the volume of sales of products from other Member States, in so 
far as it deprives traders of a method of sales promotion. But the question 
remains whether such a possibility is sufficient to characterize the legis-
lation in question as a measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative 
restriction on imports.
In view of the increasing tendency of traders to invoke Article [34] 
of the Treaty as a means of challenging any rules whose effect is to limit 
their commercial freedom even where such rules are not aimed at prod-
ucts from other Member States, the Court considers it necessary to re-
examine and clarify its case-law on this matter.
It is established by the case-law beginning with “Cassis de Dijon” that, 
in the absence of harmonization of legislation, obstacles to free move-
ment of goods which are the consequence of applying, to goods com-
ing from other Member States where they are lawfully manufactured 
and marketed, rules that lay down requirements to be met by such goods 
(such as those relating to designation, form, size, weight, composition, 
presentation, labelling, packaging) constitute measures of equivalent 
effect prohibited by Article [34]. This is so even if those rules apply with-
out distinction to all products unless their application can be justified by 
a public-interest objective taking precedence over the free movement of 
goods.
By contrast, contrary to what has previously been decided, the appli-
cation to products from other Member States of national provisions 
restricting or prohibiting certain selling arrangements is not such as 
to hinder directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, trade between 
Member States within the meaning of the Dassonville judgment, so long 
as those provisions apply to all relevant traders operating within the 
national territory and so long as they affect in the same manner, in law 
and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and of those from other 
Member States.
Provided that those conditions are fulfilled, the application of such 
rules to the sale of products from another Member State meeting the 
requirements laid down by that State is not by nature such as to prevent 
their access to the market or to impede access any more than it impedes 
the access of domestic products. Such rules therefore fall outside the 
scope of Article [34] of the Treaty.
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Accordingly, the reply to be given to the national court is that Article 
30 of the EEC Treaty is to be interpreted as not applying to legislation of a 
Member State imposing a general prohibition on resale at a loss.42
The CJEU therefore proceeded to create a new category of regulations con-
cerning ‘selling arrangements’. Provided such selling arrangements 1) apply to 
all relevant traders operating within the national territory, and 2) affect the 
marketing of domestic products and of those from other Member States in 
the same manner, both in law and in fact, they do not constitute MEQRs under 
Article 34 TFEU and hence are not prohibited.43 The concept of selling arrange-
ments, however, was not really defined, but it includes those rules dealing with 
how a product is sold, rather than rules on how the product itself is made.44
Keck indeed reduced the scope of Article 34 TFEU, even if it did so in a rather 
construed and complicated way that has kept lawyers engaged for the past 
25 years. One of the opportunities for EAC law, therefore might be to find a 
better way to delineate the scope of the EAC free movement clauses, even 
though the more urgent challenge might be to make the prohibitions them-
selves more coherent and effective first.45
One of the questions Keck left open concerned the qualification of rules 
that do not regulate the product itself or the way it is sold, but rather the way a 
product may be used in a Member State. A rule that caps the maximum speed 
on the highway to a 100 kilometres per hour, for example, does not regulate 
how a car must be made or how it must be sold. It may affect, however, the 
42   Keck, paras. 11–18.
43   One important application of this requirement concerns the internet. The CJEU has held 
that restricting sales via the internet will always affect the marketing of foreign prodcuts 
more negatively since the on-line sales are usually the only channel available to sell for-
eign products, whereas domestic products usually also have other outlets such as physicial 
shops. This application of the earlier De Agostini case law seriously curtails the applica-
tion of Keck to the on-line market. See Case C-108/09 Ker-Optika ECLI:EU:C:2010:725 and 
Joined Cases C-34/95, C-35/95 and C-36/95, De Agostini ECLI:EU:C:1997:344.
44   The CJEU only provided a negative definition by indicating that measures that do not 
form selling arrangement would, inter alia, be those relating to designation, form, size, 
weight, composition, presentation, labelling and packaging.
45   In this context also see the complex case law of the CJEU on when the effect of a national 
measure on trade is too uncertain and indirect for the measure to qualifiy as a MEQR. 
Although not amounting to a real de minimis rule, this case law further limits the scope of 
Article 34 TFEU, although it is difficult to apply and predict in practise. See inter alia Case 
C-379/92, Peralta ECLI:EU:C:1994:296, Case 155/80 Oebel, [1981] ECR I-1993 as well as the 
Opinion of AG Kokott in Case C-142/05, Mickelsson and Roos ECLI:EU:C:2009:336.
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market access of cars. An expensive hyper-car, for example, may become less 
attractive if you can never really put it to use.
In more recent case law, the CJEU has now confirmed that such rules on use 
do form MEQRs, and therefore fall under the scope of Article 34 TFEU. One 
such case concerned the Italian prohibition to use a trailer behind a motorcy-
cle.46 This rule affected the sale of trailers for motorcycles, as it prohibited their 
use, even though it did not regulate the product as such. The CJEU held that in 
addition to product rules, Article 34 TFEU also covers ‘any other measure which 
hinders access of products originating in other Member States to the market of a 
Member State.’47 This more recent case law, therefore, again widens the scope 
of Article 34 TFEU, and restricts the Keck exception to selling arrangements in 
the stricter sense.
10.5 Justifying MEQRs
Precisely because Article 34 TFEU captures so many national rules, the ques-
tion of justification becomes essential. For without a proper doctrine of justifi-
cation, the EU would run the risk of setting aside a great deal of very welcome 
national rules that for example protect public health, public security or the 
environment. The last part of this Chapter, therefore, briefly discusses the ques-
tion of justification: how can a Member State justify a restriction on the free 
movement of goods? As the question of justification is often highly context 
dependent, and as a tremendous wealth of case law exists, this part focuses 
on the structure and main characteristics of the test used to see if national 
measures are justified, as understanding this test allows one to independently 
analyse specific cases on justification.
Restrictions on free movement may be justified if they 1) serve a legitimate 
aim, 2) in a proportionate manner.48 There are two types of legitimate aims, 
46   Case C-110/05, Commission v Italy ECLI:EU:C:2009:66. For another example see Case 
C-142/05, Mickelsson and Roos ECLI:EU:C:2009:336 on the use of jet skis.
47   Case C-110/05, Commission v Italy, ECLI:EU:C:2009:66 par. 37. See for further analysis 
P. Oliver, ‘Of Trailers and Jetskis: Is the Case Law on Article 34 TFEU Hurtling in a new 
Direction?’, 33 Fordham International Law Journal (2009–2010), 1423, or L. Gormley, ‘Free 
Movement of Goods and their Use—What Is the Use of It?’, 33 Fordham International Law 
Journal (2011), 1589–1628.
48   Also note that under the Tedeschi principle discussed in EU Chatper 9, Member States 
may only rely on justifications if the relevant area of law has not yet been harmonized. 
The moment that secondary EU law has been adopted, for instance on the safety of baby 
milk, that field is governed by the secondary legislation and no longer by the Treaty 
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namely Treaty based aims and the judge made aims under the rule of reason. 
Measures are proportionate, moreover, if they are suitable and necessary in rela-
tion to the legitimate aim they pursue. When applying any of these concepts, 
furthermore, it should be realized that in general all exceptions to free move-
ment are construed narrowly by the CJEU, and that the Court usually is very 
strict in applying them.49 Justifying a restriction, therefore, usually requires 
a convincing argument from the Member States, particularly demonstrating 
that the same objective could not have been reached by less restrictive means.
10.5.1 Treaty Aims and the Rule of Reaon
Article 36 TFEU provides that:
The provisions of Articles 34 and 35 shall not preclude prohibitions or 
restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of 
public morality, public policy or public security; the protection of health 
and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of national treasures 
possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the protection of 
industrial and commercial property. Such prohibitions or restrictions 
shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a 
disguised restriction on trade between Member States.
The grounds enumerated in Article 36 TFEU, however, are limitative and inter-
preted very strictly by the CJEU.50 Article 36 TFEU, therefore only provides very 
limited grounds to Member States to justify national measures, which became 
increasingly problematic after the very broad interpretation given to MEQRs 
by the CJEU. For where traders could now attack almost any national rule, 
Member States were severely restricted in their defences. For example, Article 
36 TFEU does not even mention consumer protection or the environment, 
meaning Member States cannot justify any measures based on these clearly 
desirable and reasonable objectives under the Treaty.
provisions on free movement. See for example Case C-309/02, Radlberger v Land Baden-
Württemberg, [2004] ECR I-11763, Case C-265/06, Commission v Portugal, [2008] ECR 
I-2245 or Case 193/80, Commission v Italy, [1981] ECR 3019. For the basis principle see Case 
5/77, Tedeschi [1977] ECR 1555.
49   See already Case 7/61, Commission v Italy, [1961] ECR 317 as well as Case 72/83, Campus Oil 
ECLI:EU:C:1984:256.
50   See amongst many others Case 288/83, Commission v Ireland, [1985] ECR 1761, Case 
C-265/95, Commission v France, [1997] ECR I-695 or Case 121/85, Conegate [1986] ECR 1007.
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In the same Cassis de Dijon judgment that confirmed Dassonville and intro-
duced mutual recognition, The CJEU recognized this problem and recognized 
a second, non-Treaty based category of justificatory grounds that Member 
States could rely on. This category of mandatory requirements has become 
known as the rule of reason exceptions:
In the absence of common rules relating to the production and mar-
keting of alcohol (. . .) it is for the Member States to regulate all matters 
relating to the production and marketing of alcohol and alcoholic bever-
ages on their own territory.
Obstacles to movement within the community resulting from dispari-
ties between the national laws relating to the marketing of the products 
in question must be accepted in so far as those provisions may be rec-
ognized as being necessary in order to satisfy mandatory requirements 
relating in particular to the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the pro-
tection of public health, the fairness of commercial transactions and the 
defence of the consumer.51
The Court gives the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of public 
health, the fairness of commercial transactions and the defence of the con-
sumer as examples of mandatory requirements that may justify restrictions on 
free movement. Crucially, however, the category of mandatory requirements is 
an open one. The CJEU is open to accept any reasonable public interest that 
a Member State may want to serve as a possible ground for justification. Later 
case law, for example, accepted grounds such as the protection of the envi-
ronment and of biological resources,52 consumer protection53 or freedom of 
expression54 as acceptable mandatory grounds.
The rule of reason, therefore, greatly expands the grounds a Member State 
may rely on to justify restrictions, thereby allowing for a better balancing of 
free movement and public interests. Some limits, however, do apply. Firstly, 
the CJEU does accept any purely economic grounds.55 Secondly, under the 
51   Cassis de Dijon, par, 8–9.
52   Joined Cases 3/76, 4/76 and 6/76, Kramer [1976] ECR 1279, Case 240/83, ADBHU, [1985] 
ECR 531, or Case C-443/10 Bonnarde ECLI:EU:C:2011:641.
53   Case C-353/89, Mediawet Nederland [1999], ECR I-4069, Case C-161/09, Kakavetsos-
Fragkopoulos ECLI:EU:C:2011:110, or Case C-481/12 UAB ECLI:EU:C:2014:11.
54   Case C-112/00, Schmidberger; Case C-71/02, Karner v Troostwijk ECLI:EU:C:2004:181.
55   See Case C-109/04 Kranemann [2005] ECR I-2421 or Case C-456/10, ANETT ECLI:EU: 
C:2012:241.
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orthodox approach, rule of reason grounds may only be used to justify restric-
tions that are indirectly discriminatory or non-discriminatory. Restrictions 
that are directly discriminatory may only be justified under a ground listed in 
Article 36 TFEU, although the CJEU does not always seem to follow this rule 
religiously.56
The main challenge for Member States in justifying an MEQR, however, usu-
ally is not to find an acceptable ground under Article 36 TFEU or the rule of 
reason, but to satisfy the proportionality test that comes next.
10.5.2 Proportionality of MEQRs
An MEQR is only justified if it is proportionate in relation to its aim. For inter-
nal market cases, the proportionality test asks two questions, relating to the 
suitability and the necessity of the MEQR. Crucially, both have to be assessed 
not in abstract but in relation to the specific aim or aims provided as the legiti-
mate aim.
The question of suitability essentially asks if a measure can actually achieve 
the objective it is supposed to serve. For instance, if the aim is to protect chil-
dren against too much sugar in soft-drinks, a measure imposing a maximum 
sugar content is suitable to achieve this aim, a measure just prohibiting French 
soft-drinks is not. The CJEU has further developed the suitability test by intro-
ducing the criterion of consistency, even if the CJEU does not always apply this 
criterion or does not apply it as stringently as it could. The central idea is that 
a measure can only be suitable if it achieves its objective in a consistent and 
systematic manner.57 This inter alia means that a measure should not under-
mine the very aim it is trying to achieve. An early application of this logic can 
be seen in Conegate, where the UK had seized a consignment consisting ‘essen-
tially of inflatable dolls which were clearly of a sexual nature’ as these violated 
public morality.58 At the same time, however, the UK did allow national pro-
duction and sale of similar inflatable devices, which led the CJEU to find that:
56   Case 113/80, Commission v Ireland ECLI:EU:C:1981:139 or Case 274/87, Commission v 
Germany [1989] ECR 229 for the orthodoxy. For apparent deviations see inter alia 
Case C-573/12, Ålands Vindkraft ECLI:EU:C:2014:2037 or Case C-389/96 Aher-Waggon 
ECLI:EU:C:1998:357.
57   See for the introduction of this test in the context of services Case C-243/01 Gambelli 
[2003] ECR I-13031.
58   Case 121/85, Conegate ECLI:EU:C:1986:114.
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a Member State may not rely on grounds of public morality within the 
meaning of Article 36 of the Treaty in order to prohibit the importation 
of certain goods on the grounds that they are indecent or obscene, where 
the same goods may be manufactured freely on its territory and marketed 
on its territory subject only to an absolute prohibition on their transmis-
sion by post, a restriction on their public display and, in certain regions, 
a system of licensing of premises for the sale of those goods to customers 
aged 18 and over.59
If it wants to, a court could impose far reaching scrutiny via a consistency test, 
as many political measures will not be wholly consistent, either internally or 
compared to other measures.60 In practice, however, the real scrutiny takes 
place in the context of necessity.
The necessity test asks if the same objective could not have been achieved 
with a less far reaching measure. In other words, is the MEQR the least restric-
tive measure that can be adopted to achive the public aim being pursued?61 In 
our example on the requirement to have less sugar in soft-drinks, for example, 
the question could be asked if the same objective could not be reached by bet-
ter labeling. Could a clear labeling requirement forcing producers to clearly 
indicate sugar content and calories perhaps achieve the same objective with-
out needing to impose a maximum sugar content?
It is at this stage that the CJEU can be extremely strict, truly requiring the 
Member States to show that there was no real alternative.62 At the same time, 
the application of the necessity test also gives the CJEU a certain flexibility. For 
example, in more morally or politically sensitive cases, it may apply a lighter 
touch and give some more leeway to the Member States, where in other cases it 
59   Idem, par. 20.
60   See further on this point A. Cuyvers, Case note to: Joined Cases C-338/04, C-359/04 and 
C-360/04, Massimiliano Placanica, Christian Palazzese and Angelo Sorricchio (Placanica) 
45 (2008) Common Market Law Review, 515.
61   See for example Case C-385/99, Müller-Fauré [2003] ECR I-4509, or Case C-161/09, 
Kakavetsos-Fragkopoulos ECLI:EU:C:2011:110.
62   Also note that the burden of proof at this stage is on the Member State, so it has to proof 
that the measure is suitable and necessary. Of course the CJEU can differenitate in how 
much evidence it requires, sometimes requiring actual statistical evidence, sometimes 
allowing more general claims about certain effects. See for example Case C-14/02, ATRAL 
SA [2003] ECR I-4431, or Case C-254/05, Commission v Belgium, [2007] ECR I-4269.
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may be very strict indeed.63 Predicting the precise application of the necessity 
test in a particular case therefore requires an analysis of the courts case law in 
the particular field involved, as well as looking at the general principles and 
rules for the free movement of goods.
As we will see in Chapters 11, 12 and 13, the other freedoms have all followed 
the general development of goods, meaning the creation of a wide prohibition, 
followed by the creation of additional ground for justification and a large body 
of case law on whether specific national measures may be justified or not.
63   Compare for example Case C-434/04, Anders Ahokainen [2006] ECR I-9171 and Case 
C-141/07, Commission v Germany, [2008] ECR I-6935 with Case C-297/05, Commission v the 
Netherlands, [2007] ECR I-7467, or Case C-110/05, Commission v Italy, ECLI:EU:C:2009:66.
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CHAPTER 11
Free Movement of Workers in the EAC
Caroline Kago and Wanyama Masinde
11.1 Introduction
The common market is the third level of economic integration where all bar-
riers to the mobility of people, capital and other resources within the member 
states are removed, hence creating a single market where all factors of produc-
tion move freely within the region in question.
The Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Community Common 
Market (the Common Market Protocol) was signed in Arusha, Tanzania by 
the Republic of Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and the United Republic of 
Tanzania, on the 20 November 2009 pursuant to Articles 2(2), 5(2), 151 (1), 76 
and 104 of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community 
(the EAC Treaty) and entered into force in 2010.
The objective of establishing the EAC Common Market through the 
Common Market Protocols to realise accelerated economic growth and devel-
opment through the attainment of free movement of goods; free movement 
of persons; free movement of labour; the right of establishment; the right of 
residence; the free movement of services; and the free movement of capital.1 
The common market is guided by the principles of National Treatment, Most 
Favoured Nations Treatment and predictability through transparency and 
information sharing.2
The Common Market Protocol differentiates a “worker” from a person sup-
plying a service. It first commences by defining “labour” to include a worker 
and a self-employed person. It thereafter defines a “self-employed person” as 
a person engaged in an economic activity not under any contract of employ-
ment or supervision and who earns a living through this activity and a “worker” 
as a person who performs services for and under the direction of another per-
son in return for remuneration.3 Hence, a worker is an employee.
In light of the above, when discussing free movement of workers in the con-
text of the East African Community (EAC) one must restrict the discussion to 
1   Article 2(4) of Common Market Protocol.
2   Article 3 of the Common Market Protocol.
3   Article 1 of Common Market Protocol.
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free movement of an employee. In the context of the EAC, this chapter will 
therefore commence by discussing free movement of workers and thereafter 
examine the link between the free movement of service providers and the free 
movement of workers.
11.2 Free Movement of Workers
The Partner States under the Common Market Protocol guarantee the free 
movement of workers, who are citizens of the Partner States, within their ter-
ritories. In addition, they warrant that the said workers shall not be discrimi-
nated in their territories based on their nationalities in relation to employment, 
remuneration and other conditions of work and employment.4 In this regard, 
the workers shall be entitled to:
i. Apply for employment;
ii. Accept offers of employment;
iii. Conclude contracts and take up employment in accordance with the 
said contracts, national laws and administrative actions without any 
discrimination;
iv. Move freely within the territories of the Partners States for the purpose 
of employment;
v. Stay in the territory of the Partner State for the purpose of employ­
ment (right of residence);
vi. Enjoy freedom of association and collective bargaining for better 
working conditions in accordance with national laws of the Partner 
State;
vii. Enjoy the rights and benefits of social security accorded to workers in 
that territory;
viii. Be accompanied by the spouse and child who are entitled to be 
employed or engage in any economic activity.5
It should be noted that workers may only take up employment in the private 
sector, hence they cannot be employed in the public sector.6 This, therefore 
4   Article 10 of the Common Market Protocol.
5   Article 10(3) of the Common Market Protocol.
6   Article 10(10) of the Common Market Protocol.
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denies the public sector the benefits that accrue from free movement of work-
ers such as the transfer of skills and experiences from other Partner States.7
In addition, Partner States are permitted to limit the free movement of work-
ers on grounds of public policy, public security or public health.8 However, 
the state imposing the limitation is required to notify the other Partner States. 
Although this provision is necessary to provide Partner States with policy 
space it may be used as a form of disguised discrimination to hinder the free 
movement of workers from other Partner States.
The provisions of Article 10 of the Common Market Protocol (Free Move-
ment of Workers) are implemented by the EAC Common Market (Free 
Movement of Workers) Regulations in Annex II. The Regulations cover issues 
such as work permits; employment of spouses and children of workers; expul-
sion and deportation of the worker; equal treatment in employment; and cat-
egories of workers.
The category of workers covered by the Regulations are administrators 
and managers; professionals such as engineers, lawyers, statisticians, teach-
ers, accountants and architects; technicians and associate professionals; and 
crafts and related trades workers. For professions that require accreditation, 
the workers are subject to clearance by the respective regulatory bodies of the 
Partner States.
Based on the provisions of the Common Market Protocol and the 
Regulations, five important issues must be considered in relation to free move-
ment of workers in the EAC:
1. Free movement of persons
2. Mutual recognition of academic and professional qualifications
3. Right of residence
4. Portability of social benefits
5. Labour market information systems
11.2.1 Free Movement of Persons
Free movement of persons is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed in 
the Common Market Protocol. It is the most important right for a worker as it 
enables him/her to take up a job in another Partner State as the worker is able 
to move freely within the region with his/her dependents, stay in the territory 
7   Compare in this regard the much more limited exception to the EU right of free movement 
of workers for employment in public service under Article 45(4) TFEU as discussed in EU 
Chapter 11 par. 2.
8   Article 10 (11) of Common Market Protocol.
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of the Partner State together with his/her dependents, be protected while in 
the territory of the Partner State based on national laws and exit the territory 
of the Partner State without restrictions.9
According to the Common Market Protocol, the Partner States agreed to 
eliminate all obstacles to the freedom movement of persons by establishing 
a standard identification system of issuing national identification documents 
to nationals, which shall be the basis of identifying the citizens of the Partner 
States in the Community.10 The citizens of the Partner States will therefore 
be able to use machine-readable national identity cards as a travel document. 
Rwanda and Uganda are currently issuing standardized machine readable 
national identification. However, Kenya, Burundi and Tanzania are yet to com-
mence the issuance of the standardised machine-readable identifications. 
Nevertheless, there is currently an understanding between Kenya, Uganda and 
Rwanda that their nationals can use the national identity cards as travel docu-
ments across their borders.
The Partner States further agreed to have a common standard travel 
document for the nationals of Partner States. The common standard travel doc-
ument, which is the EAC Passport, is currently being used by many nationals 
of the Partner States. In addition, the Sectoral Council of Ministers responsible 
for EAC Affairs and Planning, during the 22nd Meeting held on 14th August 
2015, developed and adopted a schedule of activities that will ensure that the 
EAC e-Passport is launched by the 17th Ordinary Summit of the EAC Heads 
of State.11
The provision on free movement of persons contained in Article 7 of the 
Common Market Protocol is implemented through the EAC Common Market 
(Free Movement of Persons) Regulations (Annex 1). The Regulations require 
Partner States to effectively manage their borders through ensuring ease of bor-
der crossing for citizens of Partner States; reciprocal opening of border posts; 
operational hours for the border posts; manning of border posts on 24 hour 
basis; harmonisation of certain measures, including immigration procedures.12
Implementation in some Partner States of border management require-
ments is ongoing. For example, in Kenya, a recent study reported that seven 
border posts are operational on a 24 hour basis: Jomo Kenyatta Airport, 
Mombasa International Airport, Namanga, Lunga Linga, Taveta, Malaba and 
9    Article 7, 8 and 9 of the Common Market Protocol.
10   Article 8.
11   Council Report of the 32nd Meeting of the Council of Ministers held on the 10th–14th 
August 2015 in Arusha, Tanzania at ages 9–11. EAC/CM/32/2015.
12   Regulation 8 of the Regulations on Free Movement of Persons.
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Busia. All these borders are electronically interconnected and have integrated 
border management systems.13
11.2.2 Mutual Recognition of Academic and Professional Qualifications
The Common Market Protocol requires Partner States to harmonise and mutu-
ally recognise academic and professional qualifications, experience obtained, 
requirements met, and licences or certificates granted in other Partner States.14 
Recognition requires a high level of trust in the education system and profes-
sional standards of the home country.15 Therefore, this means that the Partner 
States must eventually harmonise their curricula, examinations, standards, 
certification and accreditation of educational and training institutions. This 
process is currently ongoing through a four phase project of the EAC which 
entails harmonising the goals and philosophies of education, curriculum con-
tent, education structures, policies and legal frameworks; examining the curri-
cula and approaches of content delivery in order to identify gaps, overlaps and 
areas to be harmonised; developing of a relevant harmonised curriculum; and 
making necessary reforms to implement the harmonised curricula.16
Recognition of academic and professional qualifications is currently being 
processed through the conclusion of Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) 
wherein Partner States agree to accept and recognise each other’s require-
ments, certificates and licences because they are harmonised, considered 
equivalent or are according to international standards.17
In 2013, the Sectoral Council of Education directed the EAC Secretariat to 
develop legally binding framework for MRAs and mechanisms on how signed 
MRAs can be formally adopted as instruments of the EAC.18 A draft Annex VI to 
the Common Market Protocol, the EAC Common Market (Mutual Recognition 
of Academic and Professional Qualifications) Regulations 2011, places an 
13   Victor Ogalo “Achievements and Challenges of Implementation of the EAC Common 
Market Protocol in Kenya: Case of Free Movement of Labour” (2014) Friedrich Ebert 
Foundation Research Report.
14   Article 5 (3a) and 11 (1a) of the Common Market Protocol.
15   Cronje, J.B., “Mutual Recognition of Professional Qualifications: The East African 
Community” (2015) Tralac Brief No. SI5TB04/2015. 2015.
16   This actually forms an area where EAC objectives and ambitions go beyond those in the 
Europe, as the EU lacks the competence to harmonise curricula, and mutual recognition 
is based more on trust in the existing systems, as well as secondary legislation. See EU 
Chapter 11 par. 3.
17   Cronje, J.B. (n 13 above).
18   Report of the 28th Meeting of the Council of Ministers held in Kampala, Uganda on 22nd-
29th November 2013 at page 40–41.
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obligation on the Partner States to designate competent bodies and to autho-
rise them to enter into MRAs to facilitate the movement of professionals in 
accordance with the market access commitments made under the Common 
Market Protocol.19 It provides guidance on the development of MRAs and the 
key elements it should contain. The key elements are academic and profes-
sional qualification requirements; registration procedures; permitted profes-
sional competencies; common code of conduct; disciplinary processes; and 
administration of the MRA.
This therefore requires that all competent bodies responsible for regulating 
professional services liberalised by Partner States be identified and required to 
negotiate MRAs. They include bodies responsible for regulating legal services, 
accounting services, architectural services, engineering services, integrated 
engineering services, medical and dental services, nurses and midwives, vet-
erinary services, paramedics and physiotherapists.
So far, accountants, engineers and architects (excluding the Architects’ 
Association of Tanzania) have concluded MRAs.20 Lawyers are still negotiating 
their MRA.
11.2.3 Right of Residence for Workers, Relatives and Non-Economically 
Active Persons
A worker and their spouse, children and dependents are entitled to the right 
of residence.21 In this regard, a worker with a contract of employment of a 
period of more than 90 days, his/her spouse, children and dependents are 
issued with a pass upon the submission of valid travel documents or national 
identity cards and contract of employment to the immigration officer. Upon 
entry to the territory of the Partner State, the worker is required to apply for a 
work permit and dependent pass for his/her spouse, children and dependents. 
If the contract of employment is for less that 90 days, the worker is issued with 
a special pass.
Partner States are therefore required to make major reforms in their laws 
and policies regarding movement of persons to ensure that their laws do not 
inhibit the free movement of workers and their right of residence. Kenya is 
a good example of a Partner State that has made efforts towards this end. 
Following the promulgation of the current Constitution of Kenya in 2010, laws 
that inhibited the free movement of people such as the Kenya Citizenship Act 
19   Cronje, J.B. (n13 above).
20   Report of the 28th Meeting of the Council of Ministers held in Kampala, Uganda on 
22nd–29th November 2013 at page 40–41.
21   Article 14 of Common Market Protocol.
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(Cap 170); the Immigration Act (Cap 172); Alien Restriction Act (Cap 173) and 
Visa Regulations were repealed and subsequently replaced with the Kenya 
Citizenship and Immigration Act No. 12 of 2011 and the Kenya Citizens and 
Foreign Nationals Management Act No. 31 of 2011.
Currently, the competent authorities in Partner States issue work permits to 
East Africans wishing to work within the Partner States within 30 days from the 
date of application.22 The work permits may be issued for an initial period of 
up to two years and may be renewed upon application.23 In addition, Partner 
States are given the first opportunity, based on merit, in the event they are 
competing for the same job opportunity with nationals from outside the EAC 
region.24 With regard to work permit fees, Rwanda, Kenya and Uganda have 
waived payment of the fees for East Africans who are workers.25
Pursuant to the 20th Meeting of the Sectoral Council of Ministers respon-
sible for EAC and Planning held on 13th July 2014, the EAC Secretariat is coor-
dinating the process of the harmonisation of classification and procedures for 
issuance of entry/work/residence permits as this is currently still being done 
in accordance with national laws.26
11.2.4 Labour Laws and Portability of Social Benefits
The objectives of the Common Market Protocol can only be realised if the 
Partner States (among other things) harmonise their policies in areas provided 
for by the Common Market Protocol or determined by the Council.27 Hence, 
the Partners States need to harmonise labour policies, programs, legislation, 
social services, provide for social security benefits, establish common standards 
and measures for association of workers and employers, establish employment 
promotion centers and eventually adopt a common employment policy.28
The Partners States are therefore required to make major reforms in their 
labour policies and legislations to address discrimination of citizens and 
22   http://www.eac.int/sectors/immigration-and-labour/migration-and-development. 
Accessed on 1.3.16.
23   http://www.eac.int/sectors/immigration-and-labour/migration-and-development. 
Accessed on 1.3.16.
24   http://www.eac.int/sectors/immigration-and-labour/migration-and-development. 
Accessed on 1.3.16 .
25   http://www.eac.int/sectors/immigration-and-labour/migration-and-development. 
Accessed on 1.3.16.
26   http://www.eac.int/sectors/immigration-and-labour/migration-and-development. 
Accessed on 1.3.16.
27   Article 4(3) of the Common Market Protocol.
28   Article 5 (2 c ) and 12(1) of the Common Market Protocol.
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workers from Partner States. Uganda has so far made major labour law reforms 
for purposes of compliance with the Common Market Protocol. It enacted sev-
eral statutes and adopted a set of regulations in the area of labour and employ-
ment in 2011.29 Kenya similarly made major labour law reform to facilitate free 
entry into Kenya of citizens of Partner States to take up jobs, in accordance 
with the Common Market Protocol.
In addition to the harmonisation of labour laws and policies, the Common 
Market Protocol envisages a single market in the retirement benefit sector in 
order to encourage greater movement of workers. The EAC Partner States have 
different social security schemes operating simultaneously in each Partner 
State and this therefore creates a major challenge with regard to harmoni-
sation. For example, Burundi has a mandatory public pension scheme, civil 
service pension scheme, supplementary pension schemes and individual pri-
vate pensions.30 Kenya has a mandatory public pension scheme, LAPFUND 
and LAPTRUST for employees of county governments, public service pension 
scheme for the civil service, private pension schemes and individual private 
pensions.31
In light of the above, transferability of the benefits of a worker to another 
Partner State is not possible at the moment until the retirement benefit sector 
is harmonised and therefore this is a major impediment to the realisation of 
free movement of workers.
11.2.5 Labour Market Information Systems
In order to facilitate access to employment opportunities, the Partner States 
are required to collect and disseminate information on job vacancies and put 
in place labour market information systems to facilitate access to employment 
opportunities by the citizens of the Community.32
29   ILO Labour Administration and Inspection Programme, International Labour Organisa­
tion (ILO) Technical Memorandum of the Uganda labour and administration and inspec­
tion needs assessment.
30   Callund Consulting Limited (UK), Review of the Structure of the Pension Sector in the East 
African Community (2013).
31   Callund Consulting Limited (UK), Review of the Structure of the Pension Sector in the East 
African Community (2013).
32   Regulation 12(1) of Annex II of the CMP.
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11.3 Service Providers and the Free Movement of Workers
Under the Common Market Protocol Schedule of Commitment on the 
Progressive Liberalisation of Services (Annex V), services can be traded in 
the region in four different ways—known as four modes.33 Service providers or 
self-employed, as defined in this Chapter, fall under Mode IV—supply of ser-
vices by a supplier of a Partner State through the presence of a natural person 
of a Partner State in the territory of another Partner State.
Service providers should be able to move freely within the territory of 
Partner States; stay in the territory together with his/her dependents; take up 
and pursue economic activities as self-employed persons; and set up and man-
age economic undertakings in the territory of another state without being dis-
criminated upon on the basis of nationality.34
Common Market Protocol through Annex II and Annex V link the free 
movement of workers (Annex II) and the service suppliers (Annex V) despite 
the distinction made under Article 1 of the Common Market Protocol that 
service providers are not workers. Annex V provides that market access and 
national treatment commitments in Mode IV are in accordance with Annex II 
therefore greatly limiting Mode IV to those requirements set in Annex II with 
regards to entry, stay and exit of workers; acquiring, denial and cancellation 
of work permits; employment of spouse and children; and equal treatment 
in employment. Annex II and Annex V need to be delinked in order to enable 
further separate liberalization negotiations for service suppliers so as to have 
specific market access and national treatment commitments.
In September 2014, the Council of Ministers directed that specific amend-
ments must be made to the Common Market Protocol hence giving the Partner 
States an opportunity to review their commitments across all modes of supply 
but with specific focus on the temporary movement of persons supplying a 
service (Mode IV) under Annex V of the Common Market Protocol. 
33   See page 80 of the Schedule on Trade in Services.
34   Article 13 (2) and (3).
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chapter 11a
Free Movement of Persons in the EU
Armin Cuyvers
11.1 Introduction
Labour is one of the factors of production that needs to move freely for an 
internal market to function, and free movement of labour means free move-
ment of persons. Free movement of persons, however, is one of the most 
complex and challenging of the EU freedoms, both legally and politically. 
People, after all, are rather more complex than cars, cheese or cassis liqueur. 
Unlike goods, for example, people get sick, need housing and schooling, have 
accidents, lose their job, marry and start families, perhaps divorce again, or, 
in some cases, commit criminal offences. All of these actions affect some of 
the most sensitive political areas, including social security, healthcare, immi-
gration and public order. Even more than the other freedoms, therefore, free 
movement of persons has political implications, as the recent debate on Brexit 
demonstrated in a somewhat tragic manner.1
The free movement of persons has developed significantly since its incep-
tion in the 1957 Treaty of Rome. Initially, the free movement of persons only 
concerned workers and other economically active persons. It then became 
clear that to make the free movement of workers effective, EU law also needed 
to grant rights to workers’ families. Subsequently, the free movement of per-
sons further expanded to include more and more individuals, even if they were 
not directly economically active. A major development then took place with 
the introduction of Union citizenship in the Treaty of Maastricht, as several 
free movement rights were attached directly to the status of EU Citizen.
This Chapter gives a brief overview of the free movement of persons in the 
EU and its development over time. In line with the other free movement chap-
ters, the overview primarily focuses on the negative integration developed 
through the seminal case law of the CJEU, but also looks at some of the key 
1   See in this context also the deal struck with Cameron before the referendum, in which limit-
ing the right of new workers to social benefits was the key element. The deal can be found 
in the Conclusions of the European Council of 18–19 February 2016, Annex I, EUCO 1/16. For 
analysis, see ‘Editorial comments: Presiding the Union in times of crisis: The unenviable task 
of the Netherlands’ (2016) 53(2) Common Market Law Review, 327–328.
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pieces of EU legislation, as harmonization played a relatively big role in this 
area of EU law.2
11.2 Free Movement of Workers
The free movement of workers is laid down in Article 45 TFEU, which has both 
vertical and horizontal direct effect.3
1. Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the Union.
2. Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimi-
nation based on nationality between workers of the Member States as 
regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and 
employment.
3. It shall entail the right, subject to limitations justified on grounds of 
public policy, public security or public health:
(a) to accept offers of employment actually made;
(b) to move freely within the territory of Member States for this 
purpose;
(c) to stay in a Member State for the purpose of employment in 
accordance with the provisions governing the employment of 
nationals of that State laid down by law, regulation or admin-
istrative action;
(d) to remain in the territory of a Member State after having been 
employed in that State, subject to conditions which shall be 
embodied in regulations to be drawn up by the Commission.
4. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to employment in the 
public service.’
2   For further information and analysis on this extensive area of EU law see amongst many 
others S. O’Leary, ‘Free movement and persons and services’ in P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds.) 
The Evolution of EU law (2nd edn, OUP 2011), E. Spaventa, Free Movement of Persons in the EU: 
Barriers to movement and their constitutional context. (Kluwer, 2007), A Tryfonidou, ‘In search 
of the aim of the EC free movement of persons provisions: Has the Court of Justice missed 
the point?’ (2009) 46 Common Market Law Review, 1591, or J. Shaw, ‘Citizenship: Contrasting 
dynamics at the interface of integration and constitutionalism’ in in P. Craig and G. de Búrca 
(eds.) The Evolution of EU law (2nd edn, OUP 2011).
3   Case 41/74 Van Duyn [1974] ECR 1337, Case C-281/98, Angonese ECR 2000, p. I-4139 and case 
C-415/93 Bosman, [1995] ECR I-4921. Note though that the right only applies to EU citizens 
moving to another Member State. Third country nationals cannot rely on Article 45 TFEU, 
nor can EU citizens in their own state.
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As with the other free movement provisions, Article 45 TFEU only provides a 
limited framework that had to be further developed by the CJEU. One of the 
main open questions was the definition of ‘worker’ itself. As EU law is autono-
mous, after all, one may not use national definitions of worker or employee to 
interpret the concept of worker under EU law.4 Again in line with the other 
freedoms, the CJEU developed a very broad and inclusive definition of worker, 
thereby expanding the group of persons that could rely on it.5 In Lawrie Blum, 
which concerned the question if a trainee-teacher qualified as a worker, the 
CJEU for instance held that:
Since freedom of movement for workers constitutes one of the funda-
mental principles of the Community, the term ‘worker’ in article [45] 
may not be interpreted differently according to the law of each member 
state but has a community meaning. Since it defines the scope of that 
fundamental freedom, the community concept of a ‘worker’ must be 
interpreted broadly.6
The CJEU then continued to provide the following definition of worker:
The essential feature of an employment relationship, however, is that for 
a certain period of time a person performs services for and under the 
direction of another person in return for which he receives remuneration.
In the present case, it is clear that during the entire period of pre-
paratory service the trainee teacher is under the direction and supervi-
sion of the school to which he is assigned. (. . .) The amounts which he 
receives may be regarded as remuneration for the services provided and 
for the duties involved in completing the period of preparatory service. 
Consequently, the three criteria for the existence of an employment rela-
tionship are fulfilled in this case.
The fact that teachers’ preparatory service, like apprenticeships in 
other occupations, may be regarded as practical preparation directly 
related to the actual pursuit of the occupation in point is not a bar to the 
application of article [45](1) if the service is performed under the condi-
tions of an activity as an employed person.
(. . .)
4   See also EU Chapter 4.
5   Case C-337/97, Meeusen [1999] ECR I-3289.
6   Case 66/85 Lawrie-Blum ECR 02121, par. 16.
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The fact that trainee teachers give lessons for only a few hours a week 
and are paid remuneration below the starting salary of a qualified teacher 
does not prevent them from being regarded as workers. In its judgment 
in Levin, the Court held that the expressions ‘worker’ and ‘activity as an 
employed person’ must be understood as including persons who, because 
they are not employed full time, receive pay lower than that for full-time 
employment, provided that the activities performed are effective and 
genuine. The latter requirement is not called into question in this case.7
Individuals, therefore, already qualify as workers if they perform relatively 
small jobs against relatively low wages, as long as the work is ‘effective and 
genuine’. Students that go and study in another Member State and work there 
for one day a week against minimum wages, for instance as a waiter, there-
fore qualify as a worker. The broad scope of the concept of worker was fur-
ther confirmed in Trojani, which involved an individual doing some chores 
for the salvation army in return for housing and some pocket change. The CJEU 
held that:
Any person who pursues activities which are real and genuine, to the 
exclusion of activities on such a small scale as to be regarded as purely 
marginal and ancillary, must be regarded as a ‘worker’. The essential fea-
ture of an employment relationship is, according to that case-law, that 
for a certain period of time a person performs services for and under the 
direction of another person in return for which he receives remuneration
Moreover, neither the sui generis nature of the employment rela-
tionship under national law, nor the level of productivity of the person 
concerned, the origin of the funds from which the remuneration is paid 
or the limited amount of the remuneration can have any consequence 
in regard to whether or not the person is a worker for the purposes of 
Community law.
With respect more particularly to establishing whether the condition 
of the pursuit of real and genuine activity for remuneration is satisfied, 
the national court must base its examination on objective criteria and 
make an overall assessment of all the circumstances of the case relating 
to the nature both of the activities concerned and of the employment 
relationship at issue.
7   Idem, paras. 17–21.
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In this respect, the Court has held that activities cannot be regarded as 
a real and genuine economic activity if they constitute merely a means of 
rehabilitation or reintegration for the persons concerned.
However, that conclusion can be explained only by the particular char-
acteristics of the case in question, which concerned the situation of a 
person who, by reason of his addiction to drugs, had been recruited on 
the basis of a national law intended to provide work for persons who, for 
an indefinite period, are unable, by reason of circumstances related to 
their situation, to work under normal conditions.
In the present case, as is apparent from the decision making the refer-
ence, Mr Trojani performs, for the Salvation Army and under its direc-
tion, various jobs for approximately 30 hours a week, as part of a personal 
reintegration programme, in return for which he receives benefits in kind 
and some pocket money.
(. . .)
Having established that the benefits in kind and money provided by 
the Salvation Army to Mr Trojani constitute the consideration for the ser-
vices performed by him for and under the direction of the hostel, the 
national court has thereby established the existence of the constituent 
elements of any paid employment relationship, namely subordination 
and the payment of remuneration.
For the claimant in the main proceedings to have the status of worker, 
however, the national court, in the assessment of the facts which is within 
its exclusive jurisdiction, would have to establish that the paid activity in 
question is real and genuine.
The national court must in particular ascertain whether the services 
actually performed by Mr Trojani are capable of being regarded as form-
ing part of the normal labour market. For that purpose, account may be 
taken of the status and practices of the hostel, the content of the social 
reintegration programme, and the nature and details of performance of 
the services.8
The ultimate decision whether Trojani qualified as a worker was left to the 
Belgian referring court, yet the CJEU did provide some criteria to establish 
the minimum requirements. One key criterion is if the relevant activities are 
normally provided on the labour market, or if they are more designed to keep 
8   Case C-456/02, Trojani, ECLI:EU:C:2004:488, paras. 15–24.
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certain persons occupied without really forming genuine work.9 The fact that 
Trojani was even concerned a border case in itself, however, already indicates 
how broad the concept of worker is interpreted under EU law.
In addition, the CJEU also held that, to ensure Article 45 TFEU can achieve 
its objective effectively, those seeking work also had to receive some protec-
tion. The right to work, after all, is seriously limited where one does not have 
the right to first seek work. At the same time, one cannot give too many rights 
solely on the basis that someone is looking for a job. The CJEU balanced both 
arguments by holding that those objectively qualifying as job seekers have a 
right of residence for a limited time of six months, after which, if they do not 
find a job, they have to leave.10
As to exceptions, and again in line with the case law on the other freedoms, 
the CJEU does allow rule of reason exceptions in addition to the exceptions 
in the TFEU, but interprets both restrictively.11 The CJEU also gave a very 
restrictive interpretation to the ‘public-service exception’ contained in Article 
45 paragraph 4 TFEU. This exception only applies where the post in question 
involves both the exercise of a power conferred by public law and the safe-
guarding of the general interests of the State. States can, therefore, not simply 
bypass Article 45 TFEU by qualifying a position as a public service one: a posi-
tion in a State school, for instance, will not meet these standards.12 Instead, the 
function at stake must entail a real exercise of public authority, such as a judge, 
a minister or a police officer.
11.3 The Rights of Workers and their Family Members
Once a person qualifies as a worker, both primary and secondary EU law pro-
vide several rights to the worker and her family members.13 Firstly, the worker 
9    Cf. also Case 344/87 Bettray [1989] ECR 1621, par. 17 for an example of a person not qualify-
ing as a worker.
10   Case C-292/89 Antonissen ECLI:EU:C:1991:80.
11   As many of the rights on free movement have now been laid down in secondary legis-
lation, however, any exceptions to them must be assessed under the secondary legisla-
tion, not the Treaty Articles. See on this relation between primary and secondary law EU 
Chapter 9 as well as Case C-5/77 Tedeschi ECLI:EU:C:1977:144. Where restrictions do fall 
under primary law, the familiar test for restrictions applies, meaning the restriction must 
serve a legitimate aim in a proportionate manner.
12   Case 66/85, Lawrie-Blum v. Land Baden-Würtemberg [1986], ECR 2121.
13   For the definition of family member now see Article 2 of Directive 2004/38.
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and the family members have a right to reside in the Member State.14 Secondly, 
the worker is entitled to complete equal treatment with national workers. This 
includes equal treatment in the areas of remuneration, dismissal, social and 
tax advantages, trade unions and education rights. These rights already derived 
from Article 45 TFEU, but are now also laid down in Regulation 492/2011.15 
Based on the right to complete equal treatment of the worker, the family mem-
bers also enjoy many (derived) social rights and benefits such as student grants 
and loans and access to child care.16 The idea is that people would be hindered 
in accepting a job in another Member State if they would not have the same 
rights, or if their family members would not receive benefits that nationals do, 
and the worker would have to cover all kinds of costs for the family members 
herself.
The rights of workers and their family members, moreover, apply from the 
very moment an individual becomes a worker. If an Estonian lawyer accepts a 
job in Hungary, for example, he will have an immediate right to complete equal 
treatment including all social benefits Hungarian workers are entitled to, and 
his children will be immediately entitled to student grants or other benefits 
awarded to children of Hungarian workers.
EU law also tries to support free movement of workers by requiring or sim-
plifying the mutual recognition of diplomas. To begin with, the non-recogni-
tion of a diploma can constitute a restriction of Article 45 TFEU, which must be 
justified and sufficiently motivated.17 This negative integration has also been 
complemented by positive integration in the form of elaborate legislation on 
the mutual recognition of diplomas.18
14   These rights of residence derive from Article 45 TFEU but are now also laid down in the 
general Citizens Directive 2004/38 OJ L [2004] 158/77. The right of residence may also 
extend for a period after the worker becomes unemployed. See Article 7 of Directive 
2004/38.
15   Regulation 492/2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union OJ [2011] L1/1. 
This regulation replaced Regulation 1612/68 [1968] OJ L257/2.
16   See also Case C-370/90 Singh ECLI:EU:C:1992:296.
17   See for example Case 2/74, Reyners [1972], ECR 631 or Case C-340/89, Vlassopoulou, ECR 
1991, p. 2357.
18   See especially Directive 2005/36 on the recognition of professional qualifications OJ 
[2005] L255/22.
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11.4 Union Citizenship and Directive 2004/38
In line with the economic rationale behind free movement, the rights described 
above only applied to economically active people, with family members deriv-
ing certain rights from the economically active person as well.19 Gradually, 
however, free movement rights were extended to persons who were not or 
no longer economically active.20 The major expansion of the free movement 
of persons, and the most far reaching separation of this right from economic 
activity, took place with the introduction of Union citizenship in the Treaty of 
Maastricht. Union citizenship is intended to capture and strengthen the bond 
between the EU and the individual citizen, and is established and bestowed by 
Article 20 TFEU:
1. Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding 
the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citi-
zenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national 
citizenship.
2. Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights and be subject to the duties 
provided for in the Treaties. They shall have, inter alia:
(a) the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States;
(b) the right to vote and to stand as candidates in elections to the 
European Parliament and in municipal elections in their 
Member State of residence, under the same conditions as 
nationals of that State;
 (. . .)
These rights shall be exercised in accordance with the conditions and limits 
defined by the Treaties and by the measures adopted thereunder.
19   Note that service providers and entrepreneurs establishing a business in another Member 
State also have right to move and reside, and hence fall under the category of economi-
cally active people that enjoy free movement rights. Their situation, however, will be dis-
cussed in more detail in EU Chapter 12 on services and establishment, even though one 
could also consider them as part of the free movement of persons.
20   See for example the adoption of three directives in the early nineties extending the free 
movement rights of non-economically active or no longer economically active persons: 
Directive 90/364, granting rights of residence for non economically active persons (pri-
marily pensioners); Directive 90/365, granting rights of residence to employees and entre-
preneurs having ended their professional activities; Directive 93/96, granting rights of 
residence to students. All of these have now been replaced by Directive 2004/38.
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Article 20 TFEU captures the secondary nature and normative claim of EU 
citizenship. Even though Union citizenship is ‘destined to be the fundamental 
status’ of individuals, it remains subordinated to the national citizenship of a 
Member State, and does not replace it.21 This secondary citizenship also sym-
bolizes the constitutional middle-ground occupied by the EU and represents 
the challenges and opportunities in developing a democracy based on mul-
tiple demoi instead of one demos.22
Even though it remains a secondary status,23 EU citizenship forms an 
important step in EU integration. Since its creation, moreover, Union citizen-
ship has developed rather spectacularly, and an increasing number of rights 
have been connected to it, including free movement rights. As Article 21 TFEU 
provides: ‘Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside 
freely within the territory of the Member States, subject to the limitations 
and conditions laid down in the Treaties and by the measures adopted to 
give them effect.’24 These limitations and conditions can now mostly be 
found in Directive 2004/38, known as the Citizens Directive.
Directive 2004/38 gives three ‘layers’ of movement and residence rights, 
subject to increasingly stringent criteria. Firstly, Articles 5 and 6 of Directive 
2004/38 give a right of entry and the right to reside for up to three months to 
all Union citizens who move to or reside in a Member State other than that of 
which they are a national, as well as to their family members. The right of entry 
under Article 5 entails that Member States may only require a valid identity 
card or passport, but no other documentation or formalities upon entry.25 The 
right to reside for up to three months may also not be subject to any other 
conditions than to hold a valid identity card or passport. Any EU citizen with 
21   See case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I-6193, par. 31.
22   J.H.H. Weiler, ‘European democracy and its critics: polity and system’, and ‘To be a 
European citizen: Eros and civilization’, in: J.H.H. Weiler The Constitution of Europe: Do 
the New Clothes have an Emperor? (CUP 1999), 264, 324, and especially 344 et seq. On the 
confederal middle-ground occupied by the EU see A. Cuyvers, The EU as a Confederal 
Union of Sovereign Member Peoples, Exploring the potential of American (con)federalism 
and popular sovereignty for a constitutional theory of the EU, (Diss. Leiden), Zutphen: 
Wöhrmann 2013.
23   See however cases C-369/90 Micheletti [1992] ECR I-4239 and C-135/08) Rottmann [2010] 
ECR I-1449 on the limits imposed by EU citizenship on the rights of Member States to 
grant or especially to remove national citizenship, and thereby EU citizenship.
24   These rights have direct effect. See for example Case C-413/99, Baumbast, ECR I-7091.
25   For third country family members see Article 5(2) a.o.
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a passport, therefore, may reside in any other Member State for up to three 
months.26
Secondly, Article 7 of Directive 2004/38 grants a right of residence for more 
than three months to three categories of Union citizens, being those that:
(a) are workers or self-employed persons in the host Member State, or,
(b) have sufficient resources for themselves and their family members 
not to become a burden on the social assistance system of the host 
Member State and have comprehensive sickness insurance; or,
(c) Students that have comprehensive sickness insurance and sufficient 
resources for themselves and their family members not to become 
a burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State 
during their period of residence.
As long as a Union citizen falls in one of these categories, he has the right to 
reside. This right extends, furthermore, to the family members of the Union 
citizen, even if these family members are not EU citizens themselves.27
The main reasoning behind these three categories of citizens with open-
ended residence rights is that EU citizens and their family members should 
have a right to freely reside in the EU as long as they do not become a burden 
on the host state. This also means that the resources Union citizens need to 
have under 7(b) and (c) do not have to be very high, they just have to be suf-
ficient for them not to have to rely on the host state for assistance and thereby 
become a burden.
The third, and most far reaching, right of residence is granted when a citi-
zen has resided legally for a continuous period of at least five years in the host 
Member State and acquires permanent residence.28 As of that moment, these 
Union citizens no longer have to meet the requirements under Article 7 of 
Directive 2004/38 to have residence rights, and they acquire even more rights 
to equal treatment. Permanent residency can therefore be seen as a very 
26   On the possible grounds for expelling citizens, also during this three month period, if they 
violate certain rules, see the discussion on expulsion below.
27   Directive 2004/38 Art. 7(2).
28   Article 16 2004/38 and Council Directive 2003/109 concerning the status of third-country 
nationals who are long-term residents OJ [2004] L16/44. For the five year requirement, 
continuity of residence is not undermined by temporary absences not exceeding a total 
of six months a year, or by absences of a longer duration for compulsory military service, 
or by one absence of a maximum of 12 consecutive months for important reasons such 
as pregnancy and childbirth, serious illness, study or vocational training, or a posting in 
another Member State or a third country.
Cuyvers364
substantial status that is one step below acquiring citizenship of another 
Member State. Once acquired, the right of permanent residency is only lost 
where the Union citizen leaves is absent from the host state for a period 
exceeding two consecutive years.
As soon as EU citizens rely on their rights and move to another Member 
State, they fall under the scope of EU law and under Article 24 of directive 
2004/38 also have a right to equal treatment:
1. Subject to such specific provisions as are expressly provided for in the 
Treaty and secondary law, all Union citizens residing on the basis of 
this Directive in the territory of the host Member State shall enjoy 
equal treatment with the nationals of that Member State within the 
scope of the Treaty. The benefit of this right shall be extended to family 
members who are not nationals of a Member State and who have the 
right of residence or permanent residence.
2. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the host Member State shall 
not be obliged to confer entitlement to social assistance during the first 
three months of residence or, where appropriate, the longer period 
provided for in Article 14(4)(b), nor shall it be obliged, prior to acquisi-
tion of the right of permanent residence, to grant maintenance aid for 
studies, including vocational training, consisting in student grants or 
student loans to persons other than workers, self-employed persons, 
persons who retain such status and members of their families.’
Crucially, Article 24(2) of Directive 2004/38 restricts the rights of EU citizens to 
entitlements or social assistance in the first three months, for the six month-
period granted to job-seekers and to student aid or grants. This restriction 
ensures that Union citizens cannot simply move to another Member State and 
then request social benefits, as this would undermine national social security.
Article 27 of Directive 2004/38 allows for certain restrictions on the right of 
residence on grounds of public policy, public security or public health. In line 
with the Treaty exceptions, these are interpreted very narrowly, and a propor-
tionality check has to be satisfied. In addition, Articles 28 to 32 of Directive 
2004/38 regulate the possible expulsion of Union citizens on the grounds of 
public policy, public security or public health. Expulsion, however, may only be 
based on individual behavior and the fact that the individual presents a future 
risk as well. The protection against expulsion, furthermore, increases with the 
time the citizen spent in the host Member State.29
29   See for example Case C-348/09, Remscheid ECLI:EU:C:2012:300.
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chapter 12
Freedom of Establishment and the Freedom to 
Provide Services in the EAC
Kennedy Gastorn
12.1 Introduction
Trade in services is important for the economic growth of the East African 
Region. This is recognized in the Protocol on the Establishment of the East 
African Community Common Market (“the Common Market Protocol”), 
which provides that accelerated economic growth and development of the 
Partner States can be achieved through the free movement of people and 
labour; right of establishment and residence; and the free movement of ser-
vices and capital.1
12.2 Right of Establishment
The Common Market Protocol guarantees the right of establishment of nation-
als of one Partner State in another Partner State and the non-discriminatory 
treatment of such nationals based on their nationalities.2 In this regard, 
this right entitles the nationals of a Partner State to take up and pursue eco-
nomic activities as self-employed persons, as well as to set up and manage 
economic undertakings, in the territory of another Partner State. Hence, the 
right of establishment is divided into two segments. Firstly, the right of natural 
persons to engage in economic activities not under any contract of employ-
ment or supervision and earn a living from such activities. Secondly, the right 
to set up a legal entity and manage economic activities under it. This Chapter 
shall therefore discuss the right of establishment under these two headings, 
namely natural persons and legal persons.
Before discussing the right of establishment as proposed above, it is impor-
tant to note that the provisions of Article 13 of the Common Market Protocol 
on the right of establishment are implemented by the East African Community 
1   Article 4 (2) of the Common Market Protocol.
2   Article 13 (1 and 2) of the Common Market Protocol.
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Common Market (Right of Establishment) Regulations (Annex III). Annex III 
ensures that there is uniformity among the Partner States in the implementa-
tion of Article 13 of the Common Market Protocol.
In addition to Annex III, the Common Market Protocol Schedule of 
Commitment on the Progressive Liberalisation of Services (Annex V) provides 
that services can be traded in the region in four different ways—known as 
four modes.3 The right of establishment falls under both Mode III (the supply 
of services by a service supplier of a Partner State, through the commercial 
presence of the service supplier in the territory of another Partner State) and 
Mode IV (the supply of the services by a supplier of a Partner State, through 
the presence of a natural person of a Partner State in the territory of another 
Partner State). Annex V allows Partner States to make progressive market access 
and national treatment commitments by selecting the sectors to open up, and 
sometimes with conditions, hence tailoring the commitments to the particular 
needs and policy objectives of each Partner State. Therefore, the Partner States 
are able to control the overall market presence of the other Partner States for 
different sectors and different modes of supply.4 The Partner States are how-
ever required to make additional commitments on the elimination of restric-
tions in the service sectors and sub sectors that are not specified in Annex V 
after the Common Market Protocol enters into force.5
Annex V provides that market access and national treatment commitments 
in Mode IV are in accordance with the East African Community Common 
Market (Free Movement of Workers) Regulations (Annex II). For purposes of 
the right to establishment, Annex II covers issues such as entry, stay and exit 
of workers; acquiring, denial and cancellation of work permits; employment of 
spouses and children; and equal treatment in employment. There are no spe-
cific commitments and therefore there is need to delink Annex V and Annex II 
in respect to Mode IV to allow for further market access commitments.
12.3 Freedom to Provide Services
The freedom to provide services is provided for under Part F of the Common 
Market Protocol and further detailed in the Schedule of Commitment on the 
Progressive Liberalisation of Services (Annex V). Article 16 (7) of the Common 
Market Protocol defines “services” as encompassing those “in any sector except 
3   See page 80 of the Schedule on Trade in Services.
4   Article 23 of the Common Market Protocol.
5   Article 23 (2) of the Common Market Protocol.
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services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority which are not 
provided on a commercial basis or in competition with one or more service 
suppliers” and those which are “normally provided for remuneration, in so far 
as they are not governed by the provisions relating to free movement of goods, 
capital and persons.”6 Under Article 16 (1) of the Common Market Protocol, 
the Partner States guarantee the free movement of services supplied 
by nationals of Partner States and the free movement of service suppliers 
who are nationals of the Partner States within the Community. Nationals are 
defined by Article 1 of the Common Market Protocol as natural or legal persons 
who are nationals in accordance with the laws of the Partner State.
Nationals of a Partner State provide services to other Partner States in 
two ways:
(a) By the presence of a service supplier, who is a citizen of a Partner 
State, in the territory of another Partner State hence a natural per-
son providing the service; or
(b) Commercial presence of the service supplier in the territory of 
another Partner State hence a legal person providing the service.7
This Chapter, will discuss the freedom to provide services along with the right 
of establishment under these two headings: natural and legal persons.
12.4 Natural Persons
Natural persons for purposes of the right of establishment are referred to 
as “self-employed persons” under the Common Market Protocol which defines 
a “self-employed person” as a person engaged in an economic activity not 
under any contract of employment or supervision and who earns a living 
through this activity.8
Based on the provisions of the Common Market Protocol, Annex II and 
Annex V, seven important issues must be considered in order to realise the 
right of establishment and the freedom to provide services for natural persons 
in the EAC:
6   Article 16 (7) of the Common Market Protocol. See in this regard also the very similar defini-
tion under EU law, and the way it has been developed by the Court of Justice of the EU in EU 
Chapter 12.
7   Article 16 (3 c and d) of the Common Market Protocol.
8   Article 1 of the the Common Market Protocol.
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i. Free movement of persons
ii. Right of residence
iii. Non-discrimination,
iv. Removal of restrictions
v. Obtaining licenses and certificates
vi. Portability of social benefits
vii. Right to join professional bodies and trade organisations
12.4.1 Free Movement of Persons
A self-employed person, his/her spouse and children can enter and exit the 
territory of another Partner State in accordance with the national laws and 
established immigration procedures of the Partner State.9 The Partner State 
is required to ensure non-discrimination of the citizens of the Partner States 
based on their nationalities by ensuring that the citizens of the other Partner 
States enter its territory without a visa; move freely within its territory; are 
allowed to stay in the territory; and are allowed to exit the territory without 
restrictions.10 In addition, the Partner State must guarantee the protection of 
the citizens of the other Partner States while in their territories, in accordance 
with the law. However, if the national of a Partner State commits a crime in 
their territory, the national is not exempt from prosecution or extradition.
While at the designated entry and exit point of the Partner State, the self-
employed person and his/her dependents are required to present to the 
immigration officer valid travel documents or national identity cards, where 
a Partner State has agreed to use the national identity card as a travel docu-
ment, and declare all information required for entry or departure.11 If the 
self-employed person and his/her dependents have fulfilled all the legal and 
procedural requirements, they are each issued with a pass which shall entitle 
them to enter the territory of the host Partner State for a period of up to six 
months.12
A Partner State can however limit the free movement of persons on grounds 
of public policy, public security or public health. The Partner State imposing 
any of the aforesaid permissible limitations must notify the other Partner 
States immediately.13
9    Annex II of the Common Market Protocol Regulation 4 and 5(1).
10   Article 7 of the Common Market Protocol.
11   Annex II of the Common Market Protocol. Regulation 5(2) and Article 9 of the Common 
Market Protocol. . . .
12   Annex II of the Common Market Protocol. Regulation 5(3 and 4).
13   Article 7 (5 and 6) of the Common Market Protocol . . .).
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12.4.2 Right of Residence
The right of residence is provided for in Article 14 of the Common Market 
Protocol and implemented in accordance with the East African Common 
Market (Right of Residence) Regulations—Annex IV of the Common Market 
Protocol. Annex IV ensures that there is uniformity in the implementation of 
Article 14 and that the process is transparent, accountable, fair, predictable and 
consistent with the Common Market Protocol.14
Upon entry into the territory of the Partner State, a self-employed person 
and his/her dependents who intend to reside in the territory of the Partner 
State are required to apply for a residence permit, within thirty days from the 
date of entry.15 The residence permit is however issued by the host Partner 
State on the basis of the work permit hence a valid work permit must accom-
pany an application for the residence permit.
The procedure and requirements for the application of a work permit by 
a self-employed person are contained in Annex II of the Common Market 
Protocol. Annex II provides that a self-employed person who intends to pur-
sue economic activities in the territory of the Partner State is required to apply 
to the competent authority for a work permit within 30 days from the date 
of entry.16 Upon such application, the self-employed person is first issued with 
a special pass which allows him/her to engage in an economic activity in the 
territory of the Partner State for the period of the pass as the formalities of 
establishment are completed.17 The application for the work permit must be 
supported by evidence that the self-employed person has sufficient capital and 
other resources to carry out the economic activity and that the self-employed 
person is duly licensed or authorized by the host Partner State to engage in the 
economic activity.18
If the application for a work permit is successful, the self-employed person 
is issued with a work permit within 30 days of application, for an initial period 
of two years.19 The competent authority may deny the applicant a work permit 
however an appeal of the decision is allowed provided it is done in accor-
dance with the national laws of the host Partner State. If the appeal is rejected 
or the self-employed person is not interested in appealing the decision, the 
14   Regulation 2 of Annex IV of the Common Market Protocol.
15   Regulation 6(1) of Annex IV of the Common Market Protocol.
16   Regulation 6(1) of Annex IV of the Common Market Protocol.
17   Annex II Regulation 6 (1, 2 and 3) of the Common Market Protocol.
18   Annex II Regulation 6 (4) of the Common Market Protocol.
19   Annex II Regulation 6 (5) of the Common Market Protocol.
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self-employed person and his/her dependents are required to leave the terri-
tory of the host Partner State within a given reasonable time.20
Once the self-employed person is in possession of a valid work permit, 
he/she is required to apply for a residence permit which is issued within 
30 days of the application. The duration of the residence permit for the self-
employed person cannot exceed the duration of the work permit. If the 
self-employed person wishes to reside with his/her spouse and children, he/
she is required to apply for a dependents pass for each one of them within 
30 days from the date of entry of the spouse and/or children. The dependents 
pass is issued on the basis of the work permit or residence permit of the self-
employed person.21
Cancellation of a work permit affects the residence status of a self-employed 
person. A work permit may be cancelled if the self-employed person is expelled 
or deported from the territory of the host Partner State; ceases to engage in the 
economic activity for which the work permit was issued; or obtained the work 
permit fraudulently. Upon cancellation of the work permit, the self-employed 
person is required to either regularize his/her status or leave the territory of 
the host state.22
It is not automatic that once a person has a work permit, the residence per-
mit will be issued. The competent authority of the host state may deny the 
self-employed person a residence permit. The denial must however be done 
in writing and reasons for such denial given. The self-employed person is 
permitted to appeal the decision in accordance with the national laws of the 
host Partner State. If the appeal is unsuccessful or if the self-employed person 
decides not to appeal the decision, then he/she must leave the territory of the 
Partner State within a reasonable time.23
The residency status of the self-employed person may also be affected by 
cancellation of the residence permit. A residence permit can be cancelled 
where a condition of the residence permit is not fulfilled or is breached or on 
grounds of public policy, public security and public health. In such a case, the 
self-employed persons and his/her dependents are required to leave the terri-
tory of the host state within an indicated reasonable time.24 If they fail to leave 
within the time given, then the host Partner State may deport them.25
20   Annex II Regulation 7 of the Common Market Protocol.
21   Annex II Regulation 8 of the Common Market Protocol.
22   Annex II Regulation 8 of the Common Market Protocol.
23   Annex II Regulation 9 of the Common Market Protocol.
24   Annex II Regulation 11 of the Common Market Protocol.
25   Annex II Regulation 12 of the Common Market Protocol.
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As stated earlier, if the work permit or residence permit of the self-employed 
person is cancelled, it automatically affects the residence status of the depen-
dents. However, there are certain circumstances where the dependents pass 
may be cancelled independent of the residence status of the self-employed 
person. These situations include divorce or nullification of the marriage; or if 
the dependent engages in employment or business.26 The dependent is how-
ever given an opportunity to regularise his/her status (usually 30 days) failure 
to which he/she must leave the territory of the host Partner State.27
12.4.3 Non-discrimination
The Partner States are required to ensure that nationals of other Partner States 
are not discriminated upon on the basis of their nationalities.28 In addition, 
services and service suppliers of other Partner States must get similar treat-
ment as that accorded to similar services and service suppliers of the host 
Partner State unless the difference in treatment is aimed at ensuring the equi-
table or effective imposition or collection of direct taxes in respect of services 
or service suppliers of other Partner States.29 Also, each Partner State must 
accord unconditionally, to services and service suppliers of other Partner 
States, treatment no less favourable than that it accords to like services and 
service suppliers of other Partner States, third parties or custom territories 
unless the difference in treatment is the result of an agreement on avoidance 
of double taxation or provisions on the avoidance of double taxation in any 
other international agreement or arrangement by which the Partner State is 
bound.30 Nevertheless, the Common Market Protocol allows for “policy space” 
in that a host Partner State is allowed to implement measures necessary to 
protect public morals or to maintain public order; protect human, animal and 
plant life or health; protect its essential security interests; and secure compli-
ance with laws and regulations which are not inconsistent with the Common 
Market Protocol such as the prevention of defective and fraudulent practices, 
the protection of the privacy of individuals in relation to the processing and 
dissemination of personal data, protection of confidentiality of individual 
records and accounts, and safety.31
26   Annex II Regulation 10 of the Common Market Protocol.
27   Annex II Regulation 10 (2) of the Common Market Protocol.
28   Article 13(2) of the Common Market Protocol.
29   Article 17 and 21 (1d) of the Common Market Protocol.
30   Article 18 of the Common Market Protocol.
31   Article 21 and 22 of the Common Market Protocol.
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12.4.4 Removal of Restrictions
Removal of restrictions is essential for purposes of guaranteeing the free 
movement of services supplied by nationals of Partner States and the 
free movement of service suppliers of nationals from other Partner States. 
In this regard, the Partner States are required to identify the restrictions on the 
right of establishment and progressively remove the restrictions and not intro-
duce new restrictions after entry into force of the Common Market Protocol.32 
Neither the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community (EAC 
Treaty) nor the Common Market Protocol define what amounts to a progres-
sive removal and how the same can be uniformly implemented. However, 
Article 76(2) of the EAC Treaty requires the establishment of the common 
market to be progressive and in accordance with schedules approved by the 
Council. The reference to the schedules and Article 76(2) of the EAC Treaty 
are critical and decisive in defining the progressive nature of the services. The 
schedules of commitment on the progressive liberalization of services provide 
for elimination dates for market access and national treatment provisions for 
each liberalised sector and per each country.33 The Council is therefore the 
only organ that determines the pace of the progressive removal of restrictions 
as per the schedules.
Removal of restrictions may also gradually and pragmatically be pursued 
through the principle of variable geometry. This principle is defined as a prin-
ciple of flexibility which allows for progression in co-operation among a sub-
group of members in a larger integration scheme in a variety of areas and at 
different speeds.34 It is therefore applicable at the implementation stage once 
a policy or a protocol has been concluded consensually by all Partner States.35 
Variable geometry as a rule of flexibility would allow Partner States which are 
ready to remove some restrictions among themselves and allow the remaining 
Partner States to join them at a later date.
It needs to be emphasised that the EAC Treaty does not prevent bilateral 
or trilateral arrangements between and among the Partner States. It is sub-
mitted that such arrangements may enrich the cooperation and serve as a 
foundational base for a strong Community. Some activities under the ongoing 
Northern Corridor initiatives such as the abolition of work permits between 
32   Annex III Regulation 10 (1) And Annex V of the Common Market Protocol.
33   Annex V.
34   Article 1 of the Treaty. See also Chapter 6 on the General Principles of EAC Law.
35   In the Matter of a Request by the Council of Ministers of the East African Community for an 
Advisory Opinion, Application No. 1 of 2008, EACJ First Instance Division.
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Rwanda, Uganda and Kenya serve as a good example of multilateralism as well 
as the principle of variable geometry.
12.4.5 Obtaining Licenses and Other Documents
For a service provider to be able to provide services in the territory of the host 
state, he/she needs certain licenses and certificates depending on the national 
laws and regulations of the host Partner State. The host Partner State is required 
to ensure that the processes as well as procedures involved in obtaining the 
relevant licenses and other relevant documents are simplified and the requi-
site fees to be paid are harmonised.36 With regard to issues such as proof of 
financial standing and character of the service provider, the host Partner State 
is mandated to accept the certifications issued by the banks of the national’s 
Partner State and competent authorities.37
12.4.6 Portability of Social Benefits
Portability of social benefits is a great incentive for any self-employed per-
son as it guarantees continuity in contribution. The EAC Partner States have 
different social security schemes operating simultaneously in each Partner 
State and therefore there is a major challenge with regard to harmonisation 
of national social security policies, laws and systems to provide for social secu-
rity for self-employed persons who are nationals of other Partner States.38 In 
this regard, transferability of the benefits of self-employed persons to another 
Partner State is not possible at the moment until the retirement benefit sector 
is harmonized and hence a major impediment to the realisation of freedom of 
establishment.
12.4.7 Right to Join Professional Bodies and Trade Organisations
Self-employed nationals of other Partner States should be able to join relevant 
trade organisations and professional bodies of the host Partner State under 
the same conditions and with the same rights and obligations as a national 
of the host Partner State.39 In addition, the self-employed person from a 
Partner State should be able to vie for any position in the organisation or be 
appointed for any position available. If any high position in the organisation 
is connected with the exercise of public authority and hence reserved by any 
36   Annex III Regulation 11.
37   Annex II Regulation 13.
38   Article 12 (2) and 13 (3b) of the Common Market Protocol.
39   Annex III Regulation 12 of the Common Market Protocol.
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national law of the host Partner State for its nationals, then the position may 
be declared unavailable.
12.5 Legal Persons
With regard to legal persons, the following three issues must be considered in 
order to realise the right of establishment for legal persons in the EAC:
i. Non-discrimination
ii. Removal of restrictions
iii. Licenses and Certificates
12.5.1 Non-discrimination
According to the Common Market Protocol, companies and firms estab-
lished in accordance with the national laws of a Partner State and undertak-
ing substantial economic activities in the Partner State must be accorded 
non-discriminatory treatment in other Partner States, for purposes of 
establishment.40
The requirements with regard to National Treatment and Most Favoured 
Nation treatment which are applicable to natural persons are also applicable 
to legal persons.
12.5.2 Removal of Restrictions
Partner States are required to ensure that all restrictions on the right of estab-
lishment based on the nationality of companies and firms are removed and 
new restrictions are not introduced.41 In the event that there are any restric-
tions in administrative procedures and practices resulting from national laws 
that restrict the right of establishment, the same should be progressively 
removed. In this regard, common restrictions such as those on setting up agen-
cies, branches or subsidiaries of companies or firms and the entry of personnel 
of the companies or firms registered in another Partner State into manage-
rial or supervisory positions in agencies, branches or subsidiaries should be 
eliminated.
40   Article 13(6) of the Common Market Protocol.
41   Article 13(5) of the Common Market Protocol.
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12.5.3 Licenses and Certificates
Partner States are required to mutually recognise the relevant experience 
obtained, requirements met, licenses and certificates granted to a company or 
firm in another Partner State.42 Nevertheless, the company or firm of a Partner 
State must register to be licensed in the host Partner State and disclose the 
shareholders, partners, directors and financial statements.43
42   Article 13(7) of the Common Market Protocol.
43   Annex II Regulation 9 (3 and 4) of the Common Market Protocol.
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chapter 12A
Freedom of Establishment and the Freedom to 
Provide Services in the EU
Armin Cuyvers
12.0 Services: The New Economic Epicenter
When the internal market was established, the European economy primarily 
revolved around goods.1 The free movement of services, therefore, was consid-
ered to be a residual freedom that applied where the other freedoms did not.2 
In the age of Google and Goldman Sachs, this picture has drastically changed. 
Services now constitute over 70% of the European economy. Consequently, the 
free movement of services has also significantly increased in importance.
Considering the increasing importance of services for the EAC as well, this 
Chapter primarily focuses on the free movement of services as gradually devel-
oped by the CJEU. For as we will see, the enormous pluriformity of services, 
ranging from abortion to construction and from banking to healthcare, raises 
all kinds of challenges, certainly when one tries to apply the same standard 
internal market test to all of them. The freedom of services has also given 
rise to one of the most contested and contorted pieces of EU legislation so 
far, the Services Directive. In addition to services, this Chapter also covers the 
main elements of the freedom of establishment, which is closely connected to 
services.3
12.1 The Freedom to Provide Services
This section first discusses the freedom to provide services as laid down in the 
TFEU and developed by the CJEU. It subsequently outlines what are considered 
1   See EU Chapters 9 and 10.
2   This original position can still be seen in the formulation of Article 57 TFEU, and interestingly 
the residual nature of services seems to have carried over to the EAC as well, see Chapter 12.
3   See for further reading amongst many others V. Hatzopoulos, Regulating Services in the 
European Union (OUP, 2012) or I. Liaonos and O. Odudu, Regulating Trade in Services in the 
EU and the WTO: Trust, Distrust and Economic Integration (CUP, 2012).
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restrictions to the free movement of services and how these may be justified. 
Lastly, the Services Directive is briefly introduced, as it forms one example 
from EU law that the EAC might not necessarily want to fully emulate.
12.2 The Freedom to Provide Services: Treaty Basis
The freedom to provide services is laid down in Article 56 TFEU:
Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on 
freedom to provide services within the Union shall be prohibited in 
respect of nationals of Member States who are established in a Member 
State other than that of the person for whom the services are intended.4
Article 57 TFEU adds that:
Services shall be considered to be “services” within the meaning of the 
Treaties where they are normally provided for remuneration, in so far as 
they are not governed by the provisions relating to freedom of movement 
for goods, capital and persons. (. . .) Without prejudice to the provisions 
of the Chapter relating to the right of establishment, the person provid-
ing a service may, in order to do so, temporarily pursue his activity in the 
Member State where the service is provided, under the same conditions 
as are imposed by that State on its own nationals.
As with the other freedoms, Article 56 and 57 TFEU only provide a very general 
outline. As a result, it was up to the CJEU to further develop several key issues, 
including the concept of a service itself, the demarcation between services and 
establishment and the question of who is allowed to rely on the freedom to 
provide services.
12.3 The Concept of a Service
Services are defined in the Treaty as all economic activities that are normally 
provided for remuneration and that are not covered by the other freedoms. 
4   Article 56 TFEU has vertical direct effect, see already Case 33/74 Van Binsbergen [1974] ECR 
129, par. 26. The horizontal effect has not yet been explicitly accepted by the CJEU, as will be 
discussed further below.
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The definition of a service therefore turns on two points: 1) what counts as an 
economic activity for remuneration and 2) what distinguishes a service from 
the other freedoms, especially from establishment?
12.3.1 An Economic Activity for Remuneration
To qualify as a an economic activity it suffices that an activity is normally done 
in return for some form of consideration.5 This consideration may be very 
little and does not even have to be in money, nor is it required that the service 
provider seek to make a profit.6 The CJEU has also found that the consider-
ation itself does not have to be paid by the person receiving the service. The 
only thing that matters is that the provider receives some form of consider-
ation, not who pays it.7 Consequently, the consideration may also be paid by 
a third party, including by the state. This is a particularly important extension 
of the concept of a service. It means that all kinds of semi-public services, such 
as healthcare or education, that are provided by private parties but paid for by 
the state or public insurance schemes, may fall under the free movement of 
services.8 Even these sensitive political areas, therefore, have to comply with 
the EU rules on free movement, and may in principle not restrict foreign pro-
viders. Only where an activity is fully provided by the state itself, such as in the 
case of public schools run by the government, it does not constitute a service 
and therefore falls outside the scope of free movement law.9
More generally, the moral dubiousness or political sensitivity of an activ- 
ity does not remove it from the scope of Article 56 TFEU. As long as an activity 
is legal and normally provided for remuneration, it qualifies as a service.10 
Consequently, the case law on services reaches some of the more contested 
5    See inter alia Case 263/86 Humbel [1988] ECR 5365, par. 17, Case C-422/01 Skandia and 
Ramstedt [2003] ECR I-6817, par. 23, and Case C-76/05 Schwarz and Gootjes-Schwarz 
[2007] ECR I-0000, par. 38.
6    See Case C-157/99 Smits and Peerbooms [2001] ECR I-5473, paras. 50 and 52 as well as Case 
C-281/06 Jundt ECLI:EU:C:2007:816.
7    Case 352/85 Bond van Adverteerders and Others [1988] ECR 2085, par. 16, and Joined Cases 
C-51/96 and C-191/97 Deliège [2000] ECR I-2549, par. 56, Smits en Peerbooms par. 58.
8    Case C-157/99 Smits and Peerbooms [2001] ECR I-5473, par. 55, Case C-385/99 Müller-
Fauré [2003] ECR I-4509, ECLI:EU:C:2003:270, par. 103, and especially Case C-372/04 Watts 
[2006] ECLI:EU:C:2006:325. Also see on this point G. Davies, ‘Welfare as a Service’ (2002) 
29 LIEI 27.
9    Case C-263/86 Humbel [1988] ECR 5365. Case C-109/92 Wirth, however, determined that 
private education can form a service under art. 56 TFEU.
10   On the exclusion of illegal activities from free movement law see inter alia Case C-137/09 
Josemans [2010] ECR I-13019.
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and/or colorful outer reaches of human activity, including abortion, gambling 
and prostitution.11 Grogan, for example, concerned students handing out 
information on UK abortion clinics in Ireland. At that time, abortions were 
illegal in Ireland, as was going abroad for an abortion. This prohibition was 
based on a moral conviction widely shared by the Irish population, and 
was laid down in the Irish constitution, yet the large majority of other Member 
States allowed abortion.12 Sidestepping the fierce debate on the morality of 
abortion, the CJEU focused on legality and remuneration to determine if abor-
tion qualified as a service:
Whatever the merits of those argument on the moral plane, they cannot 
influence the answer to the national court’s first question. It is not for 
the Court to substitute its assessment for that of the legislature in those 
Member States where the activities in question are practised legally.13
Abortion was a ‘medical activity which is normally provided for remuneration’ 
and was ‘lawfully practiced in several Member States’, and therefore qualified 
as a service.14 As the relation between the students and the economic activ-
ity of the abortion clinic was too remote, however, in this particular case the 
students could not rely on Article 56 TFEU, providing the CJEU an escape from 
this moral, legal and political dilemma.15 After this judgment, a Treaty protocol 
was adopted that provided legal protection to the Irish ban on abortion against 
free movement law, providing a targeted political solution without reducing 
the scope of Article 56 TFEU in general.
The CJEU has been equally been unwilling to limit the scope of Article 56 
TFEU based on the social or political sensitivity of certain services.16 Both 
11   Case C-159/90, Grogan ECLI:EU:C:1991:378, Case C-268/99 Jany ECLI:EU:C:2001:616, or 
Case C-42/07 Liga Portuguesa ECLI:EU:C:2009:519. For a discussion on the ensuing strug-
gle of the CJEU in the area of gambling see S.C.G. Van den Bogaert and A. Cuyvers: ‘Money 
For Nothing: The Case Law of the EU Court of Justice on the Regulation of Gambling’ 
Common Market Law Review (2011) 48 (4), 1175.
12   Grogan, par. 19.
13   Grogan, par. 20, emphasis added.
14   Grogan, par. 18 and 21.
15   Similarly see Case C-275/92 Schindler ECLI:EU:C:1994:119, par. 32, where the CJEU held 
that ‘Even if the morality of lotteries is at least questionable, it is not for the Court to sub-
stitute its assessment for that of the legislatures of the Member States where that activity 
is practised legally.’
16   Case 33/74 Van Binsbergen [1974] ECR 129, Case 279/80 Webb [1981] ECR 3305, par. 10, and 
Kohll, paragraph 20.
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healthcare and education, for example, have been brought under the scope 
of Article 56 TFEU, even where this brought the CJEU into contested terrain.17 
For example, as healthcare forms a service, individuals may in principle not be 
restricted from seeking medical treatment in other Member States, which also 
means that this treatment abroad should, under certain conditions, be covered 
by national health insurance.18
In line with the other freedoms, therefore, the CJEU has developed a very 
broad definition of a service, and in doing so has greatly extended the scope of 
Article 56 TFEU. A great many activities qualify as services and therefore are in 
principle entitled to free movement. As we will see below, however, in return 
for this very broad concept of a service, the CJEU is often more lenient when 
assessing restrictions on services in more contested areas.
12.3.2. Distinguishing Services from Other Freedoms: Temporary Nature
Article 57 TFEU provides that an activity only qualifies as a service where it is 
not covered by one of the other freedoms. The primary difficulty in this regard 
is to distinguish services from establishment.19 Say for example that a Spanish 
architect moves to Austria for four months to assist in a large building project, 
renting a turn-key office space for the duration of his stay. Is he ‘merely’ a pro-
vider of services or has he established himself in Austria?
The essential difference between services and establishment is the tempo-
rary nature of the activity. Services are intended to be temporary and limited 
in time. Establishment, on the other hand, is intended to be more permanent 
and open-ended. Yet in practice it can be difficult to differentiate between the 
two. The leading, if not always conclusive, judgment on the difference between 
services and establishment is Gebhard, which concerned a German lawyer 
17   See for healthcare Joined Cases 286/82 & 26/83, Luisi and Carbone [1984] ECR 377, par. 
16, Case C-158/96 Kohll [1998] ECR I-1931) ECLI:EU:C:1998:171, par. 21, Case C-368/98 
Vanbraekel [2001] ECR I-5363, Case C-157/99 Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms [2001] ECR 
I-5473, C-385/99 Müller-Fauré [2003] ECR I-4509, Case C-372/04 Watts [2006] ECR I-4325 
and Case C-444/05 Stamatelaki [2007] ECR I-3185) ECLI:EU:C:2007:231. The Court does 
make a distinction, however, between hospital and non-hospital healthcare. See also 
J.W. van de Gronden et al. (eds.), Health Care and EU Law (The Hague: Asser, 2011). For 
education see Case C-109/92 Wirth [1993] ECR I-6447, paragraphs 15 and 16 and Case 
C-76/05 Schwarz [2007] ECR I-6849.
18   See also the discussion below on the justification of possible restrictions in this regard.
19   See for financial services and capital Case C-452/04 Fidium Finanz [2006] ECR I-9521, 
ECLI:EU:C:2006:631.
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working in Italy.20 On determining whether Gebhard had established himself 
in Italy or had remained a service provider the CJEU held the following:
As the Advocate General has pointed out, the temporary nature of 
the activities in question has to be determined in the light, not only of the 
duration of the provision of the service, but also of its regularity, period-
icity or continuity. The fact that the provision of services is temporary 
does not mean that the provider of services within the meaning of the 
Treaty may not equip himself with some form of infrastructure in 
the host Member State (including an office, chambers or consulting 
rooms) in so far as such infrastructure is necessary for the purposes of 
performing the services in question.
However, that situation is to be distinguished from that of Mr Gebhard 
who, as a national of a Member State, pursues a professional activity on 
a stable and continuous basis in another Member State where he holds 
himself out from an established professional base to, amongst others, 
nationals of that State. Such a national comes under the provisions of 
the chapter relating to the right of establishment and not those of the 
chapter relating to services.21
In our example of the Spanish architect moving to Austria, therefore, the archi-
tect would still qualify as a service provider. At the same time, Gebhard does 
not mean that the provision of a service can never last for a very long time. 
In Schnitzer, for example, a Portuguese company carried out plastering in 
Germany for almost three years but still qualified as a service provider:
Thus, ‘services’ within the meaning of the Treaty may cover services 
varying widely in nature, including services which are provided over an 
extended period, even over several years, where, for example, the services 
in question are supplied in connection with the construction of a large 
building. Services within the meaning of the Treaty may likewise be con-
stituted by services which a business established in a Member State sup-
plies with a greater or lesser degree of frequency or regularity, even over 
an extended period, to persons established in one or more other Member 
States, for example the giving of advice or information for remuneration.
(. . .)
20   Case C-55/94 Gebhard ECLI:EU:C:1995:411.
21   See also Case C-131/01 Commission v Italy [2003] ECR I-1659, paragraph 22.
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It follows that the mere fact that a business established in one Member 
State supplies identical or similar services with a greater or lesser degree 
of frequency or regularity in a second Member State, without having an 
infrastructure there enabling it to pursue a professional activity there on 
a stable and continuous basis and, from the infrastructure, to hold itself 
out to, amongst others, nationals of the second Member State, is not suf-
ficient for it to be regarded as established in the second Member State.22
No simple criterion or clear time limit exists, therefore, yet the establishment 
of infrastructure seems to be of particular importance for crossing the thin 
line between services and establishment.23 Because of the grey area between 
both freedoms, it may in some cases be difficult to predict which of the two 
applies. Considering the significant convergence between the freedoms, how-
ever, it will usually also not make a real difference, in terms of outcome, which 
freeform applies.24 Sometimes, the CJEU does not even deem it necessary to 
choose between services and establishment, and simply applies both.25
12.4 Who may Rely on Article 56 TFEU?
Once something qualifies as a service, the question remains which individu-
als are entitled to rely on Article 56 TFEU to demand the free movement of 
this service. When Article 56 TFEU was drafted, the scenario envisioned was 
that of a service provider traveling to a customer in another Member State. It 
would then be the service provider that would rely on Article 56 TFEU to con-
test any restrictions to her free movement.26 In Luisi and Carbone, however, 
the CJEU held that not just service providers but also service recipients may 
rely on Article 56 TFEU.27 This case concerned Italian citizens vacationing in 
22   Case C-215/01 Schnitzer ECLI:EU:C:2003:662, paras 30–32. Also see Case C-458/08 
Commission v. Portugal [2010] ECR I-11599.
23   See already Case 205/84 Commission v. Germany (Insurance Services), where the CJEU also 
clarified that establishment does not require a formal branch or agency, but that an office 
or permanent representative may suffice.
24   See EU Chapter 9 on the gradual convergence between the freedoms.
25   See for example Case C-136/00, Danner ECLI:EU:C:2002:558, or Case C-334/02, Commission 
v. France ECLI:EU:C:2004:129. For a possible combination of services and goods see Case 
C-403/08 Football Association Premier League ECLI:EU:C:2011:631, par. 79 or Case C-390/99 
Canal Satélite Digital [2002] ECR I-607, paras. 29 to 33.
26   . See also the early case law of the CJEU fort his assumption, for example Case 33/74 van 
Binsbergen ECLI:EU:C:1974:131 or Case 76/81, SA Transporoute et travaux ECLI:EU:C:1982:49.
27   .Joined Cases 286/82 & 26/83, Luisi and Carbone [1984] ECR 377.
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Germany and France, where they inter alia received some medical treatment. 
Because they had received services there, they could rely on the free movement 
of services to challenge Italian laws restricting the export of foreign currency:
It follows that the freedom to provide services includes the freedom, 
for the recipients of services, to go to another Member State in order to 
receive a s service there, without being obstructed by restrictions, even in 
relation to payments and that tourists, persons receiving medical treat-
ment and persons travelling for the purpose of education or business are 
to be regarded as recipients of services.28
As a result of this landmark judgment, all individuals that travel to another 
Member State and receive some kind of services may rely on the free move-
ment of services.29 Moreover, any national entities that provide a service to 
such visitors from other Member States may also rely on Article 56 TFEU. For 
example, if a group of Luxemburgish tourists come to Amsterdam and take 
a tour on a canal boat, both these tourists and the operator of the canal boat 
fall under the scope of the free movement of services, and can hence rely on 
Article 56 TFEU to challenge any restriction they may encounter.30 As most 
people that travel to another Member State will receive at least some services, 
such as transport, lodging or restaurant services, this line of case law has greatly 
expanded the scope of Article 56 TFEU.
At the same time, the scope of the freedom to provide services does have 
its limits. To begin with, Article 56 TFEU only applies where a cross-border 
element is present. Purely internal situations, such as a small Hungarian law 
firm providing legal advice to a local Hungarian company, are not covered 
by the freedom to provide services.31 Four possible cross-border scenarios can 
be envisioned.32 Firstly, the service provider may travel to another Member 
28   Joined Cases 286/82 and 26/83 Luisi and Carbone [1984] ECR 377, par. 16.
29   See in this regard also Case C-158/96 Kohll [1998] ECR I-1931, Case Case C-372/04 Watts 
[2006] ECR I-4325 and especially Case 186/87 Cowan [1989] ECR 195 where the specific 
services received by a British tourist did not even have to be specified.
30   See for example Case C-98/14 Berlington ECLI:EU:C:2015:386, paras. 25 and 26 and Joined 
Cases C-340/14 and Case C-341/14 Trijber ECLI:EU:C:2015:641.
31   Cf. Case C-108/98 RI.SAN. [1999] ECR I-5219; ECLI:EU:C:1999:400 or Case 52/79 Debauve 
[1980] ECR 83.
32   Compare also the four ‘modes’ under the Common Market Protocol Schedule of 
Commitment on the Progressive Liberalisation of Services (Annex V), as discussed in 
Chapter 12 par. 2.
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State to provide a service.33 Secondly, under Luisi and Carbone, service recipi-
ents may travel to another Member State to receive a service. Thirdly, the 
service itself may cross a border, for example via the internet.34 Fourthly, 
the service provider and the service recipient may travel together to another 
Member State, for example with an Irish consultant joining his Irish client on 
a business trip to Malta.35
In addition, Article 56 TFEU only covers service providers that have the 
nationality of a Member State and are established in a Member State.36 Service 
recipients, however, do not have to meet the double requirement of nationality 
and establishment. Even third-country nationals, therefore, can rely on article 
56 TFEU when they receive a service from an EU provider.37 A Rwandese busi-
nesswoman in Brussels may, for example, rely on article 56 TFEU when receiv-
ing lobbying services from a UK law firm. Lastly, it seems that Article 56 TFEU 
still only has vertical direct, as its horizontal direct effect remains uncertain.38
12.5 Restrictions on the Free Movement of Services
The concept of a restriction under Article 56 TFEU is functionally similar to the 
very broad concept developed by the CJEU in Dassonville for goods, and also 
focuses on market access.39 The standard definition was provided in Säger, 
were the CJEU held that Article 56 TFEU requires:
33   Note that here it is not required that the specific service recipient in that other MS has 
already been identified. Mere offers of services, without any identified customers as yet, 
therefore also fall under the freedom. See Alpine investments par. 19. In addition, Art. 56 
TFEU also applies if a customer moves to another Member State, and hence the service 
relationship acquires a cross-border element. See Case 15/78 Koestler [1978] ECR 1971) 
ECLI:EU:C:1978:184.
34   Refs Alpine Investments par. 22.
35   Cf. Case C-154/89, Commission v. France ECLI:EU:C:1991:76 or Case C-398/95, Syndesmos 
ton en Elladi Touristikon kai Taxidiotikon Grafeion ECLI:EU:C:1997:282.
36   See however also the other rights Union citizens and their family members may derive 
from their citizenship, as discussed in EU Chapter 11.
37   . Case C-484/93, Svensson and Gustavsson ECLI:EU:C:1995:379.
38   For vertical direct effect see Case 33/74 Van Binsbergen [1974] ECR 1299, par. 27. For the 
complex case law on horizontal or quasi-horizontal effect see inter alia Case C-309/99 
Wouters [2002] ECR I-1577, par. 120, Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch [1974] ECR 1405 and 
especially Case C-341/05, Laval ECLI:EU:C:2007:809.
39   See EU Chapter 10 as well as Case C-390/99 Canal Satélite ECLI:EU:C:2002:34 and 
T. Connor, ‘Goods, Persons, Services and Capital in the European Union: Jurisprudential 
Routes to Free Movement’ (2010) 11 German Law Journal, 159. For the earlier case law of 
the CJEU on this point, which differentiated more between indirect discrimination and 
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(. . .) the abolition of any restriction even if it applies without distinction 
to national providers of services and to those of other Member States, 
when it is liable to prohibit or otherwise impede the activities of a provider 
of services established in another Member State where he lawfully pro-
vides similar services.40
No discrimination is therefore required, the criterion only being if there is a 
chance that a national measure will make it more difficult to provide or receive 
cross-border services.41 Importantly, this concept also covers any national rule 
that creates a so-called ‘double burden’ by replicating safeguards already in 
place in the home state of the service provider. Consequently, Member States 
may in principle not impose their own regulations on a foreign service pro-
vider on points where the provider is already regulated by its home state.42 
Otherwise, the mere duplication of national rules and requirements would in 
itself already restrict free movements, such as a free lance pilot that would 
have to make training hours in five different Member States.
Article 56 TFEU not only provides service providers the right to enter and 
reside in the Member State, but also to bring all staff they use for providing 
the service, including Third Country National (TCN) staff.43 Accidentally, this 
inclusion of free movement rights for service providers and their staff also 
means that, if the UK wants to retain the free movement of services after 
Brexit, they would indirectly also accept a significant amount of free move-
ment of persons.
Although the scope of the prohibition under Article 56 TFEU, therefore, is 
at least as broad as that under Article 34 TFEU concerning goods, the CJEU has 
not extended the Keck exception to services.44 Consequently, as with the other 
non-discriminatory measures, see S.C. Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU. The Four 
Freedoms (4th edn, OUP 2015), 387 a.o.
40   Case C-76/90 Säger [1991] ECR I-4221, par. 12.
41   See also Case C-42/07 Liga Portuguesa ECLI:EU:C:2009:519and Case C-384/93 Alpine 
Investments ECLI:EU:C:1995:126.
42   See for example Case C-272/94, Michel Guiot and Climatec ECLI:EU:C:1996:147.
43   Case C113/89 Rush Portuguesa [1990] ECR I-1417, par. 12, as well as Cases 62/81 and 63/81 
Seco and Desquenne & Giral v Etablissement d’ Assurance contre la Vieillesse et l’ Invalidité 
[1982] ECR 223, Case C-355/98 Commision v. Belgium [2000] ECR I-1221, and Case C-43/93 
Vander Elst [1994] ECR I-3803, par. 21. For the question which labour standards and social 
laws apply, see Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of 
the provision of services [1996] OJ L18/1 as well as Case C-341/05, Laval ECLI:EU:C:2007:809.
44   See for example Joined Cases C-34–36/95 De Agostini ECLI:EU:C:1997:344, Case C-275/92 
Schindler ECLI:EU:C:1994:119 or Case C-384/93 Alpine Investments ECLI:EU:C:1995:126. For 
the Keck exception see EU Chapter 10, par. 4.1. See also W.H. Roth, ‘The European Court 
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freedoms, the main legal debate takes place over the issue of justification, not 
so much over the existence of a restriction itself.
12.6 Justifications of Restrictions on the Free Movement of Services
As with the other freedoms, a restriction on Article 56 TFEU can be justified 
if it serves a legitimate aim in a proportionate manner.45 For services as well, 
the legitimate aims allowed under Article 51 and 52 TFEU have been judicially 
complemented by an open category of rule of reason exceptions.46 Under the 
rule of reason, the CJEU has already accepted a great variety of aims that may 
justify a restriction, including consumer protection,47 cultural policy,48 pre-
venting abuse of free movement of services,49 professional rules protecting the 
recipient of services,50 or the right to take collective action for the protection 
of the workers of the host State against possible social dumping.51 The one 
main limit is that purely economic aims, such as safeguarding revenue or pro-
tecting a certain economic sector, cannot form legitimate aims under the rule 
of reason.52 In addition, as in the case of goods, the orthodox doctrine holds 
of Justice’s Case Law on Freedom to Provide Services: is Keck Relevant?’, in M. Andenas, 
W.-H. Roth, Services and Free Movement in EU Law (OUP, 2002), 1.
45   See amongst many others Case C-678/11 Commission v Spain ECLI:EU:C:2014:2434, Case 
C-523/12 Dirextra Alta Formazione ECLI:EU:C:2013:831, par. 24 or Joined Cases C-369/96 
and C-376/96 Arblade [1999] ECR I-8453, par. 35.
46   For the rule of reason exceptions see Case C-76/90 Säger [1991] ECR I-4221. On the strict 
application of the Treaty exceptions see for example Case C-3/88, Commission v. Italy 
ECLI:EU:C:1992:235, Joined Cases C-430 & 431/99 Sea-Land Service ECLI:EU:C:2002:364, 
Case C-158/96 Kohll ECLI:EU:C:1998:171, or Case C-465/05 Commission v. Italy ECLI:EU: 
C:2007:781, par. 49.
47   Case 220/83 Commission v. France ECLI:EU:C:1986:461, Case C-393/05 Commission v. 
Austria ECLI:EU:C:2007:722, or Case C-404/05 Commission v. Germany ECLI:EU:C:2007:723.
48   Case C-154/89 Commission v. France ECLI:EU:C:1991:76, Case C-125/06 Commission v. 
Infront [2008] ECR I-1451, or Case C-195/06 KommAustria v. ORF [2007] ECR I-8817.
49   Case C-244/04 Commission v. Germany [2006] ECR I-885, par. 38.
50   Case 33/74 Van Binsbergen ECLI:EU:C:1974:131, Case C-19/92 Kraus ECLI:EU:C:1993:125, or 
Case C-309/99 Wouters ECLI:EU:C:2002:98.
51   Case C-341/05, Laval ECLI:EU:C:2007:809.
52   See inter alia Case C-338/09 Yellow Cab ECLI:EU:C:2010:814, or Case C-347/09 Dickinger 
and Ömer ECLI:EU:C:2011:582. The risk of seriously undermining the financial balance of 
the social security system does, however, constitute a legitimate aim. See for example 
Case C-157/99 Smits and Peerbooms ECLI:EU:C:2001:404 and Case C-372/04 Watts ECLI: 
EU:C:2006:325.
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that directly discriminatory measures can only be justified under Treaty-based 
exceptions, whereas the rule of reason can only justify indistinctly applicable 
measures.53
One of the main perculiarties in the justification of services, however, is 
the variation in leeway offered to Member States depending on which service 
is at stake. This leeway is especially granted via a more relaxed application 
of the proportionality test, which requires that a restriction is both suitable 
and necessary to achieve its objective.54 These open criteria allow the court 
to increase or reduce its scrutiny, which in turn allows the CJEU to tweak 
the formally one-size-fits-all free movement test for different services. In more 
economic or standard commercial areas, and therefore the majority of cases, 
the application of the proportionality test is usually very strict, for instance 
requiring Member States to proof that there really was no less restrictive 
alternative.55 In more sensitive areas, the CJEU sometimes satisfies itself with 
a more limited review, merely checking if the national measure is not mani-
festly inappropriate.56 The clearest example of the significant leeway the CJEU 
can create for Member States, whilst formally remaining within the standard 
internal market test, can be found in the context of gambling, where Member 
States have received all but a carte blanche to regulate games of chance.57 This 
variation in scrutiny allows for the necessary flexibility in such a diverse field 
as services, but of course also comes at a cost of legal certainty.
53   See for example Case C-353/89 Commission v. Netherlands ECLI:EU:C:1991:325, or Case 
C-451/99 Cura Anlagen ECLI:EU:C:2002:195, as well as S. O’Leary and J.M. Fernández-
Martín, ‘Judicially-Created Exceptions to the Free Provision of Services’, in M. Andenas, 
W.-H. Roth, Services and Free Movement in EU Law (OUP, 2002), 163. For cases that do not 
fit this pattern, see for example Case C-118/96 Safir ECLI:EU:C:1998:170.
54   See for example Case C-49/98 Finalarte ECLI:EU:C:2001:564. The suitability test also 
includes the requirement of consistency, meaning that the measure may be internally 
inconsistent or in part undermine the very objective it is trying to realize. See Case 
C-243/01 Gambelli ECLI:EU:C:2003:597, par. 68.
55   Case C-678/11 Commission v Spain ECLI:EU:C:2014:2434, par. 43.
56   See for example Case C-262/02 Commission v. France (Loi Evin) ECLI:EU:C:2004:431, espe-
cially the reasoning in paras 33–39.
57   See for an overview S.C.G. Van den Bogaert and A. Cuyvers: ‘Money For Nothing: The Case 
Law of the EU Court of Justice on the Regulation of Gambling’ (2011) 48 (4) Common 
Market Law Review, 1175, and for recent developments which may herald some increased 
scrutiny, S.C.G.Van den Bogaert and A. Cuyvers, ‘Let it be? The regulation and allocation of 
gambling licenses at the EU and Member State level’, in: C. Adriaanse, F.J. van Ommeren, 
W. den Ouden and C.J. Wolswinkel (Eds.), Scarcity and the State The Allocation of Limited 
Rights by the Administration (Intersentia, 2016), 299.
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12.7 The Services Directive
The negative integration achieved through Article 56 TFEU as set out above has 
also been complemented by positive integration, i.e. by EU legislation harmo-
nizing national laws.58 Of significant importance has been the sectoral legisla-
tion, which regulated particular fields such as telecommunication, energy or 
financial services, the discussion of which is beyond the scope of this Chapter.59
In 2006, however, a general directive on services in the internal market 
was adopted, the Services Directive.60 This Directive became the subject of 
hitherto unprecedented levels of political contestation and protest, including 
French plumbers cutting of electricity to the holiday home of then internal 
market Commissioner Frits Bolkestein as they feared unfair competition from 
the dreaded ‘Polish plumber’.61 The main bone of contention was the ‘coun-
try of origin principle’ proposed by the Commission, which basically required 
mutual recognition of home state control. Such mutual recognition would 
remove many obstacles in one fell swoop, but was also perceived as undermin-
ing national protection of workers and service providers.
Under intense political pressure, the final Directive was severely watered 
down, many services excluded from its scope, and the country of origin princi-
ple scrapped.62 The resulting Directive does not add very much in terms of sub-
stantive free movement rights, as the key Article 16 on free movement largely 
repeats Article 56 TFEU. Nevertheless, the Services Directive has affected the 
application of the free movement of services and also provides several relevant 
procedural rights to service procedures in terms of administrative simplifica-
tion and cooperation.63 Overall, however, the Directive is far from a success, 
and the EAC could certainly learn both from the botched political process and 
58   See EU Chapter 9 for a discussion of this process in general.
59   See in this context also Chapter 16 on sectoral regulation in the EAC.
60   Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on services in the 
internal market OJ [2006] L376/37. On the preceding debates, see Editorial Comments 
(2006) CML Rev., 307–311. On the evolution of the proposal, see J.-V. Louis and S. Rodrigues 
(Eds.) Les services d’intérêt général et l’Union européenne Brussels, 2006; O. de Schutter 
and S. Francq, “La proposition de directive relative aux services dans le Marché intérieur: 
reconnaissance mutuelle, harmonisation et conflicts de lois dans l’Europe élargie”, (2005) 
CDE, 603–660.
61   On the heated discussions surrounding the Directive see Editorial Comments (2006) 
CMLRev, 307–311.
62   C. Barnard, ‘Unravelling the Services Directive’, (2008) 45(2) CMLRev, 323. On the scope 
and application see for example Case C-341/14 Trijber ECLI:EU:C:2015:641.
63   See chapter II of the Services Directive.
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the eventual watered-down compromise. For example, one could first aim 
for the more limited but pragmatic objective of administrative simplification 
and cooperation alone, before trying any more radical steps such as introduc-
ing a country of origin principle.
12.8 The Freedom of Establishment
Article 49 TFEU contains the right to freedom of establishment, allowing natu-
ral and legal persons to establish themselves in other Member States:
Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on the 
freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory 
of another Member State shall be prohibited. Such prohibition shall also 
apply to restrictions on the setting-up of agencies, branches or subsidiar-
ies by nationals of any Member State established in the territory of any 
Member State.
Freedom of establishment shall include the right to take up and pursue 
activities as self-employed persons and to set up and manage undertak-
ings, in particular companies or firms within the meaning of the sec-
ond paragraph of Article 54, under the conditions laid down for its own 
nationals by the law of the country where such establishment is effected, 
subject to the provisions of the Chapter relating to capital.64
Article 54 TFEU then further clarifies the concept of a company or a firm:
Companies or firms formed in accordance with the law of a Member 
State and having their registered office, central administration or prin-
cipal place of business within the Union shall, for the purposes of this 
Chapter, be treated in the same way as natural persons who are nationals 
of Member States.
‘Companies or firms’ means companies or firms constituted under 
civil or commercial law, including cooperative societies, and other legal 
persons governed by public or private law, save for those which are 
non-profit-making.
64   The vertical direct effect of Article 49 TFEU was established in Case 2/74 Reyners [1974] 
ECR 631.
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As a counterpart to the freedom to provide services, which is temporary 
in nature, establishment concerns a more permanent economic activity in 
another Member State. In the words of the CJEU, it allows an entity to ‘partici-
pate, on a stable and continuous basis, in the economic life of a Member State 
other than his State of origin.’65
Article 49 TFEU covers both private individuals (the self-employed), and the 
legal persons as defined in Article 54 TFEU. Moreover, it covers both primary 
and secondary establishment, which means that it not just enables one to move 
completely to a new state to start a new company, but also to set up a second 
office or to create agencies, branches or subsidiaries in another Member State 
whilst keeping the primary company in the own Member State.66 As with ser-
vices, however, activities connected with the exercise of public authority are 
excluded.67
Just as the free movement of services, the freedom of establishment 
provides a right to market access and residence which also includes family 
members.68 Member States, therefore, are in principle prohibited to adopt 
any measures that restrict natural or legal persons from primary or secondary 
establishment.69 The justification of any such restrictions, as indicated above, 
is very similar to that of the free movement of services, requiring a legitimate 
aim that is pursued in a proportionate manner.70
One major debate unique to the freedom of establishment concerns the 
seat of undertakings and the freedom of companies under EU law to change 
their seat. In part this debate is caused by the fact that some Member States 
follow the real seat doctrine, whereas others follow the incorporation doctrine 
to determine the seat. So what happens, for example, if a company first estab-
lishes its real seat in Member State A, which follows the real seat doctrine, but 
then wants to move its seat to Member State B, which follows the incorporation 
65   Case C-55/94 Gebhard ECLI:EU:C:1995:411, par. 25.
66   See for primary establishment for example Case 2/74 Reyners [1974] ECR 631 or Case 
C-411/03 SEVIC [2005] ECR I-10805. For secondary establishment see Case 107/83 Klopp 
[1984] ECR 2971 or Case C-212/97 Centros [1999] ECR I-1459.
67   As an exception, this concept is interpreted very narrowly as well, cf. Case 42/92 Thijssen 
[1993] ECR I-4047.
68   See Article 7 of Directive 2004/38.
69   See for examples inter alia Case C-161/07 Commission v. Austria ECLI:EU:C:2008:759, Case 
208/00 Überseering [2002] ECR I-9919 or Case C-169/07 Hartlauer ECLI:EU:C:2009:141.
70   Free movement of services and the freedom of establishment even share the same Treaty 
justifications, and many of the same rule of reason grounds apply to both as well. Note 
in this regard that the Services Directive, as set out above, also applies to establishment, 
further demonstrating the similarities and connections between both.
 391Freedom of Establishment and Services in the EU
doctrine, by merely incorporating its new seat in Member State B whilst keep-
ing its real seat in Member State A? Although the case law is not fully clear yet, 
so far it seems that Member States remain free to determine which connecting 
factor they take into account for determining the initial seat as well as the con-
necting factor they require for maintaining a seat.71 For the EAC this question 
may become relevant as well, if differences in incorporation doctrines exist 
between Partner States, and if companies would increasingly start to use the 
freedom of establishment, for example for tax purposes.
71   See especially Case C-212/97) Centros [1999] ECR I-1459, Case C-208/00) Überseering 
[2002] ECR I-9919, and Case C-210/06) Cartesio [2008] ECR I-9641.
©  elvis mbembe binda, ���7 | doi ��.��63/97890043��073_0�6
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC-BY-NC License.
chapter 13




The free movement of capital and the monetary union are closely correlated. 
Indeed, a successful monetary union is dependent on the effectiveness of 
capital movement liberalization.1 At the same time, it is argued that fully 
liberalized movement of capital and integrated financial markets within a 
regulatory framework featuring economic policies create tensions in exchange 
rates, which in turn puts undesirable pressure on monetary policy-makers.2 
Therefore, the East African Monetary Union (EAMU) is a necessary step 
towards a more stable economic community in the East African Community 
(EAC).
The free movement of capital is provided by Article 76 on the Establishment 
of the Common Market, and the monetary union by Articles 82 to 88 of the 
Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community. The interrela-
tion between the free movement of capital and the monetary union has been 
acknowledged in the Treaty under Article 86 entitled ‘Movement of Capital’ 
under Chapter Fourteen on monetary and financial cooperation between EAC 
Partner States. This highlights how the free movement of capital—more than 
other common market freedoms—is crucial for an effective monetary union. 
This Chapter, however, is not intended to analyze the correlation between free 
movement of capital and the monetary union, but considering their close con-
nection, it discusses both fields after one another, shedding light on the provi-
sions governing these two areas in the EAC integration arrangement.
1   Catherine Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms (4th edn, OUP, 2013) 
614.
2   Ibid., p. 613.
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13.2 Free Movement of Capital
13.2.1 Principle
The free movement of capital is provided in Article 76(1) of the Treaty and 
further detailed in Articles 24 to 28 of the Protocol on the Establishment of the 
East African Community Common Market. However, neither the Treaty nor 
the Common Market Protocol provide a definition for “capital”. Article 28 of the 
Common Market Protocol simply enumerates a non-exhaustive list of opera-
tions that should be considered as meaning “capital and related payments and 
transfers”. These are direct investment; equity and portfolio investments; bank 
and credit transactions; payment of interest on loans and amortization; divi-
dends and other income on investments; repatriation of proceeds from the 
sale of assets; and other transfers and payments relating to investment flows.3 
This list should be read in conjunction with Annex VI to the Common Market 
Protocol which enumerates specific operations that the Partner States agreed 
to liberalize in order to free the flow of capital.4
These operations may be categorized into four groups. The first group is 
related to securities operations which includes securities transactions that are 
controlled by regulations, the prices of which are regularly published, either by 
official stock exchanges (quoted securities) or by any other facilities (unquoted 
securities); some collective investments schemes; money market instruments; 
and derivatives.5
The second group is composed of credit operations meaning, “financing 
of every kind granted by financial institutions, including financing related to 
commercial transactions or to the provision of services in which non-residents 
participate”.6 This group also includes, mortgage loans, consumer credit and 
financial leasing, as well as back-up facilities and other note issuance facilities.
The third group consists of direct investments. Direct investments are 
investments of all kinds, by natural or legal persons, that serve to establish 
or maintain lasting and direct links between the person providing the capital 
and the entrepreneur or undertaking to which the capital is made available in 
order to carry on an economic activity.7 Generally, direct investment involves 
3   Article 28 of the Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Community Common 
Market, signed on the 20 November 2009.
4   Compare in this regard also the role of secondary law in de definition of capital, as discussed 
in EU Chapter 13 par. 2.




participation in new or existing undertakings, the establishment and exten-
sion of branches or new undertakings belonging solely to the person provid-
ing the capital as well as the acquisition in full of existing undertakings, and 
finally the reinvestment of profits.8 All these three alternatives should feature 
an intention of the performer to establish or maintain lasting economic links 
with the undertaking.9 This is also the case under European Union law, where 
these types of capital movements are also considered to be direct investments.10
The final group concerns personal capital operations, which include, among 
others, loans, gifts and endowments, inheritances and legacies, death dues, 
damages, authors’ royalties, etc.11
According to Article 24 of the Common Market Protocol, Partner States 
commit to progressively remove all restrictions and discrimination which 
could impede the above-mentioned operations, including current payment.12
It is noteworthy that, unlike other common market freedoms, which are an 
exclusive entitlement of the Partner States’ nationals, Article 24(1)(e) of the 
Common Market Protocol opens the free movement of capital to any person 
who resides in the territory of a Partner State. This includes of course nationals, 
and any other legal or natural person legally living in the territory of a Partner 
State.
Article 24(1)(b) of the Common Market Protocol prohibits any form of dis-
crimination based on nationality, place of residence or place where the capital 
is invested. Discrimination based on nationality and place of residence mean 
that any person of any nationality residing in the territory of the EAC is allowed 
to move capital within the Community. The question of what “the place where 
8    Ibid.
9    The guidance provided by IMF and OECD should be taken into consideration to under-
stand the scope of “lasting” and “direct” links referred to by this explanatory note. See IMF, 
Balance of Payments Manual (6th ed., IMF, 2008, updated version of 2011) 100; and OECD, 
OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment (4th edn, OECD, 2008) 48.
10   Annex I to Council Directive 88/361/EEC for the implementation of Article 67 of 
the Treaty [1988] OJ L178. Furthermore, for the purpose of implementing Article 63 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [Ex Article 67 EC, repealed by 
the Treaty of Amsterdam], the list includes long-term loans with a view to establishing or 
maintaining lasting economic links.
11   The guidance provided by IMF and OECD should be taken into consideration to under-
stand the scope of “lasting” and “direct” links referred to by this explanatory note. See IMF, 
Balance of Payments Manual (6th edn, IMF, 2008, updated version of 2011) 100; and OECD, 
OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment (4th edn, OECD, 2008) 48.
12   Article 24(1)(d) of the Common Market Protocol.. This paragraph also highlights the 
interpenetration between capital movement and other common market freedoms.
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the capital is invested” entails is not as clear-cut. It seems clear that this provi-
sion advocates for the free movement of capital from the territory of a Partner 
State to the territory of any other Partner State without discrimination. 
However, it is not clear whether this provision could be construed as compel-
ling Partner States not to hinder the movement of capital when their residents 
want to invest in a third country. Prima facie, the response would appear nega-
tive, as there is no immediate apparent benefit for the EAC to facilitate such 
an activity, which appears contrary to the common market’s aim of creating 
wealth within the community.
However, a reading of paragraphs (f) and (g) of Article 28 of the Common 
Market Protocol may suggest otherwise. Article 28 (f) and (g) define “capital 
and related payments and transfers” to include, the “repatriation of proceeds 
from the sale of assets” and “other transfers and payments relating to invest-
ment flows.” Therefore, since it allows, among others, foreign residents in the 
Community to repatriate the proceeds from the sale of assets or to do other 
transfers and payments related to investment flows, it can be inferred that the 
free movement of capital—in terms of the Common Market Protocol—entails 
that capital is also free to leave the Community. The confinement of the free 
movement of capital only to intra-EAC operations would affect both inward 
and outward investment flows in the region. Obviously, such a provision would 
be contrary to the general expectation of EAC Partner States, who all rely on 
the attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI) to sustain their national 
economic development agendas. The free movement of capital between EAC 
Partner States and third countries would be beneficial, as among other things, 
it strengthens the control of capital towards third countries, as investors would 
not attempt to enter or exit the Community market via the most liberal juris-
diction to access their target Partner State.13
Therefore, it seems logical to interpret that the EAC lawmakers decided to 
open the EAC capital market to third countries.14 Furthermore, Article 25(1)(d), 
in providing that “[t]he free movement of capital may be restricted upon 
13   J. Snell, ‘Free Movement of Capital: Evolution as a Non-linear Process’ in Paul Craig and 
Grainne de Burca (eds), The Evolution of the EU (OUP 2011) cited by C. Barnard, cited 
supra, p. 584.
14   Note that the free movement of capital is also open in the EU to third countries but 
its implementation is closely regulated with strong available safeguard measures. 
C. Hjalmroth and S. Westerberg, ‘The Contribution of trade to a new EU growth strategy: 
Ideas for a more open European Economy’ (Part 1 A Common investment policy for the 
EU), Report, National Board of Trade, p. 11(29) online at http://www.kommers.se/upload/
Analysarkiv/Arbetsomr.pdf (accessed on 24 April 2016).
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justified reasons related to . . .(d) financial sanctions agreed to by the Partner 
States”, confirms the view that free movement of capital is applicable also to 
third countries.15 It follows that since free movement of capital is allowed 
between EAC Partner States and third countries, the former would restrict this 
free movement in case they decide to take financial sanctions against such 
third countries. Essentially, the free movement of capital between EAC Partner 
States and third countries would foster the possibility of business expansion 
for EAC companies or firms to non-EAC countries. In other words, it could be 
asserted that this freedom encourages FDI outflows from the EAC. When EAC 
companies and firms invest abroad, it increases the bloc’s competitiveness.16
In any event, Article 24(2) compels the Partner States to progressively 
remove all restrictions to the free movement of capital that existed at the 
entry into force of the Common Market Protocol and not to introduce new 
ones. According to the Schedule on the Removal of Restrictions on the Free 
Movement of Capital, Partner States committed to fully liberalize the move-
ment of capital in the EAC by 31 December 2015. However, the reality on the 
ground suggests otherwise. In fact, a World Bank Report published in 2014, 
highlighted that, not only had the Partner States not removed barriers to the 
free movement of capital existing prior to the entry into force of the Common 
Market Protocol, new restrictions had actually been introduced.
This Report revealed that out of 20 operations pinpointed by the Common 
Market Protocol to be liberalized according to the free movement of capital, 
no EAC Partner State has succeeded to fully liberalize them all. Kenya, the best 
performer in this domain, has liberalized 17 operations out of 20. All the EAC 
Partner States restrict the movement of the three remaining operations. Those 
restrictions are related to the free movement of inward investments, consisting 
of, for example, the requirement of minimum capital for investors from other 
Partner States; or the shareholding of nationals in some businesses before they 
start operating in their territories; as well as the lack of legal framework for the 
sale or issue of derivative products locally by non-residents and abroad by resi-
dents. For instance, Tanzania and Burundi are the countries where restrictions 
are still preponderant on the free movement of capital, as only four opera-
tions have been liberalized.17 This can be attributed to Burundi and Tanzania’s 
strong reluctance toward the liberalization of capital movement, as displayed 
15   Article 25(1)(d) the Common Market Protocolreads “The free movement of capital may 
be restricted upon justified reasons related to . . .(d) financial sanctions agreed to by the 
Partner States”.
16   C. Hjalmroth and S. Westerberg, cited supra, p. 8(29).
17   World Bank, The EAC Common Market Scorecard [2014], pp. 8–15.
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by the fact that these two Partner States took the longest period of time to fully 
comply with the Common Market Protocol provisions. Burundi’s compliance 
period ran till the end of 2014, while Tanzania’s went up to 31 December 2015. 
In principle, the movement of capital should be now fully liberalized in the 
EAC and any existing restrictions should be treated as a violation of the Treaty 
to be addressed by the East African Court of Justice (EACJ).
13.2.2 Safeguard Measures and Exceptions
As much as EAC Treaty-makers provided for the free movement of capital, they 
were also aware of the volatility of this sector and the dramatic impact that a 
very slight disfunctioning could have on the Partner States’ national macro-
economy. This is why Article 26(1) and (3) of the Common Market Protocol 
allow any Partner State to take the necessary steps when the free movement of 
capital disturbs the functioning of its financial markets or when its balance 
of payments is “is in difficulties or is seriously threatened with difficulties”.18
In addition, when the intervention made by a Partner State in the foreign 
exchange market seriously distorts the condition of competition among 
Partner States, Article 26(2) of the Common Market Protocol entitles other 
Partner States to take any necessary measures to counter the consequences 
of such an intervention. However, according to Article 27(1) of the Common 
Market Protocol, a safeguard measure taken pursuant to Article 26 should 
be temporary, proportional, reasonable, and should not discriminate among 
Partner States or be in favour of third parties. This provision does not however 
provide for a specific timeframe for what might be considered ‘temporary’.19 
Moreover, Article 27(3) prohibits Partner States to adopt or maintain safeguard 
measures for the purpose of protecting a particular sector, in violation of other 
provisions of the Common Market Protocol. However, the lack of specifica-
tion of these provisions may cause Partner States to adopt broad interpreta-
tions. For example Article 26(2) which specifies a ‘strictly limited period’ could 
be understood as meaning as long as the consequences of such intervention 
might last.20
18   Article 26(1) and (3) the Common Market Protocol.
19   Here it may be argued that the measure is temporary until the reasons it is taken to rectify 
are no longer present. This interpretation would be similar to the application of WTO law.
20   Nevertheless, paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 27 seem to suggest that the temporariness of 
safeguard measures have been discussed during the drafting phase of the CMP but that 
in the end, Partner States decided to entrust the Council with the task of monitoring the 
necessity of their enforcement. By analogy, in the EU, free movement of capital received 
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There is no clear indication on the nature of the safeguard measures that a 
Partner State may take pursuant to Article 26 of the Common Market Protocol, 
except the restrictions provided for in Article 27(2) and (3). However, once a 
Partner State decides to take a measure to safeguard its economy from any 
disturbance or distortion in balance of payments that the free movement of 
capital may cause, Article 27(4) obliges it to send a notification to both the EAC 
Secretariat and other Partner States.
In addition to safeguard measures that could interfere with the free move-
ment of capital, according to Article 25(1) of the Common Market Protocol, 
Partner States are also permitted to restrict this freedom for justified reasons: 
on the ground of prudential supervision, public policy considerations, money 
laundering, and financial sanctions agreed among them, provided that the 
Secretariat and other Partner States are informed. However, the Common 
Market Protocol raised the bar in allowing the use of restrictions based on any 
such exception as the concerned Partner State has to “furnish proof that the 
action taken was appropriate, reasonable and justified”.21 As indicated above, 
a Partner State that takes such a measure pursuant to Article 25(1) of the 
Common Market Protocol has an obligation to inform.22
Then some questions may arise as to the relevance of the requirement of 
appropriateness and reasonableness of any measures taken. Two questions 
remain: firstly, who is entitled to assess whether or not a Partner State’s mea-
sure impeding the free movement of capital was really justified, appropriate 
and reasonable, and secondly, what would the sanction be should such a mea-
sure be found not to fulfill these requirements. There is no clear regulation 
on this at the current state of affairs under the EAC law. Unless a case is filed 
before the EACJ, the full implementation of the free movement of capital will 
depend, like other community freedoms, on the good will of Partner States.
a distinct treatment by the ECJ and the Commission—the latter sometimes opposing 
to full liberalization—than the other market freedoms (C. Barnard, cited supra, p. 581).
21   Article 25(2) the Common Market Protocol.
22   It appears however that except Burundi, all other Partner States have taken in the past 
measures restricting the free movement of capital either on the ground of prudential 
supervision, public policy or anti-money laundering without taking care of informing 
neither the Secretariat nor the other Partner States (EAC Common Market Scorecard 2014, 
pp. 44–54). It is worth noting that no Partner State has taken a restrictive measure against 
the free movement of capital on the ground of financial sanctions.
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13.3 Problems Facing the Free Movement of Capital in the EAC 
Common Market
History has shown that, following trade liberalization between EAC Partner 
States, industrial agglomeration as a consequence of inequitable FDI inflow 
is more than hypothetical. Kenya’s historical position as the favorite destina-
tion for European and Indian FDI during the colonial period is uncontested.23 
This preferential treatment permitted Kenya to become industrially more 
advanced than the other two founding Partner States, Tanzania and Uganda. 
While Kenya has been able to maintain its industrial development advantage 
vis-à-vis Tanzania and Uganda, the industrial gap between Partner States has 
been widened by the accession of Burundi and Rwanda in 2007, and later 
South Sudan on 15 April 2016. Consequently, the differences in Partner States’ 
development levels remain significant.24
Nevertheless, it would be shortsighted to attribute the current differences 
in Partner States’ development levels exclusively to historical decisions. Apart 
from the colonial decisions that favored the industrial development of one 
Partner State to the detriment of others, deep structural discrepancies in 
terms of factor endowments exist between them. The combination of his-
torical events and disproportionate factor endowment distribution between 
Partner States predisposes the EAC to be an unbalanced region, especially with 
the implementation of a fully-fledged common market where goods, persons 
(including workers), services and capital enjoy total free movement rights. In 
other words, the implementation of free movement of goods, persons, services 
and capital would foster an inequitable FDI inflow between Partner States.25
This inequitable attraction of FDI would create polarization within the EAC, 
whereby one or two countries with the best combination of FDI determinants, 
i.e. market access,26 economic growth, human capital stock, infrastructure, 
23   Mbembe Binda, Good Governance and Foreign Direct Investment: A Legal Contribution 
to a Balanced Economic Development in the East African Community (EAC) (Uitgeverij 
BOXPress, 2015), 30.
24   Ibid., pp. 213–240.
25   On more about the impact of regional integration on the location of industries, see 
P. Krugman, Development, Geography and Economic Theory (MIT Press, 1995).
26   It is generally agreed that regional integration affects FDI determinants. For instance, in 
a common market, a factor like market size becomes less significant as FDI determinant 
for a single country since companies would focus increasingly on regional rather than 
local market. See A. Mold, ‘The Impact of the Single Market Programme on the Locational 
Determinants of US Manufacturing Affiliates: An Economic Analysis’, [2003] 41 Journal 
of Common Market Studies 38.
Mbembe Binda400
regulatory framework, and agglomeration effects would logically attract more 
FDI than the others. In the new economic geography (NEG), the Partner States 
which present strong potentials to attract more FDI are considered as ‘central’ 
economies, while those with weak potential are called ‘peripheral’. According 
to NEG, structural differences between central and peripheral economies affect 
their respective ability to attract industrial capacity.27 Accordingly, ceteris 
paribus, the individual efforts of each Partner State to attract more FDI to fos-
ter its own industrial development could not change the balance of power 
between ‘central’ and ‘peripheral’ Partner States. On the contrary, such individ-
ual efforts would lead to a fierce intra-EAC competition for FDI inflow, which 
in the end would unfortunately increase the gap between the two groups. 
Following the agglomeration effect that underpins the NEG theory, ‘central’ 
Partner States would attract more and more FDI—which implies becoming 
more and more industrialized—while ‘peripheral’ ones would attract less and 
less FDI. With no doubt, such a situation would arouse old demons of inequi-
table sharing of the benefits of the Community between Partner States which 
compromised previous regional integration initiatives in the EAC.
The occurrence of such a ‘central-peripheral’ division in FDI inflow in EAC 
would lead to a Rambo situation.28 According to an unfolding theory of regional 
integration between developing countries, “increasing of extra-regional FDI 
and export flows for one member state cause losses for other members” since 
FDI are “common pool resources”.29 Consequently, the most frustrated Partner 
State(s) would become a Rambo with the dominant strategy of defection. 
Depending on the importance or the number of defected Partner States, the 
frustration over unbalanced FDI inflow might lead to the collapse of the EAC.
27   See also A. Mold, cited supra, p. 38. For more details about NEG, see J.P. Neary, ‘Of Hype and 
Hyperbolas: Introducing the New Economic Geography’, [2001] 39 Journal of Economic 
Literature 536.
28   S. Krapohl and S. Fink, cited supra, 475. It should be recalled that the “term ‘Rambo’ does 
not refer to the Hollywood movie, but to a game-theoretical constellation of two actors. 
A Rambo situation is an asymmetrical game, where one player has a dominant strat-
egy to co-operate, whereas the Rambo’s dominant strategy is defection”. S. Krapohl, K.I. 
Meissner and J. Muntschick, ‘Regional Powers as Leaders or Rambos? The Ambivalent 
Behaviour of Brazil and South Africa in Regional Economic Integration’ [2014] 52 Journal 
of Common Market Studies 880 referring to K. Holzinger, ‘Common Goods, Matrix Games 
and Institutional Response’ [2003] 9 European Journal of International Relations 173.
29   S. Krapohl and S. Fink, ‘Different Paths of Regional Integration: Trade Networks and 
Regional Institution-Building in Europe, Southeast Asia and Southern Africa’ [2013] 51 
Journal of Common Market 474.
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The threat of an EAC collapse over Partner State’s frustration based on ineq-
uitable FDI inflow could be accused of overstatement. However, whatever its 
magnitude, the threat is real and should be taken seriously, at least for two 
reasons. The first reason is history-based. In fact, previous crises in the EAC 
were closely related to the inequitable FDI inflow between Partner States,30 
though it must be acknowledged that in the colonial era the terminology FDI 
was not yet commonly used. The second reason lays with the importance 
that is accorded to FDI inflow by both the Partner States and the EAC Treaty. 
For Partner States, it is commonly believed that FDI is the most appropriate 
supplement, if not alternative, to conditionality-tied Official Development 
Aid (ODA).31 This belief motivates most countries, EAC Partner States 
included, to undergo various reforms to maximize the inflow of FDI in their 
territories. Consequently, it would not be surprising for a Partner State to 
vehemently oppose anything that could deter or divert the flow of FDI into its 
territory, even if it is a regional integration requirement.
As for the EAC Treaty, it mentions the attraction of investment as the means 
for the realization of a fast and balanced regional development.32 To under-
stand to the fullest extent the expectations put by the EAC on the attraction 
of investment, one should remember that the treaty-makers deplored unbal-
anced regional development as a key factor that caused “continued dispro-
portionate sharing of the benefits of the community among Partner States”, 
which is identified as one of the “main reasons contributing to the collapse” of 
the EAC.33 In contemplating the attraction of investment as a remedy against 
EAC’s chronic unbalanced regional development, treaty-makers themselves 
30   Reference is made to the collapse of the East African Common Services Organizations 
(EACSO) in 1964 following the Kampala Agreement and the collapse of the former EAC in 
1977, as also rightly acknowledged by paragraph 4 of the Preamble to the Arusha Treaty.
31   Despite the controversial econometric results of the impact of FDI on the host coun-
try’s economy, developing countries—including EAC Partner States—have massively 
embarked in the battle to secure more FDI inflows. This battle is fought on all grounds, 
including in particular the reform of national policies and regulations and the availability 
of various forms of incentives to attract FDI. The attraction of FDI is even considered 
by some authors as the rationale for regional integration in developing regions. See for 
instance S. Krapohl and S. Fink, cited supra, 474.
32   Paragraph 11 of the Arusha Treaty preamble which reads “And whereas the said countries, 
with a view to realizing a fast and balanced regional development are resolved to creating 
an enabling environment in all the Partner States in order to attract investment . . .”. See 
also articles 79–80 of Arusha Treaty that stress the need for cooperation in investment 
and industrial development for a balanced industrial growth within the community.
33   Paragraph 4 of the Arusha Treaty Preamble.
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had already decided to erect FDI attraction as one of the pillars of the regional 
integration success.
However, when one confronts these Treaty provisions (where a serious case 
is made for the attraction of investment) to the practice, the paradox becomes 
intriguing. As early as 2006, Partner States adopted a well-elaborated five-year 
Joint Export and Investment Promotion Strategies ( JIPS) where most of the 
threatening issues related to FDI attraction were thoroughly identified and 
adequate solutions were recommended. At the end of the JIPS implemen-
tation period, most of its provisions never came into fruition. The same sad 
observation could be made regarding the fourth EAC Development Strategy 
(EAC-DS) which advocated for the enactment of an EAC common investment 
strategy in tandem with the development of a mechanism for equitable shar-
ing of benefits and costs of EAC integration by 2016.34 The drafting of the EAC 
Industrialization Policy (EAC-IP) is another interesting example. While the 
EAC Treaty mentions the “lack of adequate policies” to address the issue of 
unbalanced development in the EAC, EAC-IP astonishingly overlooks to men-
tion the differences in Partner States’ economic levels as one of the key chal-
lenges for the industrialization of the region.35 Furthermore, no reference is 
made to the key role that FDI location could play in the industrialization of the 
Community. Therefore, no single measure is suggested by the EAC-IP to tackle 
the issue of the uneven distribution of FDI, hence of industries, within the EAC 
common market.
The fact remains that, despite rhetoric recognition of the need to develop 
a mechanism related to investment attraction in the EAC in order to foster a 
balanced regional economic development, Partner States have paradoxically 
displayed an exasperating nonchalance for the adoption of an adequate frame-
work and for its subsequent implementation.
This lack of regional regulation makes the common market a condu-
cive area for a competition between EAC Partner States for FDI attraction. 
Unfortunately, as the EAC is characterized by striking economic discrepan-
cies between Partner States, this intra-regional competition would be won 
34   See EAC, EAC Development Strategy (2011/2012–2015–2016): Deepening and Accelerating 
Integration [August 2011], pp. 65 and 154. (Hereinafter 4th EAC-DS).
35   The challenges facing the industrialization in EAC are exhaustively listed in the EAC-IP. 
“Development disparities among Partner States is simply marginally listed in the 
table summarizing the threats to the industrial sector. For more details, see EAC, East 
African Community Industrialization Policy 2012–2013 (2011) 9, available online at http:// 
industrialization.eac.int/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=38& 
Itemid=70 accessed on 10 February 2015 (hereinafter EAC-IP).
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by one or two Partner States offering the best combination of FDI location 
determinants, including inter alia the economic productivity, the availability 
of qualified human capital, the existence of adequate infrastructure, and the 
overall observance of good governance principles. To these determinants, it 
is necessary to add the agglomeration effect professed by NEG. In confront-
ing one Partner State against the other, a twofold observation is made. On the 
one hand, Kenya leads by far on five out of the six compared determinants, 
i.e. economic productivity, human capital, infrastructure, good governance 
and—of course—the agglomeration potential. On the other hand, Burundi 
seems to be worse off in this FDI attraction intra-EAC competition. As sug-
gested by Krapohl and Fink, the likelihood of a “Rambo situation” (defection) 
is very high for an unbalanced regional integration like the EAC. Burundi and 
Tanzania have demonstrated in the past the applicability of this theory in 
the EAC by their reluctance to join some fast-tracked projects such as single-
customs territory, single tourist visa, and the approval of national ID cards to 
be used as travel documents to cross their mutual borders. As no consensus 
could be found within the Community settings to fast-track these aspects 
of integration, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda—now known as the Coalition of 
the Willing—decided to make a tripartite intergovernmental deal under the 
Northern Corridor integration projects. The defectors, Burundi and Tanzania, 
are allowed to join at their most convenient time. Although, at the beginning, 
it was perceived as sidelining Burundi and Tanzania, this kind of arrangement 
is nonetheless allowed by the Treaty under the principle of variable geome-
try enshrined in the Article 7(e), as one of the operational principles of the 
Community. Undisputedly, the three projects named above are not directly 
linked to the flow of inward FDI in the EAC. However, the behavior of some 
Partner States exemplifies the propensity of defection when regional integra-
tion does not, for one reason or another, match the national expectation.
The regional cohesion is even more vulnerable when the object of the com-
petition is external, such as FDI attraction. In this case, if there is no common 
regional policy to streamline the behavior of member states vis-à-vis external 
actors, the likelihood of fragmentation is high. It is in line with this view that, 
in order to minimize the risks of defection based on Partner States frustration 
over the claim of inequitable FDI inflow, it is suggested that there is an urgent 
need for a regional common investment policy,36 especially on inward FDI in 
the area of goods production and services distribution.
36   It should be noted, however, such a regional policy must be within a large framework of 
common commercial policy which, to some extent, may require the adoption of a com-
mon foreign policy that Partner States have failed to make so far.
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The adoption of such regional policy is sine qua non for the harmonization 
of Partner States’ laws and policies. It is therefore a necessary prerequisite for 
the establishment of any sustainable mechanism for equitable sharing of ben-
efits and costs of the EAC integration. The regional investment policy would 
set common rules and principles for the admission and treatment of foreign 
investment in the EAC.
Since playing by the same rules does not necessarily guarantee the bona fide 
application of those rules by all the players—especially when they are dia-
metrically unequal—it is imperative to have a central referee to monitor the 
game. For the EAC common regional investment policy to be effectively imple-
mented, it is suggested that the competence on FDI in the production of goods 
and services distribution should be entrusted to a central regional authority, 
the Secretariat. This can be easily be based on the—so far unused—principle 
of subsidiarity contained in Article 7(d) of the EAC Treaty. Indeed, the EAC 
Treaty defines subsidiarity as a “principle which emphasizes multi-level par-
ticipation of a wide range of participants in the process of economic integra-
tion”. Of course, this short definition does not do justice to the rich content 
encompassed by this principle. To grasp this principle to its fullest extent, a 
leaf needs to be borrowed from EU law where the principle has been debated, 
clarified and tested in various areas.37
Indeed, in the EU, when it becomes obvious that an action can efficiently 
achieve its objectives only when it is taken at the supra-national level rather 
than when it is taken by EU Member States individually or collectively, this 
forms a compelling argument to transfer an authority to the EU, or for the EU 
to actually use any competences conferred on it. To assess this efficiency, con-
sideration is given to the scale or the effects of the proposed action.38
The principle of subsidiarity has not yet received any substantial attention 
in the EAC. However, as experienced by the EU, it can be anticipated that the 
effective development of the EAC’s operational framework will much depend 
on the applicability of this principle in the future.
As the Partner States’ individual promotional campaigns for the attraction 
of FDI would lead to toxic intra-EAC competition, the most efficient alterna-
tive way would be to apply the principle of subsidiarity in order to transfer 
the competence to promote and, to some extent, to protect FDI, to the EAC 
37   See also EU Chapters 2 and 4. Although in the EU the principle is often used to limit the 
use of a competence, one can also argue that it may be used to justify why the EAC should 
be presumed to have a competence and is allowed to use is, namely in those cases where 
the objectives stated by the EAC Treaty can clearly not be achieved at the national level 
alone.
38   See Article 5 of the Treaty on the European Union.
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Secretariat. Obviously, it is foreseeable that some Partner States would resist 
that competence transfer as, for many, competence of an area as vital as the 
attraction of FDI could mean loss of national sovereignty. For this, despite 
the fact that Partner States decided themselves to give up some national sov-
ereignty by the mere fact of joining the EAC, it is important to indicate that 
there are channels available in the EAC system for such decision-making. As, 
due to its predominant political character, the Council might be tempted to 
block such a competence transfer, the EACJ on the other hand has a very strong 
potential to play a role in furthering the pro-integration agenda. However, 
instead of putting the EACJ’s legitimacy at stake in trying to impose a position 
that the primary players of the regional integration would oppose, good gov-
ernance as a principle may help in reconciling Partner States’ diverging points 
of view about the decision to transfer the competence on FDI in goods and 
services production from the Partner States to the EAC. On this specific issue, 
it would be sufficient for all Partner States to think about this transfer not from 
their individualistic national interests standpoint, but rather as a step towards 
better governance in the EAC. Better governance would be materialized only 
through the adoption of better regulations and better institutional framework 
in order to pursue the objectives of the community.
13.4 East African Monetary Union (EAMU)
13.4.1 Journey to the Adoption of the EAC Monetary Union Protocol
According to Article 5(2) of the Treaty, the EAC regional integration can be 
achieved through four milestones: the customs union, the common market, the 
monetary union and the political federation.39 The first step has been achieved 
through the EAC Customs Union Protocol in 2005. The others remained in a 
state of dormancy until August 2007 when the EAC Heads of States decided 
during the 6th Extraordinary Summit that some extra steps should be taken to 
further the regional integration process. This Summit took a resolution that a 
common market and a monetary union were to be established by 2012.
Accordingly, the EAC Secretariat was directed to explore measures for the 
fast implementation of the Summit’s resolutions. This led to the adoption 
and signature of the EAC Common Market Protocol by the Heads of State 
on 20 November 2009 before it entered into force exactly six months later on 
20 May 2010 upon ratification by all the Partner States. Pursuant to this suc-
cessful progress, in January 2011, the Council put in place the High Level Task 
Force (HLTF) with the special mandate to initiate negotiations on a protocol 
39   See on these steps also Chapter 9 and EU Chapter 9.
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establishing a monetary union. As time evolved, it became clear that having 
this protocol signed within the timeframe directed by the Summit would be 
very challenging. The negotiation progress was communicated to the Heads of 
States during their 11th Extraordinary Summit held on 20 April 2013.40
This Summit urged the Council to accelerate the drafting process of the 
East African Monetary Union (EAMU) Protocol in order to have it ready for 
signature during its scheduled 15th meeting in November 2013. Following this 
instruction, the HLTF worked so hard that in July 2013 a consensus was reached 
on all the articles of the draft EAMU Protocol which was then submitted to the 
Sectoral Council for approval.
On 25 October 2013, a final legal touch was given by the Sectoral Council on 
Legal and Judicial Affairs in order to prepare the draft of an EAMU Protocol 
for the signature of EAC Heads of States, which was done as planned on 
30 November 2013.
13.4.2 Highlights of the EAMU Protocol
The EAMU Protocol entered into force in February 2015, after ratification by 
all the Partner States in accordance with its Article 30.41 EAMU is assigned, 
pursuant to Article 3 of its Protocol, with the objective of promoting and main-
taining monetary and financial stability with the aim of facilitating economic 
integration in order to attain sustainable growth and development of the EAC.
With the adoption of the EAMU Protocol, the Partner States commit to 
cooperate in monetary and financial matters, including: harmonization and 
coordination of their fiscal policies; formulation and implementation of a 
single monetary policy and a single exchange rate policy; development and 
integration of their financial, payment and settlement systems; adoption of 
common principles and rules for the regulation and prudential supervision 
of the financial system; integration of their financial management systems; 
harmonization of their financial accounting and reporting practices; adop-
tion of common policies and standards on statistics; and adoption of a single 
currency.42
40   See in this context also the much longer road to monetary union in the EU, as described 
in EU Chapter 13.
41   Uganda was the last Partner State to deposit its instruments of ratification with the EAC 
Secretariat in early February 2015. See C. Ligami, ‘Uganda ratifies the monetary union’, 
The East African, 7 February 2015, online at http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/
Uganda-ratifies-the-monetary-union/-/2558/2616360/-/g05itfz/-/index.html (accessed on 
23 April 2016).
42   Art. 4 EAMU Protocol.
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Article 5 indicates the necessary steps to be taken by the Partner States 
prior to the monetary union. These include the full implementation of the 
Customs Union and the Common Market Protocols in order to ensure close 
integration of their economies through trade, investments, and factor mobil-
ity; the harmonization and coordination of their fiscal policies, and monetary 
and exchange rate policies; adoption of common principles and rules for pay-
ments and settlements; harmonization of their payments and settlement sys-
tems, and that of their policies and laws relating to the production, analysis 
and dissemination of statistical information; introduction of bands and grad-
ual fixation of their bilateral exchange rates to facilitate the conversion of the 
currencies of the Partner states to the East African Currency Unit (EACU); and 
the integration of their fiscal systems and adoption of common principles 
and rules for regulation and supervision of the financial system.43
In order to realize an effective monetary union, the Partner States 
committed—in addition to the prior necessary steps mentioned above—to 
phase out any outstanding national central bank lending to its government 
and public entities and to attain and maintain at least for three consecutive 
years the following macroeconomic convergence criteria:44
– A ceiling on headline inflation of 8%;
– A ceiling on fiscal deficit, including grants of 3% of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP);
– A ceiling on gross public debt of 50% of GDP in Net Present Value 
Terms; and
– A reserve cover of 4.5 months of imports.
The Council has full authority to develop measures to ensure regular moni-
toring, assessment, and enforcement of adherence to the macroeconomic 
convergence criteria and fostering discipline in the Partner states.45 In turn, 
each Partner State has the responsibility of developing a medium term 
43   Art. 5(1) EAMU Protocol.
44   Art. 6(1) EAMU Protocol. For the purpose of meeting the Macroeconomic convergence 
criteria, Partner States agree to monitor the indicative convergence criteria provided by 
article 5(3) which are (a) a ceiling on core inflation of 5%; (b) a ceiling on fiscal deficit, 
excluding grants, of 6% of GDP; and (c) a tax to GDP ration of 25%
45   Art. 6(2) EAMU Protocol. See however the difficulties caused in the EU by a reliance on 
political enforcement of budget norms by the Council of Ministers, as discussed in EU 
Chapter 13.
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convergence programme to facilitate the attainment of the agreed macroeco-
nomic convergence criteria.46
The EAMU is a progressive process that is set to run for 10 years starting from 
the entry into force of the EAMU Protocol in 2014. This process will be com-
pleted by the adoption of the EAC single currency in 2024, provided everything 
goes according plan. The name of the EAC single currency will be determined 
by the Summit at a later stage.47 The single currency would be adopted by at 
least three of the Partner States that meet the prerequisites and the macro-
economic convergence criteria discussed above. Consequently, the Partner 
States which adopt the EAC single currency will form a single currency area in 
which that single currency will be the legal tender from a date determined by 
the Summit upon recommendation of the Council. However, before the single 
currency becomes the legal tender of the single currency area, the Council 
will have to fix irrevocable conversion rates at which the single currency will 
replace the current currencies of the Partner States.48
An institutional framework is provided by the EAMU Protocol to main-
stream the establishment of the monetary union within the agreed time-
frame. The first institution to be established for the purpose of EAMU is the 
East African Monetary Institute (EAMI) as a provisional institution in charge 
of the preparatory work for the monetary union.49 The EAMI was supposed to 
be operational in 2015. The EAMI will be shortly followed by the setting-up of 
the institutions provided for in Article 21 of EAMU Protocol, such as the East 
African Surveillance, Compliance and Enforcement Commission (EASCEM), 
the East African Statistical Bureau (EASB), and the East African Financial 
Services Authority (EAFSA) in 2018. These institutions will carry out various 
activities and initiate relevant reforms leading to the harmonization of Partner 
States’ monetary and financial policies, laws, and systems until the establish-
ment of the East African Central Bank (EACB) in 2024.
The EACB will be established by the Summit upon the recommendation of 
the Council in order to perform the functions of a central bank in the single 
currency area.50 It will form, together with the national central banks of the 
Partner States in the single currency area, a functionally integrated system of 
central banks, endowed with full independence vis-à-vis the Partner States.51 
46   Art. 6(4) EAMU Protocol.
47   Art. 18(5) EAMU Protocol.
48   Art. 19 EAMU Protocol.
49   Art. 23 EAMU Protocol.
50   Art. 20(1) and (3) EAMU Protocol.
51   Art. 20(4) EAMU Protocol.
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In this sense, the EACB will be mainly in charge of two things. Firstly, the EACB 
will deal with the formulation of the single monetary policy, binding on the 
Partner States in the single currency area, with the purpose to achieve and 
maintain price stability while contributing to the financial stability and eco-
nomic growth and development of the community.52 Secondly, the EACB will 
formulate a single exchange rate policy in compliance with the free-floating 
exchange rate regime chosen for the single currency area.53
It is worth noting that, as far as the financial rights and obligations of the 
Partner States in the single currency is concerned, Article 20(6) provides that 
they will be distributed among the Partner States in the single currency area in 
accordance with the financial key to be determined by the Council and which 
will be adjusted every three years.
Reiterating, the EAMU entails the formulation of a single monetary policy 
aimed at achieving and maintaining price stability. The Protocol paves the way 
for the introduction of a new single currency, which will be the culmination of 
the EAMU process. Economic policy-making competences as such will remain 
with the Partner States. In the EU, this model of the European Monetary Union 
featuring centralization of monetary competence while leaving economic pol-
icy with the national governments, and relying on mere coordination on their 
parts, has been criticized.54 A single monetary policy for the EAC implies the 
loss of an important tool for individual Partner States to address country spe-
cific shocks: nonetheless, strict adherence to the above-mentioned macroeco-
nomic convergence criteria has the potential to avoid these shocks altogether. 
Consequently, the introduction of a single currency in the EAC is one of the 
areas where the EAC should pay careful attention to the experiences in the EU, 
as it is imperative that it learns from the very costly mistakes that have been 
made there.
52   Art. 11 EAMU Protocol.
53   Art. 12(1) and (2) EAMU Protocol.
54   See for example Stefaan Van den Bogaert and Armin Cuyvers, “Of carrots and sticks: From 
sanctions to rewards in Economic and Monetary Union” in Bernard Steunenberg, Wim 
Voermans & Stefaan Van den Bogaert, Fit for the Future: Insights on the EU from Leiden 
University (Leiden University Press, 2016) (eds) 133.
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chapter 13A
Free Movement of Capital and Economic and 
Monetary Union in the EU
Armin Cuyvers
13.1 Introduction
Full economic integration requires both free movement of capital and 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).1 Free movement of capital, moreover, 
is a prerequisite for EMU. Considering their close connection, this Chapter 
covers both free movement of capital and EMU in the EU. In line with the 
overall objective of this book, the emphasis of the analysis will be on the early 
days and the gradual development of the free movement of capital and EMU. 
In addition, this Chapter briefly analyses the devastating euro crisis that has 
been plaguing the EU since 2008. Considering its ambition to create a single 
currency, understanding this crisis and its causes is important to the EAC for 
two reasons. Firstly, the crisis uncovered several structural flaws in the way 
EMU has been set up in the EU. Secondly, the EAC may learn from the different 
measures adopted so far to address these structural flaws, even if real struc-
tural solutions have not been found yet. Even if the economic and political 
contexts differ in significant ways, the insights provided by the EU experience 
may hopefully help the EAC to avoid the staggering financial and political costs 
the EU has paid so far. In terms of money, the bill already exceeds two tril-
lion euro (€2.000.000.000.000), not even counting lost growth and secondary 
effects, whereas the full political costs, perhaps including Brexit, are not even 
fully clear yet. Introducing an EMU, therefore, is a high stakes game, with real 
benefits, but also very real risks.
13.2 Free Movement of Capital
For a long time, the free movement of capital was the ugly duckling of the 
four freedoms. Whereas its siblings emerged from the 1957 Treaty of Rome as 
1   C. Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms (OUP 2013), 579.
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full-fledged prohibitions, the then Articles 67 to 73 on the free movement of 
capital were markedly less ambitious.2 Article 67(1), for instance, provided that:
During the transitional period and to the extent necessary to ensure the 
proper functioning of the common market, Member States shall progres-
sively abolish between themselves all restrictions on the movement of 
capital belonging to persons resident in Member States and any discrimi-
nation based on the nationality or the place of residence of the parties or 
on the place where such capital is invested.
Only those restrictions necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the com-
mon market, therefore, were to be progressively abolished. Article 68 had a 
similar ring to it, where it held that Member States should be as liberal as pos-
sible in granting such exchange authorisations as would still be necessary after 
the entry into force of the Treaty. Article 71 similarly required that Member 
States should endeavour to avoid introducing within the Community any new 
exchange restrictions on the movement of capital and current payments con-
nected with such movements or to make existing rules more restrictive.
This restrictive approach to the liberalization of capital movements can 
be understood from the economic situation in Europe at that time. The Court 
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) also respected the more reserved 
language of the Treaty provisions on capital, and at this stage did not apply 
the same expansive and effect-driven interpretation it applied to the other 
freedoms.3 The limited Treaty provisions and the cautious interpretation by 
the CJEU left a gap in the free movement of capital, which was gradually filled 
with secondary legislation. It was not until 1990, however, that free movement 
of capital was really established as a basic principle of EU law by Council 
Directive 88/361.4
2   For more general discussion see inter alia Cf. J. Usher, The Law of Money and Financial 
Services in the European Community (OUP, 1994), ch. 1 or L. Flynn, ‘Free movement of capital’ 
in Catherine Barnard and Steve Peers (eds.), European Union Law (OUP 2014), 443.
3   See, for instance, Case 203/80, Casati [1981] ECR 2595. See on the general tendency for 
expansive interpretations of prohibitions and restrictive interpretations of justifications EU 
Chapter 9, and for specific examples EU Chapters 10, 11 and 12.
4   Council Directive 88/361, OJ [1988] L178/5, effective as from 1 July 1990. See on this process 
further J. Snell, ‘Free movement of capital: Evolution as a non-linear process’ in P. Craig and 
G. De Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (OUP 2011), 547.
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13.2.1 Directive 88/361 and the Concept of Capital
Directive 88/361 prohibited all restrictions on movements of capital taking 
place between persons resident in Member States.5 In line with the other 
freedoms, it only allowed several limited exceptions to this general prohibi-
tion. Article 4 of Directive 88/361, for instance, allowed Member States to adopt 
all requisite measures to prevent infringements of their laws and regulations, 
inter alia in the field of taxation and prudential supervision of financial institu-
tions, or to lay down procedures for the declaration of capital movements for 
purposes of administrative or statistical information.
Directive 88/361 was replaced by the new Treaty provisions on capital in the 
Treaty of Maastricht and is no longer in force. Yet it remains relevant for the free 
movement of capital because the CJEU still uses the nomenclature contained 
in Annex I to the Directive to interpret the current Treaty provisions on capital, 
especially to define the concept of capital. The nomenclature classifies capital 
movements according to the economic nature of the assets and liabilities they 
concern, denominated either in national currency or in foreign exchange, and 
can hence also be a useful tool to interpret the EAC provisions on free move-
ment of capital. The nomenclature covers direct investments, investments in 
real estate, operations in securities normally dealt in on the capital market 
or money market, operations in units of collective investment undertakings, 
operations in current and deposit accounts with financial institutions, credit 
cards related to commercial transactions, financial loans and credits, sureties 
and other guarantees or rights or pledge, transfers in performance of insur-
ance contracts, personal capital movements, as well as the physical import and 
export of financial assets.
13.2.2 From Ugly Duckling to Global Swan: The Treaty of Maastricht and 
Beyond
The next major step in liberalizing the movement of capital was taken with 
the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht.6 With Maastricht, the free movement of capital 
leapfrogged from the least developed freedom to the most far reaching one. 
Capital became the only freedom that also applies to third countries, meaning 
that it not only prohibits restrictions to the movement of capital within the EU, 
but also to the movement of capital to and from third countries, albeit with 
some extra exceptions. Later Treaties, including the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon, 
retained this broad scope for the free movement of capital, which now is 
contained in Article 63 TFEU:
5   See Council Directive 88/361 Article 1.
6   See also EU Chapter 1 for the broader importance of this Treaty for European integration, and 
capital and EMU in particular.
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1. Within the framework of the provisions set out in this Chapter, all 
restrictions on the movement of capital between Member States and 
between Member States and third countries shall be prohibited.
2. Within the framework of the provisions set out in this Chapter, all 
restrictions on payments between Member States and between 
Member States and third countries shall be prohibited.
Capital movements include all financial operations essentially concerned with 
the investment of funds. Payments, on the other hand, concern transfers of for-
eign exchange which form the consideration for an underlying transaction.78 
As indicated above, both concepts are further fleshed out by the non-exhaus-
tive nomenclature in Annex I of Directive 88/361.9 Sometimes, moreover, it 
may be difficult to determine whether a certain activity, such as providing 
credit, falls under services, establishment or capital, as these freedoms often 
overlap. In such cases, the CJEU generally looks at the ‘predominant’ freedom, 
even if the case law is not yet wholly clear and consistent, and sometimes 
applies multiple freedoms simultaneously.10
In contrast to the original provisions, the CJEU has held that Article 63 TFEU 
has vertical direct effect.11 So far, however, Article 63 TFEU does not seem to 
have horizontal direct effect.12
7    See on this difference Joined cases 286/82 and 26/83 Luisi and Carbone [1984] ECR 00377 
and Case 308/86 Lambert [1988] ECR-04369.
8    Case 308/86 Criminal proceedings against R. Lambert [1988] ECR-04369.
9    For examples of categories that have given rise to doubts and litigation see Case C-318/07 
Persche [2009] ECR I-00359, Case C-256/06 Jäger [2008] ECR I-123, Case C-513/03 Van 
Hilten-van der Heijden [2006] ECR I-01957, Case C-364/01 Barbier [2003] ECR I-15013, and 
Case C-35/98 Verkooijen [2000] ECR I-4071.
10   See for example Case C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes [2006] ECR I-7995, and Case 452/04 
Fidium Finanz [2006] ECR I-9521, Case C-244/11 Commission v Greece, Case C-212/09 
Commission v Portugal [2011] ECR I-10889, Case C-326/07 Commission v Italy [2009] ECR 
I-02291, or Case C-251/98 Baars [2000] ECR I-02787.
   Case C-212/09 Commission v Portugal (n. 54) para 43; Case C-112/05 Commission v 
Germany (n. 33) para 18 and the cited case law; Case C-326/07 Commission v Italy (n. 54) 
para 35; Case C-543/08 Commission v Portugal (n. 54) para 42.
11   See for the first time accepting this vertical direct effect Joined cases C-163/94, C-165/94 
and C-250/94 Sanz de Lera [1995] ECR I-04821 par. 41, and later Case C-101/05 Skatteverket 
[2007] ECR I-11531 para 21.
12   See for example Case C-478/98 Commission v Belgium (Eurobond) [2000] ECR I-07587, 
Joined cases C-282/04 and C-283/04 Commission v The Netherlands [2006] ECR I-09141, 
Case C-112/05 Commission v Germany [2007] ECR I-08995, and C. Barnard, The Substantive 
Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms (OUP 2013), 586. For a different, if not as authoritative, 
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13.2.3 Restrictions and Justifications for the Free Movement of Capital
After the broadening of the Treaty provisions in Maastricht, the CJEU also 
started to apply the familiar expansive interpretation to the concept of a 
restriction in the context of capital. Any national measure that may affect the 
market access of foreign investors qualifies as a restriction under Article 63 
TFEU, and is therefore in principle prohibited. This includes any measures that 
may deter or discourage foreign investors from investing in undertakings in a 
Member State.13
As with the other freedoms, however, restrictions on the free movement 
of capital may be justified if they serve a legitimate aim in a proportionate 
manner. The legitimate aims are partially laid down in the Treaty, but the CJEU 
also applies the rule of reason to capital, which means that Member States may 
suggest any reasonable public objective to try and justify restrictions that are 
not directly discriminatory.14
Partially because it also applies to non-EU Member States, the express Treaty 
derogations for capital are more extensive than those for the other freedoms. 
To begin with, Article 65(1)(a) TFEU allows Member States to distinguish 
between resident and non-resident taxpayers in relation to matters of taxa-
tion, reflecting the Member States’ competence over taxation.15 Article 65(1)(a) 
TFEU, however, is strictly interpreted by the Court, especially as far as compa-
rability is concerned.16 Article 65(1)(b) TFEU contains the general aims of pub-
lic policy and public security that may justify restrictions, and is similar to the 
aims mentioned in Articles 36, 45 (3) and 52 TFEU. In addition, it provides that 
restrictions may be justified in order to prevent infringements of national law 
and regulations, in particular in the field of taxation and prudential supervi-
sion of financial institutions, and to require declarations of capital movements 
for purposes of administrative or statistical information.17
view see J. Rickford, ‘Protectionism, Capital Freedom, and the Internal Market’, in Bernitz 
& Ringe (eds), Company Law and Economic Protectionism (OUP 2010) p. 77.
13   See for example Case C-543/08 Commission v Portugal ECLI:EU:C:2010:669, par. 69, Case 
C-464/98, Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Stefan and Republik Österreich [2001] 
ECR I-173, or Case C-439/97, Sandoz [1999] ECR I-7041.
14   See on the development of the rule of reason in general also EU Chapter 9 and 10, as it was 
first established in the context of the free movement of goods.
15   See also Case C-35/98 Verkooijen [2000] ECR I-4071.
16   See for example Case C-315/02 Lenz [2004] ECR I-7063 or Case C-559/13 Grünewald 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:109.
17   See for example Case C-439/97 Sandoz [1999] ECR I-7041, Joined cases C-358/93 and 
C-416/93 Bordessa ECLI:EU:C:1995:54, Case C-54/99 Association Eglise de scientologie 
de Paris [2000] ECR I-1335. In the recent restrictions imposed in Greece to protect its 
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When it comes to capital movements to and from third countries, moreover, 
the Treaty allows four additional types of restrictions, some to be imposed 
at the EU level. Firstly, Article 64 (1) TFEU allows Member States to maintain 
restrictions that already existed on 31 December 1993, and is known as the 
grandfather clause. Secondly, Article 64 (2) and (3) and Article 65 (4) TFEU 
allow the EU, and especially the Council, to adopt measures regarding capi-
tal movements with third countries. Thirdly, Article 65 (4) TFEU concerns 
Council approval of restrictive tax measures concerning third countries. 
Lastly, Article 66 TFEU allows the Council, on a proposal from the Commission 
and after consulting the European Central Bank, to take safeguard measures 
in exceptional circumstances where movements of capital to or from third 
countries cause, or threaten to cause, serious difficulties for the operation of 
Economic and Monetary Union.
As to the rule of reason grounds for restricting the free movement of capital, 
the CJEU again follows the open-ended approach developed in the context of 
goods, allowing Member States to put forward any public interest that may 
potentially justify a restriction. So far, for example, the CJEU has accepted inter 
alia the protection of the environment, the promotion of research and devel-
opment, or the safeguarding public housing as legitimate aims.18
Again in line with the other freedoms, the real bottleneck for justifying 
restrictions remains the proportionality test, which requires that a national 
measure is both suitable and necessary to achieve its legitimate aim. Especially 
the necessity test, which requires that there is no less restrictive way to 
achieve the same legitimate aim, can be difficult to satisfy.19 For example, sys-
tems of prior authorisation will generally be disproportionate as a system of 
post-facto declaration will often be able to safeguard the same public interests.20 
When defending a restriction, therefore, the Member State has to convince the 
CJEU that there really is no less restrictive measure possible that may achieve 
the same result, whereby the CJEU tends to be more lenient if it is obvious that 
banks and financial system, see European Commission, Statement /15/5271, Brussels, 
29 June 2015.
18   Joined cases C-515/99 Reisch [2002] ECR I-2157, Case C-10/10 Commission v Austria [2011] 
ECR I-5389, or Case C-567/07 Sint Servatius [2009] ECR I-9021.
19   In the context of capital, moreover, the CJEU sometimes separately applies legal certainty 
as a third criterion. See for example Case C-54/99 Association Eglise de scientologie de 
Paris [2000] ECR I-1335. For an example of a measure that was found proportionate see 
Case C-503/99 Commission v Belgium [2002] ECR I-4809.
20   Joined cases C-358/93 and C-416/93 Bordessa ECLI:EU:C:1995:54. See also Case C-483/99 
Commission v France [2002] ECR I-4781, for a somewhat more flexible approach.
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a national measure is bona fides and does not (also) serve protectionist aims 
such as protecting national champions or particular sectors of the economy.
13.3 Economic and Monetary Union: The Legal Framework Behind  
the Euro
As indicated in EU Chapter 9, an Economic and Monetary Union forms the 
most far reaching form of economic integration. Member States create a single 
currency (the euro) and transfer all monetary policy and significant parts of 
economic policy to the central authority. EMU can provide significant benefits, 
and becomes increasingly necessary as national markets become integrated. 
For example, EMU removes the problem of fluctuating exchange rates that may 
hinder free movement, and further enables and supports free movement of 
capital. At the same time, EMU can cause serious damage if not done correctly. 
Indeed, the euro simultaneously constitutes one of the crowning achievements 
and one of the most existential challenges facing European integration today.
The following section first discusses the long road towards EMU, followed 
by an overview of the legal structure eventually adopted to support the euro. 
Subsequently this section looks at the structural flaws in the way EMU has 
been structured in the EU, which have come into sharper focus since the euro 
crisis, as well as the attempts so far to remedy these flaws.21 As the euro crisis 
is still far from resolved at the time of writing, no final conclusions can yet be 
drawn, but the EAC can surely benefit from the many insights generated in the 
EU so far, and the cautionary tales some of these insights tell.22
21   Parts of this discussion builds on the description given in S. Van den Bogaert and 
A. Cuyvers, ‘Of Carrots and Sticks: What Direction to take for Economic and Monetary 
Union?’, in: B. Steunenberg, W. Voermans and S. Van den Bogaert, Fit for the Future: Insights 
on the EU from Leiden University (Leiden University Press, 2016), as well as A. Cuyvers, The 
EU as a Confederal Union of Sovereign Member Peoples, Exploring the potential of American 
(con)federalism and popular sovereignty for a constitutional theory of the EU, (2013, Diss. 
Leiden), Ch 13. In addition I gratefully acknowledge the great research assistance pro-
vided by my (former) students Carlota Marianne Wolters Corte Real de Paula Coelho and 
Victoria Trifonchovska.
22   Clearly this Chapter can only provide a brief introduction to this vast, complex and con-
tested topic. For further reading see supra 21 as well as the excellent discussions in K. Tuori 
& K. Tuori, The Eurozone Crisis, A Constitutional Analysis, (CUP, 2014), A. Hinarejos, The 
Euro Area Crisis in Constitutional Perspective (OUP, 2015) and F. Snyder, ‘EMU-Integration 
and differentiation: Metaphor for European Union”, in P. Craig and G. De Búrca (eds.), The 
Evolution of EU Law (2nd. Ed, OUP 2011).
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13.3.1 The Long Road to EMU
Long before the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, a single European currency was 
being considered. Already in 1969 very concrete plans were developed by the 
Werner Commission, which produced a detailed and well-considered road-
map towards establishing an Economic and Monetary Union by 1 January 
1981.23 This plan suggested that EMU would be achieved in three successive 
stages, and found inter alia that EMU could only work if it was accompanied 
by a transfer of all monetary and significant economic competences to the EU. 
With the benefit of hindsight, the Werner Report already pointed to many of 
the risks and weaknesses that would later plague the euro, and therefore might 
also be of great interest to the EAC.
Although the Werner plan was actually taken over in a 1971 Council Reso-
lution on the attainment of the EMU, this resolution was never implemented.24 
This failure was partially due to the economic circumstances at the time. 
Economic problems in the US caused the European currencies to float, taking 
away one of the central assumptions underlying the proposed EMU, namely 
the fixed exchange rates of European currencies. Instead of a Monetary Union, 
another mechanism was therefore adopted, which is generally referred to 
as the ‘Snake’. The crux of this Snake was that the difference between the 
exchange rates of two Member States should never exceed 2.25%. Already by 
1977, however, it was apparent that the snake had failed and was unable to stop 
the fluctuations between Member State currencies.
Besides these economic problems, the development of a real EMU was also 
hindered by political resistance to the transfer of economic policy to the EU 
level. Economic policy involves decisions on national spending, budgets and 
revenue. In other words, it concerns intensely political questions on how much 
money to spend and how to spend it, and consequently touches directly on 
national parliaments’ power of the purse, the bedrock of parliamentary power. 
One can understand, therefore, that Member States proved rather unwilling to 
transfer control over economic policy to the EU, even if pooling part of their 
economic competences at the EU level might be necessary for EMU or benefi-
cial in the longer run.
Even after the failure of the Snake, therefore, establishing a real EMU did 
not prove politically feasible. Two parallel tracks now emerged. Firstly, the 
European Monetary System (EMS) was introduced to combat the problem 
23   For a more detailed overview of the entire process leading up to the euro see O. Issing, The 
Birth of the Euro, (CUP, 2008).
24   [1971] OJ C28/1.
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of floating exchange rates.25 The EMS created the Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM) and the European Currency Unit (ECU). The value of the ECU was 
dependant on a combination of several Member State currencies. The ERM 
then contained some complex provisions to try and keep Member State cur-
rencies within 2.25% of their value as against the ECU. The ESM, however, did 
not prove robust enough to survive the currency crises of 1992 and 1993.
Secondly, a new process was started to establish full EMU in the medium 
term. This plan to create a currency union regained momentum in the wake 
of the Single European Act of 1986.26 In 1989, a committee headed by Delors, 
then the very influential president of the European Commission, submitted its 
report on how to establish an EMU.27 It proposed that EMU should be estab-
lished in three phases. The first phase comprised the completion of the inter-
nal market and membership of states in the ERM, which did not require Treaty 
amendments. The second phase entailed the creation of a European System 
of Central Banks (ESCB) which was to be entrusted with the task of coordinat-
ing national monetary policy and conducting monetary policy. The third and 
final phase would permanently fix the exchange rates and introduce a new 
single currency under the auspices of the European Central Bank (ECB), which 
would also be established under the third phase. With its three phases, the 
Delors Report bears great resemblance to the earlier Werner Report. Crucially, 
however, Delors concluded that an effective EMU required far less transfers of 
economic policy competences to the EU and far less economic convergence 
than previously indicated by the Werner Report.
By requiring less transfers of economic policy competences, the Delors 
Report reduced the political costs of EMU. The Delors Report also came at an 
economically and politically opportune moment. Economically, the internal 
market project was close to completion and the Member States were experi-
encing high economic growth. Politically, the Berlin Wall had just come down, 
which fundamentally changed the nature and dynamic of European integra-
tion. Afraid of the political and economic might of a united Germany, France 
wanted a single European currency to bind Germany to Europe. Germany 
accepted to give up its very strong Deutschmark as a price for its unification, 
but in return did insist that the legal framework behind the new currency 
would follow the German model, which included a strong and independent 
25   Bulletin EC 12–1978.
26   See on the broader importance of the SEA for revitalizing European integration and espe-
cially the internal market also EU Chapters 1 and 9.
27   Report on Economic and Monetary Union in the European Community (EC Commission 
1988).
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central bank and a primary focus of monetary policy on price stability. At this 
stage already, therefore, the euro was based more on political considerations 
than on economic ones, as well as on the rather optimistic assumptions in the 
Delors Report as to the economic coordination and economic convergence 
required to make a supranational currency work.28
With the political support of Germany and France, and on the basis of the 
Delors Report, the first stage of the EMU started in July 1990. In the mean time, 
an intergovernmental conference was set up to determine the necessary Treaty 
revisions to proceed to the second and third stages of EMU as set out in the 
Delors Report. This conference ultimately led to the commitment to a single 
European currency in the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht.
13.3.2 Maastricht and the Birth of the Euro
The Maastricht Treaty contained a clear commitment to EMU, and provided 
the Treaty amendments necessary for the second and third phase of the Delors 
Report. 1 January 1994 was set as the starting date for the second phase. Stage 
three, which included the creation of the European Central Bank and the 
introduction of the single currency, was to start no later than 1 January 1999.
Directly after the start of the third stage on 1 January 1999, the Council 
adopted the conversion rates at which the European currencies were irrevoca-
bly fixed and would later be exchanged for the single currency, which was still 
called ECU at this point. From this moment onwards, the ECU became a real cur-
rency, and exchange rate fluctuations became a thing of the past, even though 
Member States formally retained their own national currency. Even though the 
Dutch were still paying with their guilders and the Italians with their liras, in 
other words, these were in reality no longer different currencies, but rather dif-
ferent variants of the ECU, even if most people did not realize this yet.
28   On the economics of EMU, including the problem of an optimum currency union and the 
debates between monetarists and economists and between German ordoliberalism and 
French dirigisme, see inter alia K. Tuori and K. Tuori, The Eurozone Crisis, a Constitutional 
Analysis (CUP, 2014), D. Daianu, C. D’Adda, G. Basevi, and R. Kumar, The Eurozone cri-
sis and the future of Europe: the political economy of further integration and governance. 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), H. Snaith, ‘Narratives of Optimum Currency Area Theory and 
Eurozone Governance’ 19(2) 2014 New Political Economy, 183, B. Eichengreen, ‘European 
Monetary Integration with Benefit of Hindsight’, 50 (2012) Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 123, J. Rodden, Hamilton’s Paradox: The Promise and Peril of Fiscal Federalism 
(CUP, 2006), W.E. Oates, ‘Toward A Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism’, 12 
(2005) International Tax and Public Finance, 349, and R. Mundell, ‘A Theory of Optimum 
Currency Areas’ 51 (1961) American Economic Review 657.
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The start of stage three also entailed the establishment of the European 
Central Bank (ECB) to replace the European Monetary Institute (EMI). This 
institute had done preparatory work during stage 2, but in phase three it was 
time for the independent ECB to step in and take control of the single cur-
rency. The ECB heads the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and has 
the exclusive competence to determine EU monetary policy.29 Member States, 
therefore, have lost all competences regarding monetary policy.30 The primary 
objective of the ESCB is to maintain price stability. The ECB’s primary instru-
ment thereby is its control over the interest rate in the Euro zone. Without 
prejudice to this objective of price stability, the ESCB also aims to support 
the general economic policies in the Community, acting in accordance with the 
principle of an open market economy with free competition. Further ESCB 
tasks include conducting foreign-exchange operations, holding and managing 
the official foreign reserves of the Member States and promoting the smooth 
operation of payment systems. The exclusive right to authorise the issue of 
banknotes within the Community also lies with the ECB. Coins may be issued 
by the Member States, subject to approval by the ECB on the volume of the 
issue.
As of 1 January 2002, the euro was introduced in all Member States partici-
pating in the EMU and, after a short transitional period, became the only legal 
tender in these countries, fully replacing the former Member State currencies.
To join the euro, Member States had to fulfil several legal and economic 
requirements. Amongst other things, they had to establish completely inde-
pendent national central banks and meet the ‘convergence criteria’ laid 
down in Article 140(1) TFEU and Protocol No. 13. These inter alia required a 
high degree of price stability, normal fluctuation margins (ERM II), and dura-
ble convergence of interest rates. Most famously, these criteria imposed the 
famous deficit limit of 3% and debt limit of 60% of GDP to ensure the sustain-
ability of the government’s financial position.
On 1 January 1999, so at the start of phase three, the Council, meeting at the 
level of heads of state and government, found that 11 of the then 15 EU Member 
States met these criteria and were allowed to join the euro. At this stage, 
Greece was not yet allowed to join, whereas the UK, Denmark and Sweden did 
not want to join. One and a half years later, however, in July 2000, Greece was 
already allowed in, joining therefore even before the euro would be physically 
29   See Article 127 TFEU.
30   See EU Chapter 3 on the nature of EU exclusive competences. Please note though that the 
national central banks are represented in the ESCB, and therefore it is the independent 
national central banks that set EU Monetary policy, together with the ECB board.
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introduced on 1 January 2002. Currently, 19 out of the 28 Member States have 
the euro as their currency.31
For Member States, joining the euro meant going beyond coordination of 
national economic policies. Most importantly, Member States that participate 
in the euro are under a binding legal obligation to keep their deficits under 
3% and their debt under 60% of GDP. This stricter coordination, however, is 
a far cry from the real Economic Union envisioned by Werner. Member States 
still set their own economic policies, albeit that they have to do so within an 
increasingly tight framework of EU coordination and supervision. As we will 
see, it is precisely this gap between an exclusive EU monetary policy and an 
essentially intergovernmental coordination of economic policy that turned 
out to be one of the key flaws in the euro.
13.3.3 The Asymmetry Between Monetary and Economic Union: The Fault 
Lines of the Euro
As indicated above, the legal framework behind the euro is fundamentally 
asymmetric.32 Monetary policy became an exclusive EU competence, but eco-
nomic policy largely remained a Member State competence. Economic and 
monetary policies are therefore regulated at different levels, even though both 
are essential for a stable euro. The primary reason for this asymmetry is that 
Member States did not want to transfer control over economic policy to the 
EU, as it is so central to national politics. In addition, because economic pol-
icy is so connected to national politics, it also remains the question if the EU 
could be legitimate enough to wield far reaching competences over national 
economic policy.33
Member States, therefore, were fully aware of this asymmetry at Maastricht, 
but thought it could be compensated by two control mechanisms: market dis-
cipline and public discipline.
Market discipline was to be ensured by Articles 123 to 125 TFEU. Article 123 
TFEU prohibits monetary financing, meaning that the ECB and national central 
banks are not allowed to provide financial assistance, directly or indirectly, to 
Member States. Member States, therefore, cannot turn on the printing presses 
31   See for an overview <http://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/money/euro_en>.
32   See also J.-V. Louis, ‘The Economic and Monetary Union: Law and Institutions’, 41 (2004) 
Common Market Law Review, 1075.
33   See on the limited capacity of the EU, due to its confederal basis, A. Cuyvers, The EU 
as a Confederal Union of Sovereign Member Peoples, Exploring the potential of American 
(con)federalism and popular sovereignty for a constitutional theory of the EU, (2013, Diss. 
Leiden), Ch 13.
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when they need more money. Article 124 TFEU prohibits privileged access 
to financial institutions for the EU or Member States, again preventing them 
from getting easy money in this manner. Article 125 TFEU, the famous no-bail-
out clause, prohibits the Union and Member States from assuming liability 
for financial commitments of other Member States. This clause was essen-
tially designed to signal to the markets that each Member State would remain 
responsible for its own debts, and would not be helped by other Member States 
in case of default. If a bank lends money to Greece, therefore, it should only 
look at the financial situation of Greece, and should not expect Germany to 
pay back the loan if it turns out Greece cannot do so itself. Jointly, these provi-
sions should ensure that Member States can only get additional money from 
the markets, and can therefore also be disciplined by those same markets. For 
if a Member States spends too much, and the markets know that this Member 
States remains solely responsible for its own debts, the expectation was that 
markets would ask higher and higher interest when buying the bonds of this 
Member State (i.e. lending it money). The higher interest would then make 
money more expensive, and force the Member State to borrow and spend less, 
so the theory went.
Public discipline was to be ensured via Articles 121 and 126 TFEU. Article 121 
TFEU contains the multilateral surveillance procedure, which essentially 
tries to ensure closer coordination of economic policies via soft law instru-
ments. Article 126 TFEU provides for the now infamous excessive deficit 
procedure.34 Under this procedure, the Commission examines if a Member 
State has or will have an excessive deficit. If this is the case, the Council may 
issue recommendations to the Member State concerned. If the excessive 
deficits persist, the Council may eventually impose serious sanctions, includ-
ing fines of up to 0.5% of GDP. The fines, therefore, are to be imposed by the 
Council, i.e. by the Ministers of Finance of the Member States themselves. 
Consequently, this system of public enforcement ultimately depended on a 
form of political self-policing. It required politicians to fine their colleagues 
for having excessive deficits, even as they knew full well that they might have 
excessive deficits themselves at some point in the future.35
34   See Article 126(1) TFEU and the now infamous Stability and Growth Pact, originally com-
prised of three elements, being a resolution by the European Council on the Stability 
and Growth Pact OJ [1997] C236/1, Regulation 1466/97 [1997] OJ L209/1, and Regulation 
1467/97 [1997] OJ L209/6.
35   Compare for the inherent weakness of such systems also the extremely limited use of 
Article 259 TFEU, which allows Member States to start infringement proceedings against 
each other, as discussed in EU Chapter 8.
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Despite the fundamental asymmetry at its core, the euro initially performed 
well. Problems arose, however, when the global financial crisis erupted after 
the fall of Lehman Brothers in 2008, and the euro came under increasing pres-
sure. The main trigger for the subsequent euro crisis was the near bankruptcy 
of Greece. After previous fraudulent figures were re-examined, it turned out 
that in 2009 Greece’s budget deficit reached 15.4% of GDP, more than five 
times the maximum allowed. Because of its financial difficulties, interest rates 
on Greek bonds rose sharply, threatening to cut off Greece from the capital 
markets completely. The critical situation in Greece, moreover, led to general 
insecurity and instability in the markets, also causing financial difficulties for 
other euro area Members, in particular Ireland, Portugal, Cyprus, and Spain. It 
was, therefore, feared that a Greek default would cause a domino affect, lead-
ing to further defaults in much bigger euro economies that could no longer be 
contained or absorbed. At the height of the crisis, a complete melt-down of the 
European economy and the euro itself was considered a very real possibility.36
The depth, intensity and abruptness of the euro crisis pinpointed several 
structural flaws in the fabric of the euro, and demonstrated that several politi-
cal, economic and legal assumptions underlying EMU were incorrect.37 To 
begin with, the financial markets had not disciplined national budgets. Quite 
the contrary, for a long time, most euro zone members had paid almost the 
same interest on their government debt as Germany, even though they were 
not as stable. Between 2001 and 2009, for example, even Greece could bor-
row against close to the same rates as Germany, even though Greece clearly 
had not become as economically developed as Germany overnight. Instead of 
disciplining Greek spending, the markets had rather facilitated a significant 
increase in borrowing and spending.38
Secondly, the mechanisms for public discipline had also failed to contain 
the economic policy of Member States within the agreed boundaries. The 
first signs of this failure had already been visible when in 2003 the Council, 
for political reasons, decided not to sanction France and Germany for their 
excessive deficits.39 The overall failure of this political enforcement mecha-
nism, however, becomes even clearer when one realizes that by now all but 
36   Cf. M. Ruffert, ‘The European Debt Crisis and European Law’ 48 (2011) CMLRev, 1777.
37   See for an excellent overview of these assumptions K. Tuori & K. Tuori, The Eurozone 
Crisis, A Constitutional Analysis (CUP, 2014), as well as the literature cited supra note 28.
38   Note that if this windfall had just been used by Greece to refinance its debt and invest in 
structural reforms, the euro would have had a very positive impact. Instead, this golden 
economic opportunity was wasted largely on consumption, leading to bubbles.
39   See on this issue also Case C-27/04, Commission v Council, [2004] ECR I-6649.
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two euro zone members have had excessive deficits at least once, but no fine 
has ever been imposed.
Thirdly, it became clear that the EMU framework did not contain any mech-
anisms to deal with crises, such as Member States in financial distress. The 
system was premised on the idea that private and public discipline would 
always work, and that Member States would not fail. As soon as they did, how-
ever, it turned out that certain strict rules such as the ‘no-bailout clause’ of 
Article 125 TFEU became untenable. By introducing the euro, the members 
of the Eurozone had become so interconnected that they could not allow any 
euro state to default. Even discounting any arguments based on solidarity, due 
to contagion and spill-over effects the costs of letting one state default would 
simply be too great. The euro, therefore, had created the need to help euro 
states in crisis, but not the means to do so.
Fourthly, the original EMU framework was preoccupied with preventing 
public deficits and debts. Consequently, it was not sufficiently capable of 
detecting and dealing with macro-economic imbalances, including imbal-
ances in competitiveness and private debt. In addition, the assumption that the 
euro would automatically lead to sufficient economic convergence also proved 
wrong. As it turned out, macro-economic imbalances had only increased and 
significantly contributed to the crisis, for example in Ireland and Spain, where 
cheap money from several Western Member States had caused enormous bub-
bles. Many of the economic assumptions underlying the euro, which were inter 
alia relied upon to assuage worries about the fact that the EU does not form an 
optimum currency area, therefore also proved incorrect.
13.3.4 Fixing the Euro?
Even though it had started with a financial melt-down in the US, the euro cri-
sis therefore demonstrated several structural flaws in EMU and the carnage 
these flaws could cause.40 As abandoning Greece or the euro itself were politi-
cally and economically impossible, work was started to repair the EMU and 
to address, to the extent possible, the structural flaws that had been identi-
fied. This section briefly discusses the different measures adopted or proposed 
to address these flaws. As it can obviously not go into great detail, it focusses 
on the key objectives and assumptions underlying the different measures, as 
these will be of primary interest to the EAC. We start with a discussion of the 
crisis measures that were taken in the heat of the crisis, and then move on to 
the more structural measures adopted later on. These structural measures will 
40   For a powerful and concise economic analysis, see B. Eichengreen, ‘European Monetary 
Integration with Benefit of Hindsight’, 50 (2012) Journal of Common Market Studies, 123.
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be further subdivided into measures that focus on the EU level and measures 
that focus on the national level.
13.3.4.1 Crisis Measures to Save the Euro
The first crisis measures concerned direct aid to Greece, so as to avoid Greece 
from defaulting and potentially dragging the entire euro down with it. On 
2 May 2010, the euro area Member States, together with the United Kingdom, 
Sweden and Denmark, established the first Greek Loan Facility (GLF) of 
€80 billion.41 In addition, within one week of the GLF, the euro area Member 
States and the IMF set up a general €750 billion emergency fund to assist any 
other euro state that would run into difficulties. This emergency fund consisted 
of the European Financial Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM) and the European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF).42 The smaller EFSM was an EU instru-
ment, established by Regulation 407/2010 and based on the emergency clause 
of Article 122(2) TFEU. The EFSF, on the other hand, formally was not an EU 
instrument at all, but a ‘special purpose vehicle’ under Luxembourg private law, 
based on an international agreement between participating Member States: 
the crisis required a certain amount of legal ingenuity and flexibility at this 
stage. The EFSF had an effective lending capacity of €440 billion.43 Financial 
assistance could only be given on the basis of strict conditionality, entailing 
inter alia the adoption of austerity measures and structural economic reforms. 
Recourse to the EFSF, therefore, meant accepting far reaching influence by the 
creditors on national economic policy, and probably painful spending cuts and 
other austerity measures. In addition to Greece, who was the first to receive 
assistance from the EFSF, Ireland, Portugal, Cyprus, and Spain also received 
financial assistance from these emergency funds at some point, often to bail 
out their own banks.
41   The GLF is founded on two agreements concluded on 8 May 2010, available at: <www 
.eurocrisismonitor.com/Downloads/GLF.pdf>. The first concerns an inter-creditor agree-
ment among the euro area lender Member States, containing the modalities of their 
involvement in the loan facility. The second forms a loan facility agreement which sets 
out the provisions governing the pooled bilateral loans.
42   The basic arrangements concerning the European System of Financial Supervision 
(EFSF) are laid down in a framework agreement between the EFSF as a legal entity and 
the euro area Member States as its shareholders. Statement by the Eurogroup, Brussels, 
2 May 2010. See also A. de Gregorio Merino, ‘Legal Developments in the Economic and 
Monetary Union During the Debt Crisis: The Mechanisms of Financial Assistance’, 49 
(2012) CMLRev, 1613.
43   European Financial Stability Facility, EFSF Framework Agreement, available at: <www 
.efsf.europa.eu/about/legal-documents/index.htm> (last visited on 1 February 2016).
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In addition to these emergency funds, the ECB also played a vital role in 
crisis management, often throwing its full weight behind the euro. It was ECB 
president Mario Draghi who famously pledged that the ECB would ‘do what-
ever it takes to preserve the euro’ and that ‘it will be enough’. Even though the 
ECB could never directly support euro states in need, it did commit trillions of 
euros in buying up bonds on the secondary market and other unconventional 
monetary instruments, relieving pressure on euro states in distress and calm-
ing markets.44
These ad hoc bilateral loans, emergency funds and interventions by the ECB 
managed to prevent a complete melt-down, but it quickly became obvious that 
overcoming the crisis required more structural solutions as well, both at the EU 
and at the national level.45
13.3.4.2 Structural Measures at the EU Level
One of the first structural steps taken at the EU level was to set up a permanent 
fund to support euro states in crisis, also to signal to the markets that the EU 
was committed to the euro and to stop speculation against the single currency. 
The creation of a permanent stability mechanism first required a simplified 
Treaty revision to insert a new third paragraph in Article 136 TFEU, actually 
allowing the creation of such a permanent fund by the Member States. On 
2 February 2012, even before this new Treaty provision formally entered into 
effect, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) was established in an inter-
national treaty concluded by the euro Member States, and eventually given 
an effective lending capacity of €750 billion. Like the EFSF, however, it only 
provides financial assistance on the basis of strict conditionality. In light of 
the, often far reaching, conditions that must be met, Member States will only 
ask for assistance from the ESM where they have no other options left. This is 
also intended to counter the moral hazard of States simply spending too much 
as they expect to be bailed out by the ESM anyway.46
44   For the legal tension this created between the ECB, the CJEU and the German Constitu-
tional Court see the OMT Saga, played out in BVerfGE 2 BvR 2728/13 (2014) OMT (referral 
CJEU), Case C-62/14, Gauweiler (OMT), ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, and BVerfGE, 2 BvR 2728/13, 
2 BvR 2729/13, 2 BvR 2730/13, 2 BvR 2731/13, 2 BvE 13/13 (2016) OMT (final decision).
45   See also K. Armstrong, ‘The New Governance of EU Fiscal Discipline’, 38 (2013) European 
Law Review. 601, or S.C.G. Van den Bogaert and V. Borger, ‘Twenty Years After Maastricht: 
The Coming of Age of the EMU?’, in M. de Visser & A.P. van der Mei (eds.), The Treaty on 
European Union 1993–2013: Reflections from Maastricht (Intersentia, 2014), 451.
46   Cf on this risk T.J. Goodspeed, ‘Bailouts in a Federation,’ 9 (2012) International Tax and 
Public Finance, 409.
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In addition, measures were adopted to strengthen the control over Member 
States’ budgets and to improve overall economic policy coordination. For, if 
the fundamental asymmetry between economic and monetary union could 
not be removed on the short or medium term, the idea was to make EU con-
trol over national economic policy more effective, in a sense trying to fix the 
system of public control introduced at Maastricht. One important initiative 
in this regard is the so-called ‘six-pack’, which consists of six legislative mea-
sures that jointly increase budgetary discipline and create a system to prevent 
and detect macro-economic imbalances.47 The six-pack inter alia introduced 
the possibility to impose sanctions for excessive deficits by reversed qualified 
majority voting in the Council.48 Under this new system, any sanctions that 
the Commission recommends for excessive deficits will be adopted unless 
a qualified majority in the Council votes against the imposition of fines within 
10 days.49 This mechanism increases the power of the Commission, as in 
theory it should be hard to find a qualified majority to block sanctions. In prac-
tice, however, even under this new mechanism no sanctions have yet been 
imposed, despite several Member States showing excessive deficits.
The six-pack also created the possibility of imposing sanctions in the 
preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and in the newly cre-
ated macro-economic imbalance procedure. It also strengthened the correc-
tive arm of the SGP, allowing sanctions that range from an interest-bearing 
deposit of 0.2% of GDP to an irreversible fine of 0.2% of GDP.50 In light of the 
important role played by fraud in the Greek tragedy, Article 8 of Regulation 
47   Regulation (EU) 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 
2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area OJ 2011 L306/1; 
Regulation (EU) 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 
2011 on enforcement measures to correct excessive macro-economic imbalances in 
the euro area OJ 2011 L306/8; Reg. 1175/2011; Regulation (EU) 1176/2011 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of 
macro-economic imbalances OJ 2011 L306/25; Reg. 1177/2011; Council Directive 2011/85/EU 
of 8 November 2011 on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States OJ 
2011 L306/41.
48   See Articles 4(2), 5(2) and 6(2) of Regulation 1173/2011. The system of reverse qualified 
majority voting has also been introduced in the macro-economic imbalances procedure 
in relation to euro area Member States. See Article 3(3) of Regulation 1174/2011.
49   R. Palmstorfer, ‘The Reverse Majority Voting under the ‘Six Pack’: A Bad Turn for the 
Union?’ 20 (2013) European Law Journal, 186.
50   See especially Regulation 1173/2011. For macro-economic imbalances see Regulation 
1176/2011.
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1173/2011 also introduced a possible fine of up to 0.2% of GDP for the manipula-
tion of statistics.
In addition to the six-pack, a so called two-pack was also adopted in May 
2013.51 These two regulations primarily aim to improve the coordination of 
national budgets, and inter alia help establish the ‘European Semester’. Under 
the European Semester, euro zone members must submit their draft budgets 
to the Commission and the Eurogroup following a standard time-line, and take 
Commission and Council opinions and recommendations into account when 
adopting their final budgets. This mechanism ensures that the Commission 
and the Council already become involved in the national budget procedure at 
a relatively early stage. The opinions and recommendations of the Commission 
and Council are not formally binding, but the main idea is that increased trans-
parency, supervision and dialogue will guide Member States towards an eco-
nomic policy that is more in line with their EU obligations.
13.3.4.3 Structural Measures at the National Level
One interesting measure that has also been adopted so far does not focus on 
the EU level, but rather tries to improve economic policy and budgetary con-
trols at the national level. In 2012, all EU Member States except the UK and the 
Czech Republic signed the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance 
(TSCG), also known as the Fiscal Compact. Although the TSCG was rushed 
through to appease financial markets, and therefore has many limitations, the 
intuition behind the Treaty is valuable.
The TSCG firstly formulates the so-called ‘Golden Rule’, which requires all 
parties to create a rule of national law which demands that the budget is either 
balanced or in surplus. This rule, moreover, must either be incorporated in the 
constitution, or else in a law guaranteeing equivalent effectiveness to a con-
stitutional rule.52 The central idea is that the only legal instrument legitimate 
and powerful enough to limit national spending is the national constitution, as 
all lower legislation can be set aside by the same government and parliament 
51   Regulation 472/2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of 
Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with 
respect to their financial stability, OJ 2013 L140/1 and Regulation 473/2013 on common pro-
visions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of 
excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area, OJ 2013 L 140/11.
52   SCG Treaty Art. 3(1)(a) and (b). For discussion see M. Adams, F. Fabbrini, and P. Larouche 
(eds), The Constitutionalization of European Budgetary Constraints (Oxford, Hart 2014).
SCG Treaty Art. 3(1)(e). Note that this obligation, and hence the Golden Rule, only 
concerns the deficit, and not the debt ratio.
 429Free Movement Of Capital And Economic And Monetary Union
adopting the budget. In addition to the golden budget rule, the signatories 
of the TSCG are also obligated to create a national correction mechanism 
that kicks in whenever an excessive deficit nevertheless occurs.53 Lastly, and 
together with the two-pack, the TSCG also requires that states create inde-
pendent Fiscal Councils at the national level, which must monitor national 
economic policy.
The TSCG is often dismissed as a mere political gesture, largely intended 
to calm markets and acquire the support of Germany and the ECB for the 
creation of the ESM.54 Indeed the TSCG has multiple flaws and has not been 
implemented properly in most contracting states.55 However, at the same 
time, it also represents a valuable political intuition that as long as the EU 
lacks the democratic legitimacy to directly control budgets, effective budget 
controls must be primarily established at the national level, and then perhaps 
supported by secondary EU controls.56 Considering the political realities in the 
EAC, including the sensitivities surrounding sovereignty, such a more confed-
eral approach to budget discipline might also fit better in the EAC, or at least 
provide an interesting addition to more centralizing measures.
13.3.5 EMU and the Road Ahead
As indicated above, all the measures adopted so far have strengthened EMU in 
the EU, but have not yet addressed the fundamental asymmetry at the heart of 
EMU. Economic policy still remains a national competence, even if supervision 
and coordination has improved. Consequently, the debate continues as to the 
future of the euro and EMU in Europe. Three general schools of thought can 
be distinguished in this debate. On the one extreme is the school that reasons 
that a monetary union can only survive as part of a full political and economic 
53   SCG Treaty Art. 3(1)(e).
54   Cf for example S. Peers, ‘The Stability Treaty: Permanent Austerity or Gesture Politics?’, 
2012 EuConst, 404.
55   See for instance P. Craig, ‘The Stability, Coordination and Governance Treaty: Principle, 
Politics and Pragmatism’, (2012) European Law Review, 231, J-H. Reestman, ‘The Fiscal 
Compact: Europe’s Not Always Able to Speak German. On the Dutch Implementing 
Act and the Hazardous Interpretation of the Implementation Duty in Article 3(2) 
Fiscal Compact’, (2013) 9 European Constitutional Law Review, 480, or H.T. Burret and 
J. Schnellenbach, ‘Implementation of the fiscal compact in the Euro area Member States: 
Expertise on behalf of the German Council of Economic Experts’, 2014 No. 08/2013e.
56   See for a further development of this confederal take on budget controls A. Cuyvers, 
The EU as a Confederal Union of Sovereign Member Peoples, Exploring the potential of 
American (con)federalism and popular sovereignty for a constitutional theory of the EU, 
(2013, Diss. Leiden), Ch 13.
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union, but that full economic and political union is neither feasible nor desir-
able. Consequently, this school comes to the conclusion that the euro should 
be abolished, or a new currency set up between the strongest EU economies.57
The other extreme position agrees that a monetary union can only survive 
as part of a full political and economic union, but draws the opposite con-
clusion, namely that the EU should therefore take the leap of faith towards 
full political and economic union.58 This perspective is epitomized by the ‘five 
presidents report’ (FPR), the most recent high level proposal on the future of 
EMU.59 Although it does not seem to have the full political support of all five 
presidents, the FPR essentially suggests the ‘leap of faith’ solution of creating 
the economic and political union needed for a stable euro. To this end, the 
FRP proposes four interrelated unions, being 1) a ‘genuine Economic Union’, 
2) a Financial Union, 3) a Fiscal Union, and 4) a Political Union. Although the 
political union proposed is not really defined in the FPR, the measures sug-
gested go a long way towards creating a European federation, raising serious 
questions about feasibility and national democracy.60
The third school basically rejects the assumption that one needs full eco-
nomic and political union to create a sufficiently stable euro. Consequently, 
this school focusses on intermediate solutions and trying to find a middle 
ground that can both respect the primary sovereignty and democratic process 
at the national level, whilst also providing sufficient coordination and safe-
guards at the European level. Such solutions may look to combine insights 
57   See for example P. Krugman, ‘Revenge of the Optimum Currency Area’ 27 (2013) NBER, 
441.
58   See S. Van den Bogaert and A. Cuyvers, ‘Of Carrots and Sticks: What Direction to take 
for Economic and Monetary Union?’, in: B. Steunenberg, W. Voermans and S. Van den 
Bogaert, Fit for the Future: Insights on the EU from Leiden University (Leiden University 
Press, 2016).
59   Jean-Claude Juncker, in close cooperation with Donald Tusk, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, Mario 
Draghi and Martin Schulz ‘Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union’ (Five 
Presidents Report), 22 June 2015, available via: <http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/economic-
monetary-union/docs/5-presidents-report_en.pdf.>. Also seem the accompanying ana-
lytical note: Juncker, ‘Preparing for Next Steps on Better Economic Governance in the 
Euro Area’, Informal European Council 12 February 2015. The FPR forms an important 
evolution compared to the previous Commission ‘blueprint for a deep and genuine eco-
nomic and monetary union.’ COM(2012) 777 final, and the 2012 ‘Van Rompuy plan’, also 
known as the Four Presidents Report. The Van Rompuy plan was later adopted, in an 
even softer version, as the ‘Roadmap for the completion of EMU’ in the European Council 
conclusions on completing EMU of 14 December 2012, EUCO 205/12.
60   Cf B. Crum, ‘Saving the Euro at the Cost of Democracy’ 51 (2013) Journal of Common Market 
Studies 614 or G. Majone, Rethinking the Union of the Europe Post-Crisis (CUP, 2014).
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from the European Semester and the TSCG in an attempt to develop a hybrid, 
or confederal, system that can square the circle of a single European currency 
based on multiple national democracies and economic policies.61 If success-
ful, such systems could preserve the unique nature and potential of regional 
integration without slipping back into intergovernmentalism or leaping ahead 
towards uncertain federation. Yet to be successful this third school must also 
challenge the weight of history, and those economic schools that suggest a cur-
rency can only exist in a political union.
With Brexit, the euro crisis therefore remains one of the main challenges 
facing European integration today. The euro forces the EU to keep evolving 
and improving in its search for a new form of supranational governance that 
can respect national identities and democracy as the cradle of political legiti-
macy but that can also provide an effective answer to our globalizing reality in 
which public authority must be exercised above the state in order to retain its 
relevance and influence. As the EAC joins the rest of the world in this quest, 
also in the context of EMU, it may already take advantage of several practi-
cal improvements developed in the EU. For example, it may, as currently envi-
sioned, include an emergency fund like the ESM directly from the start, instead 
of only creating it when a crisis hits. In addition, it can create more effective 
tools for coordination and supervision of national economic policy at the EAC 
level by taking the lessons from the Stability and Growth Pact, the six-pack 
and the two-pack into account. These lessons can be combined with the sound 
intuition of the TSCG to also try and embed primary checks on economic policy 
at the national level, preferably via independent institutions. Equally, it would 
be wise to broaden review and coordination to macro-economic imbalances 
right from the start, as the EAC also does not form an optimal currency union.
None of these mechanisms, however, will sufficiently solve the fundamental 
asymmetry between national economic policies and an EAC monetary union, 
61   See for a discussion of this approach A. Cuyvers, The EU as a Confederal Union of Sovereign 
Member Peoples, Exploring the potential of American (con)federalism and popular sover-
eignty for a constitutional theory of the EU, (2013, Diss. Leiden), Ch 13, and for a more gen-
eral overview of these debates. K. Tuori and K. Tuori, The Eurozone Crisis, a Constitutional 
Analysis (OUP, 2014), G. Majone, Rethinking the Union of the Europe Post-Crisis (CUP, 2014), 
B. Eichengreen ‘European Monetary Integration with Benefit of Hindsight’, 50 Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 123, M. Hallerberg, ‘Fiscal federalism reforms in the European 
Union and the Greek crisis’, 12 (2011) European Union Politics, 127, W.E. Oates, ‘Toward A 
Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism’, 12 (2005) International Tax and Public 
Finance, 349, M. Adams, F. Fabbrini and P. Larouche (eds), The Constitutionalization of 
European Budgetary Constraints (Hart, 2014), A J. Menendez, ‘The existential crisis of the 
European Union’, 14 (2013) German Law Journal, 453.
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which, as in the EU, will persist as long as the EAC does not evolve into a full 
political union. Consequently, on this point, as on many of the other challenges 
facing European integration, the EAC will join the EU in the fray of regional 
integration, where its unique contributions and perspectives will be warmly 
welcomed. For, as far as regional integration is concerned, both the challenges 
and opportunities are more than big enough for all of us, and certainly too big 
for each of us individually.
©  joyce karanja-ng’ang’a, ���7 | doi ��.��63/97890043��073_0�8




14.1 Introduction and Background
Competition law is concerned with the structure and behaviour of enterprises 
in the market.1 It aims to create a market in which producers and traders 
would compete freely on the quality of products and services they offer and 
the prices they charge rather than through the improper exercise of market 
power, whether acquired unilaterally or in concert with others.2 Further, com-
petition law is important to provide a framework for competitive activity as it 
seeks to encourage and improve the competitive environment, create a condu-
cive environment for investment and promote the transfer of the benefits to 
consumers. More broadly, competition policy is designed to address “industry 
structures and practices that give excessive market power to sellers to raise 
prices above, or reduce quantities below the levels that would prevail in com-
petitive markets.”3
The increasing number of regional trade agreements for closer economic 
integration through removal of barriers against free movement of goods and 
services and labour, has raised the need for competition law and policy at the 
regional level.4 The Secretary General of the Common Markets for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (“COMESA”) in 2004 stated the issue as follows:
as the regional economy integrates more deeply, the necessity for appro-
priate policy instruments and tools is becoming increasingly urgent and, 
in this regard, a competition policy is important to ensure observance 
1   Melaku Geboye Desta, ‘Exemptions from Competition Law in Regional Trade Agreements: 
A study based on experiences in agriculture and energy sectors’ in Philippe Bruisk, Ana 
Maria Alvarez, Lucian Cernat (eds), in United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
Competition Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements: How to Assure Development Gains 
(United Nations 2005).
2   Ibid. 2.
3   Tarullo, D.K. (2000), Norms and Institutions in global competition policy, American Journal 
of International Law, 94, 478–504.
4   Supra. 1.
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of good corporate governance and promoting equitable and harmonious 
economic development.5
This Chapter examines competition law in the East African Community 
(“EAC”) which is the regional intergovernmental organization of the Republics 
of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and South Sudan6 (the “Partner 
States”),7 headquartered in Arusha, Tanzania. In order to ensure, protect and 
promote fair trade and consumer welfare in the EAC region, the Council of 
Ministers of the EAC adopted a competition policy in 2004.8 Subsequently 
the East African Legislative Assembly (the “Assembly”) enacted the East 
African Community Competition Act in 20069 (the “EAC Competition Act”). 
Additionally, the East African Community Regulations (the “EAC Competition 
Regulations”) were adopted in 2010 by the Council of Ministers. The EAC 
Competition Regulations mainly contain procedural requirements on the vari-
ous applications of the East African Community Competition Authority (the 
“EAC Competition Authority”) as provided in the EAC Competition Act. The 
EAC Competition Regulations are to come into force on such date as the EAC 
Council of Ministers may appoint by notice in the EAC Gazette.
The EAC Competition Act came into effect on 1 December 2014 by an EAC 
Gazette notice dated 23 January 2015. It has been ratified by all Partner States 
but the enforcement and operationalization of the EAC Competition Act has 
not yet commenced. This is primarily linked to the delay in constituting the EAC 
Competition Authority which is established under the EAC Competition Act10 
and charged with enforcing the EAC Competition Act.11 Notably, the Council of 
Ministers has now approved commissioners to the EAC Competition Authority 
and appointed a secretariat which is currently in the process of recruiting tech-
nical staff.12 The EAC Competition Authority is expected to begin operations in 
the third or fourth quarter of 2016.
5    Erastus Mwencha, Secretary General, COMESA: Ministerial Roundtable, (Cairo 2004).
6    South Sudan was admitted into the EAC by a resolution of the 17th Ordinary session of the 
EAC Heads of State Summit held in Arusha, Tanzania on 3 February 2016.
7    Somalia has also applied in 2011 for entry into the EAC but they have not yet been admitted.
8    East African Community Competition Policy, 2004.
9    Gazette of the East African Community No. 002 Vol AT 1-003 dated September 2007.
10   EAC Competition Act, s 37.
11   An interim organisational structure and budget for the EAC Competition Authority for 
the 2016/2017 financial year has also been approved by the Partner States.
12   Adam Ihucha, ‘EAC Competition Authority to Start Operations in July’ (The East African 
Standard 18 June 2016) <http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/EAC-competition-
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According to TradeMark East Africa,13 there have been other major chal-
lenges that have contributed to delays in operationalizing the EAC Competition 
Act. To begin with, there has been inadequate funding from Partner States to 
enable the EAC Competition Authority to start its operations and function 
effectively across the region.14 Furthermore, there are jurisdictional conflicts 
between the EAC competition regime and the national competition regimes 
leading to disharmony and enforcement hurdles. Similarly, amendments to 
the EAC competition legislation that would bring regional harmony have been 
delayed by national governments.15 In addition, the economies of the Partner 
States are at different levels of development, and there is still a quest for pro-
tectionism by the governments of some of the Partner States.16
More importantly, there has been a lack of political will and vested interests 
by the governments of some Partner States, who have shown reluctance to be 
supervised at the regional level on national economic matters such as national 
procurement law and industrial policy.17 Another major challenge is that the 
interface between sector regulators and national competition authorities has 
not been properly established in the Partner States.
The EAC Competition Act gives the EAC Competition Authority exclusive 
original jurisdiction in the determination of violations of the EAC Competition 
Act. This means that national competition authorities in the Partner States will 
not have the jurisdiction to make determinations or findings based on the East 
African Competition Act. Therefore, the jurisdiction of national competition 
authorities is limited to enforcement of their own national laws. The enforce-
ment authorities of Partner States are also obliged to enforce the decisions 
made by the EAC Competition Authority.18 Consequently, each Partner State 
authority-to-start-operations-in-July-/-/2560/3255818/-/b6nmku/-/index.html> accessed 
12 July 2016.
13   Elizabeth Sisenda, ‘Why EAC Competition Law is Key in Efforts to Spur Growth’ (The 
Business Daily, 2 November 2015)<h http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Opinion-and-
Analysis/EAC-competition-law-to-spur-growth/-/539548/2939986/-/12kt4ny/-/index 
.html> accessed 27 January 2016.
14   Ibid. The EAC Legislative Assembly approved a budget of USD 587,565 for the operation-
alization of the EAC Competition Authority in the 2016/2017 financial year which begins 
on 1 July 2016 and ends on 30 June 2017. Please also see <http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/
news/EAC-unveils-austere-budget-for-2016-17-/-/2558/3222616/-/14lj4l9z/-/index.html>.
15   Ibid. 15.
16   Ibid. 15.
17   Ibid. 15.
18   EAC Competition Act, s 44(6).
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is required to establish its own competition legislation, policy and regulatory 
authority.
At present, all Partner States have enacted national competition laws except 
Uganda. However, the Partner States are at different stages of implementing 
their competition laws. Kenya and Tanzania have functioning competition 
enforcement organs charged with enforcing their respective national competi-
tion laws. These are the Competition Authority of Kenya19 (the “CAK”) and the 
Fair Competition Commission20 (the “FCC”), respectively.
Rwanda is in the process of setting up an enforcement authority, the Rwanda 
Competition and Inspectorate Authority, to deal specifically with competi-
tion matters. In the meantime, Rwanda’s competition law, Law Nº36/2012 
Relating to Competition and Consumer Protection of 21 September 2012, is 
being enforced by the Ministry of Trade and Industry. In Burundi, the relevant 
competition legislation is the Competition Act, Law N° 1/06 of 25 March 2010, 
which establishes the Competition Commission. However, to date, the Burundi 
Act has not yet been implemented nor has the Competition Commission been 
operationalised.
As for Uganda, no specific competition regime has been put in place to date, 
even though over the years Bills have been submitted to Uganda’s Cabinet and 
Parliament, in particular a Competition Bill issued by the Uganda Law Reform 
Commission, so far unsuccessfully.21 Uganda, however has in place sector spe-
cific laws which address competition regulation in particular industries. These 
include, the Uganda Communications Act (Cap 106 of the laws of Uganda), 
the Electricity Act, 1999 (Cap. 145); the Financial Institutions Act (Cap. 54); the 
Petroleum Supply Act, 2003 and the Insurance Act (Cap. 213) as amended by 
the Insurance (Amendment) Act, 2011.
In light of the above, any comparative analysis to the practice of a Partner 
State in this Chapter will focus on the practice in Kenya and Tanzania, which 
already have competition regulation that is actively being enforced.
Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda are also members of COMESA and are subject 
to the COMESA competition regime comprised of the COMESA Competition 
Regulations, 2004 and the COMESA Competition Rules, 2004.22 Further, 
19   Established under section 7 of the Kenyan Competition Act, Act No.12 of 2010.
20   Established by the Fair Competition Act, No.8 of 2003.
21   Anne Brigot-Laperrousaz, ‘East-Africa and Antitrust: Enforcement of EAC Competition 
Act’, (African Antitrust & Competition Law, 14 January 2016), <http://africanantitrust.com/
category/burundi/> accessed 8 January 2016.
22   The COMESA competition regime is enforced by the COMESA Competition Commission 
established under Article 6 of the COMESA Competition Regulations, 2004.
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Tanzania is a member of the Southern African Development Community 
(“SADC”). Although SADC does not have a binding competition law in force, it 
signed a Declaration on Regional Cooperation in Competition and Consumer 
Policies in September 2009, which sets out a cooperation framework on com-
petition policy for the SADC Free Trade Area that helps streamline interna-
tional trade and support economic growth.23 Similarly, Tanzania is required to 
act within the spirit of this Declaration.
Therefore, an additional challenge with implementation of the EAC compe-
tition regime, in particular for Kenya and Tanzania is that no mechanism has 
yet been established to facilitate the interaction between the EAC Competition 
law, their national competition laws and COMESA (in the case of Kenya). As 
such, a merger transaction in Kenya, for example, may fall within the ambit 
of three separate regimes, and in theory would need to be notified to the EAC 
Competition Authority, the Competition Authority of Kenya and COMESA 
Competition Commission. This multiplicity of notifications would result in 
increased transaction costs and possible delays in obtaining merger clearances, 
making these regions potentially less attractive to investments. This is contrary 
to the objectives of the EAC competition regime which we examine in detail 
below. Further, there is the risk of contradicting decisions being issued by the 
different regulators and forum shopping where merger parties choose to notify 
only to the regulator they think is most likely to approve their transaction.
14.2 Objectives and Application of the EAC Competition Act
The EAC Competition Act states that the objectives of the competition policy 
and practice in the EAC shall be, among other things:
(a) to enhance the welfare of the people in the EAC by protecting all mar-
ket participants’ freedom to compete by prohibiting anti-competitive 
practices; protecting the opening of Partner States’ markets against 
the creation of barriers to interstate trade and economic transac-
tions by market participants; guaranteeing equal opportunities in the 
EAC to all market participants in the EAC and especially to small and 
medium-sized enterprises; guaranteeing a level playing field for all 
market participants in the EAC by eliminating any discrimination by 
Partner States on the basis of nationality or residence;
23   Southern African Development Community, ‘Competition Policy’, <http://www.sadc.int/
themes/economic-development/trade/competition-policy/> accessed 8 January 2016.
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(b) to enhance the competitiveness of EAC enterprises in world markets by 
exposing them to competition within the EAC;
(c) to create an environment which is conducive to investment in the EAC;
(d) to bring the EAC’s competition policy and practice in line with interna-
tional best practice; and
(e) to strengthen the Partner States’ role in relevant international 
organizations.24
The EAC Competition Act applies to all economic activities and sectors hav-
ing cross-border effect.25 The extent of the cross-border effect is not expressly 
defined but it is implied from the provisions of the EAC Competition Act to be 
within the East African Community.
The EAC Competition Act does not apply to: any conduct of persons act-
ing in their capacity as consumers; collective industrial bargaining; and sov-
ereign acts of the Partner States.26 It also excludes its application to restraints 
on competition imposed by and resulting from a Partner State’s regulation of 
specific sectors or industries to the extent that the anti-competitive conduct is 
required by such regulation within that Partner State’s own jurisdiction,27—
presumably a carve-out for parastatal monopolies or state aided firms.
The EAC Competition Act deals with specific aspects which would affect 
competition in the EAC including: mergers and acquisitions, prohibited 
trade practices, abuse of dominance, Partner State subsidies and public pro-
curement. Most of the provisions contained in the EAC Competition Act are 
broadly drafted and do not provide the means of interpretation or proce-
dures for implementation. Once operationalized, it is expected that the EAC 
Competition Authority, will publish guidelines, rules or regulations setting out 
its application of the provisions of the EAC Competition Act and providing 
more specific details of the way in which the EAC Competition Act is to be 
applied; this was the approach taken by the COMESA Competition Commission 
to which Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda are members. It will be critical that any 
such guidelines, rules and regulations are developed whilst taking into account 
the competition legislation in Partner States.
We consider the specific provisions of the EAC Competition Act governing 
cartels, abuse of dominance and concentrations below.
24   EAC Competition Act, s 3.
25   EAC Competition Act, s 4(1).
26   EAC Competition Act, s 4(2).
27   EAC Competition Act, s 4(3).
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Central to each of these provisions is the definition of the relevant mar-
ket. The concept of relevant market is defined in Section 5(5) of the EAC 
Competition Act. For the purposes of the Act, the area of the relevant market 
is to be determined by “the substitutability of goods or services for consumers in 
light of their intended use, characteristics and prices as well as by the substitut-
ability of different sources of supply located in different regions.” 28
14.3 Cartels
Black’s Law Dictionary defines a cartel as, ‘a combination of producers or sellers 
that join together to control a product’s production or price’.29 It is also defined 
as an association of firms with common interest seeking to prevent extreme 
competition, allocate markets or share knowledge.30
OECD explains a cartel as a formal agreement among firms in an oligopolistic 
industry.31 Cartel members may agree on such matters as prices, total industry 
output, market shares, allocation of customers, allocation of territories, bid-
rigging, establishment of common sales agencies, and the division of profits or 
combination of these.32 Cartels or cartel behaviour attempts to emulate that of 
a monopoly by restricting industry output, raising or fixing prices in order to 
earn higher profits.33 This then hinders competition by limiting the supply of 
specific trade goods or increasing the prices of such goods and services, mak-
ing them unnecessarily expensive and hence injuring the consumer.34
Cartel conduct is prohibited in most competition laws around the world 
including those in the Partner States that presently have competition legisla-
tion; and the EAC Competition Act is no different. The EAC Competition Act 
provides that a person shall not engage in a concerted practice if that practice 
has, or is intended to have, an anti-competitive effect in the relevant market,35 
unless permitted by the EAC Competition Authority.36 A “concerted practice” 
28   EAC Competition Act, s 5(5).
29   Bryan A. Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary, (8th edn, West Publishing Co., 2004).
30   Ibid.
31   R.S. Khemani and D.M. Shapiro, ‘Glossary of Industrial Organisation Economics and 
Competition Law’ (Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, OECD, 1993), 
<https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3157> accessed on 8 February 2016.
32   Ibid.
33   Ibid.
34   ‘Cartels and anti-competitive agreements’ www.oecd.org.
35   EAC Competition Act, s 5(1).
36   EAC Competition Act, s 7.
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is defined to mean, “any agreement, arrangement or understanding, formal or 
informal, written or oral, open or clandestine, between competitors.” 37 From the 
definition, the cartel provisions of the EAC Competition Act appear to cover 
only cooperation among competitors, that is, horizontal agreements. However, 
this may arguably include vertical arrangements with underlying horizontal 
purposes.38
More specifically, the EAC Competition Act prohibits the following 
practices:39
(a) collusion by competitors to fix prices;
(b) collusive tendering and bid rigging;
(c) collusive market or customer allocation;
(d) quantitative restraints on investment, input, output or sales;
(e) barring competitors from access to the market or from access to an 
association or arrangement which is essential for competition; and
(f) concerted practice restricting movement of goods within the EAC.
Additionally, any concerted practice by undertakings restricting exports to 
or imports from foreign countries is prohibited, if it is intended to have anti-
competitive effects on the relevant market within the EAC or on access of EAC 
undertakings to exports or imports.
Any person who contravenes the above provisions is liable to a fine of not 
more than USD 100,000. In this respect, the EAC Competition Act does not 
expressly provide an appeal mechanism for a person dissatisfied with the 
decision of the EAC Competition Authority. However, the EAC Competition 
Act generally empowers the East African Court of Justice (the “EACJ”)40 to 
determine any question with respect to any action of the EAC Competition 
37   EAC Competition Act, s 2.
38   Please note however, the provisions of the EAC Competition Act relating to abuse of dom-
inance also consider the vertical effects of the actions of an undertaking holding a domi-
nant position by prohibiting a dominant firm from engaging in practices whereby: (a) the 
resale prices or conditions are directly or indirectly fixed; (b) customers or competitors 
are foreclosed from access to sources of supply or from access to outlets; (c) movement 
of goods or services between different geographical areas are restricted; and (d) an intel-
lectual property right is used in any way that goes beyond the limits of its legal protection.
39   EAC Competition Act, s 5(2).
40   The East African Court of Justice is one of the organs of the EAC established under 
Article 9 of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community. EACJ’s major 
responsibility is to ensure the adherence to law in the interpretation and application of 
and compliance with the EAC Treaty.
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Authority. Consequently, an aggrieved person may appeal a decision of the 
EAC Competition Authority pursuant to this provision, to the EACJ.
However, the EAC Competition Act exempts certain practices from the 
application of the provisions stated above. Thus, in situations where the com-
bined market share of the competitors does not exceed 10% of the relevant 
market, the undertakings will not be prohibited from engaging in quantitative 
restraints on investment, input, output or sales or from engaging in concerted 
practices restricting movement of goods within the EAC.41
Additionally, where the combined market share of the parties involved in 
the concerted practice does not exceed 20% of the relevant market and the 
agreement relating to the concerted practice does not contain any of the spe-
cifically prohibited practices outlined in (a)–(f) above, the prohibition will not 
apply to the following practices: joint research and development; specializa-
tion or distribution; and standardization of products or services.42
The EAC Competition Authority may also exempt any other category of con-
certed practice, provided it has objectives which lead to the improvement of 
production or distribution and whose beneficial effects, in the opinion of the 
EAC Competition Authority, outweighs its negative effects on competition pro-
vided that the combined market share of the parties involved in the concerted 
practice does not exceed 20% of the relevant market.43
Any person44 who intends to engage in a concerted practice which does not 
fall into the exemptions discussed above, must apply to the EAC Competition 
Authority for permission. The procedure for the exemption application is pro-
vided in the EAC Competition Regulations. The application must be made 
in the prescribed form45 provided in the EAC Competition Regulations, filed 
together with a detailed statement setting out the reasons why the concerted 
practice should be permitted and accompanied by the prescribed fee46 (which 
has not yet been prescribed).
Under the EAC Competition Act, the EAC Competition Authority is required 
to determine the exemption application within 45 days from the receipt of 
41   EAC Competition Act, s 6(1).
42   EAC Competition Act, s 6(2).
43   EAC Competition Act, s 6(4).
44   The Laws of The Community (Interpretation) Act, 2004, section 2, a person is defined 
to include a company, corporation and association or body of persons, corporate or 
unincorporated.
45   EAC Competition Regulations, Regulation 16(1).
46   EAC Competition Regulations, Regulation 16(2).
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the application and communicate the decision to the applicant.47 If the EAC 
Competition Authority does not communicate a decision on the application 
within the stipulated time, the exemption application shall be deemed to have 
been approved.48 Notably, unlike most of the Partner States’ existing competi-
tion laws, for example Kenya, neither the EAC Competition Act nor the EAC 
Competition Regulations provide for an extension of the prescribed timelines. 
This means that the EAC Competition Authority would need to make any 
requests for additional information, raise any queries or hold any conference 
hearings within the 45 day period in which it is required to make and commu-
nicate its decision.
A person who engages in a concerted practice without the permission of the 
EAC Competition Authority commits an offence and is liable to a fine of not 
more than USD 10,000. It is not clear from the EAC Competition Act whether 
this penalty is in addition to, or instead of the USD. 100,000 penalty prescribed 
for breach of the provisions on concerted practices stated above. This is an 
issue that will perhaps be clarified by the EAC Competition Authority once it 
is operationalized.
In addition, any agreement that constitutes a concerted practice is void.49
14.4 Abuse of a Dominant Position
The EAC Competition Act defines a dominant position as:
a position of economic strength enjoyed by one undertaking individu-
ally or by more undertakings collectively which enables them to prevent 
effective competition being maintained in the relevant market by giving 
the undertaking the power to behave to a material extent independently 
of its competitors, customers and consumers and in particular to fore-
close other undertakings from competing in the relevant market.50
The definition of dominant position above is broad and gives the EAC 
Competition Authority a lot of discretion in determining whether a firm holds 
a dominant position. Notably, this can be compared to the EU where the rel-
evant provisions do not provide a definition of “dominant position” and the 
47   EAC Competition Act, s 7(3); EAC Competition Regulations, Regulations 16(3).
48   EAC Competition Act, s 7(5); EAC Competition Regulations, Regulations 16(4).
49   EAC Competition Act, s 26(1).
50   EAC Competition Act, s 2.
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concept of dominance has been elaborated on in case-law and European 
Commission Guidance Papers.51
The definition provided by the EAC Competition Act is different from that 
in Kenya and Tanzania where the market share held by the relevant firm is 
one of the main elements taken into account in determining if an entity is a 
dominant undertaking.
In Kenya, the Competition Act of Kenya defines a dominant undertaking as 
an undertaking which:52
(a) produces, supplies, distributes or otherwise controls not less than one-
half of the total goods of any description which are produced, supplied 
or distributed in Kenya or any substantial part thereof; or
(b) provides or otherwise controls not less than one-half of the services 
which are rendered in Kenya or any substantial part thereof.53
Additionally, and notwithstanding the above definition, an undertaking in 
Kenya will be deemed to be dominant if:54
(i) though not dominant it controls at least 40% but not more than 50% 
of the market share (unless it can show that it does not have market 
power); or
(ii) it controls less than 40% of the market share but has market power.
Similarly, in Tanzania an undertaking is deemed to have a dominant position 
if: acting alone, it can profitably and materially restrain or reduce competition 
in that market for a significant period of time; and the person’s share of the rel-
evant market exceeds 35%. It remains to be seen whether the EAC Competition 
Authority will apply a market share test when interpreting the dominance of 
an undertaking.
From the definition of dominant position above, it is clear that the EAC 
Competition Act covers both the conduct of a single dominant firm as well 
as collective dominance. This is distinct from Tanzania’s Fair Competition Act 
51   Case 102/77, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG v Commission [1979] ECR 461; Guidance on 
the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to 
Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/2. See also EU 
Chapter 14.
52   Competition Act of Kenya, s 4(3).
53   Pursuant to sec.4 of the Competition Act of Kenya, No. 12 of 2010.
54   Competition Act of Kenya, s 34(2).
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whose provisions on dominance are restricted to the conduct of a single firm.55 
Due to the delicacy of making a finding of collective dominance, which would 
place a considerable burden of proof on the EAC Competition Authority, espe-
cially in establishing a concerted practice affording the parties the power to 
behave to an appreciable extent independently of their competitors and the 
consumers, the EAC Competition Authority will need to adopt rules or guide-
lines setting out the criteria for economic assessment particularly an assess-
ment of the structure of the market.56
In addition, an undertaking on which small or medium sized undertakings 
(SMEs) are dependent on is deemed to be a dominant undertaking and is also 
bound by the prohibitions set out in (a) and (b) below.57
The provisions of the EAC Competition Act on abuse of dominance can be 
classified into three categories:
(a) prohibitions against exploitation of consumers—under the EAC Com-
petition Act, a dominant undertaking should not: directly or indirectly 
impose unfairly high selling or unfairly low purchasing prices or other 
unfair trading conditions; limit production or technical development 
and innovation to the prejudice of consumers; and discriminate between 
consumers or suppliers according to non-commercial criteria such as 
nationality or residence.58
(b) prohibition against exclusion of competitors—a dominant undertaking 
should not engage in any practice that excludes, or is intended to exclude, 
its competitors from the market by means of: predatory pricing; price 
squeezing or cross subsidization.59 Further, a dominant undertaking in 
the relevant market should not engage in a practice that harms the com-
petitive position of competitors on downstream or upstream markets by: 
a refusal to deal; a refusal of access to an essential facility; tying arrange-
ments; or unjustifiably discriminating among customers or suppliers.
(c) prohibitions relating to vertical agreements that is, agreements within 
the supply chain—a dominant undertaking in the relevant market 
should not engage in a practice whereby: the resale prices or conditions 
55   United Nations Conference for Trade and Development, (2012) Voluntary Peer Review Of 
Competition Law And Policy: United Republic Of Tanzania, UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2012/1.
56   Carina Olsson, ‘Collective Dominance—Merger Control on Oligopolistic Markets’ (2000) 
Göteborgs Universitet.
57   EAC Competition Act, s 8(2), 9(3).
58   EAC Competition Act, s 8(1).
59   EAC Competition Act, 9(1).
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are directly or indirectly fixed; customers or competitors are foreclosed 
from access to sources of supply or from access to outlets; movement of 
goods or services between different geographical areas are restricted; or 
an intellectual property right is used in any way that goes beyond the 
limits of its legal protection.
Any contravention of the above provisions on abuse of dominance is an offence 
punishable by either a fine of not more than USD 10,000 or imprisonment for 
a term of not more than 2 years or both. It is noteworthy that, as in mergers, 
the national courts in Partner States have jurisdiction in relation to criminal 
offences under the EAC Competition Act.60
14.5 Concentrations
Concentrations in the EAC are subject to merger control and the EAC 
Competition Authority must be notified of them promptly upon the conclu-
sion of the agreement in respect of a merger or an acquisition.61 It is notable 
that an agreement will be considered to be as such, irrespective of whether it 
is in writing or not. This notification is required to be made by the undertaking 
acquiring control through the merger or acquisition.62
The EAC competition regime is suspensory and therefore parties cannot 
implement a proposed merger or acquisition before obtaining the approval of 
the EAC Competition Authority. However, the EAC Competition Act contains 
deemed approval provisions discussed under this heading below.
The EAC Competition Act defines a merger as “. . . an amalgamation or joining 
of two or more firms into an existing firm or to form a new firm.” 63 Furthermore, 
it defines an acquisition as “any acquisition by an undertaking of direct or indi-
rect control of the whole or part of one or more other undertakings, irrespective of 
whether the acquisition is effected by merger, consolidation, take-over, purchase 
of securities or assets, contract or by any other means.”64
The EAC Competition Act does not contain a definition of “control”. However, 
it grants the Council of Ministers the power to make regulations generally for 
60   EAC Competition Act, s 48(2).
61   EAC Competition Act, s 11(1) (2).
62   EAC Competition Act, s 11(3).
63   EAC Competition Act, s 2.
64   EAC Competition Act, s 2.
karanja-ng’ang’a446
the carrying into effect of the provisions of the EAC Competition Act.65 The 
Council of Ministers, exercising this power, may also pass regulations provid-
ing a definition of control for purposes of the EAC Competition Act.
Hopefully, such rules or regulations will be developed through a process of 
consultation with stakeholders in Partner States. As stated above, it is likely 
that the EAC Competition Authority will be influenced by the interpretation of 
control in the competition laws and decisions of the competition authorities 
of the EAC Partner States,66 as well as the general practices of other regional 
regulators such as the COMESA Competition Commission.67
The other likelihood is that rules or guidelines will be issued by the EAC 
Competition Authority to provide further guidance in this respect. It is useful 
to note that this is the approach that was taken by the COMESA Competition 
65   EAC Competition Act, s 49.
66   Section 41(3) of the Kenyan Competition Act defines control in terms of the specific cir-
cumstances in which a person would be deemed to have control of an undertaking. Thus, 
a person ‘controls’ an undertaking if that person: (i) beneficially owns more than one half 
of the issued share capital of the undertaking; (ii) is entitled to vote a majority of the votes 
that may be cast at a general meeting of the undertaking, or has the ability to control the 
voting of a majority of those votes, either directly or through a controlled entity of that 
undertaking; (iii) is able to appoint, or to veto the appointment of, a majority of the direc-
tors of the undertaking; (iii) is a holding company, and the undertaking is a subsidiary of 
that company as contemplated in the Companies Act; or (iv) in the case of the undertak-
ing being a trust, has the ability to control the majority of the votes of the trustees or to 
appoint the majority of the trustees or to appoint or change the majority of the benefi-
ciaries of the trust; (v) in the case of the undertaking being a nominee undertaking, owns 
the majority of the members’ interest or controls directly or has the right to control the 
majority of members’ votes in the nominee undertaking; or (vi) has the ability to materi-
ally influence the policy of the undertaking in a manner comparable to a person who, in 
ordinary commercial practice, can exercise an element of control referred to above.
   Section 4(2) of Tanzania’s Fair Competition Act provides that, ‘a body corporate shall 
control another body corporate within the meaning of sub-section (1) if the first-mentioned 
body corporate: (i) owns or controls a majority of the shares carrying the right to vote at a 
general meeting of the other body corporate; or (ii) has the power to control the composition 
of a majority of the board of directors or other governing organ of the other of body corpo-
rate; or (iii) has the power to make decisions in respect of the conduct of the affairs of the 
other body corporate.’
67   In COMESA (which affects Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda), the COMESA Competition 
Commission published guidelines, the COMESA Merger Assessment Guidelines, 2014 
which confirmed the COMESA Competition Commission’s previous practice as at the 
time of their adoption that, whether a transaction is a ‘merger’ depends on whether con-
trol is acquired—and ‘control’ is based on whether a party has the possibility of exercising 
decisive influence over an undertaking or asset.
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Commission. At the moment, there are no merger thresholds specified by 
either the EAC Competition Act or the EAC Competition Regulations and con-
sequently, all mergers having a cross-border effect within the EAC are notifi-
able to the EAC Competition Authority. The EAC Competition Act also does 
not provide the meaning of “cross-border effect”. It is not clear whether cross-
border effect means that the proposed merger or acquisition affects at least 
two Partner States or whether it must affect more than two Partner States. 
Again, this will hopefully be clarified by the EAC Competition Authority once 
it is operationalized. However, this means that mergers and acquisitions that 
are confined within the national boundaries of a Partner State would not be 
subject to the application of the EAC Competition Act; instead, national com-
petition laws (if any) would apply. However, the lack of merger thresholds 
means that every transaction that qualifies as a merger or an acquisition with 
cross-border effect under the EAC Competition Act would be notifiable and 
would result in the EAC Competition Authority utilizing its limited resources 
on transactions that are too small to affect trade between the Partner States. By 
way of observation, this is how the COMESA Competition Regulations were ini-
tially operationalized and the period following their commencement caused 
chaos and uncertainty for transactions affecting businesses in the Common 
Market. It is hoped that the EAC Competition Authority would learn from the 
shortcomings of the COMESA Competition Commission. Furthermore, this 
can be contrasted to the EU system in which the EU Merger Regulation estab-
lishes certain turnover thresholds which need to be satisfied in order to trigger 
notification to the EU Competition Authority.68
A merger or acquisition carried out in the absence of an authorizing order 
by the EAC Competition Authority is of no legal effect.69 The EAC Competition 
Authority is mandated to order the divestiture of any merger or acquisition 
undertaken in contravention of the EAC Competition Act.70
Any person found guilty of failing to obtain an authorising order from the 
EAC Competition Authority prior to a merger will be liable upon conviction to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years or to a fine not exceeding USD 
10,000, or both.71 The national courts in Partner States have jurisdiction in rela-
tion to criminal offences under the EAC Competition Act.72
68   Articles 1(2) and (3) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004.See also EU Chapter 14.
69   EAC Competition Act, s 12(1)(4).
70   EAC Competition Act, s 26(2).
71   EAC Competition Act, s 48.
72   EAC Competition Act, s 48(2).
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The test that the EAC Competition Authority will use when assessing a 
merger is whether it will lead to the creation, or strengthening of an already 
dominant position, thereby lessening competition in the relevant market. 
More particularly, Section 13(2) of the EAC Competition Act provides that the 
EAC Competition Authority will consider the following factors:
(a) the competitive structure of all markets affected by the merger or 
acquisition, including the potential competition from both inside and 
outside the EAC in light of legal or other barriers to entry;
(b) the undertakings in the markets affected, their control of essential 
facilities, their integration in upstream and downstream markets, and 
their financial resources;
(c) the competitors and the alternatives available to suppliers and con-
sumers; and
(d) any pro-competitive effects of the merger or acquisition which may 
outweigh the harmful effects on competition.
The merger notification must be made in the form prescribed in the EAC 
Competition Regulations,73 and submitted to the EAC Competition Authority 
together with any relevant documents supporting the intended merger or 
acquisition.74 Upon the issuance of an acknowledgment of receipt of notifi-
cation of an intended merger or acquisition, the EAC Competition Authority 
is mandated to publish a notice of the intended merger in at least two news-
papers of national circulation in each Partner State and on the EAC website.75 
The purpose of this notice is to invite interested persons to express their 
views on the proposed merger or acquisition within 14 days of publication of 
the notice.
The EAC Competition Regulations also allow any interested person to sub-
mit any relevant document to the EAC Competition Authority expressing their 
views on the merger or acquisition at hand.76 The EAC Competition Authority 
may then utilize this information in considering the merger or acquisition as 
it deems fit.
73   Form EACCA 1 provided in the Schedule to the EAC Competition Regulations.
74   The prescribed form (Form EACCA 1) prescribes the following supporting documents: 
memorandum and articles of association, copies of audited annual financial statements 
for the last three years, strategic business plans, certificates of incorporation/registration, 
merger agreement, and other relevant documents.
75   EAC Competition Regulations, Regulation 7.
76   EAC Competition Regulations, Regulation 8(1).
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Upon assessing the intended merger or acquisition, the Authority may 
either: approve the merger or acquisition with or without conditions; decide 
that the intended merger or acquisition falls outside the jurisdiction of the EAC 
Competition Act; or reject the intended merger or acquisition.77 In the event 
that the EAC Competition Authority decides that the merger is outside the 
jurisdiction of the EAC Competition Act, then it is required to refund 75% of 
the filing fee paid in respect of the merger notification. No fees have yet been 
prescribed for filing a merger notification to the EAC Competition Authority.
The EAC Competition Authority is required to make a decision within 45 
calendar days of the notification requirements being satisfied.78 If the EAC 
Competition Authority has not communicated its decision within the stipu-
lated time period,79 the merger or acquisition may be implemented. This pro-
vision will help to deal with any potential delays in determining applications. 
Due to the lack of merger thresholds it is expected that the EAC Competition 
Authority may initially be inundated with applications since, in the absence of 
any thresholds or contrary legislative instruments, all mergers and acquisitions 
having cross-border effects would be notifiable to it.
Where the EAC Competition Authority rejects a merger or acquisition appli-
cation, the merging parties may appeal the decision of the EAC Competition 
Authority to the Council of Ministers.80 The Council of Ministers may only 
approve a merger or acquisition if it is satisfied that the merger or acquisition 
is to fulfil an overriding public interest.81
The EAC Competition Act does not expressly stipulate the factors to be 
considered by the Council of Ministers in determining whether a merger or 
acquisition fulfils an overriding public interest. However, it is expected that the 
Council of Ministers will be guided by the objectives of the EAC as set out in 
the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community. These objec-
tives are to develop policies and programmes aimed at widening and deepen-
ing co-operation among the Partner States in political, economic, social and 
cultural fields, research and technology, defence, security and legal and judi-
cial affairs, for their mutual benefit.82 In this respect, the EAC seeks to, among 
 
 
77   EAC Competition Regulations, Regulation 8(2).
78   Articles 1(2) and (3) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004. See also EU Chapter 14.
79   EAC Competition Act, s 12(1)(4).
80   EAC Competition Act, s 26(2).
81   EAC Competition Act, s 48.
82   EAC Competition Act, s 48(2).
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other things, ensure: the attainment of sustainable growth and development 
of the Partner States by the promotion of a more balanced and harmonious 
development of the Partner States; and the strengthening and consolidation of 
co-operation in agreed fields that would lead to equitable economic develop-
ment within the Partner States and which would in turn, raise the standard of 
living and improve the quality of life of their populations.83
14.6 State Aids as a Prohibited Business Practice
The EAC Competition Act does not define “state aid”. State aid is also not 
provided in the national competition laws of the Partner States. The EAC 
Competition Authority would perhaps need to look to other jurisdictions with 
more developed competition law in implementing the State aid provisions 
of the EAC Competition Act, including the European Union. The European 
Commission defines state aid as an advantage in any form whatsoever con-
ferred on a selective basis to undertakings by national public authorities.84 
According to the European Commission, to constitute State aid, a measure 
needs satisfy the following:
there has been an intervention by the State or through State resources 
which take the forms of either a tax relief, grant, government holding of 
all or part of a company, or providing goods and services on preferen-
tial terms; the intervention gives the recipient an advantage on a selec-
tive basis, for example to specific companies or industry sectors, or to 
companies located in specific regions; competition has been or may be 
distorted; and the intervention is likely to affect trade between Member 
States.85
83   Form EACCA 1 provided in the Schedule to the EAC Competition Regulations.
84   The prescribed form (Form EACCA 1) prescribes the following supporting documents: 
memorandum and articles of association, copies of audited annual financial statements 
for the last three years, strategic business plans, certificates of incorporation/registration, 
merger agreement, and other relevant documents.
85   EAC Competition Regulations, Regulation 7.
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However, in some circumstances, state aid can promote a well-functioning and 
equitable economy.86
Articles 107 to 109 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(the “TFEU”) contain the substantive and procedural rules on distortions 
of competition as a result of State measures involving any form of aid to 
undertakings.
Article 107(1) of the TFEU provides that aid granted by a member state or 
through State resources, in any form whatsoever, which distorts, or threatens 
to distort, competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production 
of certain goods, is incompatible with the internal market insofar as such aid 
affects trade between member states. There are several types of aid which are 
de jure exempt from the prohibition and which are enumerated in Article 107(2) 
of the TFEU.87 In addition, Article 107(3) of the TFEU provides for the pos-
sibility of exemption from the prohibition with the approval of the European 
Commission. It sets out a number of policy objectives for which state aid may 
be considered compatible with the internal market, including state aid aimed 
at: (a) promoting the economic development of areas where the standard of 
living is abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment; (b) rem-
edying a serious disturbance in the economy of a member state; or (c) promot-
ing the execution of an important project of common European interest.
The European Commission enjoys a wide discretion in assessing the com-
patibility of aid under Article 107(3) of the TFEU. To this end, the European 
Commission must conduct a balancing test between economic and social 
interests on the one hand, against the effects on competition and trade 
between member states on the other hand. The European Commission also 
ensures that there is frequent review of the law in ensuring that state aid is 
boosting the European economy. In this respect, it has adopted policies for 
assessing specific types of aids such as rescue and restructuring aid, govern-
ment guarantees, and aid for the sale of land by public bodies.
Similarly, the EAC Competition Act allows each Partner State to grant sub-
sidies to any undertaking if it is of the opinion that it is in the public interest 
to do so.88
86   EAC Competition Regulations, Regulation 8(1).
87   EAC Competition Regulations, Regulation 8(2).
88   EAC Competition Act, s 14.
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A Partner State may grant subsidies to/for:89
(a) consumers of certain categories of products or services in order to 
promote social services;
(b) the development of small and medium-sized enterprises;
(c) the restructuring, rationalizing and modernizing of specific sectors of 
the Partner State’s economy;
(d) less developed regions;
(e) research and development;
( f ) the financing of a public sector;
(g) the promotion and protection of food security;
(h) the protection of the environment;
(i) the education and training of personnel;
( j) the conservation of the cultural heritage; and
(k) the compensation of damages caused by natural disasters or by 
macro economic disturbances.
The instances listed above essentially comprise the public interest concerns 
that a Partner State would consider in determining whether to grant a subsidy 
or not. This list is not exhaustive. Under Section 17(2) of the EAC Competition 
Act, the Council of Ministers may exempt other categories of subsidies on the 
recommendation of the EAC Competition Authority. In granting the exemp-
tion, the Council of Ministers shall take into account: the materiality of the 
subsidy for the achievement of its objective; the compatibility of the subsidy 
with the objectives of the EAC, including the opening of Partner States’ mar-
kets; and the establishment of a competitive environment in the EAC. For these 
cases, the Council of Ministers shall determine the duration of every exemp-
tion of subsidy so granted.90
However, Partner States are prohibited from applying any subsidies which 
distort or threaten to distort competition within the EAC.91 More specifically, 
the following subsidies are expressly not allowed:92
89   EAC Competition Act, s 17.
90   EAC Competition Act, s17(4).
91   EAC Competition Act, s 16(1).
92   EAC Competition Act, s 16(2).
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(a) any subsidy for the promotion of exports or imports between the 
EAC Partner States; and
(b) any subsidy which is granted on the basis of the nationality or resi-
dence of persons or country of origin of goods or service.
Before granting any subsidy, a Partner State must notify the EAC Competition 
Authority.93 Where the EAC Competition Authority considers that the subsidy 
falls under the exemption stated above, it will communicate its decision to 
the Partner State. If the Partner State is dissatisfied with the EAC Competition 
Authority’s decision, it may refer the matter to the EACJ.94 In the case that the 
EACJ determines that the subsidy is illegal, a Partner State will be required to 
recover the subsidy from its recipient.95
93   EAC Competition Act, s 15(1).
94   EAC Competition Act, s 15(3).
95   EAC Competition Act, s 15(4).
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The European Union’s ambition to establish a single market always extended 
beyond the abolition of State rules restricting the free movement of persons 
and commodities. Convinced that restrictive agreements between or unilateral 
practices of private businesses as well as State measures subsidising particular 
enterprises could be equally harmful to the smooth functioning of an internal 
market, the Treaties have always incorporated competition law provisions.1 
Current Articles 101–109 TFEU2 prohibit cartel agreements (2.), unilateral abu-
sive behaviour (3.) as well as certain forms of State aid (4.)3 and contain legal 
bases for the setup of a supranational enforcement mechanism (5.).
14.2 Article 101 TFEU: prohibited collusion
Article 101 TFEU states that “shall be prohibited as incompatible with the 
internal market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associa-
tions of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between 
Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restric-
tion or distortion of competition within the internal market. More particularly, 
* Professor (chargé de cours) of European Union law, Université de Liège, Belgium; Ph.D (KU 
Leuven); LL.M. (Harvard); LL.M., LL.B. (KU Leuven); pieter.vancleynenbreugel@ulg.ac.be.
1   Contrary to s3 of the East African Community Competition Act (see previous chapter), 
which outlines the objectives of EAC Competition law, the EU Treaties remain silent about 
the exact objectives of EU competition law; the only thing they seem to hint at—in Protocol 
No. 26—is that competition law constitutes an inherent part of the EU internal market.
2   Those provisions can be found in Chapter I, Title VII, Part III (Union policies and internal 
actions) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
3   In addition, Article 106 also states that competition law applies, in principle, without excep-
tion to undertakings entrusted with services of general economic interest. In some situa-
tions, however, exceptions to the full-fledged application of those rules could obstruct the 
performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them; in that situation, 
exceptions to the full application of competition law rules can be proposed.
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the provision adds a few examples of such agreements, decisions or practices. 
Those include, yet are not limited to:4
(a) directly or indirectly fixing purchase or selling prices or any other 
trading conditions;
(b) limiting or controlling production, markets, technical development, 
or investment;
(c) sharing markets or sources of supply;
(d) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with 
other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disad-
vantage;
(e) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the 
other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature 
or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the 
subject of such contracts.
In order for Article 101(1) to apply, the behaviour concerned has to produce 
effects within the internal market5 and, similar to s4(1) EAC Competition Act, 
affect trade between Member States. Within that territorial context, the pro-
vision prohibits all agreements fixing prices, quantities or territorial areas 
between different businesses, or which would otherwise restrict the normal 
processes of competition on a market. The Treaty did not define the notions 
of agreement between undertakings, decision of an association of undertak-
ings, concerted practice, and restriction of competition. It has fallen upon 
the European Commission and the Court of Justice of the European Union to 
explain the scope of those notions following the entry into force of the Treaties. 
In doing so, both institutions continuously opted for a functional approach, 
seeking to capture as many varieties of cartel-like behaviour within the scope 
of the prohibition.
In order for Article 101 TFEU to apply, the behaviour of at least two under-
takings has to be at stake. According to consistent case law, an undertaking 
comprises any entity engaged in economic activity, regardless of its legal status 
and the way in which it is financed.6 The entity definition looks beyond the 
4   As confirmed in Case C-49/92 P, Commission of the European Communities v Anic 
Partecipazioni SpA, ECLI:EU:C:1999:356, para 108.
5   On that notion, see Joined Cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117 & 125–129/85, A. Ahlström Osakeyhtio and 
Others v Commission (Woodpulp-I), ECLI:EU:C:1988:447, para 11–18 and Case T-102/96, Gencor 
Ltd v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:1999:65, para 90–100.
6   Case C-41/90, Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser v. Macrotron GmbH., ECLI:EU:C:1991:161, para 21.
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legal corporate or association law categories determined across the different 
national legal orders, identifying economic realities over legal form. As a result, 
a parent company and its fully-owned subsidiary will be considered a single 
undertaking; intra-enterprise contracts are thus excluded from the scope of 
Article 101 TFEU.7 Economic activity is defined as any offering of goods or 
services that can take place in a market environment.8 As such, marketable 
activities engaged in by public entities also qualify as economic, bringing 
those entities within the undertaking definition.9 The Court of Justice con-
sistently maintains a similar non-formal approach when identifying an agree-
ment. From its early case law onwards, it confirmed that any concurrence of 
wills, regardless its form or scope, could be considered an agreement.10 In the 
seminal Consten and Grundig judgment, the Court added that both horizontal 
(concluded at the same level of production/distribution chain) and vertical 
agreements (concluded between operators on different levels of that chain) 
are covered by the prohibition.11
An association of undertakings comprises any grouping of economic opera-
tors which could potentially be used as an intermediary, a shield or an alterna-
tive means to maintain, monitor and develop prohibited collusive practices.12 
Trade associations or other professional associations acknowledged as such 
by national law and created to protect and promote the interests of particular 
economic operators are the most obvious examples of such groupings.13 EU 
competition law nevertheless goes beyond those formal distinctions. Recently, 
the Court of Justice even argued that, in assembling banks in one of its com-
mittees deciding on fees applied across the payment card network, a credit 
card company—itself an undertaking—acted as an association of banks, 
thus qualifying as an association of undertakings. Any calculated decision, 
7    Case C-73/95 P, Viho Europe BV v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1996:405, paras. 6 and 16.
8    See M. Szydlo, ‘Leeway of Member States in Shaping the Notion of an ‘Undertaking’ in 
Competition Law’, 33 World Competition (2010), 549–568.
9    See e.g. Case C-475/99 Firma Ambulanz Glöckner v Landkreis Südwestpfalz, 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:577, para 20.
10   Joined Cases C-2 & 3/01 P, Bundesverband der Arzneimittel-Importeure eV & Commission v. 
Bayer, ECLI:EU:C:2004:2, para 69.
11   Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, Consten and Grundig v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1966:41, p. 339.
12   Case T-39/92, Groupement des Cartes Bancaires CB v Commission of the European 
Communities, ECLI:EU:T:1994:20, para 77.
13   Case 246/86, Societé Cooperative des Asphalteurs Belges (Belasco SC) v Commission of the 
European Communities, ECLI:EU:C:1989:301 or Case C-309/99, Wouters v Algemene Raad 
van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, ECLI:EU:C:2002:98.
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recommendation or advisory practice in the interest of its members, it will be 
considered to represent the “private interests” of participating undertakings.14
In order to avoid situations where parties refrain from concluding an agree-
ment or reverting to their trade association in order to adopt potentially 
anticompetitive behaviour, the Treaty also prohibits concerted practices. 
According to the Court, a concerted practice refers to any form of coordina-
tion between undertakings, by which, without it having been taken to the stage 
where an agreement properly so-called has been concluded, practical coop-
eration between them is knowingly substituted for the risks of competition.15 
The mere proof of contact followed by prima facie coordinated behaviour suf-
fices for the European Commission to prove the existence of such practice.16 
A case in point is T-Mobile, in which the Court held that the coordinated price 
increase of Dutch telecom operators following known contacts between rep-
resentatives of the different undertakings gave rise to the existence of such 
practice.17
The notion of restriction of competition has never been defined in an 
exhaustive manner. The European Commission and the EU Courts have rather 
analysed, in each individual case, to what extent a restriction can be deemed 
in place, inter alia relying on the examples listed in the Treaty.18 An important 
distinction is made between restrictions by object and by effect in that regard. 
Object restrictions are practices deemed quasi-always to restrict competition, 
without the need for an in-depth analysis of the actual effects the behaviour 
concerned produces on the relevant market.19 Price-fixing, market segmen-
tation and output restrictions, also listed in Article 101(1) TFEU, are the most 
obvious examples in this regard. Effect restrictions require a more in-depth 
economic “counterfactual” analysis. The European Commission in those cases 
has to prove that competition has been harmed in a way that would not have 
14   Case C-382/12 P, MasterCard v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2201, para 71–73.
15   Joined Cases 40–48, 50, 54–56, 111, 113 & 114/73, Suiker Unie and Others v. Commission, 
ECLI:EU:C:1975:174, para 26.
16   Joined Cases C-89, 104, 114, 116, 117, 125–129/85, Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and Others v. 
Commission (Woodpulp II), ECLI:EU:C:1993:120, para 126–127.
17   Case C-8/08, T-Mobile, ECLI:EU:C:2009:343.
18   See for a more elaborate analysis, P. Van Cleynenbreugel, ‘Article 101 TFEU and the EU 
Courts: adapting legal form to the realities of modernization?’, 51 Common Market Law 
Review (2014), 1409.
19   Case C-209/07, Competition Authority v. Beef Industry Development Society Ltd and Barry 
Brothers (Carrigmore) Meats Ltd., ECLI:EU:C:2008:643, para 17.
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been the case had the restrictive behaviour not been engaged in.20 In addition, 
such restrictions have to be appreciably affecting interstate trade within the 
internal market. To the extent that undertakings have a market share below 
10% (horizontal agreements) or 15% (vertical and mixed agreements), the 
Commission will not take enforcement action.21 Object restrictions neverthe-
less never benefit from de minimis.22
In addition to the prohibition, Article 101(2) TFEU contains a specific civil 
law sanction, stating that any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to 
this Article shall be automatically void. The sanction outlined in this provi-
sion complements the administrative enforcement framework set up by the 
Commission from the early 1960s onwards. By virtue of the direct effect of that 
provision, the voidness of anticompetitive agreements can be invoked directly 
before and by national jurisdictions.23
The prohibition outlined in Article 101(1) is not absolute. Article 101(3) TFEU 
confirms that agreements, decisions or practices which contribute to improv-
ing the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or eco-
nomic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, 
and which do neither impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions 
which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives nor afford 
such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a 
substantial part of the products in question, can be justified. It results from this 
provision that any restrictive agreement, decision or practice can—at least 
in theory—be justified. Prior to 2004, only the European Commission could 
decide on the existence of such justification, called an exemption decision. 
Since 2004, undertakings will have to self-assess whether their agreement can 
be deemed justified.24
In order to render this assessment more predictable, the European 
Commission adopted, after having been granted those powers by the Council 
in accordance with Article 103 TFEU, so-called block-exemption regulations, 
excluding categories of agreements from the Article 101(1) TFEU prohibition. 
20   2004 Commission Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, [2004] O.J. 
C101/97, para 24.
21   See 2014 Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict 
competition under Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(de minimis Notice), [2014] O.J. C291/1 .
22   Case C-226/11, Expedia Inc. v. Autorité de la concurrence and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2012:795, 
para 38.
23   Case C-127/73, BRT v Sabam, ECLI:EU:C:1974:25.
24   Case C-68/12, Protimonopolný úrad Slovenskej republiky v. Slovenská sporitel’ňa a.s., 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:71, para 36.
 459Eu Competition Law
By way of example, all vertical agreements between undertakings having a 
market share of less than 30% are thus excluded, except for agreements con-
taining so-called “hardcore restrictions”.25 Hardcore restrictions can only very 
rarely be justified on the basis of Article 101(3) TFEU.
14.3 Article 102 TFEU: Prohibited Unilateral Market Behaviour
Article 102 TFEU states that any abuse by one or more undertakings of a 
dominant position within the internal market or in a substantial part of it shall 
be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in so far as it may affect 
trade between Member States. The Treaty again provides a non-exhaustive list 
of examples,26 referring to:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or 
other unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prej-
udice of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with 
other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disad-
vantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the 
other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature 
or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the 
subject of such contracts.
Prohibiting above all the unilateral behaviour of one undertaking or of a group 
of undertakings presenting itself on the market as a single economic operator,27 
Article 102 TFEU contains additional non-defined concepts, which have been 
clarified early on in the Commission’s decision-making practice and the Court 
of Justice’s case law. More specifically, the notions of dominance and abuse are 
particularly relevant in that respect.
25   Commission Regulation 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements 
and concerted practices, [2010] O.J. L102/1.
26   Compare with s8 EAC Competition Act, which defines and classifies, in a more direct way, 
different types of abuses.
27   See Joined Cases C-395/96 P and C-396/96 P, Compagnie maritime belge transports and 
Others v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2000:132, para 36.
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Dominance is a precondition in order for the Article 102 TFEU prohibition 
to be applicable. Indeed, a non-dominant undertaking engaging in behaviour 
deemed as abusive under that provision will not be subject to competition law 
scrutiny. An undertaking is said to have a dominant position if it can prevent 
effective competition from being maintained on the relevant market by vir-
tue of it having the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently 
of its competitors, its customers and ultimately of the consumers.28 In order 
to determine the existence of such position, the EU Courts accepted that the 
Commission established, on a case-by-case way, the existence of dominance 
on a relevant product and geographical market.29
Once the market determined, the finding of dominance is above all pre-
mised on market shares. The Court established that an undertaking maintain-
ing a market share of 50% or more is presumed to be dominant while a share 
between 40% and 50% may indicate dominance depending on other factors. 
An undertaking with a market share below 40% can still be dominant but only 
in exceptional circumstances in light of other market features.30 In addition, 
the market structure may have to be looked at, even when market shares do 
not permit to derive that the undertaking concerned is dominant.31
In its early Hoffmann LaRoche judgment, the Court has defined abuse as 
an objective concept relating to the behaviour of an undertaking in a domi-
nant position which is such as to influence the structure of a market where, 
as a result of the very presence of the undertaking in question, the degree of 
competition is weakened and which, through recourse to methods different 
from those which condition normal competition in products or services on 
the basis of the transactions of commercial operators, has the effect of hinder-
ing the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the market 
or the growth of that competition.32
From that definition, two types of abuses have been identified. On the one 
hand, it captures exploitative abuses, e.g. the charging of monopolist prices to 
28   Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the European Communities, 
ECLI:EU:C:1979:36, para 38.
29   Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community 
competition law, [1997] O.J. C372/5.
30   Communication from the Commission—Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement 
priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by domi-
nant undertakings, [2009] O.J. C45/7, recital µ&’.(hereinafter 2009 enforcement priorities 
notice).
31   2009 enforcement priorities notice, recital 15.
32   Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the European Communities, 
ECLI:EU:C:1979:36, para 91.
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consumers or clients,33 On the other hand, it also encompasses exclusionary 
abuses targeting (potential) competitors.34 Examples that have been identified 
throughout the case law include predatory pricing,35 loyalty discounts,36 exclu-
sivity agreements, and refusal of access to essential facilities necessary to the 
creation of a new product or service.37
Contrary to Article 101 TFEU, Article 102 does not contain a specific civil law 
sanction or possibilities for exception. In practice, the administrative enforce-
ment regime will nevertheless apply and the EU Courts have accepted—at 
least in theory—that abusive behaviour can be justified objectively, for exam-
ple if it contributes to a more efficient functioning of the market in which the 
undertaking concerned is active.38
14.4 State Aid
Article 107(1) TFEU considers any aid granted by a Member State or through 
State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort 
competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain 
goods, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, to be incompatible 
with the internal market.39 Again, the Treaty did not define the notions of aid 
and of ‘certain’ undertakings. The other notions—undertaking, internal mar-
ket and affectation of trade—are interpreted in coherence with the interpreta-
tions of those concepts in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.
According to consistent case law, any advantage granted by or attributed to 
a public authority to one or more selected undertakings will be considered as 
incompatible aid. As such, direct subsidies, but also interest-free loans, interest 
reductions or tax breaks are considered advantages.40 Applied in this regard, 
33   2009 enforcement priorities notice, recital 7.
34   2009 enforcement priorities notice, recital 6.
35   See Case C-62/86, AKZO Chemie BV v Commission of the European Communities, ECLI: 
EU:C:1991:286.
36   Case C-95/04, British Airways plc v Commission of the European Communities, ECLI: 
EU:C:2007:166.
37   Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, ECLI: 
EU:C:2004:257.
38   Case C-52/09, Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige AB, ECLI:EU:C:2011:83.
39   S14 et seq. of the EAC Competition Act rather refer to subsidies, which potentially are 
more limited in scope than advantages envisaged by EU law.
40   For more detailed examples of what constitutes aid, see Commission Notice on the 
notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union, [2016] O.J. C262/1.
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the existence or not of aid is dependent on the so-called “private investor” test. 
To the extent that a private undertaking would have made the same invest-
ment or transcation as a public authority, the measure at hand is not consid-
ered aid.41
In order to be prohibited, an aid measure also necessarily has to be selec-
tive. Selectivity means that the advantage will only be granted to an individual 
undertaking or to a particular group of undertakings active within a Member 
State’s territory. A measure targeting a specific sector of the economy or a cer-
tain region within a Member State is also deemed selective.42
The general prohibition outlined in Article 107(1) TFEU is again not abso-
lute. Articles 107(2) and (3) TFEU contain a list of exceptions excluding mea-
sures from the prohibition. The second paragraph contains per se exceptions, 
i.e. exceptions that do not leave any discretion for the Commission to judge 
their compatibility (e.g. aid relating to natural disasters), whereas the third 
allows the Commission some discretion whether or not to accept them. This 
has given rise to the emergence of soft law instruments outlining how the 
Commission will use its discretion.43 In addition, block exemption regulations 
excluding certain categories of aid up to a certain quantified amount have 
excluded specific categories of aid from the prohibition.44
14.5 Enforcement
The mere inscription of rules in the Treaty framework has not as such given 
rise in itself to the creation of a competition law culture across the EU inter-
nal market. A dedicated enforcement system was necessary in that respect, 
coupled with a supranational court—the Court of Justice—willing to review 
and interpret vague notions included in the Treaty. It deserves to be men-
tioned that the enforcement system gradually grew from being a strong ex ante 
authorisation-focused to a more ex post enforcement regime.
41   The Court often refers to the ‘market economy investor principle’, see e.g. Case C482/99, 
France v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2002:294.
42   Among others Case C-88/03, Portugal v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2006:511, para 54.
43   For an overview, see http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/legislation.
html.
44   Most notably, Commission Regulation (EU) No. 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain 
categories of aid compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 
108 of the Treaty, [2014] O.J. L187/1.
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14.5.1 Ex ante Authorisation as Enforcement Starting Point
Upon its entry into force in 1958, the EEC Treaty did not envisage one singularly 
structured enforcement regime for EU competition law.
On the one hand, in relation to State aid, Article 108 TFEU determines that 
the Commission is to keep under review existing aid schemes, yet, above all, 
mustbe informed of any plans by Member States to grant or alter aid. Informed 
in this context actually implies that the advantage to be granted has to be noti-
fied to it, following which an approval or rejection decision will be adopted. As 
such, absent a Commission approval decision, Member States can not proceed 
in granting aid to the undertakings concerned.45
On the other hand, in relation to restrictive agreements and abusive behav-
iour, Article 103 provides a legal basis for the Council to adopt measures aimed 
at ensuring compliance with the prohibitions laid down in Article 101(1) and 
in Article 102 by making provision for fines and periodic penalty payments 
and delineating the role of Commission and Court of Justice in this regard. 
In 1962, the Commission was entrusted with the task, by virtue of Regulation 
17/62, directly to grant exemptions in accordance with Article 101(3) TFEU. As a 
result, every agreement which was potentially anticompetitive had to be noti-
fied to the Commission, which by virtue of a decision could exempt it from 
the Article 101(1) TFEU prohibition.46 Only the Commission was competent to 
apply Article 101(3) TFEU, which did not have direct effect.47 The notification 
obligation allowed the Commission to establish a more or less consistent line 
of decisions, in which it interpreted Article 101 TFEU. The Court of Justice, in 
reviewing those decisions, further confirmed or modified the Commission’s 
interpretation of those provisions. The lack of clear time limits for taking a 
decision and, the continuous increase of notifications nevertheless triggered 
a reform towards a more ex post enforcement system in 2004.
Article 102 TFEU practices were not subject to a similar notification obli-
gation. In practice, however, the European Commission, from the early days 
onwards, actively used its freshly conferred enforcement powers also to target 
dominant undertakings and to penalise their abusive practices. Being allowed 
to impose fines of up to 10% of the annual turnover of each undertaking, the 
45   Confirmed in Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules 
for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
[2015] O.J. L248/9.
46   Article 9 Council Regulation 17 implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, [1962] 
O.J. L 13/204 (English Special Edition, Chapter 1959–1962, 87) (Hereafter referred to as 
Regulation 17/62).
47   Article 4 Regulation 17/62.
Van Cleynenbreugel464
Commission succeeded in interpreting and enforcing this provision at the 
same time.48 Along the way, it shaped the notions of dominance and abuse 
that are still being applied today.
In addition, Regulation 17/62 set up an elaborate administrative enforce-
ment regime, allowing the Commission to inspect undertakings’ premises, 
to seize documents and to impose fines and periodic penalty payments on 
those undertakings for having infringed Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Those fines 
could be as high as 10% of the undertaking’s global annual turnover, a rule that 
remains in force until today.49
14.5.2 Moving Towards More ex post Enforcement
The focus on ex ante enforcement and the accompanying notification/authori-
sation obligations imposed on the Commission services became increasingly 
burdensome, as more and more notifications were made and the Commission’s 
resources were not extended at a comparable pace. Anticipating the accession 
of ten new Member States in 2004 and the most likely unmanageable increase 
in Article 101(3) TFEU authorisation requests, the European Commission 
decided that a reform of the Article 101 TFEU enforcement system was 
necessary.50 Emphasising how the basic competition law provisions had 
become well-established throughout the Union, it proposed to decentralise the 
application and enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, by giving national 
competition authorities and courts direct powers under Article 101(3) TFEU.
Regulation 1/2003 effectively made this happen from 1 May 2004 onwards. 
It since obliges national competition authorities and courts to apply Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU in full and to ensure that those provisions are interpreted 
in accordance with the established case law of the Court of Justice and deci-
sion-making practice of the Commission.51 In addition, national competition 
authorities have been conferred specifically circumscribed powers as regards 
the types of EU competition law decisions they can/have to adopt.52
48   Article 3 Regulation 17/62; see on that development, P. Ibanez Colomo, The Law on Abuses 
of Dominance and the System of Judicial Remedies, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2270099.
49   Article 15(2)b Regulation 17/62.
50   For the proposal and its background, again see Commission White Paper on the 
Modernisation of the Rules implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty.
51   Article 3 Council Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, [2003] O.J. L 1/1.
52   Article 5 Regulation 1/2003.
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Although Member States’ authorities apply those rules autonomously, the 
Commission provides for tools to take away a case from national authorities and 
take over the investigation or to intervene in pending litigation before Member 
States’ courts.53 Although the Commission now no longer authorises agree-
ments in the realm of Article 101(3) TFEU, the increased adoption of soft law 
instruments and Commission “help lines” allow it to keep an eye on whether or 
not the application of EU competition law develops in a coherent way across 
different Member States’ jurisdictions.54 To that extent, the Commission 
also assembles all national authorities in a European Competition Network 
(ECN), within which decisions on case allocation are made in an informal way. 
Following the allocation decision, the designated authority will initiate or pro-
ceed its infringement proceedings, whereas other authorities will refrain from 
continuing their actions. As such, the Commission seeks to control who deals 
with a specific case at what time.55
Regulation 1/2003 also confirms and extends the Commission’s investigative 
and sanctioning powers, inviting Member States’ to streamline theirs in line 
with the Commission’s.56
14.6 Concentrations
The Treaty did not mention anything on those concentrations, including acqui-
sitions and certain joint ventures. Their assessment under the Article 101(3) 
TFEU exemption mechanism or, ex post under Article 102 TFEU, was not con-
ducive to legal certainty. For that reason, and responding directly to the lim-
its enounced in the Court’s case law,57 the EU adopted Concentration Control 
Regulation 4064/89, which has been modified into Regulation 139/2004.58 The 
53   Article 11(6) Regulation 1/2003.
54   For an introductory overview of those help lines, P. Van Cleynenbreugel, ‘National courts 
and EU competition law: lost in multilevel confusion?’ in N. Bodiroga-Vukobrat, S. Rodin 
and G. Sander, New Europe, Old Values? Reform and Perseverance (Heidelberg, Springer, 
2016), 181–198.
55   On the operations of the European Competition Network, see Joint Statement of the 
Council and the Commission on the Functioning of the Network of Competition 
Authorities, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/joint_statement_en.pdf.
56   See Articles 17–24 Regulation 1/2003.
57   E.g. Case 6/72, Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc. v 
Commission of the European Communities, ECLI:EU:C:1973:22.
58   Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentra-
tions between undertakings, [1989] O.J. L395/1, replaced by Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/ 
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notion of concentration captures any change in control or ownership over an 
undertaking, through mergers and other forms of control through acquisitions 
and certain joint ventures.59
Turnover thresholds are used to determine whether or not the concentra-
tion has a so-called “Union dimension”.60 All intended concentrations with a 
Union dimension now have to be notified to the European Commission, which 
is called upon to authorise or prohibit them by means of a decision, to be 
adopted within strict time limits.61 Concentrations which do not have a Union 
dimension, have to be notified to Member State competition authorities, 
which almost all adopted a similar notification procedure at national level. The 
test applied in this regard originally focused on whether or not the envisaged 
concentration would result in a dominant position on the relevant market.62 
The 2004 Regulation explicitly broadened that test, asking the Commission 
to assess whether the envisaged concentration does not result in a significant 
impediment of effective competition on a relevant market.63
2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC 
Merger Regulation), [2004] O.J. L24/1.
59   Article 3 Regulation 139/2004.
60   Articles 1(2) and (3) Regulation 139/2004.
61   Articles 4 and 10 Regulation 139/2004.
62   Article 2 Regulation 4064/89.
63   Article 2 Regulation 139/2004.
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The East African Community law is found in the Treaty for the Establishment 
of the East African Community (the EAC Treaty), its Protocols, Directives of 
the Council of Ministers and Acts of the East African Legislative Assembly 
(the Assembly) and decisions of the East African Court of Justice (EACJ). The 
Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Customs Union sets out 
the customs law of the Community to include the relevant provisions of the 
Treaty; the Customs Union Protocol; regulations and directives made by 
the Council; applicable decisions of the EACJ; Acts of the Community enacted 
by the Assembly and relevant principles of international law.1 On matters per-
taining to implementation of the Treaty, Community organs, institutions and 
laws take precedence over similar national ones.2
The EAC Treaty establishes the EACJ as the judicial organ of the 
Community.3 The Court is made up of two divisions: First Instance Division 
and the Appellate Division. Cases are lodged before the First Instance 
Division and an aggrieved party may institute appeal before the Appellate 
Division. The First Instance Division is at any given time composed of not 
more than ten Judges whereas the Appellate Division is comprised of five 
Judges.4 The EAC Treaty allows national courts of the Partner States to adjudi-
cate on issues involving the Community. However, decisions of the EACJ on the 
interpretation and application of the Treaty take precedence over decisions of 
national courts on similar matters.5
1   Article 39 of the Customs Union Protocol.
2   Article 8 (4) of the EAC Treaty.
3   Article 23 of the EAC Treaty stipulates that the Court shall be a judicial body which shall 
ensure the adherence to law in the interpretation and application of and compliance with 
the Treaty.
4   Article 24 (2) of the EAC Treaty.
5   Article 33 (2) of the EAC Treaty.
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Primarily, the EACJ has jurisdiction over interpretation and application of 
the EAC Treaty.6 The Court’s jurisdiction includes advisory and arbitral juris-
diction and any such jurisdiction that may be conferred upon it any time by 
the Council of Ministers. The jurisdiction of the Court has since been extended 
to cover trade and investment disputes.7
The execution of a judgment of the EACJ which imposes pecuniary obli-
gation on a person is governed by the rules of civil procedure in force in the 
Partner State in which execution is to take place.8 Judgments of the Court are 
enforced and executed at national level by the Partner States.
This Chapter is a snapshot of the emerging jurisprudence from the EACJ 
and a preview of how EAC Partner States are enforcing and implementing the 
Community law in their national jurisdictions. In appraising how the Partner 
States are enforcing and implementing the community law, it is vital to note 
that in the case of Timothy Alvin Kahoho—v- The Secretary General of the EAC,9 
the EACJ observed that the Summit10 is the driver of of East African integration 
and political federation. In Peter Anyang Nyongo—v- The Attorney General of 
the Republic of Kenya,11 the EACJ held that a Partner State may not invoke the 
provisions of its internal law as a justification for its failure to perform obliga-
tions under the EAC Treaty. The Court expressed that it cannot be lawful for a 
State which has voluntarily entered into a Treaty with other States by which 
rights and obligations are vested not only on the State parties but also on their 
people, to plead that it is unable to perform its obligations because its laws do 
not permit it to do so. In Henry Kyarimpa—v- Attorney General of Uganda,12 the 
Appellate Division of the EACJ expressed that in adjudging an impugned State 
action as being internationally wrongful, the Court asks itself the question not 
whether such action is in conformity with internal law, but rather whether it is 
in conformity with the EAC Treaty. The Court found that where the complaint 
6    Article 21 (1) of the EAC Treaty.
7    On 30th November, 2013, the Summit of the EAC Head of States approved the Council of 
Ministers’ decision to extend the Courts jurisdiction to include matters of trade, invest-
ment and EAC Monetary Union. To this end, the Partner States of the Community will 
need to agree a Protocol tooperationalize the extended jurisdiction as per Article 27(2).
8    Article 44 of the EAC Treaty.
9    Appeal No. 2 of 2013.
10   Article 9 (1) (a) of the EAC Treaty establishes the Summit as an organ of the Community. 
In Article 10 (1), the Summit consists of the Heads of State or Government of the Partner 
States. In Article 11 (1), the Summit gives the general directions and impetus as to the 
development and achievement of the objectives of the Community.
11   EACJ Reference No. 1 of 2006.
12   EACJ Appeal No. 6 of 2014.
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is that the action was inconsistent with internal law and, on that basis, a 
breach of a Partner State’s obligation under the EAC Treaty to observe the prin-
ciple of the rule of law, it is the Court’s inescapable duty to consider the inter-
nal law of such Partner State in determining whether the conduct complained 
of amounts to a violation or contravention of the Treaty.13
15.2 Emerging Jurisprudence from the EACJ on Interpretation of the 
Treaty
The EACJ is very active in the interpretation of the EAC Treaty. The Court 
has expressed that the Community is a people centered and market-driven 
cooperation,14 and in this regard, consultation and participation of the people 
outside the Summit and other organs of the Community is imperative. In the 
case of East Africa Law Society and 4 others v. Attorney General of Kenya and 
3 others,15 the Court expressed:
It is common knowledge that the private sector and civil society partici-
pated in the negotiations that led to the conclusion of the Treaty among 
the Partner States and, as we have just observed, that they continue to 
participate in the making of Protocols thereto. Furthermore, as we noted 
earlier in this judgment, Article 30 entrenches the people’s right to par-
ticipate in protecting the integrity of the Treaty. We think that construing 
the Treaty as if it permits sporadic amendments at the whims of officials 
without any form of consultation with stakeholders would be a recipe for 
regression to the situation lamented in the preamble of “lack of strong 
participation of the private sector and civil society” that led to the col-
lapse of the previous Community . . ..Failure to carry out consultation 
outside the Summit, Council and the Secretariat was inconsistent with a 
principle of the Treaty and therefore constituted an infringement of the 
Treaty (. . .)
13   The Court took a similar view in the case of Plaxeda Lugumba v. The Secretary General 
of the East African Community, Reference No. 8 of 2010 (First Instance Division); and 
The Attorney General of Rwanda v. Plaxeda Lugumba, Appeal No. 1 of 2012 (Appellate 
Division).
14   Article 7 (1) of the EAC Treaty.
15   EACJ Reference No. 3 of 2007.
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Another notable statement from the EACJ relates to the interpretation of the 
principle of variable geometry. Article 7(1) of the EAC Treaty identifies 
the principle of variable geometry as one of the operational principles in the 
integration of the Community. Variable geometry is defined in Article 1 of 
the EAC Treaty to mean the principle of flexibility which allows for progression 
in co-operation among a sub-group of members in a larger integration scheme 
in a variety of areas and at different speeds. Article 7(1) (e) of the EAC Treaty 
describes the principle of variable geometry as one which allows for progres-
sion in co-operation among groups within the Community for wider integra-
tion schemes in various fields and at different speeds.
In the Advisory Opinion in Reference by Council of Minister,16 the Court 
opined that variable geometry is intended to allow those Partner States who 
cannot implement a particular decision simultaneously or immediately to 
implement it at a suitable certain future time or simply at a different speed 
while at the same time allowing those who are able to implement immediately 
to do so. The Court held that the principle of variable geometry is a strategy 
of implementation of Community decisions and a guide to the integration 
process.
On locus standi of individuals to bring action alleging violation of the EAC 
Treaty, the Court in Peter Anyang Nyongo—v- The Attorney General of the 
Republic of Kenya17 expressed that under Article 30 (1) of the EAC Treaty, a 
claimant is not required to show a right or interest that was infringed or dam-
age that was suffered as a consequence of the matter complained about but 
that it is enough if it is alleged that the matter complained of infringes a provi-
sion of the Treaty in a relevant manner. This principle was equally applied in 
Samuel Mukira Muhochi—v- Attorney General of the Uganda18 where the Court 
held that once there is an allegation of infringement of the provision of the 
EAC Treaty, the Court has jurisdiction to interpret and apply the provisions 
alleged to be infringed under the powers conferred on it by Articles 23 (1) and 
27 (1) of the EAC Treaty. It must be noted that in Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o—v- The 
Attorney General of the Republic of Kenya,19 the EACJ held that exhaustion of 
local remedies is not a pre-condition for accessing the Court.
In relation to Bills presented before the Assembly, the EACJ in the case of 
Callist Andrew Mwatella & 2 others vs. East African Community,20 held that all 
16   EACJ Application No. 1 of 2008.
17   EACJ Reference No. 1 of 2006.
18   EACJ Reference No. 5 of 2011.
19   EACJ Reference No. 1 of 2006.
20   EACJ Reference No. 1 of 2005.
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Bills introduced into the Assembly belong to the Assembly, whether tabled ini-
tially by way of Private Members’ Bills, Community Bills or by the Council of 
Ministers. As such, permission of the Assembly is required to withdraw any Bill 
from the House.
15.3 Emerging EACJ Jurisprudence on the Rule of Law and  
Human Rights
The rule of law is the sine qua non of any democratic society. In Baranzira 
Raphael & another—v- Attorney General of the Republic of Burundi,21 the First 
Instance Division of the Court examined the concept of rule of law. Quoting 
from a UN Report, the court stated:
The concept of the rule of law refers to the principle of governance to 
which all persons, institutions and entities, public or private, including 
the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, 
equally enforced and independently adjudicated and which are consis-
tent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, 
as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principle of supremacy of 
the law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the 
application of the law, separation of power, participation in decision 
making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and 
legal transparency. (See Report of the (UN) Secretary General on the Rule 
of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, UN 
Doc.5/2004/616 (2004) para.6)
The Appellate Division of the EACJ has had occasion to pronounce itself 
on the need for an applicant to prove the allegations made in a complaint or 
reference. In Union Trade Centre Limited—v- The Attorney General of Uganda,22 
the Appellate Division observed that in law, pleadings in court (whether 
in the form of Reference, Response to Reference, Notice of Motion, Statement 
of Claim or by whatever name called) are not evidence. They are averments of 
the proof of which is submitted to the trier of fact. Evidence is the means by 
which those averments are proved or disproved. The Court opined on the 
need to dispense justice effectively before the national courts. In discharging 
21   EACJ, First Instance Division Reference No. 15 of 2014.
22   EACJ Appeal No. 1 of 2015.
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judicial duties, the Court expressed, although speed is good justice is even bet-
ter and often, justice hurried is justice buried.
Notable features from the jurisprudence of the EACJ appertain to its human 
rights jurisdiction. In James Katabazi—v- Secretary General of the EAC,23 the 
Court held that while it did not have jurisdiction over human rights violations 
per se, it may still consider human rights violation if it falls under the provi-
sions of Article 27(1) of the EAC Treaty. It was noted that one role of the Court 
is to interpret the Treaty (Article 27(1)), which includes “respect for the rule of 
law” as per Article 6(d).24 The Court stated that the overriding consideration 
of the rule of law is that both the rulers and the governed are equally sub-
ject to the same law of the land. In Attorney General of Rwanda—v- Plaxeda 
Rugumba,25 the Appellate Division found that although the EACJ does not 
yet have jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes concerning human rights per se, 
Article 6(d) of the EAC Treaty and Article 6 of the African Charter allow 
the Court to assert jurisdiction over human rights claims. In Samuel Mukira 
Mohochi v. Attorney-General of Uganda,26 the Court re-iterated that whereas 
there are no human rights provisions in the EAC Treaty, the Court does have 
jurisdiction over breaches of the State’s obligations under Articles 6(d), 7(2) 
and 104 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the East African Common Market 
Protocol. The Court in expressing that human rights infringements establish a 
legal foundation for jurisdiction under Article 27(1) of the Treaty stressed that 
the obligations in Article 6(d) are serious government obligations of immedi-
ate and consistent conduct.
In Mary Ariviza and Okotch Mondoh v. Attorney General of Kenya and 
Secretary General of the East African Community,27 the EACJ affirmed that 
“due process” is a component of the “rule of law” and defined it as the “fol-
lowing of laid down laws and procedures.” In Henry Kyarimpa—v- Attorney 
23   EACJ, First Instance Division, Reference No. 1 of 2007.
24   Article 6 (d) of the EAC Treaty provides that one of the fundamental principles of coop-
eration in the Community is good governance including adherence to the principles of 
democracy, the rule of law, accountability, transparency, social justice, equal opportuni-
ties, gender equality, as well as the recognition, promotion and protection of human and 
peoples rights in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights.
25   EACJ Appellate Division, Appeal No. 1 of 2012.
26   EACJ First Instance Division, Reference No. 5 of 2011.
27   EACJ First Instance Division, Ref. No. 7 of 2010.
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General of Uganda,28 the EACJ Appellate Division expressed that the Court 
cannot act in vain. The Court affirmed:
We must say that when we don our gowns, step out of our chambers, and 
enter the temple of justice to do our sacred duty of dispensing justice, we 
never ever leave our common sense outside. As a Court of Law, we can-
not act in vain . . . Decisions of this Court under Article 30 of the Treaty 
are decisions in rem (binding as against both the parties and non parties 
alike) and not in personam (binding only on the parties before the court). 
The Court cannot shirk its duty to make such decisions because third par-
ties who have not been afforded an opportunity to be heard are thereby 
affected.29
In Henry Kyarimpa—v- Attorney General of Uganda,30 the Appellate Division 
further expressed that:
. . . When the Court has to consider whether particular actions of a Partner 
State are unlawful and contravene the Principle of the Rule of Law under 
the Treaty, the Court has jurisdiction, and, indeed, a duty to consider the 
internal laws of the Partner State and apply its own appreciation thereof 
to the provisions of the Treaty. The Court does not and should not abide 
the determination of the import of such internal law by the National 
Courts. By parity of reasoning, it should be equally obvious that when 
what is alleged to be a violation of the Treaty Principle of the Rule of 
Law is the disobedience of an order of the Court of a Partner State, the 
Court should not abide the determination, if any, by such National Court 
on whether such Court’s order has been disobeyed. It is for this Court to 
satisfy itself, without the input of the National Court, whether there has 
been disobedience or disregard of a Court order and to apply that finding 
in the interpretation of the Treaty.
28   EACJ Appeal No. 6 of 2014.
29   Article 30 of the EAC Treaty stipulates that any person who is a resident in a Partner State 
may refer for determination by the Court, the legality of any Act, regulations, directive, 
decision or action of Partner State or an institution of the Community on the grounds 
that such Act, regulation, directive, decision or action is unlawful or is an infringement of 
the provisions of the Treaty.
30   EACJ Appeal No. 6 of 2014.
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15.4 Emerging Jurisprudence from National Courts on Enforcement and 
Implementation of Community Law
The national courts of the EAC Partner States have jurisdictional competence 
to consider and determine matters relevant to the Community.31 Most of the 
cases that have been urged before national courts pertain to the implementa-
tion and enforcement of the EAC Customs Management Act. The Act provides 
the legal framework for the trade regime of the Community. The Act is the 
foundation for private sector engagement and involvement in the Community; 
it embodies the market driven component of the EAC cooperation.
In criminal matters, unless otherwise expressly specified, offences under 
the Act are dealt with in accordance with the laws on criminal procedure of 
a Partner State.32 In civil cases, the applicable law is the law of the Partner 
State with the relevant court being the national court with national pecuniary 
jurisdiction.
The EAC Customs Management Act lays out procedures to be followed in 
the resolution of customs disputes. Any suit or action under the Act may be 
brought in the name of the Commissioner and the Commissioner may sue and 
be sued in the name of the Commissioner.33 The Commissioner may, where 
satisfied that a person has committed an offence under the Act in respect of 
which a fine is provided or in which anything is liable to forfeiture, compound 
the offence and may order such person to pay an amount of money not exceed-
ing the fine which the person would have paid if prosecuted or convicted of 
the offence.34 However the Commissioner may not exercise the power to com-
pound unless the person admits he has committed the offence and requests 
the Commissioner to compound the offence.
In the Tanzanian case of Tanzania Revenue Authority—v- Murtazar Hussein 
Budha,35 the Revenue Authority in the exercise of its powers under section 
219 (1) of the EAC Customs Management Act charged the respondent with the 
offence of being found in possession of uncustomed goods contrary to Section 
200 of the Act and Section 47 of the Value Added Tax (VAT) Act. The trial court 
held that “orders emanating from compounded offences under Section 219 
of the Customs Management Act lack forum of enforcement.” This finding by 
the Tanzania national court portends a challenge to enforcement of the EAC 
31   Article 33 of the EAC Treaty.
32   Section 220 (2) of the EAC Customs Management Act.
33   Section 221 of the EAC Customs Management Act.
34   Section 221 of the EAC Customs Management Act.
35   Tanzania Criminal Appeal No. 285 of 2008.
 475Judicial Enforcement And Implementation Of Eac Law
Customs Management Act. From the perspective of the Revenue Authority, 
the ruling diminishes the advantages of compounding offences.
Where a person is dissatisfied with the decision of the Commissioner, he or 
she may lodge an application for review to the Commissioner within 30 days 
of the decision. Section 230 (1) of the EAC Customs Management Act provides 
that appeals from the decision of the Commissioner under Section 229 of the 
Act lie to the Tax Appeals Tribunal established under Section 231. The appeal 
ought to be lodged within 45 days of the Commissioner’s decision.
In the Ugandan case of Kawuki Mathias—v- Commissioner General of Uganda 
Revenue Authority,36 the Ugandan High Court held that the statutory procedure 
under the EAC Customs Management Act must be followed; that when statute 
prescribes a certain procedure, it is unlawful to follow a different procedure. In 
the Uganda case, the applicant Mr. Kawuki Mathias filed an originating Notice 
of Motion before the Commercial Division of the High Court under Section 98 of 
the Civil Procedure Act seeking release of his container of imported cargo 
comprising of sandals. The Ugandan Revenue Authority objected to the suit 
on the ground that the suit was prematurely instituted, bad in law and ought 
to be dismissed. It was contended that the Applicant should have exhausted 
the procedures provided for under the EAC Customs Management Act before 
filing the application. Section 230 (1) of the EAC Customs Management Act 
provides that appeals from a decision of a Commissioner under Section 229 of 
the Act lie to the Tax Appeals Tribunal established under Section 231. Taking 
into consideration the above provisions, the Ugandan High Court held that the 
application was prematurely filed for not having exhausted the appeal proce-
dures under Section 231 of the EAC Customs Management Act.
Principles and concepts from administrative law have been adopted and 
applied by the national courts in the enforcement and implementation of 
Community law. It has been expressed that in the implementation of the 
EAC Customs Management Act, the trading parties have a legitimate expecta-
tion that they would not be compelled to meet tax obligations which are not 
imposed by the law; that the revenue authorities shall not demand taxes or 
import duty when the law does not provide for the same; and that nationals 
would not be made to bear unlawful tax obligations.
In Greenberg Trading Limited—v- Kenya Revenue Authority,37 it was held that 
the doctrine of legitimate expectations applies in the implementation of the 
36   HC Miscellaneous Cause No. 14 of 2014.
37   Mombasa HC Misc. App. No. 52 of 2010.
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EAC Customs Management Act.38 The Court expressed that it is a legitimate 
expectation of an import duty payer that, once a tax liability arises, the Revenue 
Authority would notify the tax payer and demand payment of the same and 
in doing so, the Authority would specify how the liability arose, the transac-
tions in question and how the same is payable. The Court expressed that it is 
a legitimate expectation that the regular practice of the Revenue Authority is 
that once goods have been verified and duty thereon paid, the Authority would 
release the goods to the importer. It must be noted that in Coastal Bottlers 
Limited—v- Commissioner of Domestic Taxes,39 it was held that when an act is 
against the law, the doctrine of legitimate expectations is inapplicable.
Apart from the doctrine of legitimate expectations, national courts have held 
that in implementation of the EAC Customs Management Act, the Revenue 
Authority is under obligation to observe the rules of natural justice. Under the 
Act, the Commissioners of Revenue Authorities in all the EAC Partner States 
have wide powers to assess and levy import duty, VAT, to seize goods and to 
compound offences. It has been expressed that these powers must be exer-
cised in accordance with the rules of natural justice and fair administrative 
action. In Major General David Tinyefuza—v- Attorney General,40 the Uganda 
Constitutional Court expressed that
the notion of a subjective or unfettered discretion is contrary to the rule 
of law. All power has legal limits and the rule of law demands that the 
Courts should be able to examine the exercise of discretionary power. 
If therefore the executive in exercising its discretion under an Act of 
Parliament has exceeded the four corners within which the Parliament 
has decided it can exercise its discretion, such an exercise of discretion 
would be ultra vires the Act and a court of law must be able to hold it to 
be so.
In Kenya Revenue Authority v. Spectre International Limited,41 the Kenya Court 
of Appeal re-affirmed that:
38   The concept of legitimate expectation arises where in a particular situation a person has 
an expectation that a public body or private parties will retain a long-standing practice 
or keep a promise. Legitimate or reasonable expectation may arise either from an express 
promise given on behalf of a public authority or the existence of a regular practice which 
the claimant can reasonably expect to continue.
39   Nairobi High Court Miscellaneous Application No. 1756 of 2005.
40   Uganda Constitutional Petition No. 1 of 1996.
41   Civil Appeal No. 235 of 2010.
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it is trite law that persons charged with statutory powers and duty ought 
to exercise the same reasonably and fairly and the discretion ought not to 
be exercised whimsically, unreasonably, arbitrarily or against the tenets 
of natural justice. If the discretion is used arbitrarily or unreasonably, the 
court may step in to remedy the situation.
An aspect of the EAC trade regime that has been adjudicated by a Partner 
State court relates to product classification and product valuation under the 
EAC Customs Management Act. Article 8 (2) of the Customs Union Protocol 
stipulates that the Partners States shall adopt the “Harmonized Commodity 
Description and Coding System” for product classification and follow the opin-
ion of the World Customs Organization.
In BETA Healthcare International Limited—vs- Kenya Revenue Authority,42 
the dispute related to classification of a product either as a medicament or 
a food supplement. The applicant had imported Sandoz Calcium Forte—500 
and declared the goods as medicaments and paid zero import duty. On the 
other hand, the Revenue Authority upon conducting a post clearance audit 
classified the imported goods as food supplement liable to import duty Ksh. 
127, 795,427. The applicant requested for an opinion of the classification of the 
goods from the World Customs Organization. The High Court held that the 
opinion of the World Customs Organization classifying the product as food 
supplement was binding. The Court observed that under Section 126 of the 
EAC Customs Management Act the customs authority is required to apply or 
interpret the section and the 4th Schedule on product classification after tak-
ing into account the decisions, rulings, opinions and interpretations given by 
the directorate, WTO or the Customs Cooperation Council.
The Uganda High Court has had an opportunity to consider and determine 
the implementation of EAC Customs Management Act in relation to product 
valuation. In Testimony Motors—v- Commissioner of Customs Uganda Revenue 
Authority,43 the Ugandan Revenue Authority unilaterally suspended the use of 
the transaction value and adopted the alternative method for customs valua-
tion. The action against the Revenue Authority was for a declaration that the 
directive to unilaterally suspend the operation of the transaction value method 
provided in Section 122 and the 4th Schedule of the EAC Customs Management 
Act was arbitrary and unlawful. The interpretative notes of the Act provides 
that the methods of valuation are set out in sequential order of application 
and the primary method of customs valuation is defined in paragraph 2 to be 
42   Miscellaneous. Application No. 4 of 2009.
43   High Court Case No. 212 of 2012.
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the transaction value method. The Ugandan Court issued a declaration that the 
directive of the Commissioner of Customs of the Uganda Revenue Authority 
to suspend the operation of the transaction value method was unlawful to the 
extent that it excluded the application of the transaction value method for 
assessment of customs duty.
The relationship between the EAC Customs Management Act and the fun-
damental right to property and detention of goods for non-payment of duty 
has been considered by the national court in Kenya. In Cyrwan Enterprises—v- 
Kenya Revenue Authority,44 the petitioner challenged the constitutionality of 
the provisions of the EAC Customs Management Act that permitted the Kenya 
Revenue Authority officials to intercept and detain goods they considered sus-
picious until duty was paid. It was argued that the Act was contrary to Article 
40 of the Kenya Constitution that protects the right to property.45 It was argued 
that the powers of the Revenue Authority to intercept and detain goods were 
an arbitrary detention of one’s property. The Court held that collection of taxes 
was an important component of the modern state and statutes governing col-
lection of taxes are consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution. It 
was observed that the provisions of EAC Customs Management Act were part 
of a statutory scheme aimed at efficient and effective collection of customs 
duty; that Section 210 of the Act only set out the kind of goods liable to forfei-
ture and did not empower the revenue authority to arbitrarily take a person’s 
property. It was noted that taking the provisions of impugned sections within 
the context of the entire Act, the EAC Customs Management Act demonstrates 
that forfeiture is not arbitrary but is subject to reasonable grounds. Moreover, 
the Court observed that there was a procedure for determining the rights of a 
party whose property had been seized on account of suspicion of breach of the 
EAC Customs Mangement Act and for the Commissioner to secure the collec-
tion of taxes. The Court concluded that Sections 210 and 211 of EAC Customs 
Management Act were not unconstitutional or in violation of Article 40 of the 
Constitution of Kenya. In Kasibo Joshua—v- Commissioner of Customs, Uganda 
Revenue Authority,46 it was held that it was wrong to forfeit and condemn the 
goods if the fines and penalties imposed were wrong in the first place.
44   High Court Constitutional Petition No. 322 of 2011.
45   Article 40 (1) of the Kenya Constitution provides inter alia that every person has the right 
either individually or in association with others to own and acquire property. Article 40 
(1) stipulates that the State shall not deprive a person of property of any description or 
of any interest in or right over property of any description unless the deprivation is for a 
public purpose and provision is made for compensation.
46   Uganda HC Misc. App. No. 44 of 2007.
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Apart from the adopting principles of administrative law, the practi-
cal aspects of regional trade integration has been a subject of adjudicate by 
national courts. One of the factors determining successful regional integration 
is trade facilitation. Trade facilitation provides an important opportunity for 
integrating countries to increase the benefits from open trade, and contrib-
uting to economic growth and poverty reduction.47 The infrastructural and 
logistical aspects of trade facilitation have impact on efficient and effective 
movement of goods within and among the integrating States.
Trade facilitation focuses inter alia on transactions at the border, such as 
documentary requirements, transparency of customs clearance and transit 
procedures, and disciplines on fees and taxes. Comprehensive trade facilitation 
examines the costs that traders and producers face from production until the 
delivery of their goods and services to the overseas buyer and thereby includes 
all the transaction costs both directly and indirectly associated with the trad-
ing process. In regional integration, the legal framework for trade facilitation 
is significant. A vital logistical aspect for regional trade is clearance of goods at 
the port of entry either for domestic consumption, transit to frontier states or 
goods destined for Export Processing Zones in a Partner State.
Port clearance of goods is largely handled by clearing agents and the issue 
liability of owner of goods for acts of a duly authorized agent is a pertinent 
question in customs law. Once goods have entered a Partner State, Regulation 
174 of the EAC Customs Management Act provides that a security bond shall 
be furnished to cover movement of goods between points of importation and 
re-exportation or transit.
In Alltex EPZ Ltd.—v- Kenya Revenue Authority,48 the applicant was licensed 
to manufacture goods under bond as an Export Processing Zone (EPZ) within 
the meaning of Section 160 of the EAC Customs Management Act. An employee 
of Alltex fraudulently cleared some goods destined for the EPZ and diverted 
them into the Kenya domestic market. The Revenue Authority demanded 
import duty for the fraudulently cleared goods. The legal issue was whether a 
licensee must pay taxes secured by the security bond when the imported goods 
destined to the EPZ are diverted by criminal or delinquent acts of an employee. 
It was argued that the licensee was not liable to pay taxes as the criminal acts 
of the employee were not done in the course of employment; that once an 
employee is engaged in fraud he was outside the scope of his employment. 
The Revenue Authority submitted that there are judicial decisions to support 
the position that a tax payer is liable to pay tax notwithstanding the criminal or 
47   World Bank, Policy Note No: 27 by Barbara Rippel November, 2011.
48   Miscellaneous Application No. 709 of 2008.
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delinquent conduct of the employee (See R v. Kenya Revenue Authority ex parte 
Africa Boot Limited, HC Misc. App No. 24 of 2010; R- v- Commissioner of Customs ex 
parte Transami (K) Limited.49 The Kenya High Court citing R- v- Commissioner 
of Customs ex parte Transami (K) Limited,50 held that an owner of any goods 
who authorizes an agent to act for him is liable for the acts and declarations by 
the agent. Citing with approval the decision in R v. Kenya Revenue Authority ex 
parte Africa Boot Limited,51 the Court emphasized that when a customs agent 
engages in fraudulent activities, the importer has to bear the loss with fortitude 
and find a way of recovering the money misappropriated from the customs 
agent; that a prudent tax payer will always monitor the activities of its agent so 
as to ensure compliance with the law.
In the realm of intellectual property, the case of R- v-Kenya Revenue Authority 
ex parte Bata Shoe Company (K) Ltd,52 provides a case study on the interface 
between intellectual property rights, customs and value added tax in the con-
text of the EAC Customs Management Act. One of the grounds raised by Bata 
Shoe Co. (K) Limited as the applicant was that the Revenue Authority’s deci-
sion to demand payment of taxes on royalties the applicant paid to an entity 
known as Bata Brands was ultra vires the EAC Customs Management Act and 
the Revenue Authority’s powers. According to the applicant, the distribution 
royalties is not subject to customs duty as they are not royalties related to the 
goods being valued that the buyer must pay within the meaning of Rule 9(i) (c) 
of the 4th Schedule to the EAC Customs Management Act. It was contended 
that subparagraph 1(c) to the Note on Interpretation of Rule 9(i) (c) of the 4th 
Schedule provides that—
Payments made by the buyer, for the right to distribute or resell the 
imported goods shall not be added to the price actually paid or payable 
for the imported goods if such payments are not a condition of sale for 
export to Partner state of the imported goods.
The applicant maintained it was not obliged to pay the customs and VAT on 
the buying commission by virtue of the provisions of Paragraph 1 of the Note 
of Interpretation of Paragraph 2(1) of the 4th Schedule which provides that:
49   Nairobi High Court Miscellaneous Application No. 81 of 2011.
50   Nairobi High Court Miscellaneous Application No. 81 of 2011.
51   High Court Miscellaneous Application No. 24 of 2010.
52   Judicial Review Case No. 36 of 2011.
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the price actually paid or payable is the total payment made by the buyer 
to or for the benefit of the seller for the imported goods.
The Revenue Authority in demanding customs duty contended that payment 
of duty was permitted under Section 122 and paragraph 9(1) (c) of the 4th 
Schedule. It was submitted that the Interpretive Notes to paragraph 9(1) (c) 
clarify that royalties and licence fees may include among other things pay-
ment in respect of patents, trademarks and copyrights. The Revenue Authority 
asserted that two conditions must be established for chargeability of royalties 
namely, the royalty payment relates to the goods being valued and the royalty 
is paid pursuant to a condition of sale. It was the Revenue Authority’s case that 
both conditions were satisfied in relation to the goods sold by the applicant. 
The Revenue Authority cited the case of Republic v Kenya Revenue Authority 
ex-parte Beirsdorf East Africa Ltd,53 where it was expressed:
. . . . payment of royalties by the applicant to Biersdorf is a condition of 
sale of their imported patented goods. I agree with the respondent that 
if royalties were not a condition of sale anyone would be at liberty to 
import, manufacture or even distribute Biersdorf ’s products without 
permission of the patent holder. That would be an unacceptable trade 
practice. The relevant law must be interpreted in a manner that makes 
economic sense. The only instance in which payments made by a buyer 
for the right to distribute or resale imported goods may not be added to 
the price actually paid or payable for purposes of determining custom 
value is where the payments (including royalties) are not a condition of 
sale.
The trial court in R—v- Kenya Revenue Authority ex parte Bata Shoe Company 
(K) Ltd,54 observed that the royalty fees paid to Bata Brands by Bata Shoe (K) 
Limited were payable in respect of imported goods as well as goods manufac-
tured locally. The Court held that the royalty fees were paid for the use of the 
trademarks in Kenya and they had nothing to do with the prices of imported 
products. The Court expressed that it would be a herculean exercise to try and 
separate royalties for locally manufactured goods and imported goods so as to 
find out what the price payable for the imported goods is. The Court concluded 
that the Court was not the forum for assessment of taxes, that it is the duty of 
53   Nairobi High Court Miscellaneous Application No. 413 of 2009.
54   Judicial Review Case No. 36 of 2011.
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the Revenue Authority to assess the tax due and payable and the court will not 
interfere with the statutory functions of the Revenue Authority.
Aside from trade in goods, the trade regime of the EAC incorporates trade 
in services. Partner States have undertaken to adopt measures to achieve free 
movement of services.55 The case of Barclays Bank of Kenya Limited—v- Kenya 
Revenue Authority,56 is a pointer on how Kenyan courts deal with taxation of 
service charge on credit card transactions in cross border trade in services. 
The relevant facts of the case are that Barclays Bank (K) Limited enables its 
customers to make payment for goods and services in Kenya and elsewhere 
using credit card instead of cash. To provide credit card services, the Bank is 
a member of a wide network operated by international credit card compa-
nies such as VISA CARD, American Express (AMEX) and Master Card. These 
companies administer a world-wide consumer payment system which enables 
their members to provide their customers with the means of making payment. 
Barclays Bank (K) Limited pays various fees to the Card companies to access 
the networks. The fees paid to the card companies include Association Fees, 
Quarterly Service Fees, International Service Fee, and VISANET (internet soft-
ware licence) Service fee, Interchange fees (for clearing and settlement fees, 
risk monitoring) and compliance fee between issuers of the card and the net-
works. The issue in the Barclays case was whether such fees are royalty or pro-
fessional management fee subject to withholding tax under the provisions of 
the EAC Customs Management Act and the relevant Kenya revenue laws. The 
Kenyan High Court held that such fees are not royalty and are not professional 
management fees subject to withholding tax.
15.5 Emerging Jurisprudence on Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Judgments in EAC
The EAC Treaty calls for “standardization of judgments of courts within the 
Community” and cooperation in “judicial and legal matters with a view to 
harmonizing their judicial and legal systems”.57 Each of the Partner States has 
national courts which delivers judgments that may need to be enforced and 
executed in another Partner State’s national jurisdiction. The EAC Treaty in 
Article 44 provides the legal framework for execution of EACJ judgments in the 
Partner States. However, the legal framework for execution of a Partner State 
55   Article 104 (1) of the EAC Treaty.
56   Misc. Appl. No. 1223 of 2007.
57   Article 126 (1) of the EAC Treaty.
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national judgment in the territory of another Partner State is a subject that is 
not dealt with by the Treaty. This issue depends on the national legal frame-
work for execution of foreign judgments.
Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania have Foreign Judgment Reciprocal Enforce-
ment Acts which permit judgments of each Partner State’s national court to 
be enforced and executed in another Partner State.58 The respective Acts of 
each country has designated the other countries as designated countries for 
purposes of foreign judgment reciprocal enforcement.
In Kenya, enforcement of foreign judgments is the subject of The Foreign 
Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act (Cap 43 of the Laws of Kenya). The 
objective of the Act is to make provision for enforcement of judgments given 
in countries outside Kenya which accord reciprocal treatment to judgments 
given in Kenya. Litigation on enforcement of foreign judgment has been con-
sidered in various cases in Kenya. In Intalframe Ltd—v- Mediterranean Shipping 
Company,59 it was held that the basic principle upon which neighbouring or 
other states provide enforcement of foreign judgments is one of reciprocity. 
(See also Ssebaggala & Sons Electric Centre Limited—v- Kenya National Shipping 
Lime Limited;60 Pioneer General Assurance Society Limited—v- Zilfikarali Nimji 
Javer;61 Societe de Transports International Rwanda—v- H. Abdi.62
In Jayesh Hasmukh Shah—v- Navin Haria & another,63 enforceability of a 
foreign judgment from non-designated country was considered. The appellant 
sought to enforce and execute in Kenya a judgment from Ethiopia which is not 
a designated country under the provisions of Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal 
Enforcement) Act (Cap 43 of the Laws of Kenya). The Kenya Court of Appeal 
held that in the absence of a reciprocal enforcement arrangement, a foreign 
judgment is enforceable in Kenya as a claim in common law. The common law 
principles on enforcement of foreign judgments were extensively elaborated 
in the case of Adams & Others—v- Cape Industrials PLC.64 Another relevant 
case law on enforceability of foreign judgment from a non-designated country 
is the Uganda case of Christopher Sales & Another—v- The Attorney Genera.65 
58   See Tanzania, The Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, Chapter 8 of the 
Laws of Tanzania; see Uganda Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act Chapter 9 
of the Laws of Uganda.
59   (1986) KLR.
60   (2000) LawAfrica LR 931.
61   (2006) eKLR.
62   Civil Application No. NAI 298 of 1997.
63   [2016] eKLR, Nairobi Civil Appeal No. 147 of 2009.
64   (1990) Ch. 433.
65   Uganda HCCC No. 91 of 2011.
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In this case, the Uganda High Court held that a foreign judgment from the 
United States of America (USA) was enforceable in Uganda despite the fact 
that the USA was not a designated country under the provisions of Uganda 
Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act (Cap 9, Laws of Uganda).
15.6 Conclusions and Recommendations
The emerging jurisprudence from the EACJ and the national courts of the 
Partner States depict a positive trend towards development of local jurispru-
dence in the interpretation and application of Community law. Most of the 
cases before the EACJ are premised on violation of EAC Treaty provisions par-
ticularly the Articles on good governance and rule of law. Through the craft of 
judicial interpretation, human rights litigation has found its way into the EACJ 
jurisdictional competence. It is observable that the EACJ is making positive 
contribution to Community jurisprudence on the rule of law, good governance 
and respect for human rights. The Court’s decisions play a role in putting the 
national governments of the Partner States under check and control. Likewise, 
the residents of the EAC Partner States have found a supranational forum at 
which they can ventilate grievances on violation of their fundamental rights 
and freedoms. The Bar Associations have also found an additional forum in 
which to practice and sharpen their advocacy skills. To this end, the EACJ plays 
a significant role in human resource capacity building on regional integration 
issues within the Community. The Court is incrementally institutionalizing 
the rule of law within the Community.
On trade liberalization, disputes on interpretation and application of the 
EAC Customs Management Act have rarely found their way before the EACJ. 
There is limited litigation before the Court on the EAC Trade Regime. The 
EACJ has received no single case on the EAC Customs Union. In 2008, Mordern 
Holdings—v- Kenya Ports Authority,66 filed a customs union reference case but 
the Court dismissed it for want of jurisdiction. The dismissal of this case by the 
Court for lack of jurisdiction was a big blow to the business community that 
has since shunned the Court.
In a majority of the cases before the EACJ, the applicants are natural persons 
or Bar Associations of the Partner States. Litigation by the business community 
or commercial corporate entities is very limited before the Court. There is need 
to encourage the private sector to be active before the Court. The limited par-
ticipation of the business community may be explained by the establishment 
66   Reference No. 1 of 2008.
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of parallel EAC Dispute Resolution Mechanisms (Quasi Judicial Bodies). Much 
as the EACJ is the main judicial organ of the Community, the EAC Partner States 
continue to establish other quasi-judicial bodies or mechanisms with the same 
mandate as the EACJ. The Customs Union and Common Market Protocols are 
an example where parallel mechanisms have been established with potentiali-
ties of making EACJ redundant or be a cause for conflicting decisions in the 
region.67 Under Article 54 (2) of the EAC Common Market Protocol, jurisdic-
tion to entertain Common Market related disputes has mainly been given to 
national courts and this undermines the EACJ.
From an administrative point of view, one of the challenges facing the 
EACJ is its intermittent and an ad-hoc nature. The EACJ does not have any 
continuous sittings; the court sits in sessions and this delays disposal of cases 
and hinders efficiency. The current work load of the EACJ does not require 
all the Judges to reside permanently in Arusha where the seat of the Court is 
located. However, it is recommended that when the work load of the Court 
increases, the possibility of continuous sitting should be explored. Another 
challenge is the reluctance of the Partner States to explicitly extend the juris-
diction of the EACJ to include human rights issues.
At the national level, disputes before the Partner States court are customs 
related and are founded on the EAC Customs Management Act. Rarely has an 
issue relating to interpretation and application of the EAC Treaty been consid-
ered for determination by the national courts. In most cases, the private sector 
is active as the applicants before the national courts. The active participation is 
due to enforcement of the EAC Customs Management Act by national Revenue 
Authorities as they collect revenue for their national governments. Time lag 
between the filing of complaint before the national court and the determina-
tion of the dispute is a factor that should be considered if dispute resolution 
before national courts can effectively contribute to regional integration.
67   The dispute resolution mechanism put in place by the EAC Customs Union Protocol is in 
Annex IX of the Protocol. See also the East African Committee on Trade Remedies estab-
lished under Article 24 of the EAC Customs Union Protocol.
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chapter 16
Harmonization in the EAC
Aleem Tharani
16.1 Introduction
Regional integration is a major development strategy for African countries who 
share the aim of continent-wide economic, social and cultural integration by 
2028. An important aspect of this is trade liberalization. This is to be achieved 
through regional free trade areas, progressing towards a customs union, a com-
mon market and ultimately monetary union. The East African Community 
(EAC) is a regional intergovernmental organisation of five Partner States, com-
prising Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda (the Partner States), 
headquartered in Arusha, Tanzania. The broad goal of the EAC is to widen and 
deepen cooperation among the Partner States. The EAC is one of eight regional 
economic communities recognised by the African Union (AU), and the only 
one that has a vision of the creation of a political federation within the EAC. 
This Chapter will look at how the EAC can use harmonisation to further inte-
gration by focusing on the energy sector.
It is well established that Africa is rich in resources, however, has poor infra-
structure. In the energy sector, while the EAC is focused on laying the ground-
work to ensure that energy and power are harnessed by all Partner States, what 
additionally will need to be harnessed is regional integration and the harmoni-
sation not only of policy but of laws. Harmonization is necessary in order to 
ensure that within the EAC, no deterrent Partner States that have not been on 
the strongest footing in terms of legislation and those Partner States tradition-
ally regarded as “legally safe” are both regarded equally.
16.2 The Rationale for Harmonization
There can be little doubt that the increase in inter-state trade promotes 
economic development and growth. In order to further economic growth, 
developed and developing countries alike have entered into relationships 
characterised by interdependence. This interdependence has prompted a 
move towards economic convergence and this is where the idea of regionalism 
originates; it is rooted in the observation that small and fragmented markets 
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hamper economic development and trade, and that economic development 
is measured, inter alia, by the ability of a country to create a good environ-
ment for the private sector. Regional integration arrangements are intended to 
pave the way towards the creation of larger regional markets. A larger market 
benefits the participating countries in that it enhances domestic competition, 
encourages economic diversification, increases return on investment, thereby 
attracting more investment.
Evidence from the harmonization of energy laws in other trade commu-
nities globally suggests that harmonization results in increased efficiency 
and approvals for the energy sector thereby cutting one or two years off the 
overall approval process (thereby allowing project development to occur 
quicker) and enhancing domestic GDP by upwards of 8%-10%.
There is a tremendous variation across East Africa in the legal framework 
and policy when the fundamentals of the energy industry and how a devel-
oper goes about exploration, project development, operations and decom-
missioning are considered. These variations, combined with the economic 
consequences of mismanagement of the sector create investment uncertainty. 
This investment uncertainty is increased by “inefficient and cumbersome” leg-
islation found in some East African States. Even if a potential investor (and a 
potential trader for that matter) is not deterred by the unfamiliarity or possible 
complexity of a foreign legal system, he may be loathed to invest in a state 
whose laws have not been brought up to date with the developments in eco-
nomic and international relations. Of course, once attracted, investor interests 
must be protected and each African state must have laws that provide such 
security to all investors.
Harmonization is also important to deal with global transboundary issues 
such as climate change. Climate change resulting from energy-related green-
house gas emissions is a global challenge without physical or geographical bor-
ders which pose various threats to vulnerable regions such as the EAC. The 
transboundary nature of climate change and its effects necessitates regulatory 
action in the form of harmonized law and policy responses among the EAC 
Partner States. The role of the energy sector in climate change mitigation in 
developing regions such as the EAC pertains to a shift from overtly fossil fuel-
based energy sectors to more renewable energy sources. The energy sector 
reforms needed to achieve this transition to a low carbon economy based on 
less carbon-intensive energy sources should be regulated in terms of harmo-
nized sub-regional law and policy.
Many African countries already have institutions, legislations and regu-
lations which allowed interconnection and electricity market. Benchmark 
national legislation and best practices identified represent good examples for 
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less advanced countries, regarding the different framework conditions, for 
cooperation and harmonization. The power sector of the Sub-Saharan coun-
tries, with the exception of South Africa, is comprised of relatively small 
systems which are characterized by technical, operational and financial prob-
lems. The creation of regional markets is essential for creating the environ-
ment to attract the needed (funds) capital, technology and expertise to help 
fix the challenges of the electricity deficit. Many countries under perform in 
rate and level of electricity access, because of weak means and also due to a 
lack of policies, poor enabling environment for private sector investments, and 
institutions for development and roll-out of related programmes, in particular 
through innovative ways, including renewable energy and mini-grid solutions. 
Despite a large number of best practices, there are a range of remaining barri-
ers hindering the development and access to modern and sustainable energy 
services on the continent, including: low levels and lack of effective policy, reg-
ulatory and institutional frameworks; unattractive energy market to potential 
investors due to high investment costs and low technical skills and implemen-
tation capacity, amongst others.
Harmonization is not only a public sector led initiative. The role of the pri-
vate sector in African regional integration (which has to date been largely in 
the hands of governments and non-governmental organisations) is gradually 
increasing. Apart from its contribution to policymaking and advice to govern-
ments, the private sector can participate in the implementation of regional 
projects and provide financial and human resources, spread of expertise, 
and technological and management knowledge. It can also contribute to 
production of goods, job creation and increased market size and cross- 
border investment. The harmonization of legal regimes improves the capac-
ity of states to coordinate their economic policies. If harmonization of laws 
is extended beyond the coordination of economic policies to include substan-
tive business laws among Partner States, individual traders will be encouraged, 
but so will potential investors who will have the needed assurance that they 
will be familiar with the legal procedure and consequences. Every investor, 
creditor or trader wants to be aware of the risks inherent in the undertaken 
commercial transaction. Where the content and effect of legal rights and obli-
gations are more predictable, the legal risks and thus the transaction costs are 
reduced.
Regional harmonization is a necessary corollary to the overall aim to pro-
mote trade and investment and increase economic growth. In order to make 
the process of regional integration meaningful, traders and investors must be 
given the opportunity to avoid the doldrums of legal diversity, they must 
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be allowed to rely on laws which are in line with the realities of business prac-
tice and which are up to date with international standards. This should involve 
the harmonization of domestic substantive legal provisions. What remains for 
East African states is to find the most appropriate method by which such har-
monization would take place.
16.3 EAC Approach to Integration and Harmonization in the  
Energy Sector
Co-operation in the energy sector among the Partner States is governed by 
Article 101 of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community 
(the Treaty).
Article 101 of the Treaty provides that the Partner States shall adopt poli-
cies and mechanisms to promote the efficient exploitation, development, joint 
research and utilisation of various energy resources available within the region 
and shall in particular promote within the Community:
1. the least cost development and transmission of electric power, effi-
cient exploration and exploitation of fossil fuels and utilisation of 
new and renewable energy sources;
2. the joint planning, training and research in, and the exchange of 
information on the exploration, exploitation, development and 
utilisation of available energy resources,
3. the development of integrated policy on rural electrification,
4. the development of inter-Partner State electrical grid inter-
connections,
5. the construction of oil and gas pipelines, and
6. all such other measures to supply affordable energy to their people 
taking cognisance of the protection of the environment as provided 
for by this Treaty.
In order to achieve the Article 101 objectives, the sector has been organised into 
three sub-sectors, namely:
1. Power (including transmission and interconnectivity);




16.3.1 The Power Sector
The following have been identified as the key harmonization objectives for the 
Power sub-sector:
1. Cooperation on power sector issues of regional interest;
2. Development of regional interconnections;
3. Joint development of power projects for regional benefit;
4. Development of regional power markets; and
5. Exchange of technical and strategic information.
In order to foster power system interconnectivity by the Heads of States of the 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) region, a special-
ised institution named the Eastern Africa Power Pool (the EAPP) was estab-
lished in 2005 with the signing of an Inter-Governmental Memorandum of 
Understanding (IGMOU) by seven Eastern Africa countries, namely: Burundi, 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda and 
Sudan. Since the IGMOU, Tanzania, Libya and Uganda have also joined the 
EAPP.
The main objective of the EAPP is the optimum development of energy 
resources in the region and to ease the access to electricity power supply to all 
people of the countries in the Eastern Africa region through regional power 
interconnections. The EAPP has also been formed to achieve the following 
goals:
1. To be a framework for pooling energy resources, promoting power 
exchanges between utilities in Eastern Africa and reduce power sup-
ply costs based on an integrated master plan and pre-established 
rules (Grid code);
2. Optimize the usage of energy resources available in the region by 
working out regional investment schemes in Power Generation, 
Transmission and Distribution;
3. Reduce electricity cost in the region by using power systems inter-
connection and increasing power exchanges between countries; 
and
4. Provide efficient co-ordination between various initiatives taken in 
the fields of power production, transmission as well as exchanges 
in the region.
Well on its ways to achieving its objectives, the EAPP has so far:
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1. Together with the EAC, developed a Regional Power Master Plan 
and Interconnection Code that will allow the EAC and EAPP to 
identify sources of cheap electricity from ten Eastern Africa coun-
tries that the EAC could use to interconnect to and complement the 
development of locally available resources; and
2. Developed a gap analysis tool to assist member country power util-
ity companies to assess their compliance to the Interconnection 
Code. This is useful to member countries because the complete 
interconnectivity of the East African region is scheduled for the end 
of 2017 and in readiness for this, all power utility companies in the 
EAC and are working closely to be fully compliant to the Intercon-
nection Code.
In addition to the work of the EAPP, the EAC works closely with other regional 
organisations in promoting regional projects and programmes. The aim of 
these projects, as with the EAPP is regional interconnection through the estab-
lishment of transmission lines in order to facilitate a vibrant regional power 
trade. In this regard, the EAC energy department works closely with the Nile 
Equatorial Lakes Subsidiary Action Programme, the Eastern Africa Power Pool, 
the Energy for Great Lakes and neighbouring Regional Economic Communities 
in collaboration with development partners.
One additional initiative of the EAC worth mentioning is the development 
of a cross-border electrification programme. This programme enables border 
towns to connect from the neighbouring Partner State at the distribution volt-
age when it is more economical than connecting with the grid within its own 
country. This initiative hopes to increase access in a cost effective manner. The 
EAC Cross-Border Electrification Policy governs the implementation of this 
programme as well as development of shared renewable energy resources such 
as small hydro power projects.
16.3.2 Renewable Energy
The objective of the EAC for the New and Renewable Energy Sources, Energy 
Conservation and Energy Efficiency sub-sector is to increase the deployment 
of renewable energy and the adoption of energy conservation and energy effi-
ciency practices. Specific objectives include:
1. To promote development of New and Renewable Energy Sources;
2. To initiate programmes on Energy Conservation and Energy 
Efficiency;
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3. To develop a comprehensive energy conservation and efficiency 
strategy and plan; and
4. To develop a Renewable Energy Master Plan.
The following initiatives have been adopted to meet the above objectives:
1. Regional Strategy on Scaling-Up Access to Modern Energy Services
2. Technical Capacity Building for Small Hydropower projects
3. Establishment of the East Africa Centre for Renewable Energy and 
Energy Efficiency
To achieve its objectives and contribute towards increased access to modern, 
affordable and reliable energy services, in March 2014, the Sectoral Council 
on Energy approved the Project Document for the Establishment of the EAC 
Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (EACREEE). EACREEE is 
expected to be operational by end of 2016.
16.3.3 Fossil Fuels
In order to facilitate the provision of efficient and reliable delivery of oil prod-
ucts throughout the region, a Regional Strategy on development of regional 
refineries was developed. It addresses all aspects of petroleum distribution sys-
tems in the region, including refineries and storage facilities in a holistic way 
in order to improve its effectiveness and efficiency. The Strategy reveals the 
clear interdependence between various forms of infrastructure in the delivery 
of petroleum products. Key recommendations for the strategy include:
1. The development a new refinery in Uganda in order for the oil 
already discovered in Uganda to benefit the region financially;
2. The acceleration of planned upgrading of the Mombasa refinery; 
and
3. The improvement in the handling, transportation, storage and dis-
tribution facilities in the region for efficient and economic distribu-
tion of petroleum products.
Important discoveries made in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda are expected to 
enhance the resource potential for the region towards energy self-sufficiency. 
This has resulted in the scaling up of regional exploration efforts in the oil and 
gas sector.
The EAC has identified priority oil and gas pipeline projects as follows:
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1. Crude oil pipeline: Feasibility studies for a crude oil pipeline to 
transport crude oil from the Albertine Graben to the Indian Ocean 
for export have been completed. In addition, networks of crude oil 
pipelines which will transport crude oil from oil fields in the EAC to 
the refinery are currently under development. Also in development 
is an oil products pipeline from the refinery to Kampala, Uganda 
which will facilitate delivery to the market.
2. Upgrading existing oil products pipeline: The existing pipeline sys-
tem runs from the Mombasa port to Eldoret and Kisumu in Western 
Kenya. The upgrade project covers construction of a new pipeline 
from Mombasa to Nairobi and between Sinendat and Kisumu as 
capacity enhancement for the Eldoret depot. These projects will 
contribute to planned expansion to other EAC Partner States and 
other countries that rely on the region for their petroleum imports. 
Further information on the development of the pipeline can be 
found on the Kenya Power (KPLC) website.
3. Kenya—Uganda—Rwanda—Burundi oil products pipeline: Feasi-
bility studies and tender documents for the extension of the exist-
ing oil products pipeline from Kenya to Uganda and Rwanda have 
been completed and resources for EPC contracting are being mobil-
ised. Procurement for consultancy services to carry out feasibility 
study for extension from Rwanda to Burundi is ongoing. The project 
sections include Eldoret (Kenya)—Kampala (Uganda), Kampala—
Kigali (Rwanda) and Kigali—Bujumbura (Burundi). In addition, an 
oil products pipeline will link a new refinery in Hoima (Uganda) to 
Kampala making it a hub for refined oil products from the discover-
ies in the Albertine Graben for distribution in the region through 
the planned pipeline network. These projects will facilitate effi-
cient, safe, cost-effective and environmentally-friendly distribution 
of the oil products.
4. Proposed Uganda—Tanzania oil products pipeline: EAC plans to 
link all its Partner States to the planned refinery development in 
Hoima, Uganda. It is in this context that an oil products pipeline 
is planned from Mbarara (Uganda) to Mwanza, Isaka and Dar es 
Salaam (Tanzania). The planned pipeline system from Kampala 
(Uganda) to Kigali (Rwanda) and Bujumbura (Burundi) will cre-
ate a major depot in Mbarara (Uganda). The planned pipeline to 
Tanzania is proposed to start from this depot. Resources are being 
mobilised to carry out a feasibility study on the project.
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16.4 Harmonisation in the Energy Sector from an EAC Perspective: 
Progress and Challenges
The EAC faces several challenges in achieving its development vision. Energy 
has been recognised as one of the key elements in achieving this vision. Lack 
of electrical and motive power means that a majority of the population cannot 
participate in economic and social activities to improve their standards of liv-
ing. Access to clean, affordable, and reliable energy has a profound bearing on 
living standards and human wellbeing. It is therefore necessary to move away 
from the ‘business-as-usual’ scenario to a more determined energy services 
driven approach that addresses some of the key barriers that hinder increased 
access to modern energy services.
An argument has also been made in favour of EAC Partner States entering 
into a multi-lateral investment treaty with a focus on trade and investment in 
energy. A number of factors combine in varying degrees to make a cooperative 
approach toward the harnessing of resources (and, therefore, policies) for sus-
tainable energy development in the EAC. These include the underdevelopment 
and uneven distribution of energy resources across the region; the landlocked 
position of Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi and the consequent difficulties of 
importing commercial energy; the poverty of the consumers and a small sized 
market; the poor development of commercial energy infrastructure; and the 
lack of skilled technical expertise in the region. The guiding principles for 
investment regulation/liberalization towards a regional investment agreement 
for the EAC can be similar to those of the OECD’s multilateral agreement, which 
have been described as follows: (1) Promoting a more secure, predictable, and 
transparent environment in which to plan and operate cross-border invest-
ments; (2) Ensuring greater protection for investors and their investments; 
(3) Promoting the progressive liberalization of barriers restricting the entry 
and conduct of foreign firms in domestic markets; (4) Reducing or eliminat-
ing measures that distort trade and investment decisions and reduce allocative 
efficiency; (5) Developing credible institutions and rules for solving potential 
disputes; (6) Ensuring adequate consideration for environmental issues, core 
labour standards and other related issues; and (7) Ensuring that the relation-
ship between the agreement and other related international instruments is 
clarified. By providing greater predictability, transparency and legal security 
for investors, a regional investment agreement would have the added benefit 
of attracting more foreign direct investment in the region.
Although some progress has been made in achieving harmonisation, sub-
stantial challenges remain which are not specific to the energy sector. These 
include:
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1. The original EAC is a regional intergovernmental organisation that 
dates back to 1917 and collapsed in 1977 due to various political 
and economic reasons. The present EAC was established in 2000 
with the aim of become an economic area (including customs and 
monetary unions, with harmonized macroeconomic policies, and 
ultimately a political federation). However, no overall timetable has 
been established for this process. EAC Partner States are yet to fully 
implement some of the provisions within the legal framework of 
the EAC, such as the harmonization of customs procedures, other 
duties and charges on imports, internal indirect taxes and fees on 
production.
2. Differences in implementation capacity among the various EAC 
Partner States has also affected the ability to fully implement the 
EAC Treaty into national law.
3. Membership in multiple trade agreements has also proved prob-
lematic from a harmonization and integration perspective. Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda participate in different regional trade agree-
ments. For instance, Kenya and Uganda are members of the COMESA 
while Tanzania is a member of the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) and a signatory to the Agreement on the Global 
System of Trade Preferences among Developing Countries (GSTP). 
Tanzania is also considering re-entering COMESA after its with-
drawal in 2000. While each country is free under the provisions of 
the EAC to negotiate bilateral agreements provided they notify the 
other two members, in practice, overlapping membership has cre-
ated problems. For instance, the agreements use different types of 
rules of origin, i.e. the criteria used to define where a product was 
made to determine whether it is eligible to benefit from liberalised 
trade within a regional trade agreement. The terms of entry of goods 
into the EAC can also vary for different importing countries since 
SADC and COMESA are governed by different protocols of trade.
From an energy sector perspective, the following observations can be made 
around harmonisation and integration:
1. EAC Partner States have more or less the same development and 
energy needs, with few disparities in the levels of each. What is 
required to achieve sustainable development in one country is not 
very different from what is required in another. For energy supply to 
be dependable enough to foster sustainable economic development 
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in the EAC, there should be an effective and unified energy pol-
icy in place. This is lacking in the EAC. Each country has its own 
approaches to energy trade and investment. These, however, are 
neither effective nor uniform. Each country operates alone and 
the results do not promote economic development. It is of para-
mount importance, therefore, that the EAC puts in place a viable 
and harmonized energy policy, which will address the problems of 
trade and investment in sustainable energy. Harmonized and well 
thought out strategies will go a long way to promote sustainable 
development in the EAC
2. There is a further need amongst the EAC Partner States to harmo-
nize the investment climate in the energy sector and thereby pro-
mote foreign investment in the energy sector. Measures are required 
to be taken in respect of expanding and upgrading the energy infra-
structure; promoting energy efficiency and conservation; mobilis-
ing requisite financial resources for the operation and expansion 
of energy services consistent with rising demands; ensuring secu-
rity of supply through diversification of sources and mixes in a cost 
effective manner; increasing accessibility to all sectors of the popu-
lation; and improving corporate governance and accountability.
3. The divergence in energy related policies across the EAC has 
resulted in different standards of bankability being applied across 
the EAC Partner States thereby requiring investors to undertake 
detailed due diligence in respect of various issues across the EAC 
Partner States. The impact of this is that invariably, investors end 
up favouring one jurisdiction over another for purposes of invest-
ing in different segments of the energy sector. An example of such 
varying bankability thresholds is nowhere more evident than in the 
power sector. The potential of the power sector to be the driving 
force behind economic growth for each EAC Partner State cannot 
be disputed. The Eastern Africa region has more than 15,000MW 
of geothermal power potential, located primarily in the Rift Valley 
areas. The untapped energy potential for the latter is estimated at 
more than 7,000MW of electric power. Notwithstanding this, geo-
thermal energy is currently under-exploited due to a number of 
challenges, including: (i) lack of an enabling policy, legal and reg-
ulatory framework that would attract investment into the region; 
(ii) colossal start-up investment outlays for geothermal explo-
ration and development; and (iii) risks inherent with resource 
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exploration and power development projects. In terms of the dis-
parity between EAC Partner States in harnessing and exploiting 
this potential one need only look at the varying fortunes of the 
national offtakers in Kenya and Tanzania. The electricity sector in 
Tanzania is dominated by the Tanzania Electric Supply Company 
Limited (TANESCO) in a vertically integrated market structure car-
rying out generation, transmission, distribution and supply. In 1992, 
the Tanzania National Energy Policy ended the monopoly held by 
the public utility and allowed private sector involvement in the 
electricity industry. Although opportunities for economic growth 
are created by Tanzania’s approximately US$75 billion gas reserves, 
it is widely accepted that any TANESCO power purchase agreement 
(PPA) may be difficult to bank and any greenfield independent 
power producer (IPP) project will need government support in the 
form of a sovereign guarantee for all TANESCO payments under the 
PPA. By contrast, the Kenyan IPP market, which was unbundled in 
the mid-2000s, has largely moved away from any requirement for 
a government guarantee to backstop offtaker payments under the 
PPA. KPLC’s ability to build this internal capacity and balance sheet 
strength is largely seen to have resulted from the 2007 unbundling. 
Besides being responsible for system operations, KPLC was man-
dated to prepare long-term generation plans (under the supervi-
sion of the regulator) and to procure new generation capacity from 
either Kenya Electricity (KenGen) or IPPs. Initially, KPLC relied on 
transaction advisers but has over time become an effective inde-
pendent entity capable of running competitive international ten-
ders and negotiating contracts with winning bidders.
4. Notwithstanding point 3 above, there are areas of common diffi-
culties experienced amongst the EAC Partner States. Several studies 
have concluded that the biggest impediment to regional and intra-
Africa trade is poor infrastructure, both in terms of missing links in 
existing regional networks and inadequate maintenance of existing 
infrastructure. The supply-side constraints include poor transport 
infrastructure, logistical problems, energy deficit, poor access to 
ICT, and water scarcity. Sustainable infrastructure will help remove 
those constraints and enhance trade. The focus on infrastructure is 
also consistent with continental initiatives. The financing needs of 
infrastructure development in Africa are huge. For example, weak 
power transmission and distribution infrastructure is due to limited 
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investments in power system upgrading. The economies, therefore, 
experience high electrical power system losses, extreme voltage 
fluctuations and intermittent power outages that cause equipment 
and material damage and losses in production. The low level of 
electricity access explains the need for sustainable energy invest-
ment projects. The energy policies and legislation for EAC countries 
are supposed to respond to these challenges. Yet, much as these 
policies and legislation have been in place for some time, the chal-
lenges continue. To achieve sustainable development, the strong 
points of each policy, strategy and law should be put together and 
weak points dropped, to form a single unified energy policy, as well 
as strategies and legislation for the EAC.
The disparity in investment terms is also evident in the oil and gas sector 
where no EAC model form exploration law or production sharing agree-
ment has been put into place. The existing upstream exploration regime 
between EAC Partner States differs significantly. For example:
each jurisdiction applies differing models in respect of matters such 
as signature bonuses, royalties as well as the applicable formula for 
production sharing;
differing rates of income tax apply to contractors across the different 
jurisdictions (Kenya: The income tax rate for branches is 37.5% (rather 
than 30% for resident companies); Tanzania: 10% of profits deemed to be 
repatriated; and Uganda: 15% of profits deemed to be repatriated); and
each country also applies different requirements in respect of local 
content requirements in the extractives industry.
16.5 Conclusion
The benefits of a regional approach to energy access have been well articu-
lated. The potential economic benefits of a harmonized approach to legisla-
tion in this sector can have a domino effect that results in greater and large 
investments, which then results in positive economic benefits, which in turn 
has the potential to lead to better regulation, increased monitoring especially 
of environmental impacts and greater ownership by Partner States in the 
future of resources that they have been privileged to be entrusted with.
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